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Résumé 
Ce mémoire analyse trois réformes majeures de politique sociale en Turquie, en deux 
domaines: emploi et sécurité social. En utilisant l'approche "Usage de l'Europe", cette thèse 
developpe une analyse empirique et apporte une explication théorique de ces changements qui 
ont été introduits au cours du processus d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne. 
 
"Les usages de l'Europe" est une approche d'européanisation qui se concentre sur le rôle des 
acteurs domestiques, au sein des États membres et candidats, ainsi que de leur utilisation des 
ressources de l'Union européenne. Les études de cas utilisées dans cette thèse démontrent 
l'introduction de changements au niveau de l'État-providence; ainsi, l'approche originelle est 
suppléée par des concepts provenant de la littérature sur la politique partisane, les institutions 
formelles et l'héritage des politiques. 
 
Cette recherche utilise la méthode de l'analyse de processus pour suivre la réforme des 
règlements du travail par la voie de reconstitution des droits individuels des travailleurs et de 
l'Agence d'emploi en Turquie jusqu'en 2003, ainsi que la transformation du système de 
sécurité sociale en 2008. Ces trois réformes représentent des changements majeurs tant sur le 
plan institutionnel que politique en Turquie depuis 2001. Afin de comprendre "les usages de 
l'Europe" dans ces réformes politiques, l'analyse empirique questionne, si, quand et comment 
les acteurs turcs ont utilisé les ressources, les références et les développements politiques de 
l'Union européenne lors de ce processus dynamique de réforme. 
 
Les réformes du système de sécurité sociale, des règlements du travail, en plus de la 
reconstitution de l'Agence d'emploi étaient à l'agenda politique en Turquie depuis les années 
1990. La réforme des règlements du travail ont entraîné l'introduction des accommodements 
flexibles au travail et une révision de la Loi du travail permettant l'établissement d'une 
législation de la sécurité d'emploi. La reconstitution de l'Agence d'emploi visait à remplacer la 
vieille institution défunte par une institution moderne afin d'introduire des politiques 
d'activation. La réforme de sécurité sociale comprend les pensions de retraite, le système de 
santé ainsi que l'administration des institutions de sécurité sociale. 
 
Les principaux résultats révèlent que la provision des ressources de l'Union européenne en 
Turquie a augmenté à partir de la reconnaissance de sa candidature en 1999 et ce, depuis 
lancement des négociations pour son adhésion en 2005; ce qui fut une occasion favorable pour 
les acteurs domestiques impliqués dans les réformes. Cependant, à l'encontre de certaines 
attentes originelles de l'approche de "les usages de l'Europe", les résultats de cette recherche 
démontrent que le temps et le type de "les usages de l'Europe" dépendent des intérêts des 
acteurs domestiques, ainsi de leurs stratégies tout au long de ce processus de réforme, plutôt 
que des phases du processus ou la quantité des ressources fournies par l'Union européenne. 
 
Mots-clés : Usages de l’Europe, Les réformes des politiques sociales, Européanisation, 
Institutions du marché du travail, Régimes des pensions, Sytème de santé, Protection sociale, 
Turquie, État providence 
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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses three major social policy reforms in Turkey in two policy domains: 
employment and social security. By adopting the Uses of Europe theoretical approach, it aims 
to analyze empirically and to explain theoretically the uses of Europe in two domains of social 
policy during the EU membership process in Turkey. Uses of Europe is an actor-centered 
approach to Europeanization that focuses on the role of national actors, in member and 
candidate states, and their use of EU resources. The case studies in this thesis involve welfare 
state changes. Thus the original approach is complemented by concepts from the welfare state 
literature on formal institutions, partisan politics and policy legacies.  
 
This research uses a process-tracing methodology to follow the reform of labor regulations on 
individual labor rights, restructuring of the Turkish employment agency up through 2003 and 
the transformation of the social security system by 2008. Both represent major institutional 
and policy changes in the post-2001 period in Turkey. In order to understand the uses Europe 
in these policy reforms, the empirical analysis asks whether, where, and how Turkish actors 
were using EU resources, references and policy developments within the dynamic processes of 
reform.  
 
The reforms of the social security system, labor regulation and the restructuring of the 
employment agency have been on the agenda in Turkey since the mid-1990’s. The reform of 
labor regulations involved the introduction of flexible work arrangements and job security 
legislation into a revised Labor Act. The restructuring of the employment agency aimed to 
replace the old institution that had become defunct with a modern institution oriented towards 
active labor market policies. The social security reform comprising pension, healthcare and 
administrative components aimed to ensure financial sustainability and increase the coverage 
of the system.  
 
The main findings were that the supply of EU resources in Turkey increased from the 
recognition of its candidate status in 1999 to the launch of accession negotiations in 2005.  
This supply offered opportunities for national actors involved in the reform processes, via 
legitimizing uses of Europe, obfuscation and credit claiming, among other practices. However 
in contrast to some of the expectations of the original Uses of Europe approach, the findings of 
this research demonstrate that the type and timing of uses of Europe depend on the national 
actors’ interests and coalition-building strategies in the reform process rather than on the stage 
of the reform process or amount of resources supplied by the European Union.  
 
Keywords: Uses of Europe, Social Policy Reforms, Europeanization, Labor Market 
Institutions, Pension Sytem, Healthcare, Social Protection, Turkey, Welfare State and Regime 
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Introduction 
 
After residing for close to 10 years in Canada, I had a surprising phone call from my parents 
living in Istanbul, Turkey just before finalizing the conclusion for this dissertation. There was 
a letter addressed to me from the Social Security Institution, sent to my parents’ address and 
inquiring about my employment status and income level. The letter also contained a 
calculation of the social security premiums that I had failed to pay in the last two years. The 
Social Security Institution asked for a proof of income and working status, adding that if I 
would like to benefit from the means-tested coverage for social security, I would need to apply 
to the local administration to obtain a proof of low income. In case of not providing this proof, 
I would have to pay the social security premiums for healthcare coverage and social security 
benefits.  
I had a moment of bewilderment after my father summarized the content of the letter. I 
had never heard, either from my friends or from members of my family, about the Turkish 
state’s investigation into payment of the social security premiums in a similar way. Moreover, 
although I had been registered with the previous social security institution (having been 
employed in student jobs during my university years in Turkey), that institution could not 
generate a proof of registration when I applied in 2006. My father who as businessman is 
knowledgeable about the rules and procedures of the social security system including the 
recent changes was also surprised by the letter, which provided unusually accurate 
information.  
This brief anecdote made me think about the main issue of my doctoral dissertation: 
changes to the social policy framework in Turkey. Perhaps this letter was just a minor 
reflection of the extent of changes, both in institutions and practices.  
This dissertation is about social policy reforms in Turkey, analyzing the extent of 
policy and institutional changes by focusing on the interaction of domestic dynamics, 
international pressures and European Union (EU) influence and resources. It examines two 
  2 
policy areas in particular: employment and social security.1 
The 1990s brought extensive reform of the social protection systems in advanced 
industrialized countries as well as in many developing countries. Economic changes, such as 
globalization and economic internationalization, put pressure on governments to control public 
finances and to reduce budgetary deficits in the context of increasing competition. The social 
policy framework in Turkey did not escape from these economic pressures and has also been 
challenged by profound social and demographic changes. An important element of this 
changing context is related to Turkey’s encounter with economic globalization since the 
1980’s with the shift towards an export-oriented economy and the financial liberalization of 
capital accounts in 1989.2 The adoption of a market-oriented economic strategy by the 
political elite in conformity with global trends undermined the welfare state’s capacity and the 
patchy institutional framework of social security (Buğra and Candaş, 2011; Aybars and 
Tsarouhas, 2010; Eder, 2010; Pamuk, 2008; Öniş and Bakır, 2007). Yet, despite the labor 
market and welfare state in Turkey being under economic pressure and challenged by social 
and demographic changes, the formal social security system – including pensions, healthcare – 
and labor regulation displayed considerable resiliency in terms of institutional shape and 
principles through the 1990s. It remained faithful to the principles established in the late 
1970’s. Although the structural modernization reforms of the social security institutions and 
labor regulations had been on the agenda since the mid-1990’s, any major institutional 
                                                 
1 Social policy is complex, encompassing directly government policies in health care, education, social security, 
housing, social assitance and including indirectly economic, fiscal, labor-market and family policies (Taylor-
Gooby, 2003: 539). It is more difficult to distinguish social policies from economic ones in developing countries, 
as any program can serve for both spheres in terms of goals (Gough, 2000: 14). This research focuses on social 
policies that mitigate life-cycle and market risks in Turkey. Social security system provides coverage against 
risks of sickness, work related injury, disability and old-age. This research encompasses the policy sector of labor 
regulation considering it as an instrument of income security against market risks as a form of social policy in the 
light of Guiliano Bonoli’s (2003) crucial contribution. Employment policy consists of “laws and conventions that 
establish the rights and entitlements of workers and structure the work relationship” and policies “to protect and 
promote employment more generally” (Rhodes, 2005: 280). Empirically the reforms of pensions, healthcare, 
social security administration, labor regulation and the establishment of the employment agency were among 
major social policy changes in Turkey in the post-2001 period. 
2 As later chapters will elaborate, the opening of the Turkish economy started in 1980’s, following the major 
crisis of the previous model of import-substitution industrialization in the late 1970s and the coup d’État of 
September 12, 1980 that brought to power the military government which initiated the shift in economic and 
development strategy (Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 1990; Öniş and Webb, 1994; Boratav, Yeldan and Köse, 2000).  
  3 
restructuring and policy changes were introduced only after 2001.3 To appreciate these 
changes to the welfare regime in Turkey, it is crucial to understand the domestic and 
international dynamics shaping them. The opening to global economic forces was not the only 
major change that occurred at the beginning of the new millennium. The presence of a 
majority government in 2002 – after years of minority governments – was an important 
political factor bringing change. An additional aspect of the post-2001 period in Turkey was 
the EU membership process, which created a catalyst for change in the political and economic 
realms in Turkey with the recognition of candidate status in 1999.  
This thesis studies the reform of labor law and the restructuring of employment agency 
in 2003 and the transformation of the social security system in 2008. The main argument is 
that the explanation of social policy change and redesign in Turkey requires examining the 
effects of endogenous and exogenous factors and the way that they were combined in the 
reform processes.  
One key question is why the reform of labor regulation was possible only in 2003, 
despite having been debated among government, bureaucratic and corporate actors since 
1995? How can we explain the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş 
Kurumu, İŞKUR) only in 2003, despite a certain consensus by the mid-1990’s that the 
previous employment agency had become defunct? Why was the social security system 
reformed only in 2008 even though that the ministerial bureaucracy,4 the State Planning 
Organization and the Treasury had been identifying the problems of the social protection 
regime and had prepared several reform programs with the input of various international 
organizations such the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and World Bank since the 
                                                 
3 In this dissertation, the year 2001 is identified as a start of a new period where several important domestic 
developments occurred, changing the political context compared to the 1990’s. On the one hand, the economic 
crisis of 2001 represents the most severe economic crisis in terms shrinking of the economy and rising 
unemployment (Pamuk, 2008: 286-290). Following the financial crisis in 2001, Kemal Derviş, the World Bank 
vice-president for poverty reduction and economic management, was appointed Minister for the Treasury and 
Economic Affairs and introduced the economic reform program in 2001 that included major structural reforms 
and a new stand-by agreement with the IMF. Following the 2002 election, Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) won the 2002 parliamentary with 34.3 per cent of votes and two-thirds of 550 
parliamentary seats, thereby establishing the first majority government since 1991. This was a major change 
compared to the coalition governments of 1990’s. Even though that EU recognized Turkey’s candidate status in 
1999, the EU’s emphasis on necessary political reforms increased in 2001 with the preparation of the first 
Accession Partnership Document.  
4 This includes the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of Health with related sub-units.  
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1990’s? These questions regarding the timing of the reforms call for a theoretical approach 
that can explain their occurrence after 2001. This approach is one that combines attention to 
international factors (globalization and the European accession process) and domestic ones.  
 The reforms of the social security system, labor regulation and the restructuring of the 
employment agency have been on the agenda in Turkey since the mid-1990’s (Boratav and 
Özuğurlu, 2006; Yakut-Çakar, 2007).5 The corporatist social security system, based on 
contributions by employees and employers, had been financially unsustainable due to an early 
retirement scheme (1992) introduced by populist policies of governments in the 1990’s and 
has been considered as a burden in terms of increasing the public debt. The Five Year Plans 
prepared by the State Planning Organization had already insisted in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s that the restructuring of the health care system was necessary for the expansion of 
insurance coverage to larger segments of the population in order to increase the efficiency of 
the system and increase the funds for health sector. Reform proposals for the healthcare 
system were prepared in 1990’s but they were never implemented, either being dropped from 
parliament’s agenda or rejected by the Constitutional Court. The first reform program of the 
pension regime was prepared in 1994 as a part of the austerity measures after the first severe 
economic crisis of the 1990’s but never fully implemented in the face of strong opposition of 
union confederations. During the 1990’s, the ILO, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank urged the Turkish governments to make urgent reforms in order to control the 
deficit and ensure the sustainability of the social security system (Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 117). 
The IMF had also been demanding the reform of the pension component since 1994, as part of 
stand-by agreements.  
In the second policy realm, we observe that the 1971 Labor Act6 (no. 1475) stayed in 
force for more than three decades reflecting the inclusionary state corporatism and union 
confederations whose interest lay in the maintenance of the formal social security system 
complemented with the goal of securing employment with related benefits (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 
1992: 720). This stability was present despite the existence of a dual labor market in Turkey, 
                                                 
5 Ömer Taşpinar (2012) characterizes the 1990’s in Turkey as the “lost decade,” characterized by high inflation, 
structural budget deficits, chronic financial crisis and constant political instability. 
6 This legislation covered the main components and limitations of labor rights, such as the form of labor 
contracts, the payment of wages, working hours, rest days, annual paid leave, the protection of children and 
pregnant women, workers’ compensation and work rules. 
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in which the formal sector gave workers legal protections but where a large informal sector 
existed without protection.  
The normative assumption and logic of the Labor Code covered the formal sector and 
reflected male breadwinner assumptions in regulating work arrangements, targeting mainly 
male industrial workers in urban settings in terms of designing full-time work, without 
allowing a-typical types of work, part-time work or social protection for these types of 
contracts. The reform of the Labor Code has also been called for by the ILO and World Bank. 
Moreover the World Bank had targeted for restructuring the Turkish Job Placement Agency 
(İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu, İİBK) since the launch of its “Employment and Training Project” in 
1994.  
How can we explain that the transformation of the frozen social policy environment in 
Turkey happened in the 2000’s rather than in 1990’s? The reform of the labor law with the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency in 2003 and the restructuring of the social 
security institutions in 2008 have occurred in the post-2001 period where the EU membership 
has become a more salient factor in Turkish politics. What, then, was the impact of 
Europeanization on the reform process?  
These reforms constitute a theoretical and empirical puzzle to explain how various 
domestic dynamics, EU membership process and international factors have intersected in 
understanding the timing and the direction of these changes.  
The content of these reforms represents change of the institutions and policies that 
need to be theoretically explained. Concerning the reform of the Labor Law in 2003, the 
reform has introduced “flexible” working arrangements, job security measures, extension of 
maternity leave and removal of certain legal barriers on women’s participation to the labor 
market. These changes seemed to seek a balance between the concerns of union 
confederations and the pressure of employers. With the restructuring in 2003, the Turkish 
Employment Agency (İŞKUR) became more oriented towards active labor market policies in 
line with the EU acquis and the priorities of the European Employment Strategy. In the social 
security reform introduced in 2008, the administrative reform involved the unification of 
social security institutions under one organization and the equalization of coverage between 
different occupational groups. Considering the inegalitarian corporatist character of the 
welfare regime in Turkey (Yakut-Çakar, 2007), this change involved an orientation towards 
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coverage of more categories and groups in terms of pension and healthcare. The healthcare 
reform has also involved a tendency towards universal coverage: by including all segments of 
the population in the health insurance scheme; by covering the population under the age of 18, 
whose premiums would becovered; and by institutionalizing mean-tested coverage for the 
poor. Although the reform has extended the coverage, there are also tendencies to introduce 
market elements in the delivery of services by encouraging private sector investment, allowing 
choices for patients and introducing competition between public and private actors in the 
healthcare system. The most controversial component of the social security reform involved 
changes to the pension system, which altered the parameters of the system by increasing the 
retirement age and contribution period, with the aim of reducing the fiscal deficit. Moreover 
the reform has institutionalized the state’s contribution to the social security system at 5%, 
while abandoning the previous practice of state funds only covering the deficit. Accordingly 
the social security reform conforms to the EU priorities on equal treatment and non-
discrimination and to the norms of adequate social security in terms of pensions and healthcare 
coverage.  
The content of both reforms do not only reflect priorities that can be characterized as 
“retrenchment” in line with a neo-liberal agenda,7 although they do clearly combine a mixture 
of market elements with universalistic policy priorities. This mixed content and direction 
constitute a puzzle, given the liberalization and the deepening global integration of the Turkish 
economy since the 1980’s, often considered to lead to a “race to the bottom” (Oyvat, 2011).8 
Secondly, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP)9 government 
                                                 
7 I do not argue that these reforms did not have a cost containment aspect; indeed they involved curtailing certain 
benefits and cutting public spending especially within the social security system. The argument developed here is 
that these reforms are not one-dimensional but combined elements in various directions. In assessing policy 
reforms in advanced industrial as well as developing countries in post-1990’s, scholars such as Peck and Tickell 
(2002) argue that there was a shift towards “roll-out neoliberalism” characterized by reregulation, disciplining 
and containment of those excluded; while others such as Esping-Andersen et al. (2002), Jenson and Saint-Martin 
(2003), Jenson (2010a) and Morel, Palier and Palme (2012) argue for the emergence of the social investment 
perspective for after neo-liberalism. This research focuses on the process of institutional and policy changes 
rather than concluding a priori on the neo-liberal character of social policy reforms.  
8 Cem Oyvat’s (2011: 124) analysis for the period 1980 to 2001 makes the race to the bottom argument, claiming 
that high trade intensity leads to worsening “labour share by raising labour flexibility and lowering bargaining 
power” in Turkey. 
9 In this thesis, I will use the Turkish abbreviations for political party names and state institutions in Turkey. 
Thus, the acronym AKP is used throughout to refer to what is called in English the Justice and Development 
Party. 
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has a “conservative-liberal” ideological orientation rooted in political Islam with commitments 
to a traditional and patriarchal value system and favors liberal economic policies (Buğra, 
2012; Öniş, 2012; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, 2010: 517; Eder, 2010: 152). AKP governments’s 
conservative-liberal orientation reflected in its practices and policy choices since 2002: 
implementing structural economic reforms promoted by IMF and World Bank, introducing 
political reforms in line with EU membership criteria, aiming to strengthen formal and 
informal role of familiy in order aleviate social risks, populist choices in distributional politics, 
supporting the integration of charity and philanthropy provided by non governmental 
organizations into the formal social assistance system. Therefore, the coexistence of universal 
and market-orientations in the content of reforms requires an explanation that can consider the 
interaction of multiple factors and processes, including EU accession process. 
I. Taking endogenous factors and exogenous dynamics into 
account: Towards a Uses of Europe approach 
 
The existing theoretical explanations of the reforms of the social security system and 
labor regulation, including the reorganization of the Turkish employment agency, emphasize 
either domestic dynamics or international and exogenous factors.10 On the one hand, domestic 
factors have been argued to be predominant to explain the social policy reforms such as: 
governmental policy choices of the AKP government (Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012; Akan, 2011; 
Çelik, 2007a), the power of the coalition between government and employer association with a 
neo-liberal agenda and the interests of the capitalist class (Coşar and Yeğenoglu, 2009; 
Mütevellioglu and Işık, 2009; Cam, 2002). These factors have been mentioned recurrently in 
the scholarly analysis of these reforms. On the other hand, explanations based on the role of 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in neo-liberal 
restructuring serving the interest of the capital class (Elveren, 2008) are also developed to 
explain the parameters of the social security reform (especially the pension component) as 
well as the flexibility agenda in the labor regulation reform (Mütevellioglu and Işık, 2009). 
                                                 
10 These theoretical explanations of Turkish social policy reforms are a reflection of a larger literature on the 
welfare state transformation of advanced industrial nations and developing countries.  
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Accordingly these explanations emphasize that Turkey was subjected to World Bank and IMF 
structural adjustment programs since 1990’s, obliging governments to cut public spending in 
order to balance their budgets as a condition of receiving loans. Certain conditions applied to 
the social security and labor regulation reforms including reorganizing employment agency. 
These existing explanations do not account for the timing of these reforms as well as 
their complex mixed content. The above-mentioned studies can be considered as partial 
explanations of the transformation of pensions, healthcare or labor market policy and 
institutions in Turkey, as they focus solely on one part of the process through a rigid 
theoretical lens. We need rather to analyze further empirically and explain theoretically how 
both domestic and international factors may have shaped the reforms, and particularly their 
timing and precise content. 
Nor do these literatures, focusing either on domestic dynamics or international 
pressures, pay sufficient attention to the EU membership process of Turkey in the post-2001 
period. We must surely anticipate that candidacy for EU membership has been an important 
catalyst for change in the Turkish political and economic realms as in other candidate 
countries. The significance of the EU’s influence increased considerably following the 
decision at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 to grant Turkey formal candidate status. 
As a result of the Helsinki decision, the key political and economic actors faced a powerful set 
of incentives for change and the implementation of important institutional reforms (Öniş, 
2009a; Keyman and Öniş, 2004).11  
There is already an extensive literature on how the EU has been a crucial “anchor” for 
Turkey (Öniş and Bakır, 2007; Tocci, 2005; Nas and Özer, 2012). The literature concerning 
domestic change in response to the Copenhagen criteria and related to EU membership has 
focused on various policy fields and issue areas: political reforms (Özer, 2012; Eralp, 2009; 
Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Keyman and Öniş 2007), civil military relations (Gürsoy 2011; 
Heper 2005), minority rights (Yilmaz, 2012; Grigoriodis, 2008), environmental policies, 
(Ünalan and Cowell, 2009), regionalization (Dulupçu, 2005), foreign policy (Öniş and Yılmaz, 
                                                 
11 However since 2005, the credibility of the EU accession perspective has declined dramatically for Turkey after 
several member states such as France, Austria and Cyprus stressed the “open-ended” character of the 
negotiations, the limited absorption capacity of the EU and the possibility of an alternative outcome (Aydın, 
2006; Uğur, 2010). 
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2009) and civil society organizations and the state-society relations (İçduygu 2011; Diez et al. 
2005).  
However the EU’s influence on social policy and labor regulation reforms has been 
mainly downplayed by the existing literature. There are few studies (such as Taymaz and 
Özler, 2004; Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Buğra and Adar, 2008; Ağartan, 2008; Göksel, 2011; 
Yalman, 2011; Tsarouhas, 2012) arguing that Turkey’s relations with the EU have been 
instrumental in the articulation of policies towards modernization. Although these studies are 
useful, either they do not empirically focus on EU influence in relation to the reform of the 
labor regulation and social security system and to the restructuring of the employment agency 
or they lack theoretical rigor to conceptualize the ways and the extent on how the EU 
membership process might matter.  
Any detailed empirical study of the role of the EU membership process has been 
omitted thus far from the analysis of the reforms of labor regulation, social security system 
and of the organization of the employment agency in Turkey. This research, by adopting an 
Europeanization theoretical framework and a comparative method across policy sectors, aims 
to develop a theoretically grounded explanation and to make an original contribution to the 
literature.  
How might we theoretically conceptualize the impact of the European Union on social 
policies in member and candidate states? The literatures used here are contributions to 
analyses of Europeanization and welfare state change by incorporating integration dynamics, 
whether political, economic or social, into domestic politics when analyzing reforms (Palier, 
2000; Kvist and Saari, 2007).  
Europeanization is often described as a top-down process, where the “goodness of fit” 
or the adaptation pressure determines the extent of the political work that needs to be done in 
order to confirm to European norms. Institutional adaptation is explained as transformation 
under the direct and indirect pressure of the EU as well as to the emergence of multilevel and 
network governance. Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001) have explained Europeanization via 
a “fit/misfit” model. The “fit/misfit” pattern is an explanation of change according to which 
convergence and divergence as well as the degree of adaptation of the different member states 
is explained by their reaction to European pressures (Héritier, 2001). The notion of 
Europeanization essentially implies an adjustment of a domestic variable to a European 
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constraint. The degree of adaptation is determined by the compatibility between national 
conditions and European constraints. Accordingly, especially for rationalist institutionalist 
scholars, Europeanization represents pressure for adaptation characterized by downloading 
(Howell, 2004), leading to institutional change or policy inertia (Schmidt, 2002; Radaelli, 
2003).  
The “fit-misfit” argument has often been criticized as explaining the relation as a top-
down process, where the structural difference between the EU model and member or candidate 
states’ domestic policies determines the extent of the EU influence and actors, following the 
rationalist assumption of a logic of consequences. The theoretical conceptualization of 
Europeanization through “goodness of fit”, “fit-misfit” or “congruence-incongruence” 
arguments provides a structuralist understanding of the impact of EU integration without 
clarifying how these adaptational pressures are translated into policy change. Accordingly it 
does not specify how EU-level actors and domestic actors matter in the translation of these 
pressures into policy change. Moreover when we consider the complex and fragmented 
character of the EU’s social acquis and competences in the social policy field, it is difficult to 
determine the degree of misfit between EU and domestic policy structures.  
The starting position of this dissertation is that empirical research needs to explain the 
process which induces change of policies, accounting for how EU institutions are able to have 
an impact on national politics. Accordingly, one needs to examine the role of political actors 
when facing the pressure or constraints as well as the opportunities resulting from the EU 
accession process. 
Therefore this research adopts an actor-centered Europeanization theoretical 
framework - the Uses of Europe. This approach has been advanced by Paolo Graziano, Sophie 
Jacquot and Bruno Palier (2011) to analyze the role of European resources in welfare state 
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reforms.12 Following discussion in the historical institutionalist literature on how to 
conceptualize and understand the interaction of actors and institutional structures (Jenson and 
Mérand, 2010; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992), recent studies of Europeanization have put the 
emphasis on actors and their interaction in the densely institutionalized EU environment 
(Saurugger, 2008; Favell and Guiraudon, 2010; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein, 2001). 
The Uses of Europe approach offers a dynamic theoretical understanding oriented towards the 
role of actors13 and their use of various European resources made available in the membership 
process, as compared to earlier generations of Europeanization research which insisted upon 
modeling the impact of adaptive pressures through “goodness of fit”, “fit-misfit” or 
“congruence-incongruence” arguments.14 The core of this approach involves analyzing actors’ 
strategies, considering their normative assumptions and representations of social policies and 
their interplay with the past policy legacies and the institutional rules, procedures and practices 
in the process and substance of social policy reforms.  
This dissertation uses this approach to examine how actors use European norms, 
opportunities, constraints, rules, and discourse as resources to advance their agenda or 
interests within domestic politics. In order to understand the role of the EU in the social policy 
reforms, it asks whether, where, and how domestic actors were making use of EU resources, 
references and policy approaches within the dynamics of Turkish social policy reforms? 
Attentive to the role of European resources in the reform of the labor law in 2003, the 
reorganization of the Turkish Employment Agency in 2003 and the restructuring of the social 
                                                 
12 The theoretical approach “usage of Europe” was put forward by Jacquot and Woll (2003; 2008) and developed 
theoretically in a more recent contribution by Woll and Jacquot (2010). In this thesis, I choose to employ “uses of 
Europe” for referring to the theoretical approach and research agenda developed by Jacquot and Woll (2003; 
2004), rather than the notion of “usage of Europe” that was adopted as well by Graziano, Jacquot and Palier 
(2011). In a more recent contribution, Woll and Jacquot (2010) have utilized the concept of “using Europe” in an 
attempt to further develop this theoretical approach. In fact, the choice of employing the notion of “uses of 
Europe” has a twofold aim: on the one hand, it refers to all scholarly contributions developed in this research 
agenda and on the other hand, it reflects the goal of deepening the theoretical scope and explanatory capacity of 
this theoretical approach. 
13 The focus on actors is in line with recent theoretical developments in historical institutionalism. Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010: 15) emphasize the role of actors and their strategies in the incremental institutional changes shaped 
by the characteristics of the political context and institutions. 
14 The theoretical framework of this research, “uses of Europe” (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011: 7) considers 
factors that shape the welfare reforms: “Therefore, the aim is to analyze changes at the national level that result 
from the process of European integration facilitated by many and diverse actors through many and diverse ways. 
Such a research strategy makes it possible to correctly place EU actors and strategies in a wider (and more 
appropriate) context, i.e. where welfare state reforms have always taken – and still take – place.”  
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security institutions in 2008, this study examines the ways and extent to which actors 
undertaking these social policy reforms have made use of Europe (Graziano, Jacquot and 
Palier, 2011).  
Why is the Turkish experience of social policy reforms appropriate to examine such a 
process of Europeanization with the Uses of Europe analytical framework? The political and 
economic reforms in Turkey have been related in different degrees to EU membership process 
that requires the adaptation of candidate states to the Union’s accession requirements. The 
Turkish case constitutes a crucial or critical case study (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 38; 
Lijphart, 1971: 691) for examining an Europeanization research agenda. Considering the 
institutional relationship with Europe since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963 
(where Turkey’s eligibility for full membership was recognized) there is no observable linear 
convergence towards European rules and norms. We observe periods of slowdowns and 
accelerations on the fulfillment of conditions. The institutional relationship evolved further 
with the signing of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1995, the recognition of 
Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 and the launch of 
accession negotiations in 2005 (Önis 2009a; Tocci 2005). The EU became a major actor in 
Turkish affairs after 1999, triggering major political and economic reforms in order to comply 
with the membership conditions.  
The policy sectors and reforms chosen for this dissertation (pensions, healthcare, social 
security administration and labor regulation and restructuring of the employment agency) are 
also “hard cases” to examine the uses of Europe in a membership process, given the Union’s 
limited competence in social policy and the limited social dimension of candidacy and 
accession processes (Falkner, 2007; Keune, 2009) and considering the related distributional 
dynamics on income equality that these reforms involve where the EU membership process is 
expected to have a limited impact (Uğur, 2006).  
II. Research method and design 
In this thesis, social policy reforms are considered to be processes in which policy 
change takes place, potentially involving both domestic and international actors (Hall, 2003; 
Falleti and Lynch, 2008). They are the empirical terrain of policy-making upon which unfold 
the interaction of domestic actors and institutions with international organizations such as the 
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IMF and World Bank and supranational institutions such as the EU. The comparison of the 
reform of labor regulation and restructuring of the employment agency with the transformation 
of social security system will provide rich material for analysis of the institutional relationship 
with the EU and the uses of Europe.  
Process-tracing (George and Bennett, 2005; Tansey, 2007; Hall, 2003) is an 
appropriate method to explore how European resources and other international influences have 
been channeled at the national level by various actors. The project uses a close process 
analysis (Mahoney, 2003) by focusing on steps and sequences of policy making, the aim being 
to pinpoint how specific actors use resources This research employed two main 
methodological sources: interviews and documentary analysis. During field research in 
Brussels and Ankara in 2010-2011, I conducted interviews with the Commission officials in 
Brussels and Turkish policy makers in Ankara and carried out archival research at the 
European Commission and at the Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security in Ankara. 
The primary source information is gathered through 15 semi-structured interviews (see 
Appendix A) conducted between February 2010 to April 2012 with key informants who are 
Turkish policy makers and bureaucrats at ministerial levels as well as Commission officials 
working in various Directorates-General of the EU. The main aim of the interviews was to 
understand the policymaking process and interviewees were initially purposively selected. I 
have supplemented the information gathered through these semi-structured interviews by 
informal discussions with Turkish scholars from various social science fields, representatives 
of union confederations and business associations, and members of the involved civil society 
organizations. These sources were very helpful to understand various conflicts among actors 
and their position and supported the more in-depth interviews conducted with policy-makers.  
Grounded on case study methods, the empirical evidence is based as well on secondary 
sources in Turkey of parliamentary minutes of major laws, texts of earlier reform proposals, 
reform programs announced by various political parties, five-year development plans of the 
State Planning Organization, policy papers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and 
the governments, including draft laws, programming documents, action plans and ministerial 
programs, including the parliamentary hearings and discussions during the reform processes. 
The EU documents concerning Turkey’s accession such as the Progress Reports, Accession 
Partnership Documents and screening reports have been analyzed. World Bank and IMF 
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documents, ILO and OECD reports and data and Turkish newspaper databases and web 
sources were also consulted. The interviews and documentary analysis complement each other 
for identifying the factors shaping the reform process and its content. The process-tracing 
analysis is supplemented by quantitative indicators such as expenditures on the social security 
system and labor market statistics.  
While concentrating on specific social policy reforms in Turkey, this research also 
positions these processes on the trajectory of welfare state transformations, considering 
sequencing and temporality in order to assess the direction of change. Institutional change is 
considered to be “cumulative but transformative,” following Streeck and Thelen (2005) and 
Palier and Martin (2008: 8). 
The choice of research design based on a case study recognizes the limits of the design. 
Research designs based a small number of case studies have been criticized as weaker than 
large-N comparative research designs allowing statistical methods to test hypotheses (Lijphart, 
1971; King et al., 1994). However researchers following new theoretical developments have 
argued for the added value of the case study method and within case analysis, describing them 
as research designs valuable for causal inference and theory-oriented explanations (Ragin and 
Becker, 1992; Ragin, 1994; Hall, 2003; 2006). For instance, Ragin (1987) suggests focusing 
on how causes come together, as multiple conjunctural causation, to produce outcomes 
emphasizing configurational understanding of causation involving the intersection and the 
interaction of causal and conjectural variables such as necessary and sufficient conditions. A 
key characteristic of configurational thinking according to Ragin (2000; 2008) is that the 
effect of any particular causal condition may depend on the presence or absence of other 
conditions and that different combinations of conditions can be connected to similar outcomes. 
In the empirical investigation of policy change, I follow a configurational understanding of 
causation. 
III. Overview of the chapters  
This dissertation is organized into chapters that will address the research question by a 
theoretically grounded analysis of the labor regulation reform and restructuring of the 
employment agency in 2003 and social security reform in 2008.  
Chapter I involves a synthetic review of scholarly research related to the research 
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question. The chapter builds on the literature regarding the determinants of social policy 
change in advanced industrial countries as well as in late-developing and transition countries. 
Relying mainly on the work of neo-institutionalist analysts of policy change, the chapter 
overviews the state of research emphasizing endogenous factors in explaining social policy 
change such as the logic of industrialization approach, the power resources approach and 
conceptualization of policy based on policy legacies and path dependency as well as studies of 
the ways political institutions influence the governments’ strategies for reforms. This review 
of the literature emphasizing endogenous factors will derive three theoretical findings: 
“politics matters” for the social policy reforms as governments choose either blame avoidance 
or credit claiming strategies to introduce electorally costly reforms in the context of cost-
containment; policy legacies influence the available reform options; and the political 
institutions such as constitutional rules and the type of parliamentary system may set up veto 
points that shape a government’s ability for policy change and its capabilities.  
The theoretical insight of the literature on the endogenous determinants of social policy 
change is valuable on shedding light on how to conceptualize policy change, reform dynamics, 
actors’ strategies and institutional settings but fails to grasp that social policy making may also 
respond to international and supranational pressures. In the light of policy developments since 
1990’s, there is growing literature on exogenous sources of policy change. In this second part 
of the chapter, the focus moves to literature on the diffusion of public policies conceptualizing 
exogenous mechanisms of policy change, using the review by Dobbin et al. (2007) as the 
organizing frame. This section concentrates on research and studies on social policy and 
welfare states, and demonstrates that three insights are important in orienting the theoretical 
framework of this research: the role of epistemic communities and international organization 
in diffusion of norms; conditionality related to the external incentives model; and social 
learning mechanisms.  
Building on the review of these two literatures the theoretical frameworks of 
Europeanization are assessed, with particular reference to how the accession of the Southern 
and Eastern European countries influenced welfare state and social policy reforms. This 
section will also demonstrate the rationale of adopting the Uses of Europe approach as well as 
exposing the theoretical premises that clarify the research agenda suggested by Paolo 
Graziano, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier (2011) discussed above.  
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Chapter II tackles the institutional factors and political context that surrounded the 
timing and implementation of political and economic reforms, specifically the social security 
and labor regulation reforms. There are two main reasons why institutions need attention in 
order to account for the timing of reforms. The analysis of institutional factors and political 
context can shed light both on the reasons for the lack of reforms in the 1990’s and why they 
took place after 2002. Others have found (Bonoli, 2001; Huber et al. 1993; Lijphart, 1999) that 
institutional structures that concentrate power in the executive branch are more likely to allow 
the implementation of social policy priorities of the government. The political system in 
Turkey structured upon the 1982 Constitution introduced by the military junta. The 
institutional parameters set the necessary conditions for policy change and public policy 
reforms.  
But we cannot rely only on the description of the institutional configuration to see the 
direct effect of institutional design on policy outcomes. Doing so would be a mechanical 
institutional explanation of domestic change. Therefore partisan politics and how political 
party competition have shaped the social policy developments from late 1980’s to 1990’s must 
also be analyzed in order to characterize the relationship between electoral politics, political 
parties and the social policy preferences of corporate actors in a political regime such as 
Turkey’s.  
The second rationale for examining the institutional settings and conditions of change 
is directly related to the Uses of Europe emphasis on analyzing the political elites’ attitudes 
towards and national public opinion. The proponents of the approach claim these influence the 
quantity of uses of Europe. Following this theoretical line, the political elite’s and public 
opinion views towards the EU are analyzed to understand the political context of Turkey’s 
relationship with the European Union.  
Chapter III presents European instruments and resources while examining the 
evolution of the institutional relationship between the EU and Turkey. This relationship has 
evolved from the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963, to the launch of a Customs 
Union in 1995, to the recognition of candidate status in 1999, to the start of accession 
negotiations in 2005. Accordingly it is important to understand how the supply of European 
resources evolved over these years. This chapter will examine the research hypothesis that 
European resources provided by European institutions tend to vary according to the 
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institutional relationship that a country has with the EU (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011: 
8). The scrutiny of this hypothesis aims to identify specific resources such as legal, financial, 
institutional, political and cognitive linked to social policies and welfare state in Turkey and 
their changing supply in time. The research will also describe how the Commission and other 
EU institutions themselves assessed Turkish labor law (2003), the restructuring of the 
employment agency (2003) and the social security reform (from 2006 to 2008) in Turkey. 
Their preferences for reform were sources of pressure for adaptation.  
Chapter IV focuses on the revision of the Labor Law with the enactment of the Law 
No. 4857 in 2003 that replaced the old legislation, Law No. 1475 of 1971. The chapter also 
analyses the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency that replaced the Employment 
Brokerage Agency, with the enactment of the Law No. 4904 in 2003. The policy legacies that 
conditioned the reforms are described and assessed by following the historical trajectory 
(timing and sequencing) of reform debates since mid-1990s. Concentrating on the uses of 
Europe in the reforms implemented by the coalition and AKP governments, the research 
explores whether Europe is used in a cognitive, strategic or legitimizing way depending on the 
domestic actors’ interest and coalition-building strategy in the reform process. The chapter 
specifically examines which national actors have been involved with what types of uses as 
well as the institutional constraints and partisan strategies.  
Chapter V focuses on the social security reform in Turkey between 2003 and 2008 that 
involved the restructuring of pension and health care systems via the administrative unification 
of the social security institutions. The chapter first describes the social security system before 
the reform in order to expose the policy legacies that influenced the direction of the reform, 
particularly during the 1990’s. The analysis examines the first phase of the reform initiated in 
1999, and then attention turns how the social security reform process evolved since 2003 and 
examines the uses of Europe.  
The Conclusion assesses the findings of the empirical research and the explanatory 
capability of the Uses of Europe approach. New ways of improving the explanatory capacity 
of the Uses of Europe approach will be discussed in the light of the empirical findings, by 
exploring other conceptual contributions of the neo-institutional framework.   
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Chapter I. Explaining Social Policy Change: From 
Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in a “Uses of Europe” 
Approach 
 
This chapter focuses on explanations of social policy change put forward in the literature. This 
review aims to clarify and categorize existing theoretical explanations of the emergence, 
growth and change of social policies and welfare states. What factors can account for various 
social policies that states carry out?15 What drives welfare state development and reform 
trajectories?  
I – Social policy change 
The analysis builds on the literature regarding the determinants of social policy change 
in advanced industrial countries as well as in late-developing and transition countries. There 
are two broad types of explanation of change emphasized in the literature: endogenous and 
exogenous factors. These are reviewed. Then, relying mainly on neo-institutionalist analyses 
of policy change, I synthetically build the theoretical framework of this research, Uses of 
Europe. 
I.a. Explaining social policy change with endogenous factors: From national 
economic development towards “politics matters” 
The scholarly research in this category aims to understand the historical trends that 
trigger the emergence of social policies by emphasizing endogenous domestic factors akin to 
country specific contexts. Three approaches exist in the scholarly literature: a logic of 
industrialization perspective, power resource theory and neo-institutionalist explanation(s). 
Despite all explaining social policy change using domestic level variables, these explanations 
differ in their theoretical assumptions and the way that they consider the relationship between 
structures or institutions and actors. 
                                                 
15 While reviewing theoretical explanations of policy change, the term ‘reforms,’ which has become a more 
recurrent theme in politics of social policy, is used interchangeably with ‘change’ or ‘transformation’. 
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The logic of industrialization: Some of the earliest studies of the development and 
emergence of welfare states published found a close relationship between the level of 
economic development of a country and the emergence of its social programs (for an overview 
see Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 36). Scholars such as Cutright (1965) and Wilensky (1975), 
generally using quantitative analysis, argued that social programs and expenditures are a 
byproduct of economic development. As a functionalist perspective and a derivative of 
modernization theory (Munck, 2007), the main assumption of this approach is that economic 
development creates new economic and social risks and leads to the weakening of traditional 
support mechanisms such as extended families. In this logic of industrialization perspective, 
economic (industrialization and urbanization particularly) and demographic changes are the 
main triggers of social policy development and change.  
The main conclusion of this literature is that countries will adopt similar social policies 
as they reach comparable levels of development. Variation in social provisions follows from 
the timing of modernization and industrialization. Accordingly the welfare state is an answer 
to the growing needs and problems developed through similar processes across countries with 
similar levels of economic development and capitalist industrialization (for an example see 
Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981: 38).  In a less functionalist analysis, Haggard and Kaufman 
(2008) cluster countries according to their economic development and considering the level of 
industrialization and urbanization and measure the extent of welfare state development with 
social expenditure. 
Although this functionalist approach is convincing in a broad sense, its critics argue 
that it fails to assess cross-national variation of social policy characteristics among countries 
that have similar level of economic development (Skocpol, 1992: 4-6). Moreover the levels of 
social expenditures do not approximate the qualitative cross-national differences between 
different policies in terms of coverage, conditions for entitlements, eligibility and targeting 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19). Such critiques provoked, among other things, a turn to 
institutions. 
The (neo) institutional approach: Research on institutions, with varying theoretical 
emphases, considers them as key explanatory factors in the development of welfare 
arrangements and policy change. The literature developed through rational choice 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism that concentrate 
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on welfare state development and social policy change is extensive. Considering the scope of 
the research question of this study, this section will concentrate on the theoretical findings of 
the research on formal institutions and studies that adopted historical institutionalism in 
explaining social policy outcomes and policy change. 
Looking at the development of early social policies, Skocpol and Amenta (1986: 147) 
and Skocpol (1992), for example, emphasize that limited social policy development in the 
United States is related to weak state capacity in the early 20th century; encompassing social 
programs could not be developed given relatively weak bureaucratic capacities.  Nonetheless, 
certain social programs were developed towards specific interest groups because of the 
existence of particularistic and patronage politics. 
To explain the variance across cases and why some countries have adopted distinctive 
forms of social policy, some authors prioritize the characteristics of formal institutional 
structures and rules in shaping welfare state development and social policies. For example, 
Immergut (1992) examines why distinctive and substantially very different health systems 
were developed in Sweden, France and Switzerland by focusing on constitutional 
arrangements in the three countries. For instance, the availability of referendums in 
Switzerland has allowed interest groups opposed to state intervention in health policy to block 
the implementation of legislation on national health systems and insurance. On the other hand, 
the power concentration in the executive branch in Sweden is the most salient factor to explain 
the development of its health service. Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993: 741) also found a 
strong impact of constitutional structures (defined as the possibility of interest groups and 
minorities to block legislation or the capacity of majorities to pass legislation) on welfare state 
development and level of social expenditure.  
A considerable literature has developed examining the impact of formal institutions for 
understanding policy differences, such as: the characteristics of the political regime (whether 
parliamentary or presidential); the form of democracy (majoritarian or consensus) (Huber et 
al. 1993; Lijphart, 1999); the type of legislature and its rules (Persson and Tabellini, 1999); the 
electoral system (proportional or majoritarian) (Iversen and Soskice, 2006); the presence of 
actors with vetoes (such as constitutional courts) (Tsebelis, 1995) and the division of power 
between different branches and the public administration in a state (Schmidt, 2006).   
Bonoli (2001: 238) claims that institutional structures that allow power concentration 
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of the executive branch are more likely to allow the implementation of social policy priorities 
of the government, including cutbacks. Considering the constitutional rules and the existence 
and number of veto points and the electoral dynamics, he argues that the different levels of 
institutional power concentration when combined with the politics of social policy reforms are 
salient factors to explain recent social policy reforms. Bonoli examines this hypothesis in 
Britain with concentrated powers, France with an intermediate level of power concentration 
and Switzerland characterized by power fragmentation. He concludes (2001: 264) that 
“political institutions do matter, but in interaction with other factors ... [it] is impossible to 
make predictions of individual instances of policy outcomes solely on their basis.”  
Consequently, Bonoli’s work appears frequently as well in the next part of this section. 
Recent research on the impact on institutions on welfare policies reveal how they 
condition power relations rather than predict outcomes (Häusermann, Picot and Geering, 
2013). Such findings will be important for the analysis of social policy reforms in Turkey, and 
have led in this research to significant attention to constitutional and institutional forms.  
Historical institutionalism has also developed a substantial body of literature that 
examines the roles of state actors within institutions.16 Early research by Heclo (1974) on the 
pension policies of Britain and Sweden emphasized the role of state administrative capacity 
and demonstrated the crucial importance of bureaucracies in the development of distinct 
policy responses. He drew attention to the intellectual ability of civil servants to ‘puzzle’ in the 
policy process. Heclo’s argument influenced Hall’s (1993) research on social learning and 
paradigm change, seeking to explain how new policy ideas become institutionalized (Heclo, 
1994: 380-81). Jenson has also demonstrated that the shift towards an “investing-in-children” 
perspective in new public policies since the 1990’s in the Canadian context can be attributed 
to “a social-learning network made up of advocates and experts from civil society and inside 
the state” (2004: 169). Saint-Martin (2002) emphasizes the role of the expert groups and civil 
society actors in disseminating the scientific knowledge about the saliency of early childhood 
education during the emergence of the “investing in children” paradigm.   
                                                 
16 The main text on historical institutionalism is Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth’s 1992 collection of Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective where two specific theoretical orientations were 
declared: one focussed on mechanisms that trigger change and another that stresses ideational innovation and 
change within institutional settings (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 13-14). 
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 Another major contribution of historical institutionalism has been to highlight how 
existing and inherited public policies affect the politics of social policymaking through a 
mechanism of policy feedback (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1994). Pierson emphasizes that 
inherited policies create a group of beneficiaries. They shape the organizational structure and 
political goals of existing interest groups and create new groups of beneficiaries that are 
strongly attached to the existing policies and oppose major changes. For his part, Giuliano 
Bonoli (2003: 1015-16) argues that the policy paths of countries in the provision of labor 
market regulation reflect the specific character and legacy of state-society relationships at 
crucial moments in the development of the modern industrial economy:  
 
“These initial decisions seem to have affected policy development to a significant 
extent, so that in subsequent instances of social instability, such as the interwar 
period or the recessions of the 1970s, countries have tended to rely predominantly 
on those instruments that were already in place. This pattern of policy 
development strictly follows the logic of path dependency. Decisions taken at a 
very early stage in the development of a policy lock countries into a given policy 
path. They do so by increasing the cost of shifting to alternative policy solutions, 
by creating incentive structures that encourage the different actors to remain 
within the established path, and by shaping normative views as to what are the 
appropriate policy instruments that are to be used in given circumstances.” 
 
Focusing on the absence of change, scholars such as Pierson claimed that interests and 
institutions accounted for the stability and continuity they observed in social policy. For 
example, the interests groups and organizations that had formed around post-war social 
policies with policy feedback effects were able to block the spending cuts proposed by New 
Right governments of Reagan and Thatcher in the US and the UK in the 1980’s (Pierson 1994: 
8-9).  The research on retrenchment17 focusing on the macro-analysis of spending on different 
programs such as old-age pensions or housing policy has argued that social programs and 
spending were not dismantled despite neo-liberal policy preferences and the political 
willingness of New Right governments (Pierson, 1994; Stephens, Huber and Ray, 1999).  
Thus Pierson (2001: 414) emphasizes the institutional stickiness of the welfare state, 
with electoral barriers to reform. Others identify veto points, formal or informal, that reinforce 
                                                 
17 Pierson writes about ‘new politics’ because retrenchment is a distinctive process compared to the long phase of 
welfare state expansion (Pierson, 1998). 
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the existing policy arrangements (Bonoli, 2001; Tsebilis, 1995). Furthermore, in addition to 
veto points, Pierson (1994) evaluates how adaptations by organizations and individuals to 
previous policy arrangements that have large set-up costs lock-in institutions by creating 
increasing returns and learning effects among its beneficiaries. Pierson claimed that interests 
and institutions, as welfare states have created a set of beneficiary groups whose interests 
depend on those programs, contribute to “a dominant pattern of continuity in social policy” 
(1994:179).  
Thus, endogenous dynamics of increasing returns and power asymmetries foster 
institutional inertia and path-dependence, thereby making far-reaching change electorally risky 
and highly unlikely (Pierson 1996a, 2001). These explanations based on path dependent 
processes have been used to account for the stability of Bismarckian welfare states (Palier, 
2010).  We see in such arguments a significant overlap between historical institutionalism and 
the “politics matters” analyses presented below. 
A related but theoretically different concept of  “policy legacy” is based as well on the 
premises of historical institutionalism. It treats the interaction of ideational foundation, 
interests and institutions.18 In the use of the original concept of policy legacy, Weir and 
Skocpol (1985: 119) built on Heclo’s description of policy making as an “historical process in 
which all actors build on and react against previous governmental efforts for dealing with the 
same or similar problems.” According to Weir and Skocpol (1985), policy legacies affected 
the development of ideas about policy, the formation of interest group demands and the 
                                                 
18 The interaction of ideas, interests and institutions is important for historical institutionalists such as Hall and 
Taylor (1998) for explaining the outcomes: “The attention that historical institutionalists have devoted to the role 
of ideas in politics provides them with a good basis for an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between structures and agents. Their advantage here is twofold. On the one hand, they are more 
willing than many rational choice analysts to acknowledge that exposure to new ideas can alter the basic, as well 
as the strategic, preferences of actors. They generally postulate actors with multiple preferences, often associated 
with manifold self-conceptions, such that the weights an actor assigns to particular preferences when choosing a 
course of action may be enacted by the way in which the relevant issue is defined… On the other hand, historical 
institutionalists also tend to embrace a more expansive conception of the kind of ideas that might matter to actors, 
ranging from information about the causal relations that govern the world and the likely behaviour of other actors 
(on which rational choice analysis often concentrates), to moral visions about what is good or just that speak to 
the self-identities of many political actors. These perspectives open historical institutionalism to a wide range of 
understandings about how the structure of ideas embodied in the institutions of a polity may affect individual 
action” (Hall and Taylor, 1998: 962). Hugh Heclo has insisted on the “codependency among ideas, institutions, 
and interests” not by giving priority to one or another type of variable, but by concentrating on the 
interrelationships of ideas, interests, and institutions (Heclo, 1994: 380).  The interrelationship of ideas, interests 
and institutions is complex without the necessity of choosing type of factor as more fundamental than others 
(Heclo, 1994: 381). 
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development of policy coalitions around Keynesian ideas and policies in Sweden, Britain and 
the United States during the Great Depression. Their explanation of differentiated adoption of 
Keynesian economic ideas in Sweden, Britain and US was that they depended on the 
structures and policy legacies of the state which influenced the political orientations and 
capacities of conflicting parties and coalitions of social groups.  
Policy legacy in this original formulation involves two aspects. Policy legacy is 
characterized by the established policy approaches for addressing the problems involved in 
one policy sector. Moreover it signifies the institutional mechanisms recurrent in public policy 
making. In terms of considering the possible effects of policy legacies, Denis Saint-Martin 
(2000: 31) argues that: 
“Policy actors will be more or less predisposed towards policies; they will reject or 
support them depending on what they have learned from previous governmental 
efforts dealing with the same or similar problems. This learning process is never 
purely rational, contrary to what rational choice theorists argue, it is shaped by the 
practices, norms, and institutional context left by past policies.”  
 
The concept of policy legacy fits within historical institutionalism and policy regime 
analysis but allows as well examination of particular conditions and the direction of 
institutional change while considering the historical characteristics and the evolution of 
institutional structures (Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Skocpol, 1995; Weir, 1992). It provides 
accounts of the ways how inherited policy structures shaped available reform options for 
policy makers. Therefore, contrary to a narrow version of historical institutionalist explanation 
based on path dependency, I will refer to theoretical concept of “policy legacy” based as well 
on the historical institutionalism’s emphasis on the interaction of ideas, interests and 
institutions. 
Power resources and partisan politics: The third theoretical explanation of welfare 
state development and social policy change relies more on political factors, and is labeled in 
the literature as a “partisan politics” approach and/or a “power resources approach” (see Myles 
and Quadagno, 2002: 37). This third approach is based on the argument that the party politics 
shape social policy. Accordingly scholars such as Castles (1978) and Borg and Castles (1981) 
argue that partisan politics matters in explaining welfare state development. A related but also 
a different type of politics matters premise is represented by power resources approach that 
stresses the impact of social democratic or left-wing parties on welfare state emergence and 
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development (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983; 1989). This very endogenous approach orients us 
to party politics, arguing that the mobilization of the working class and actors such as trade 
unions are key to understanding the demand side of welfare state and the strength of the labor 
movement and of left-wing parties are the key factors shaping different levels and models of 
social protection (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983; 2006; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; 1985). The core concern of this approach and related literature is to explain 
variation of social policies across countries or groups of countries.19  
Theoretical approaches adopting a “partisan politics matters” position emphasize the 
role of partisan competition between various political parties and interest groups in the 
institutionalization of welfare states. While different variants of the approach exist, a main 
contribution of all this literature is to demonstrate that history and politics matter in explaining 
the shape of social policies in different country contexts. Accordingly, the literature developed 
following this theoretical line has demonstrated that electoral competition and the balance of 
power among political parties, their relation with unions and business associations and their 
coalition-building strategies mediated by institutional rules of democratic decision making are 
the main determinant of social policy outcomes (Kitschelt, 2003). The claim is that 
concentrating on the politics played out within the institutional rules provides empirically 
grounded theoretical insights (Bonoli, 2001; Kitschelt, 2001). 
This approach, emphasizing partisan and interest group politics, has been applied to the 
retrenchment and cost-containment of the 1990’s and 2000’s. These studies emphasize that 
governments have multiple goals of policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking (Natali 
and Rhodes, 2004). These multiple goals can have contradictory consequences as governments 
aim to implement certain policies but they also want to maximize their vote and increase their 
chances of staying in office. Accordingly governments develop “blame avoidance” and “credit 
claiming” practices in order to balance these multiple goals (Bonoli and Natali, 2012). 
For example, Pierson (1996a: 143-144) argues that the new politics is different because 
                                                 
19 A recent version of power resources approach is provided by Iversen and Stephens (2008), based on 
institutionalism’s assumptions and related to the Varieties of Capitalism approach. Their notion of welfare 
production regime involves combining a power resources approach with a Varieties of Capitalism research 
agenda. It seeks to explain the variation in labor regulation in different production regimes and its 
institutionalization. It is, however, inadequate for specifying the conditions of change and different related 
political dynamics.  
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“welfare state retrenchment generally requires elected officials to pursue unpopular policies 
that must withstand the scrutiny of both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest 
groups.” According to Pierson (1996a: 179), the reforms of social programs in mature welfare 
states are characterized by governments’ strategies of blame-avoidance (drawing on Weaver, 
1986), as most of the voters are stakeholders of social insurance schemes. Pierson (1994: 19-
24) emphasizes three main strategies to cope with the political blame: obfuscation, division 
and compensation.  
Considering pension reform, “obfuscation” constitutes one of the main means of the 
governments to introduce reforms by obscuring or hiding the negative consequences of the 
reforms. Accordingly governments make changes in technical parameters in a less obvious 
way rather than cutting directly the benefits such as in the case of pension indexation. Another 
strategy of governments to introduce pension reforms suggested by Pierson (1996a) is 
“division,” where governments would prefer to set up changes to influence a small segment of 
the population rather than the all beneficiaries or a large segment of the electorate. Pierson 
(2001: 411) emphasizes that “major policy reform is a political process dependent on the 
mobilization of political resources sufficient to overcome organized opponents and other 
barriers to change.”  
Other researchers have examined the same challenges to reform and strategies that 
fragment the interests of recipients. For instance Bonoli and Palier (2007) argue that pension 
reforms in Europe have involved long phase-out periods without affecting current pension 
beneficiaries, thereby lowering their opposition while the changes are designed to influence 
future generations. Palier and Thelen (2010) argue that reforms of employment legislation did 
not involve the benefits of the core workers but introduced flexible type of contracts for young 
workers without social security coverage, deepening the divide between insiders and outsiders 
in the labor market.  
Other researchers emphasize the role of framing arguments, by which governments 
convince voters of the necessity of the reforms by justifying implementation as cost 
containment reforms. For example, according to Green-Pedersen (2002), with a justification of 
the reforms as necessary for long-term sustainability of the system, governments were able to 
reduce opposition to reforms among political parties and among unions and employer 
associations. Other scholars such as Hering (2004) and Vis and van Kersbergen (2007) also 
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argue that policy leaders with certain preferences for reforms deployed a strong discourse on 
the need and unavoidability of cost-cutting reforms and could change the perception of the 
public. A similar line of argument is represented by Fiona Ross (2000), who argues that voters 
perceive that certain political parties have ownership of certain issues and policy domains 
linked to the configuration of the political party system. Voters do not perceive similar 
reforms introduced by left or right-wing political parties in the same way, thereby allowing 
social democratic political parties more political room to introduce cost-cutting reforms. 
In addition, the politics of social policy reform in the last two decades have been 
characterized sometimes by involvement of other actors than political parties. Bonoli (2000: 
38) has emphasized that pension reforms in continental European countries involved 
bargaining and negotiations between political and corporatist actors that were more important 
than the political process between the political parties. As a compensation strategy, 
governments can combine different goals to satisfy different group interests in specific ways. 
The research especially on the pension reforms in the Bismarckian welfare states demonstrates 
that policy-makers are not only “vote seekers” acting in the electoral arena but they also act in 
the corporatist arena engaging in negotiations and bargaining with labor unions whose roles 
are decisive in the success or failure in implementing the reform projects (Natali and Rhodes, 
2004).20 Accordingly governments act as a “creative opportunist” in setting the compensation 
of unions during the reform process (Natali and Rhodes, 2004: 9).  
Recent research on the politics of social policy reforms also reveals credit-claiming 
strategies followed by governments. Governments can use social policy reforms as an 
opportunity for credit-claiming, intended to provide them with electoral gains. For instance, 
increasing the scope of the public protection system to include self-employed as well as 
workers with atypical contracts have been recurrent in Continental and Southern European 
countries (Bridgen and Meyer, 2007), allowing policy-makers to argue for increasing the 
equity and efficiency of the system. In this regard, the policy initiatives involving equality and 
adequateness dimensions have been paramount for credit claiming by governments that were 
                                                 
20 For instance, Natali and Rhodes (2004) indicate that the 1995 reform of pensions in Italy involved 
compensation of trade unions that increased their organizational power. In France, the pension reform excluded 
the public sector pension, keeping intact their entitlement levels (Palier, 2005). Schludi (2005; 2008) has found 
that during the reform of pensions in Germany, governments have made several concessions to trade unions in 
order to ease their opposition. 
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able to bargain with labor unions that have a priority of balancing the gains and benefits of 
different occupational groups as well as gaining more institutional power in the Continental 
and Southern European countries (Natali and Rhodes, 2004: 26). For Jonah Levy (1999: 240-
241), governments introduced reforms by adopting a strategy of turning “vice into virtue”21 by 
reallocating resources towards the needy sectors or the poor in a less costly manner without 
increasing overall spending. Doing so, they can claim credit for addressing social risks.  
Finally, some authors emphasize the change in risk structures as a source of reform. 
The last decade has witnessed two novel policy developments in Europe and beyond: 
measures towards activation and human capital development in employment policies and 
policies and programs supporting parents to reconcile work and family life (Bonoli and Natali, 
2012; Jenson, 2010a). These new responses are related to a certain extent to the emergence of 
new social risks with the socio-economic and demographic changes of post-industrialization 
(Bonoli, 2006). But there is also a partisan dimension to account for these reforms. Kananen et 
al. (2006) have found for example that public support for activation in labor market policy is 
highly supported by German, British and Swedish electorates. Electoral competition involved 
credit claiming for the modernization and reorientation of their welfare states (Bonoli and 
Natali, 2012).22 Another dimension is the enactment of measures towards investing in children 
(Jenson, 2009; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002) in order to 
maximize their chances of succeeding in education and in the labor market. The 2004 reforms 
of childcare in Germany exemplify a successful credit-claiming strategy by the coalition 
government of Social Democrats and Greens that invested in 200,000 subsidized childcare 
facilities addressing regional differences in the number of care facilities as well as the 
insufficiency of childcare facilities. This policy was continued by the Christian Democratic 
(CDU) government. Although surprising giving Christian Democrats’ past commitment to a 
male breadwinner model, Seeleib-Kaiser (2010: 421) argues that by framing the issues in 
                                                 
21 Levy (1999: 240) explains that this practice can involve “redistributing income toward the poor without 
increasing public spending; improving the functioning of the economy without reducing benefits to the truly 
needy; and facilitating (through side-payments) the negotiation of far-reaching, tripartite social pacts to redesign 
basic parameters of welfare, labor market, and fiscal policy. In other words, inherited welfare vices can be 
manipulated so as to soften or even obviate the supposedly ineluctable trade-off between efficiency and equity”. 
22 For Bonoli (2012: 105), the Labour Party in Britain in the 1990’s and 2000’s under the leadership of Tony 
Blair, the Rasmussen governments in Denmark from 1994 to 2001 and the Dutch government of Wim Kok from 
1994 to 2002 exemplify how governments have introduced activation reforms for credit-claiming and electoral 
reasons. 
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relation to changing socio-economic structures and by arguing the economic benefits of family 
policy reforms in terms of human capital input and enabling women, CDU modernizers and 
leadership managed to create a coalition of various actors and to convince political parties, 
including the fractions inside of the party. This provided in return a considerable credit-
claiming opportunity.  
According to Seeleib-Kaiser (2010: 425), the underlying factors that oriented the 
Christian Democrats to grasp modernization reforms lay in the electoral dynamics, aiming to 
gain female voters. The German reform process for family policy again demonstrates how 
governments can act as a creative opportunist. Accordingly the explanation of reforms lies on 
the strategies developed by governments and political parties in the context of political 
competition rather than belonging to party families or their position on the right-left 
continuum. This insight will be important for my analysis of Turkey. 
Following the New Politics literature, the above explanations mainly focus on blame 
avoidance or credit claiming developed by vote seeking governments and the political elites 
that calculate the cost and benefit of the policy preferences in terms of electoral politics and 
that involve various struggles and bargains with societal actors such as unions or business 
associations.23 The focus on the executive branch is also relevant, however, to address the 
question of how politically costly social policy reforms may occur.  
Herbert Kitschelt (2001) investigated the factors that influence vote and office-seeking 
governments’ decisions to introduce unpopular social policy reforms. He emphasized the 
dynamic of competitive party democracy and the configuration of party systems. Accordingly, 
taking Germany, Sweden, Netherlands and Japan as cases of retrenchment during the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, Kitschelt looked to different configurations of party competition and found that 
governments that were not facing serous competitions in the upcoming election (whether right 
or left-wing governments) were able to introduce cutbacks without fearing electoral 
punishment.  
Following Skocpol’s (1992) argument about the historical development of social 
policies in US, Julia Lynch (2006) argued that a programmatic mode of party competition and 
                                                 
23 A further way of explaining governments’ and political parties’ positioning on reforms is based on research 
conducted on changing electoral constituencies driving preference formation regarding social policy reforms 
(Häusermann, 2010; Rueda, 2007).   
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particularistic competition have different consequences for the actions of parties once in 
government. According to Lynch, a programmatic mode of party competition exists where 
parties are supposed to promote certain policy programs such as universal coverage intended 
to evolve towards citizenship based policies. Lynch (2006) emphasizes the impact of the state 
capacity in shaping a transformation towards more universal and citizenship based policies. 
On the other hand, particularistic competition targeting incentives for certain occupational 
groups orient governments to establish occupational based welfare policies. Emphasizing as 
well the relevance of party competition on social policy development and reforms, Georg 
Picot (2009; 2012) argues that the social policy preferences of parties are driven by the appeal 
of attracting crucial groups of voters. According to Picot (2012), the configuration of the party 
system is decisive in orienting social policy preferences of the parties. Polarized party systems 
where the competition is centrifugal, leads parties to focus on voters in the extreme poles in 
political space and in non-polarized party systems where the competition is centripetal 
competition, parties are more concentrated on the median voter in the center of the political 
spectrum. Picot examines the historical development of unemployment benefits in Italy and 
Germany and found that these two types of party competition as centrifugal and centripetal 
have diverse consequences leading to the development of programmatic and comprehensive 
policies in Germany and to fragmented and occupationally based policies in the case of Italy.  
The above literature on political competition orients us to focus on strategies of 
political parties grounded on the political party system and taking into account the context of 
competition (whether particularistic or programmatic) in explaining preference formation of 
political parties.24  
Also looking at the preference formation of governments and political parties, some 
                                                 
24 These observations have led some authors to examine cleavage patterns (Häusermann, Picot and Geering, 
2013: 10). Although Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the main cleavage shaping political party systems since 
the Second World War was a left-right one based on socio-economic conflict, more recent work describes 
cleavage structures related to historical processes in each country’s context (Manow, 2009). This means the 
existence of additional cleavages such urban-rural, church-state or along ethnic and linguistic lines can interact 
with the socio-economic cleavage. Through a macro analysis, Ferrera (2005) argues that the prevalence of 
multiple cleavages on ethnic, linguistic, religious lines combined with ideological polarization to orient the 
development of rather fragmented and occupationally based welfare policies where the overarching existence of 
socio-economic cleavage is conducive towards more universal welfare policies. The research on the links 
between cleavage structures, political party systems and welfare policies rest upon on macro level generalizations 
rather than more on the institutional level analysis of specific social policy developments, however.  
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authors emphasize changes in the electoral constituencies of political parties (Häusermann, 
Picot and Geering, 2013; Häusermann, 2010; Kriesi, 1998). These studies examine empirically 
the link assumed by the power resource approach between the constituencies of political 
parties and their policy positions. They demonstrate that since the 1970’s and 1980’s there 
have been changes and new alignments in the characteristics of core constituencies supporting 
left and right-wing political parties. Accordingly the main constituencies of left-wing parties 
have changed from the typical industrial worker towards highly skilled workers including 
women working in the service sector (Häusermann, 2010). On the other hand, considering 
cultural changes, working class voters tend to support more traditionalist and nationalist 
policies promoting anti-immigration policies in line with populist right political parties (Kriesi 
et al., 2008). Häusermann (2010) argues that these changes in electoral constituencies are 
reflected in the preference formation of political parties and unintended social policy 
preferences regarding the reforms can be explained because they represent different societal 
groups.  
This literature on changing constituencies of political parties is informative about 
novel realignments but does not adequately adress the ways by which these demand side 
changes were translated into social policy preference formation. Considering the growing 
literature, it is important to deliberate on the ways this research will benefit from these 
findings while also clarifying the limits.   
This thesis is in line with the assumption that “politics matters” to understand the 
social policy reforms. This review of the scholarly literature on endogenous factors 
demonstrates various theoretical orientations to assess social policy change and reforms in this 
line of inquiry. I have tried to categorize this rich and large literature according to the main 
focus of each theoretical approach considering also different variants developed in the last two 
decades. Accordingly the theoretical framework will build on the findings of New Politics 
literature that sheds light on the government strategies characterized either by blame 
avoidance such as obfuscation, division, compensation, justification or credit claiming and 
creative opportunism in introducing costly social policy reforms.  
During this review, moreover, I have voiced various issues and questions considering 
the main arguments of each theoretical approach rather than directly refuting or criticizing 
their main findings. As I have emphasized in the Introduction, this rich literature has important 
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implications for empirical research on social policy reforms in Turkey. Accordingly, my 
argument will make use of the findings of the “politics matters” literature emphasizing 
government strategies and political competition as well as integrating the conclusions of those 
who stress institutional rules and veto points. While oriented towards explaining change, it 
will also consider policy legacies, as a theoretical concept helping to understand how past 
policy choices and structures influence change in public policies by limiting policy options.  
All of this has so far, however, only considered domestic politics or the endogenous 
sources of policy change. More is needed. 
I.b. Explaining social policy change with exogenous factors: From 
international constraints to Europeanization  
 
 Here the focus moves to literature on the diffusion of public policies by 
conceptualizing exogenous mechanisms of policy change. It takes the review provided by 
Dobbin et al. (2007) as an organizing framework. They propose four theoretical perspectives 
and related literature: competition theories emphasizing the role of international pressures and 
constraints in orienting policy change; coercion theories that emphasize the conditionality of 
international financial institutions and organizations in offering rewards or threatening 
sanctions in return for policy change; constructivist theories emphasizing the role of epistemic 
communities and international organizations tracing the diffusion of norms; and social 
learning theories for which policy change is related to an internal process of learning from an 
actor’s own experience or from the experience of others. In this section the goal is to consider 
how these theoretical approaches are related to the Europeanization literature and the 
processes of European enlargement. 
The review will follow these four approaches but will concentrate primarily on 
research and studies of social policy and welfare states. By doing so, the overview will 
ultimately identify three factors important for orienting the theoretical framework of this 
research: conditionality imposed by various international organizations (IO) (the external 
incentives model); the role of epistemic communities and international organizations in the 
diffusion of norms; and social learning mechanisms.  
Globalization and social policy: One set of explanations focusing on exogenous 
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factors in social policy change examines how economic globalization pressures welfare states 
in developed and developing countries.  Glatzer and Rueschemeyer (2005: 5-7) identify two 
competing hypothesis to theoretically explain the link between globalization and pressures on 
welfare states. First, globalization puts large welfare states under pressure, forcing social 
spending down in order to free up resources for raising the international competitiveness of 
domestic producers (the ‘efficiency’ hypothesis). The contrary claim sees economic 
internationalization as leading to more social spending because of dislocations, tensions and 
conflicts arising out of greater global economic interdependencies (the ‘compensation’ 
hypothesis). Dobbin et al. (2007) classify these arguments among competition theories, which 
argue that countries, competing for attracting global capital and keeping exports attractive, 
have to implement market-friendly or what are often labeled neo-liberal policies (see also 
Strange, 1996; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). In a similar vein, research adopting the race to 
bottom hypothesis argues that developing countries need to adopt market-oriented policies and 
limit and shape their social protection (Rudra, 2008).  
Comparative research on welfare states has insisted either that international constraints 
lead to market-oriented policy responses in different country settings or that distinct national 
paths are developed due to institutional development over time and the constellation of 
interests at the domestic level in response to international economic pressures or globalization. 
Analysis along this line rests understanding how institutional and economic structures in the 
national context are constrained by international economic pressures, which force adjustments 
in the welfare state and employment structures.25 This argument has been reflected in 
proposals that European integration has influenced social policies of welfare states primarily 
via the market-deepening with the completion of the Single Market and the implementation of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU).26 Scharpf (2002) has framed the indirect effects of 
European economic integration on the social policies of member states as negative integration. 
In this regard, the EMU has been described as the main mechanism involving competitive 
devaluation of national standards (Falkner, 2006). The Single European Act, EMU and 
                                                 
25 Such as Sykes, Palier, and Prior (2001). 
26 There is a large literature on the EMU discussing whether it has institutionalized neoliberalism and monetarism 
in the EU (for example Dyson, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Verdun, 2000).  
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Maastricht during 1980s and 1990s have oriented scholars to emphasize that member states 
are constrained (Ross, 1998a) and have become semi-sovereign in their social policy decisions 
(Leibfried and Pierson 1995).  
Nonetheless, the identification of constellations of production and distribution regimes 
became the key to the abandonment of any convergence hypothesis in favor of systematic 
divergence (Esping-Anderson 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Kitschelt et al 1999). Analysis of welfare regimes or studies focusing on Varieties of 
Capitalism and production regimes focus on the historical legacies of the earlier policy choices 
at the national level in welfare provision. Emphasizing the role of domestic political 
institutions, for example Swank (2002) has argued that they mitigate the pressures for 
retrenchment of social policies initiated by international globalization. His research 
demonstrates that the impact of international capital mobility is associated with retrenchment 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s only in countries with pluralist, majoritarian and fragmented political 
systems and it was in liberal welfare states where the coalition of producers and center-right 
parties with a neo-liberal agenda were successful. On the other hand, capital mobility had a 
more mixed consequence on social protection in conservative welfare states where 
corporatism, centralized states and consensual decision-making mechanisms in coordinated 
economies (Swank, 2002; 2003).  
Following similar theoretical premises, the research on late developers and on East 
Asia, Latin America and in post-communist Eastern Europe (Gough et al., 2004; Gough and 
McGregor, 2007; Haggard and Kaufmann, 2008; Rudra, 2007; Barrientos, 2004; 2009; 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2007) has focused on how legacies and characters of welfare regimes 
condition the social policy reforms under the pressure of international economic forces. 
Turkey has also been examined in this way (for example, Buğra and Adar, 2008; Öniş and 
Fikret, 2009). These authors have argued that Turkey’s encounter with economic globalization 
since the 1980’s has undermined the welfare state’s capacity and the patchy institutional 
framework of social security. In a similar line of inquiry, Rudra (2007) focused on 32 less 
developed countries (LDCs) to emphasize the systematic divergence among their social policy 
regimes. She emphasized a path dependent development of welfare regimes in developing 
world as “the initial choice of development strategy and complementary welfare policies 
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create distributional coalitions, which thereafter have a vested interest in maintaining existing 
institutions and reinforcing them” (Rudra 2007: 391).  
The social policy regimes of developing countries are described as having hybrid 
characteristics, combining a welfare regime and informal security (Gough et al., 2004; 
Barrientos, 2004). Accordingly these countries have developed distinct patterns of welfare 
regimes characterized as “immature” (Gough, 2004) due to their conditions of late 
development, as well as different paths of democratization (Mares and Carnes 2009; Rudra, 
2007; Deacon, 2007). Thus convergence under pressure from exogenous factors seems limited 
(Glatzer and Rueschemeyer, 2005: 215): 
“The actual trajectories of social policy development will rely primarily on 
conditions within countries. Welfare states are in the first instance shaped by the 
wealth of nations, by state-economy relations and power relations within countries. 
If these factors are fundamentally changed by international openness of the 
economy, we should expect fundamental changes in social welfare policy.” 
 
 This line of research on the change of social policies in advanced capitalist countries 
and the developing world has based explanation on the impact of international constraints 
either in the form of globalization or changing economic structures (Mishra, 1999; Rhodes and 
Mény, 1998) or on the distinct national responses developed due to the historical institutional 
legacies (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000; Skyes, Palier and Prior, 2001) adopting theoretical 
premises of neo-institutionalism. Although this literature provides rich theoretical and 
empirical findings, it generally downplays any “politics” shaping the transformations of social 
policies, which might have come from the intertwining of domestic, supranational and 
international processes and the involvement of diverse political and social actors (Hassenteufel 
and Palier, 2001: 24). Therefore this was a limited theoretical understanding of social policy 
change in Europe without analyzing how domestic, supranational and international factors 
interwoven.  
 For their part, scholarly analyses of comparative social policy and European dynamics 
have insisted on “recalibaration”, “redesign”, “modernization’ and “retrenchment” to explain 
and describe the change of welfare states in Europe while considering international pressures 
of globalization, supranational dynamics of European integration and domestic dynamics of 
demographic and societal changes (Esping-Andersen and Palier, 2008; Ferrera, 2008 and 
  36 
2005; Hemerijck, 2007; Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Jenson 
and Sineau, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001). Recently, Guiliano Bonoli and 
David Natali (2012: 301) indicate that the trend in Europe is towards the formation “a new 
welfare state” following three directions of change: less emphasis on income replacement; 
more emphasis on labor market participation and activation; and new investment in human 
capital. These changes are the result of three interconnected processes: cost-containment, re-
commodification and re-calibration. 
The power of conditionality: Another set of factors emphasized by this literature is the 
impact of conditions set by international organizations (IOs) such as the IMF or World Bank 
or supranational organizations such as the EU. Conditionality refers to the use of stipulated 
obligations, either economic or political reforms, as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, 
debt relief, most-favored nation treatment, access to subsidized credit, or membership in 
regional or global organizations (Schmitter, 1996). The early research on conditionality 
focused primarily on IMF and World Bank structural adjustment loans (Collier et al., 1997).  
Countries in need of financial assistance in economic crisis or having difficulty to finance 
adequately through financial markets have benefited especially from IMF loans that were 
made conditional on economic reforms (Vreeland, 2003; Deacon, 2007; Orenstein 2005). In 
addition, scholars argue that powerful countries shaped the IMF’s conditionality and policy 
priorities, imposing neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions on others (Vreeland, 2007).  
Recent research has also focused on the factors that influence the efficiency of 
conditionality, arguing that due to domestic factors such as lack of political will (Vreeland, 
2003, 2007; Cordella and Dell’Ariccia, 2002) or weak institutional capacity, borrowing 
countries often do not comply with IMF conditionality. Moreover research has also argued 
that World Bank as an international organization is different in its use of conditionality while 
insisting on the ownership of programs due its specific organizational structure (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004; Deacon, 2007; Mosley, Noorbakhsh, Paloni, 2004).27  
                                                 
27 It is worth noting that the ILO and OECD are involved as well with social policy. Historically the ILO has been 
active in establishing global rules and norms on social protection including the labor codes and has considered 
social policy and related expenditures as a means of fostering social cohesion (Deacon, 2007). The ILO has used 
its capacity to recommend to effect policy steering in specific countries (Armingeon and Beyeler, 2004). The 
OECD provides policy prescriptions to influence social policies of its member states but does have not the power 
to impose conditions (Marcussen, 2004; Kildal, 2009; Mahon, 2009).  
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Research on European enlargement has characterized conditionality as the main 
mechanism under which the EU influence candidate states for membership.28 In this regard, 
the EU has been the most significant organization that insists on conditions regarding political 
reforms and it has developed a proactive policy of conditionality explicitly focused on the 
promotion of democracy in the states that strive for membership. The EU’s approach to 
candidates, developed during the last enlargement, was founded on asymmetry of power, 
objectivity and conditionality while the Copenhagen criteria have evolved as the key policy 
tool (Schimmelfennig, 2012; Dimitrova, 2011: 222).  
Scholars such as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) and Falkner and Treib (2008) 
have argued that during the pre-accession process, the adaptation performance of the 
candidates can be explained by an external incentives model based on the benefits offered by 
the EU for rule adoption. This is a rationalist bargaining model where the actors are supposed 
to be acting as utility maximizers in order to improve their power and welfare. Other studies 
adopting constructivist theoretical premises of social learning or soft mechanisms such as 
Kubicek (2003) have argued another channel of influence other than external incentives 
model. 
For scholars that focus on the impact of the EU on the social policy developments of 
the candidate states, this is an interactive process comprising different adaptive pressures of 
international institutions with domestic actors and structures rather than a direct institutional 
impact, such as requiring the adaptation of a European social policy model or compliance with 
EU norms (Deacon, 2001; Lendvai, 2004). In this regard, empirical research on how Europe 
can influence the transformation of a candidate state can enrich this line of questioning as 
there is a lack of research on the new social policy regime emerging with candidacy and 
accession (Lendvai, 2004: 319). In fact, concentrating on how the European Union can shape 
social policy choices in candidate countries can clarify the generalization of “international 
constraints” 29 that the transnationalization30 of social policy literature insists upon (Deacon et 
al., 1997: 3-7).  
                                                 
28 It is only since the 2008 crisis that the IMF has imposed conditionality on member states of the EU (Ross, 
2011). 
29 There is no single definition or explanation of international constraints but it is defined as a combination of 
processes including international economic pressure arising from structural economic changes since the 1970’s 
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Accordingly I will survey below the findings of the large literature on EU enlargement 
and conditionality while reweaving it with the Europeanization literature. Furthermore I will 
discuss the specific link between EU candidacy and social policy reforms in the review of 
Europeanization literature considering the findings of the research on the impact of EU 
membership process on candidate states’ social policy.   
Consensus and learning approaches: Constructivist theories emphasize the consensual 
mechanisms and processes of policy diffusion (Dobbin et al., 2007: 450). On the one hand 
research following world polity institutionalism argues global cultural models orient all 
countries toward the adoption of common objectives, forms, and practices (Goodman and 
Jinks, 2003: 1757). Policy-makers adhere to worldwide cultural frames, including the 
institutional features of modern societies without considering their relative positions in the 
world economy or their domestic characteristics. Accordingly the advice and policy proposals 
offered by international organizations can spread not because they are imposed on countries 
but because they are accepted and considered as modern.  
Thomas and Meyer (1984: 476) indicate that social security programs spread in this 
way from European countries towards developing countries. Although world polity 
institutionalism can describe historically the spread of macro policy frames, it fails to specify 
the specific mechanism of diffusion and it does not explain the divergence between different 
country contexts despite the transmission of the similar policies (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 
147).  
                                                                                                                                                         
economic crisis; the institutional rules and norms promoted by Bretton Woods institutions such as IMF and 
World Bank; or economic globalization (Rhodes, 2000). There is a tendency to consider EU integration as a part 
of the economic globalization process (Cerny, 1996; Axtmann, 1998) and use the concepts interchangeably in the 
literature. This can lead to confusion and overgeneralization. Ross (1998b) and Graziano (2003) clarify the 
interrelation between globalization and Europeanization.  For instance, Ross (1998b: 180) argues that during the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the Single Market, European Monetary Union or Maastricht are not so much the result of 
globalization but a contributory factor to globalization itself: “For a variety of reasons, European leaders have 
pursued a course of action which has simulated what globalization is claimed to be doing everywhere within the 
continental boundaries of the EU…putting the structural constraints on what national governments can do.” 
30 The concept of transnationalization refers here to the growing role played by diverse forms of interactions 
between domestic and external actors in defining the direction and the content of the evolution of domestic 
institutions and policies (Bruszt and Holzhacker, 2009: 3). This research follows a similar line of inquiry with the 
literature especially on the transnationalization of rule transfer through EU enlargement (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeir, 2005 and Vachudova, 2005), and considering the interaction of European and domestic levels and 
actors in influencing the rule transfer. The Uses of Europe approach is a specific theoretical approach to 
understanding the transnationalization of policy making.   
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Nonetheless, a similar line of analysis has been adopted by constructivist scholars in 
the field of International Relations that focuses especially on the relationship of international 
organizations and states (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2008; Ruggie, 1998). For 
instance, Finnemore (1996) argues that international organizations may orient states to adopt 
new policy goals, by documenting that UNESCO convinced 75 states from 1955 to 1975 to 
adopt science bureaucracies.  
As Dobbin et al. (2007: 452) emphasize, constructivist approaches try to explain how 
the social acceptance of public policies can occur among various countries. The theoretical 
puzzle is to explain the ways the countries are willing to adopt public policy frames: either 
following leading countries or accepting the norms promoted by a group of experts. Scholars 
emphasize also the diffusion of ideas where policy makers derive ideas around public policy 
experience of different countries either in the light of the new information that expert networks 
is providing or by taking example the successful cases of leading countries. One source of 
social acceptance could be a leading country’s public policies and their success in setting an 
example for the others to follow. An example is the leadership of Germany in influencing the 
EU’s economic and financial policies (Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Ross, 2011).  
Another source of social acceptance could be the role of experts or epistemic 
communities in demonstrating the effects of a new policy. An epistemic community is a 
“network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Haas, 1992: 3). An epistemic 
community can be supported and created in an institutionalized form by international 
organizations. For instance, Armingeon and Beyeler (2004) demonstrate how the OECD has 
formed an international network of economists working with the national governments 
providing ideas and information in the fields of economic and social policies for their member 
states. The role of epistemic communities that provide scientific information and comparable 
data on various policy fields can explain why public policies have spread to states in all levels 
of development. Scholars working on EU integration have explicitly adopted the concept. 
Verdun (1999: 320–2) emphasizes the importance of the Delors Committee in shaping the 
framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU), despite the existence of diverging 
national interest of member states. Concerning the policy orientations towards social inclusion 
and child poverty, Jenson (2010b) demonstrates the role played by the epistemic community 
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composed of researchers and anti-poverty NGOs and governmental agencies in disseminating 
new information and indicators through institutionalized processes with the Lisbon strategy. 
Natali (2008: 205) has also argued that the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in pensions 
and healthcare via specialized committees has allowed the involvement of technical experts. 
Schäfer (2006: 81) indicates that the EU’s OMC and the surveillance and persuasion 
mechanisms of the OECD exemplify the use of scientific knowledge to influence public policy 
development of member states.  
Another non-coercive explanation of policy diffusion and exogenous source of policy 
change comes from learning approaches (already described). Following Hall (1993), Saint-
Martin (2002) argues that social learning does not occur only endogenously, meaning through 
the intellectual and scientific activities of bureaucrats and public institutions, but may 
encompass exogenous learning mechanisms with the involvement of networks of national and 
international experts and actors. Civil society may also have a transnational character, as 
exemplified in Saint-Martin’s research on the emergence of public policies focusing on 
investing in children in Canada and Great Britain during the 1990’s.  
In line with constructivist approaches on the importance of ideational factors in public 
policy change, Dobbin et al. (2007: 450) indicate that “learning theorists point to rational, 
observational deduction vicariously from experiences of others”. The policy transfer literature 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) and research on lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993) insisted that 
learning does not occur only internally in bureaucratic structures but also new information 
from the environment, including the experiences of other countries, international 
organizations, and epistemic communities, can be a source of learning. Following the same 
logic, another source of acceptance of public policies could be socio-cultural linkages between 
peer countries, established either by experts or policy-makers. The most common example is 
the link between in public policy diffusion or mimicking between Britain and the United 
States  (Rose, 1993). Jenson (2010a), while documenting the emergence of social investment 
perspective in social policy and demonstrating its diffusion across Latin America and Europe, 
emphasizes the role played by networks of international agencies, governments, experts, 
intellectuals and NGOs. Anton Hemerijck (2007: 4) underlines various learning processes 
during the recalibration of European welfare states, stating that: 
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“The reform experience over the past two decades was primarily built on processes 
of domestic (crisis induced) lesson drawing. The intensity and the great variety of 
cross-national social and economic policy redirection, bring out the learning 
capacities of European welfare states. In addition, increasingly cross-national 
social learning in the context of the European Union has moved to the forefront. 
The EU, as a national boundary spanning institution, provides an additional vital 
exploratory policy space, inhabited by agents who learn and constantly apply 
lessons from sharing domestic experience and EU social and economic policy 
coordination for cross-national agenda setting.” 
 
The increasing use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) since 2000 and the 
enlargement of the EU have oriented scholarly attention to examine the mechanisms and 
conditions for diffusion. Research on OMCs shows coordination of policies and governance 
based on the assumption of mutual policy learning in policy areas where the EU has limited 
legislative power (Hartlapp, 2009; de la Porte and Pochet, 2012). Research on European 
integration and Europeanization reveals horizontal processes such as OMC and the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) that include a logic of benchmarking, networking and learning 
through the involvement of European-level technical experts with the participation of national 
policy-makers (Pasquier and Radaelli, 2007; Natali, 2009: 815). Jacobsson and Johansson 
(2009) argue that OMC has oriented the reframing of national policy thinking with the 
incorporation of EU concepts and categories in new Member States. 
  In EU enlargement studies, scholars adopting constructivist or sociological 
institutionalism approaches have also argued that the rule transfer of candidate states can 
follow social learning or lesson-drawing explanations through socialization (Coppieters et al. 
2004; Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). According to the 
social learning model based on a logic of appropriateness, if a government identifies with the 
EU and it expresses its commitment to European values and norms and considers these rules 
as legitimate, the likelihood of rule adoption increases (Sedelmeier, 2011). The social learning 
explanation of rule adoption by candidate states considers two paths of influence that could 
work together: one pathway of impact can be channeled following intergovernmental 
interaction and other one is through transnational channel with the involvement of societal 
actors. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) suggest also a third model, lesson drawing, 
which emphasizes the voluntary transfer of rules by non-member states as a response to the 
domestic dissatisfaction. The lesson drawing model differs from the other two models through 
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its focus on the adoption of EU rules as induced by the non-members themselves rather than 
the activities of the EU. According to the lesson drawing model, policy makers in non-member 
states can choose to adopt the EU rules when they face particular problems with existing 
policies and can perceive them as solutions to their problems either through an instrumental 
calculation or as they found appropriate to follow EU solutions.  
The literature on exogenous factors accounting for the diffusion of public policies 
emphasizes: international constraints and pressures related to changing economic context 
orienting change within states; the impact of international organizations via conditionality; the 
role of epistemic communities; and non-coercive mechanisms of diffusion through social 
learning. I have reviewed the findings and the theoretical frameworks of the above-mentioned 
studies on the diffusion of public policies. Accordingly I have voiced various issues and 
questions considering the main arguments of each theoretical approach rather than directly 
refuting or criticizing their main findings.  
The theoretical framework, Uses of Europe, depends on having an analysis of the 
exogenous factors that trigger public policy change. In contrast to the literature on 
international constraints and pressures related to globalization, however, the concepts retained 
from this literature pay more attention to approaches that stress the role of epistemic 
communities and learning, although conditionality in the accession process can not be ignored. 
The Uses of Europe approach is theoretically in line with the findings of the research on 
conditionality considering the compliance of candidate states with EU membership conditions, 
on the role of epistemic communities and on social learning, the latter two insisting on non-
coercive mechanisms for rule adoption by candidate states. The review of the Europeanization 
literature will demonstrate the relevance of adopting a Uses of Europe approach for the 
empirical research because it can bridge exogenous (the EU accession process) and 
endogenous (domestic politics) accounts of social policy reforms.  
II. Europeanization: Towards Uses of Europe 
The literature on the transformative impact of the EU that has come to be referred as a  
Europeanization research agenda and generated much academic research beginning in the 
1990’s by examining the impact of European integration on domestic politics and policies 
(Ladrech, 1994; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Featherstone and 
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Radaelli, 2003; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006).   
Europeanization has developed theoretically in parallel to other sub-fields in political 
science, namely comparative politics and international relations.31 Kevin Featherstone 
indicates that Europeanization has been used with four meanings in the literature: as a 
historical process; as cultural diffusion; as a process of institutional adaptation; and as the 
adaptation of policy and policy processes (Featherstone, 2003: 6). In this section of the 
chapter, I will limit my discussion to recent applications of Europeanization as a process of 
institutional adaptation and the adaptation of policy and policy processes, while prioritizing 
neo-institutionalist approaches (Jenson and Mérand, 2010; Featherstone, 2003: 2-3).  
It is important to emphasize that the first generation of Europeanization research 
insisted upon modeling the impact of adaptive pressures coming from the EU (Mény, Muller 
and Quermonne, 1996; Goetz and Hix, 2000; Cowles, Caparoso and Risse, 2001). These 
studies conceptualized domestic policy adjustments related to fit-misfit between EU policies, 
legislation and directives and domestic policies and legislation, expecting a certain level of 
convergence or harmonization. This first generation of Europeanization studies concentrated 
on the process of national adjustment to the EU, although they differed over which factors 
explain better the policy change in the process of adjustment. Claims were made for the 
primacy of EU pressures, of “fit-misfit” between EU-level policies and national policy 
legacies and preferences, and of actors’ problem-solving capacity in a given political-
institutional setting (see Héritier 2001; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003). Recent research has expanded attention to Europeanization into the candidate 
states, analyzing the role of the EU in policy changes occurring in the accession process 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
The Europeanization research agenda from its start has been shaped by definitional 
                                                 
31 There are two important intellectual sources of Europeanization studies: Gourevitch’s (1978) second image 
reversed argument and Putnam’s (1988) two-level games. On the one hand, Gourevitch focused on the domestic 
characteristics of states as the primary determinant of foreign policy, examining the impact of the international 
system – the distribution of power among states and the economic opportunities offered by the global system –  
on domestic political structures and domestic politics.  On the other hand, Putnam examined the interactions of 
domestic and international politics during diplomatic negotiations using the case of 1978 Bonn Accord between 
United States, Japan and West Germany. According to his claim, a negotiation at the international level takes 
place simultaneously with negotiation at the domestic level. The two-level approach recognizes the inevitability 
of domestic conflict on the definition of national interest and accepts that domestic and international imperatives 
are simultaneously constructed through win sets. 
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debates (Radaelli, 2003). Definitional debates are important as they provide theoretical affinity 
(Pasquier and Radaelli, 2007) and prevent concept stretching (Radaelli, 2003). Considering 
two variants of institutionalism in Europeanization studies (sociological and historical 
institutionalism), this study adopts Radaelli’s encompassing definition of Europeanization.  It 
takes into account the formal and informal rules and the cognitive dimension of public 
policies, giving the analyst the opportunity to include elements that cannot be defined as direct 
adaptational pressures. According to the definition of Radaelli (2003: 30):   
“Europeanization deals with the impact of the European Union on domestic policy, 
politics, and policies. It refers to processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in EU processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” 
II.a. Neo-institutionalism and the Europeanization research agenda 
There are strong connections between neo-institutionalism and the Europeanization 
research agenda (Goetz and Hix, 2000) reflecting the institutionalist turn in political science. 
Neo-institutionalism is characterized by three variants (rational choice institutionalism; 
historical institutionalism; sociological institutionalism) (Hall and Taylor, 1998) each with a 
distinctive set of hypotheses and insights about Europeanization. The theoretical framework 
established so far in this research has made extensive use of the premises of historical 
institutionalism for explaining the emergence of the welfare state and change in social 
policies. In this section the aim is to clarify the link between historical and sociological 
institutionalism and Europeanization following recent theoretical developments in the field 
(Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein, 2001; Jacquot and Woll, 2003; Bulmer et al., 2007; 
Salgado and Woll, 2004; Pasquier, 2005; Jenson and Mérand, 2010; Woll and Jacquot, 2010, 
Mérand, 2011).  
This does not mean that rational choice institutionalism is refuted; we have already 
decided that formal institutions and veto-points are theoretically salient to understand 
domestic change. Moreover the literature review on Europeanization will refer to studies that 
adopt rational-choice institutionalist premises, which provide important findings on 
Europeanization. Nonetheless, we find certain problems in rational choice institutionalism 
based on modeling the impact of goodness of fit arguments for Europeanization, assumptions 
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about actors’ preferences and interests, and considering institutions as pay-off matrixes 
(Jenson and Mérand, 2010) for responding to the research question at hand. The main themes 
drawn from sociological and historical institutionalisms’ treatment of Europeanization relate 
to the role of actors and the conceptualization of the impact of the EU on the domestic level.  
Because the European political space constitutes “the most densely institutionalized 
international organization in the world” (Pollack, 2004: 137), the understanding of 
Europeanization is often grounded in neo-institutionalism’s theoretical agenda (Stone Sweet, 
Sandholtz and Fligstein, 2001: 3), an important aspect of this institutionalization is “the polity 
creating” aspect of the EU. It is a multi-level polity, with subnational, national and 
supranational actors interacting in complex ways (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Accordingly an 
important aspect of institutionalization in the EU is the political space that exists for actors 
that are not only constrained by rules but also provided with opportunities.32 This reflects a 
more sociological understanding of the agency-structure issue (Jenson and Mérand, 2010; 
Woll and Jacquot, 2010).  
This perspective on institutionalization at the EU level prioritizes the interactive 
process between actors and institutions (Mérand, 2011). As Pasquier and Radaelli (2007: 38) 
emphasize “domestic actors are at the same time filters and users of European norms and 
rules,” re-appropriating rules and norms to implement their own policies (Pasquier, 2005). 
According to Woll and Jacquot (2010: 113), their sociological perspective considers the EU as 
an institutional source providing ideational and tangible resources where actors can seize them 
and use them strategically: 
“The debate that emerged under the heading ‘Europeanization’ goes beyond the 
study of how supranational institutions exert adaptive pressures: it also asks what 
the relationship is between institutions and individual actors, how much agency 
remains, and how institutions evolve. To move beyond the misfit model to study 
not just institutional constraints, but also informal politics and the cognitive 
dimension of multi-level policymaking allows understanding of instances of 
                                                 
32 For example, examining an area in which there was no European competence (family policy) George Ross 
(2001) found that the EU Commission and European Court of Justice were able to generate some policy 
competencies in family policy and childcare during 1980’s and 1990’s, pushing towards harmonization among 
member states. This was accomplished through the political work of European institutions and policy 
entrepreneurs despite the lack of constitutional competences and the opposition of certain member states. This 
research orients us to consider in a more dynamic way the impact of the EU emphasizing complex processes of 
policy making in the densely institutionalized EU environment with the involvement of various European 
institutions and non-governmental actors without only evaluating the policy outcomes. 
  46 
deliberate policy changes in the absence of adaptive pressures. The European 
Union can become a vector of change by providing new resources, references and 
policy frames, which national policy actors use strategically. It therefore becomes 
crucial to understand what motivates these different strategies and to study the 
action of individual participants in the policy process. This ties EU studies to 
fundamental questions of institutionalist analysis and raises important 
epistemological and methodological issues, in particular by shedding light on the 
tensions between structure and agency or continuity and change.” 
 
The above studies propose a different theoretical understanding for actors’ intention 
and social interactions than one based on rational choice institutionalism’s explanation relying 
on cost-benefit calculations and strategic action built upon by the logic of consequences or 
constructivist arguments on norms and identities and social action shaped by the logic of 
appropriateness (Saurugger and Mérand, 2010). A number of other studies reject any binary 
modeling of strategic action and social interaction. According to Woll (2008), Woll and 
Jacquot (2010) and Jenson and Mérand (2010), interests and preferences should not be treated 
as given. What needs to be analyzed is how the interaction of actors in an institutionalized 
environment combined with their cognitive and normative frames and social representations 
on the issues at hand shape the formation of their interests and positioning them towards 
others.  
In line with this sociological approach to Europeanization, Mérand (2011: 182) 
suggests a focus on practices and to observe what actors do rather than to presuppose their 
preference or analyze the institutional configuration. This involves considering that actors 
react to each other in any policy process and adopt their practices according to the sequence of 
events. Furthermore Mérand emphasizes that actors are also creative with policies, can reshape 
the preset goals in the policymaking process and transform them while implementing policy. 
Concentrating on the practices of the actors is an important insight for the Uses of Europe 
approach and for the empirical research of this thesis.  
Frameworks drawing on historical institutionalism in Europeanization research tend to 
find that variation in the acceptance and transposition of EU norms by candidate countries is 
explained by distinct national traditions and the path-dependent nature of domestic institutions 
and policies (Jacoby, 2004; Vachudova, 2005). This insight has led to conceptualizing the 
impact of the accession process on candidate states through resonance or historical legacies 
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(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).33 Such analyses lead us to consider the timing and 
the temporal context of the relationship between the EU and the domestic level taking into 
account the historical legacies in analyzing the impact of Europe. 
This research will examine policy legacies of domestic policies and politics to assess 
the ways the EU has an impact in the social policy reforms in Turkey. 
II.b. What is the link between Europeanization and welfare state 
transformation? Diverse theoretical angles and varying empirical findings 
The impact of the EU on transformations in the social policy sectors of pensions, 
health and social protection in member states was treated as marginal and neglected in the 
literature until 2000’s (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2001: 23). On the one hand studies 
emphasized the lack of competence of the EU in the main domains of social policy (Kvist, 
2004: 302; Hantrais, 2000; Scharpf, 2002; Streeck, 1995). On the other hand, the source of any 
impact was considered to be confined to the market deepening of European integration with 
the completion of the Single Market and the implementation of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU).  
Empirical research on the enlargement of the EU towards Southern European countries 
(Spain, Portugal and Greece) and on the Eastern enlargement has contradictory findings, 
without agreeing to what effect, to what extent and how the EU can influence social policy. 
Guillén, Alvarez and Adao (2003) analyze comparatively how the accession and membership 
to the EU has influenced the redesign of Spanish and Portuguese welfare states through direct 
(conditionality, economic and financial pressures, and EU directives and acquis) and indirect 
(policy recommendations and models, ideas, discourse and problem definitions) channels. 
They document considerable approximation to EU standards in the redesign of Spanish and 
Portuguese welfare states, in terms of quantitative indicators of social expenditures and 
qualitative indicators of social policy program designs in the field of social protection, labor 
insertion policies, social services, healthcare and vocational training. Guillén, Alvarez and 
                                                 
33 There are various studies drawing on historical institutionalism in an effort to understand temporal aspects of 
European integration, including phenomena such as feedback effects, lock-ins, and path-dependence (Pierson 
1996b; Armstrong and Bulmer 1998) but they focus on institutionalization at the EU level rather than 
Europeanization at the domestic level of member and candidate states. 
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Adao (2003) found that domestic factors were most significant in the redesign of Spanish and 
Portuguese welfare states, without downplaying the role of accession in shaping those 
domestic level factors. Accordingly the EU’s membership conditions and the directives have 
influenced the procedural aspect of reforms. The authors argue that the indirect or soft 
influence of EU recommendations on social policy have exercised even more substantive 
impact on the reforms than direct influences, especially considering the cognitive dimension 
of core-policy beliefs and problem definitions. In a similar way, Guillén and Alvarez (2004: 
298) have focused on the EU’s impact on the Spanish welfare state and argue that “becoming 
a member of such a supranational institution has had a significant effect on the evolution of 
identities and attitudes towards social policy and in the perception of social problems.” 
Guillén, Alvarez and Adao (2003: 263) emphasize the close connection between the redesign 
of the welfare state in Spain and the democratization process, indicating that “in Spain, the 
amelioration and expansion of social protection systems was made synonymous with 
democratic modernization.” The accession of the Southern European countries to the EU has 
been defined as an important factor in explaining the evolution towards more universal and 
right-based social policies through “cognitive Europeanization” in the restructuring of welfare 
regimes of these countries (Guillén, Alvarez and Adao, 2003; Guillén and Alvarez, 2004). 
However the research on Eastern enlargement is less conclusive about the impact of 
EU membership on the transformation of social policies and welfare states and contrary to 
optimistic expectations (de la Porte and Deacon, 2004; Ghelab and Vaughan-Whitehead, 
2003; Ferge, 2002; Ferge and Tausz, 2001). De la Porte and Deacon (2004: 122) focused on 
how far “the EU’s external dimension of social policy has had an impact on social policy 
reform in Lithuania when it was a candidate for EU membership”. They found that the impact 
of the EU was minimal, as the main programs to support social policy reforms and to enhance 
the institutional capacities were not appropriately designed for the candidate countries. They 
conclude that the EU’s main instruments, the Pologne-Hongrie, Aide à la reconstruction 
économique (PHARE) programs, had a rather weak effect on social policy changes of 
accession countries during the Eastern enlargement. In a similar vein, Ferge (2001) analyzes 
the Accession Country Reports for 10 countries during the Eastern enlargement and found that 
social policy has been minimally addressed in the Commission reports. Falkner and Treib 
(2008) evaluated the compliance of certain accession countries with the social dimension of 
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the acquis communautaire as weak. Other research suggests that the IMF and World Bank 
have been more influential actors in shaping the reform process in post-communist countries, 
with their structural economic policy reform agenda (Deacon et al., 1997; Ferge and Tausz, 
2002; Fenger, 2007).  
Overall the conclusion seems to be that European level had little or no influence on the 
recent transformations of welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe, and reference to EU 
integration or European policies seems unnecessary for an understanding of welfare state 
changes (Fenger, 2007; Ferge, 2001). However, this reasoning usually stands on an 
assumption that that if European integration or European policies had any influence on 
national welfare reforms, there should be some convergence of the welfare systems. As we 
will see, other assumptions are possible. 
Ana Guillén and Bruno Palier (2004: 207) argue that the impact of the EU on social 
policy developments in new member states can take four possible directions: it might lead to a 
liberalization of social Europe; it can lead to a “market without regulation” scenario; it could 
lead to efforts to catch-up with old member states; or it could lead to a “race to the bottom” 
scenario which would concern both old and new members and would be the consequence of 
the refusal of existing members to provide the necessary means for the development of the 
new ones and the application of a strategy of competitive social-dumping and social-
devaluation.  
Guillén and Palier’s theoretical approach opens the door to treating Europeanization 
and welfare state transformation as a puzzle. They direct us back then to the discussions of 
kinds of change (for example retrenchment, recalibration and so on) already discussed above. 
They also direct us forward towards consideration of the literature, developed within an actor-
centered form of neo-institutionalism, on the Uses of Europe approach. 
II.c. Europeanization becomes the “Uses of Europe” 
The EU offers various resources that cannot be solely theoretically conceptualized as 
legally binding formal rules and regulations. The impact of the EU on the social policy 
developments of the candidate states is better framed as an interactive process comprising 
different adaptive pressures of international institutions with domestic actors and structures, 
such as requiring the adoption of a version of the European social policy model or the 
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compliance with the EU conditions on social policy. 
A set of analyses that undertake a dynamic understanding on how the EU plays a part 
in shaping national measures of reform is suggested by Zeitlin (2009). This study examines 
how the proposals and targets of the OMC are interpreted in the reforms rather than looking on 
a top-down manner on EU directives. Their conclusion is that the process of Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) and the European Employment Strategy (EES) did not lead to 
convergence of European welfare states nor did social and employment policies stay on frozen 
paths either. Rather, these policy initiatives have led to “continuous emergence of new forms 
of practical diversity through the creative adaptation of common European principles and 
policy approaches by domestic actors to suit their distinct circumstances” (Zeitlin, 2009: 234). 
Zeitlin emphasizes that the most important mechanism of OMC influence on national social 
and employment policies operates through creative appropriation by domestic actors (Zeitlin, 
2009: 231).  Other studies point to actors at the national level using OMC processes, European 
concepts, objectives, guidelines, targets, indicators, performance comparisons and 
recommendations as a selective amplifier (Visser, 2005) leading to a leverage effect (Erhel et 
al. 2005), that is as a resource for their own purposes.  
Such a focus on interaction and cognitive factors, informs the Europeanization research 
agenda suggested by Paolo Graziano, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier (2011), known as the 
Uses of Europe approach.  They focus on where, what and how national actors deploy EU 
resources, references, and developments as a strategic device for their own strategies within 
the dynamics of national reforms. This is not, therefore, a top-down approach looking for the 
direct impact of Europe imposed by the EU institutions with hard law or directives. An 
important aspect of Graziano, Jacquot and Palier’s (2011: 6) theoretical framework is the way 
that they conceptualize theoretically and methodologically the interaction of the national and 
European level in explaining welfare state change:  
“It can not easily be contested that the evolution of welfare states and their reform 
can be understood and explained primarily looking at the national level: the 
origins, the timing, the actors, the political and social conflicts, the specific 
measures vary from one country to the other, even from one sector to another, and 
have national traits and specificities that can not be ignored. Hence, it is quite 
difficult to argue that any national reform in the main areas of welfare 
(unemployment insurance, employment policies, pension and health care polices, 
care policies, etc.) has been implemented in any given European country because it 
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was imposed by European institutions. Any attempt to look at the Europeanization 
of welfare reforms with this top down perspective and type of question (is Europe 
the cause of national welfare reforms?) will have hard times in seeing any strong 
influence of the EU. As it is well known, there has been no hard law, no directives 
in the ‘traditional’ fields of the welfare state (with the exception of vocational 
training and other employment sub-policy fields), and in the literature limited 
empirical evidence for direct EU influence on national welfare reforms can be 
found.” 
 
This approach has been developed to respond to the question “How does the EU 
matter?” This is a key puzzle in the Europeanization literature (Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 117). 
As an analytical and theoretical tool, the Uses of Europe approach focuses on particular 
resources such as legal, financial, institutional, political and cognitive provided by the 
European integration process and the intersection of supranational and national level with the 
involvement of various types of actors in the policy process. This approach orients us to 
examine “the interaction between European integration and its effects on the domestic level” 
(Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 117).  
Originally Jacquot and Woll (2003: 9) defined the notion of using Europe as a set of 
social practices by national actors who seize the EU as a set of institutional, ideological, 
political or organizational opportunities. European integration and the EU institutional 
structures provide national actors with legal resources such as directives, budgetary resources 
such as the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, cognitive resources such as policy 
frames, political resources such as blame avoidance arguments, or constraints such as the 
Maastricht criteria of the EMU. These can be deployed in processes of national policy-
making.  
However Woll and Jacquot (2010: 116) also emphasize that “resources and constraints 
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for strategic behavior. They are only a contextual 
element that usages are based on; actors intentionally transform them into political practices in 
order to reach their goals.” Jacquot (2008: 21) argues that the Uses of Europe approach can be 
applied to welfare state reforms and she conceptualizes the EU’s policies, developments, and 
decisions as institutional, ideological, political or organizational resources providing 
opportunities for domestic actors. 
Caune, Jacquot and Palier (2011) suggest that five different types of resources are 
supplied by the EU and may be deployed in national processes of social policy making: legal 
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(treaties, directives, case law from the Court of Justice); financial (European Funds); 
institutional (European foundations, observatories, committees, agencies); political (European 
Council decisions); cognitive (guidelines, statements, White Papers). It is an analytical way of 
conceptualizing EU social policy interventions in fields such as free movement of workers, 
health and safety at work, equal treatment, employment, social inclusion, pensions and health 
as resources that have ideational, interest and institutional based character.34 
Considering the EU’s approach to social and employment policies, these arguments are 
convincing that it is more helpful to consider EU resources in a multi-level governance system 
rather than to expect a European Social Model to be imposed on all member states and leading 
to convergence on social policy and employment policy fields. 
The Uses of Europe approach focuses on the type of influence that the EU exerts, but 
does so by linking national reforms with European developments and tracing the uses of EU 
resources at the domestic level. A key dimension to understand the relationship between 
Europeanization and policy change and to analyze the meaning of a reform is “the political 
work of actors” (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011: 13). Jacquot suggests that concentrating 
on practices, and thus on use, and on actors permits concentrating on political action or 
political work and on the substance of political relations (Jacquot, 2008: 22).  
This dissertation examines how the actors use the European norms, opportunities, 
constraints, rules, and discourse as resources to advance their agenda or interests. Following 
this theoretical perspective, we will first describe and categorize the various resources 
supplied during the EU membership process on the social policy domain for Turkey. On the 
specific analysis of social policy reforms, we will concentrate on the different uses of these 
resources by Turkish actors who seized them and transformed them. 
Woll and Jacquot argue that three types of uses of Europe are prevalent in the actions 
of domestic actors: cognitive use, strategic use and legitimizing use. They aim to create 
encompassing typologies of uses that could be employed in the analysis of various policy 
domains as well of various reform processes.  Cognitive use refers to “the understanding and 
                                                 
34 The five types of EU resources include legally binding regulations and financial resources, in line with 
rationalist and formal institutionalism; the construction and definition of EU norms and rules by indirect, soft and 
cognitive means, in line with constructivist institutionalism; political resources for the national level, in line with 
historical institutionalism. 
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interpretation of a political subject where these ideas supplied by the EU institutions and 
integration serve as a persuasion mechanism” (Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 116). This involves 
communication of ideas and expertise through argumentation, framing and problem building; 
and it is mostly observed in the framing phase of the policy cycle and reform process 
engendering definition of problems and articulation of policy alternatives.  
Strategic use refers to the use of European resources by national actors for specific and 
defined goals, aiming to influence policy decision or to increase actors’ access to the policy or 
reform process. Accordingly, strategic use can serve to aggregate interests for building 
coalitions for specific policy reforms involving the use of institutional, legal and budgetary 
resources mainly by ministerial and bureaucratic actors. They claim that such uses usually 
occur in the middle of the policy process (Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 116).  
Legitimizing uses include cognitive and strategic elements that take place when 
political decisions need to be transmitted to the public. They legitimize political choices by 
communicating implicitly or explicitly the image of “Europe” as a model and source of good 
practices. There may also be constraints such as those attributed to the accession conditions or 
Maastricht criteria used to justify decisions (Woll and Jacquot, 2010). These uses are deployed 
at the end of the policy process where the practices of blame avoidance and credit claiming 
may be used by governments. The complex set of blame avoidance practices such as 
obfuscation, compensation and division and credit claiming practices can be employed by 
actors in order to increase political and social credibility and consensus for reforms, whether 
promised or implemented.  
The extent of and capacity for using Europe is not confined only to governments; it is 
important to analyze how domestic actors including opposition political parties, labor unions 
and employer organizations are involved with uses of European resources for power 
enhancement purposes in national politics (Jacquot, 2008; Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011: 
11). Considering various domestic actors’ uses of Europe either in the parliamentary arena, 
such as government and opposition political parties, in the corporatist arena, such as union 
confederations, business associations, or in the bureaucratic arena will give better accounts of 
the role played by EU resources in the social policy reform process. 
Focusing on the Turkish labor law reform (2003), restructuring of the employment 
agency (2003) and social security reform (from 2006 to 2008), this research framework will 
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allow me to disentangle how various political, legal, cognitive, and budgetary EU resources 
are used by domestic actors during the transformation of institutional and political settings of 
social policies. 
III. Enriching the Uses of Europe approach: Mobilizing 
theoretical tools from the literature on exogenous and endogenous 
dynamic of welfare state change 
I propose to adopt the Uses of Europe approach as a better way of understanding 
Europeanization than theoretical approaches focused on fit-misfit, compliance, or other top-
down conceptualizations. This approach provides a dynamic understanding of the impact of 
the EU by focusing on the domestic actors’ use of various European resources. The approach 
grew out of neo-institutionalism.  
The approach uses both deductive and inductive theoretical reasoning. Accordingly 
Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011) argue that it is more likely that EU policies and 
institutions will be considered seriously and constitute a fundamental motivation of and point 
of reference for the political behavior of national actors if a country is under scrutiny by the 
EU. This orients us to look at various EU resources and their evolution depending on the 
institutional and accession context.  
The first research hypothesis is concerned with general political context and 
relationship of each country with Europe indicated by the elite’s attitude and public opinion 
towards EU. The causal assumptions are the following: if elites and public opinion are in favor 
of Europe, we expect to observe positive and explicit uses of Europe with major changes in 
the social policy field examined. If both elites and public opinion are Eurosceptic, it is 
expected that there is either no use of Europe or a denial of any use. This implies that limited 
or no EU-driven policy change may exist in some social policy fields. Graziano, Jacquot and 
Palier (2011) argue that there could be mixed combinations in-between these two ends of the 
continuum.  
The second research hypothesis proposed by Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011: 8) 
relates the amount and type of EU resources to the institutional relationship between a country 
and EU. This involves examining the following research hypothesis: a candidate country will 
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be subject to more scrutiny by the EU institutions with the evolution of the institutional 
relationship when there would be more resources available for domestic reforms. Accordingly 
it is important to understand how EU resources change and uses evolve with the changing 
institutional relationship between Turkey and EU. The examination of this research hypothesis 
aims to identify specific resources as legal, financial, institutional, political and cognitive 
linked to social policies and welfare state in Turkey and their evolution in time.  
Accordingly both hypotheses orient us to examine the contextual elements that are the 
necessary conditions for various uses of Europe. Considerable political and public support for 
the EU and adequate EU resources in a domestic context are “contextual elements that usages 
are based on; actors intentionally transform them into political practices in order to reach their 
goals” (Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 116).  
Yet, the Uses of Europe approach provides mainly a descriptive explanation of the 
context in which cognitive, strategic and legitimizing uses of European resources by domestic 
actors as an answer to the “when” research question about the impact of the EU. It does not 
specifically address why or how a certain type of use of Europe is adopted by specific 
domestic actors in a policy sector. Although it develops theoretical explanations of the context 
for uses of Europe via these two research hypotheses, it is less informative about the process 
(why and how) of social policy reforms related to the uses of Europe.  
My goal in this research is, then, to deepen and enrich the explanatory power of the 
Uses of Europe approach by mobilizing theoretical tools and concepts developed in the 
welfare state change literature drawing on the findings of the research on formal institutions, 
partisan politics and policy legacies.  
 My claim is that it is also important to analyze the strategic behavior of actors in using 
EU resources in the reforms process in more detail, moving beyond the context of the 
institutional relationship between the actors of a member state or candidate country and the 
EU. 
Therefore, beyond examining the two hypotheses put forward by the originators of the 
approach, the following proposition will be examined inductively by my case studies: Whether 
Europe is used in a cognitive, strategic or legitimizing way depends on the domestic actors’ 
interest and coalition-building strategies in the reform process rather than on the stage of 
policy change.  
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The findings of institutionalist analysis of social policy by Bonoli (2001) for example, 
uncovered the constitutional rules of law making and the existence of veto points that shape 
the power concentration or fragmentation of the executive branch allowing the implementation 
of its social policy priorities. Such an institutionalist analysis can shed light on the timing of 
the reform process and can clarify the institutional conditions for policy change that are 
necessary conditions for implementing reforms. When the institutional conditions are 
characterized by a large parliamentary majority that allows high power concentration for the 
executive branch, governments may bargain more in the corporatist arena rather than with 
opposition parties, developing strategies to communicate policy choices to the electorate that 
could include various uses of Europe. It is also important to consider veto points such as 
Constitutional Courts or the Presidency that could influence the strategies of governments, 
opposition political parties and other actors and their uses of Europe.  
Acknowledging that politics matters, it is important to analyze the context of party 
competition and the strategies by governments, political parties and domestic actors. The 
social policy reforms under empirical scrutiny in this research (labor regulation reform in 
2003, restructuring of the employment agency in 2003 and social security reform in 2008) 
were introduced by the AKP government that has positioned itself as “reformer”. By analyzing 
the context of political competition, this research will discuss first the dynamics of party 
competition in terms of “programmatic” and “particularistic” character, as related to right and 
left on the political spectrum. This will be complemented by focusing on political competition 
on the Turkish political spectrum between “conservative globalists” and “defensive 
nationalists” in the last decade that help to understand the AKP government’s approach to EU 
and its uses of Europe despite its conservative roots in the Turkish political context. This 
analysis tries to understand as well as the social policy preference of the AKP by looking to 
certain electoral and social group bases.  
Following the New Politics literature, it is important to analyze the blame avoidance or 
credit claiming practices of governments and the political elite that calculate the cost and 
benefit of the policy preferences in terms of electoral politics and involved into various 
struggles and bargains with corporatist actors such as unions or business associations. Whether 
uses of Europe are part of blame avoidance or credit claiming practices can have different 
consequences for the reform process, the content of the reforms and its consequences for 
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policy change. Even the discursive uses of the European political resources by governmental 
actors can allow legitimizing the reform. Opposition political parties and other domestic actors 
can also use Europe in order to rhetorically entrap the governments in the EU membership 
process. Moreover the uses of European budgetary, legal and cognitive resources by state 
actors and agencies can have more long-term consequences with the introduction of new 
problem definitions and the institutionalization of new policy instruments and frames. 
Accordingly the question of who is involved with the uses of Europe is also crucial to answer 
in order make sense of the consequences of using Europe. 
The concept of policy legacy fits within historical institutionalism and policy regime 
analysis but allows as well assessment of particular conditions and the direction of 
institutional change while considering the historical characteristics and the evolution of 
institutional structures. This will allow documentation of how inherited policy structures have 
shaped available reform options for policy makers.  
In line with this theoretical adjustment of the Uses of Europe approach, the next two 
chapters present the institutional configuration from which the two reforms emerged and the 
resources available to all actors during the accession process to the European Union. 
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Chapter II. The Timing of the Reforms: Institutional 
Conditions for Policy Change and the Political Context of 
Using Europe 
 
This chapter addresses the institutional factors and political context that conditioned the timing 
and implementation of the social policy reforms, making them possible to be implemented 
only after 2001. Although reforms in these areas had been on the agenda in Turkey since the 
mid-1990’s, the coalition governments did not successfully pass modernization reforms of 
social security, employment agency and labor law during those years (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 
2006; Yakut-Çakar, 2007). The analysis of institutional factors and political context can shed 
light on this puzzle, both on the reasons for the lack of reforms in the 1990’s and why they 
took place after 2001.  
According to the institutionalist explanations of social policy change presented in 
Chapter I (Bonoli, 2001; Huber et al. 1993; Lijphart, 1999), institutional structures that allow 
power concentration of the executive branches are more likely to enable implementation of 
social policy priorities of a government. Constitutional rules can concentrate power in the 
hands of the executive as well as establishing veto points. The 1982 Turkish Constitution set 
such parameters, including veto points that could block legislation proposed by the executive 
as well as laws passed by the parliament. Such institutional parameters set the necessary or 
minimum conditions for policy change and public policy reforms.  
Relying on the description of the institutional configuration is not, of course, 
synonymous with conceptualizing the direct effect of institutional design on policy outcomes 
(Bonoli, 2001: 264). It is also important to understand the conjuncture shaping the strategies of 
actors in the political and institutional configuration. Therefore this chapter examines partisan 
politics and party competition that has shaped the social policy developments from the late 
1980’s to 1990’s, in order to characterize the relationship between electoral politics, political 
parties and their social policy preferences. 
Finally, Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011) argue that the national elite’s attitudes 
towards Europe and public opinion about EU influence the uses of Europe. Thus, these are 
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also documented in order to understand the political context of Turkey’s relationship with the 
EU. These contextual elements set the necessary conditions for using Europe in various ways 
(Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 116).  
Overall, this chapter provides the information needed to understand the content and 
sequencing of social policy making in Turkey, via an analysis of the institutional 
configuration, the characteristics and political orientation of the domestic political actors, and 
the state of opinion of key actors and the public.  
I. The institutional context of Turkish social policy making: The 
constitutional framework and veto points  
 
This section examines the constitutional framework and veto points that were 
established by the 1982 Constitution that set the parameters for power concentration or 
fragmentation of governments. This will provide an understanding of the strength and 
influence of institutional parameters in the process of social policy reforms, including the 
balance of power between the presidency, National Security Council, executive, parliament.  
A new political regime was institutionalized with the 1982 Constitution set in place by 
the military junta in power between 1980 and 1983. This Constitution entrenched the legacy of 
a very strong state tradition, reflecting the particularities of Turkey’s modernization 
experience.35 The full consequences of the 1980 coup d’État and the related historical process 
cannot be covered in this section, but a brief overview of the historical background with 
relevant institutional and political changes in this period will be provided.  
The coup on 12 September 1980 and the resulting military regime aimed to establish 
order and security, via the National Security Council36 (NSC) and writing a new Constitution 
to replace that of 1961 (Özbudun, 2011: 26).37 The Constitution was prepared by the NSC and 
                                                 
35 On Turkey’s state tradition and modernization experience, see Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997). 
36 The National Security Council (NSC) was an advisory body created under the 1961 Constitution and composed 
of certain ministers and the highest-ranking commanders of the armed forces. This composition gave the military 
a legitimate role in the formulation of national security policies.  
37 One of the main rationales for the coup d’État given by generals (such as General Kenan Evren) was the high 
level of civil violence between different ideological fractions on the right and left, which had killed over 5,000 
people and injured nearly 20,000 from 1977 to 1979 (Jacoby, 2004). 
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by a Constituent Assembly whose members were selected by the NSC. No political party 
members were represented in the Assembly, as these individuals were banned from politics by 
law.38  
The 1982 Constitution instituted major changes compare to 1961 Constitution. The 
President of the Republic was assigned substantive powers. Compared to the 1961 
Constitution, the President acquired new powers such as appointing high-court judges39 and 
university administrators40, instructing the State Supervisory Council to carry out inquiries, 
investigations and inspections and gained an executive role (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 
1; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 21).  
With the 1982 Constitution, the executive branch and the Council of Ministers also 
gained power in its relation with the parliament (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). 
Furthermore decrees, which had the force of law and had been used very rarely and only under 
exceptional circumstances for bypassing parliamentary control until the 1982 Constitution, 
became an institutionalized practice. Only after the decree was adopted and implemented, it 
was subject to legislative review and judiciary process.41 This modification allowed the 
executive branch more room to increase the pace and scope of reforms and institutional 
changes.  
Another important characteristic of the 1982 Constitution is the institutionalization of 
the National Security Council (NSC), where the military members held a majority. The NSC 
became more tightly linked to the government.  The Prime Minister and Ministers were 
members and NSC decisions were required to be considered by the Council of Ministers 
                                                 
38 The 1982 Constitution was ratified in a constitutional referendum combined with the election as President of 
General Kenan Evren. These campaigns were conducted under political bans enforced by the military regime. 
There were several undemocratic practices in the ratification of the 1982 Constitution. The military regime 
allowed only a one-sided and pro-Constitution campaign, conducted by General Kenan Evren, the head of state 
and president of the NSC. Moreover the military regime had announced that a no vote in the referendum would 
mean the continuation of the status quo indefinitely.  In the end, 91.37% of referendum voters accepted the 
Constitution.  
39  The President of the Republic had the power to appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court.  
40 The President was given substantive power to appoint the president and members of the Council of Higher 
Education, an institution established by the 1982 Constitution. 
41 By virtue of Article 91, the Council of Ministers could adopt decrees having the force of law.  However, 
fundamental rights, individual rights and duties encompassed by the First and Second Chapter of the Second Part 
of the Constitution, and political rights and duties listed in the Fourth Chapter cannot be regulated, amended or 
abolished by these types of decrees, except during periods of martial law and states of emergency. Decrees with 
the force of law enter into force on the day of their publication in the Official Gazette. 
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(Yücel, 2002; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997).42 The Constitution assigned to the Constitutional 
Court and the State Security Courts43 the role of protecting the integrity of the state, law and 
order, and the national interest, including the principles of Kemalism. The Parliamentary 
Election Act of 1983 and related Law on Political Parties set several legal restrictions on the 
establishment of political parties, especially on the return of banned politicians and political 
parties, and introduced a 10% threshold of votes received for a political party to be represented 
in parliament (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). The electoral system was based on the 
d’Hondt method of proportional representation. The 1982 Constitution also restricted the 
freedom of association curbing the legal rights of civil society institutions such as trade 
unions, professional organizations or voluntary associations.  
The legislative process institutionalized by the 1982 Constitution established a 
parliamentary system of government with a unicameral Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) with 550 members44 elected for a five-year term 
(Sayarı and Esmer, 2002). The Prime Minister needs to be a member of parliament and the 
President asks the leader of the party with the largest number of elected members to establish a 
government.45 The Prime Minister nominates ministers for the cabinet that must be approved 
by a simple majority vote of confidence by the TBMM.46 In the case of no clear majority party 
in the TBMM, a coalition is negotiated among several parties.47  
The TBMM’s main task is to enact legislation by debating, amending and passing bills. 
The parliamentary procedure to pass legislative bills is based on the vote of a simple majority 
of the MPs attending the parliamentary assembly with a minimum attendance of one fourth of 
the 550 members.  
                                                 
42 The General-Secretariat of NSC had gained extensive executive power and the Secretary-General was a high-
ranking military person until constitutional changes in 2003. 
43 The establishment of State Security Courts followed from a constitutional amendment in the aftermath of the 
1971 coup.  
44 Through a constitutional amendment, the number of TBMM members increased from 400 to 450 in 1987; and 
following a constitutional change, the number of parliamentarians increased from 450 to 550 in 1995 (Özbudun, 
2011: 27).  
45 The parliament can supervise and scrutinize the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister through various 
forms of questioning, including the annual approval of the budget.  It can overthrow the government through a 
vote of confidence with support of an absolute majority. 
46 The vote of confidence should occur within one week. 
47 If no coalition can be formed within six weeks, the President can dissolve the parliament and call new 
elections. 
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Legislative bills passed by the TBMM require the consent of the President48 who has a 
veto power and can send laws back to the TBMM. The parliament can either adopt the law in 
the same form or amend it, before sending it back to the President. The President has the right 
to veto the bill a second time. If parliament confirms a second time the legislation in the same 
form, the President is obliged then to approve it. The President can also appeal to the 
Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain provisions or the entirety of laws or decrees 
on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content.  
The law-making process in Turkey demonstrates that the Constitutional Court can also 
be considered as an important institutional veto point. The Constitutional Court has the 
jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of laws or decrees on appeal from the President or 
one-fifth of the members of the TBMM. This judgment can concern both substance and 
procedure. Appeals by individuals cannot be made. The Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
constitutionality of legislative bills or decrees is final.49 
The political system in Turkey is based on a unitary state where there are no 
autonomous regional or provincial levels of government. Provinces are administered by 
governors appointed by the Council of Ministers with approval of the President. Provincial 
governors are responsible for implementing the national programs for health services, social 
assistance, public welfare, cultural and educational policies. The municipalities are organized 
according to the population in each district with an elected mayor (Tuncer, 2002).   
An important characteristic of the political system in Turkey is that it is a simple 
polity, with a unitary and majoritarian character where authority and power is to a great extent 
concentrated at the center (Schmidt, 2006: 51). The political system designed by the 1982 
Constitution can be characterized as “semi-parliamentary” (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009) 
or “weakened parliamentarism” (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009) due to the strengthened role 
and new substantive power of the presidency, the increased power of executive branches in 
                                                 
48 The President is the head of state and elected for a non-renewable seven years by the TBMM. 
49 The Constitutional Court has eleven regular and four alternate members. The President appoints two regular 
and two alternate members from the High Court of Appeals, two regular and one alternate from the Council of 
State, and one member each from the Military High Court of Appeals, the High Military Administrative Court 
and the Audit Court (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009). An important dimension of the powers assigned to the 
Constitutional Court is related to the Political Parties Law. It can shut down political parties if they are found to 
be violating the principles of the Republic (İnsel, 2003).  
  63 
agenda setting in parliament and the institutionalization of tutelary institutions such as the 
NSC and the Council of Higher Education (İnsel, 2003).  
The semi-parliamentary as well as the proportional representation regime with a high 
threshold within a unitary state structure created a viscous institutional form of power. The 
aim was to prevent fragmentation in the parliament and limit the need for a coalition of parties 
in the government. A single party or majority government, given the power concentration, can 
introduce major legislative reforms but the President and the Constitutional Court can exercise 
institutional vetoes. It is these institutional features that characterize conditions for policy 
change in Turkey. However, it is also important to complement the institutional characteristics 
of law making considering various political party positions that could be conceptualized as 
partisan veto points.  
II. Partisan politics and public policy making in the post-1980 
period 
The analysis in Part I provides a description of the institutional rules of law making in 
Turkey and institutional veto points. In order to understand the characteristics of policy 
making, it is also important to consider partisan politics and evaluate how party competition 
shaped the social policy developments in this period. The analytical goal of this section is to 
connect the trajectory of Turkish politics and developments in the social policy environment. 
Tsebilis (2002) defines partisan veto players as political parties forming a coalition 
government whose agreement is necessary or collective actors such as labor unions whose 
consent is necessary for legislative change. The literature on political competition orients us to 
focus on strategies of political parties grounded in the political party system, considering the 
context of competition, whether particularistic or programmatic, to explain preference 
formation of political parties (Lynch, 2006; Picot, 2009 and 2012).  
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Table 1.Partisan Politics, Governments and key events in the post-1980 period 
1980-1983 Military intervention and rule 
1982  New Constitution 
1983-1991 Return to limited multiparty politics and Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) single party majority governments 
1991-2002 Coalition governments and fragmented parliament 
1997 Military demonstration 
2000-2001 Severe economic crisis 
2002- Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) 
single party majority government 
II.a. Economic liberalization under ANAP governments: top-down policy 
making 
The post-1980 period in Turkey brought the transition to market-oriented policies and 
full integration into the global market (Aydın, 2005: 43; Keyder, 2004: 67-68; Buğra, 2003: 
459). Following the referendum on the 1982 Constitution, Turkey returned to limited 
multiparty politics, with severe restrictions on political participation of previously banned 
politicians. Turgut Özal, the former head of the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı, DPT), undersecretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and a minister under the 
military regime, established the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) which gained 
45% of the national vote and a majority of seats in the TBMM in the 1983 election. Only three 
parties had been allowed to run candidates.  
Prime Minister Özal’s government launched a series of economic liberalization 
reforms. The liberal economic policies of the ANAP government implemented structural 
economic reforms, mostly through decrees,50 with the goal of promoting the principles of a 
market economy (Buğra, 2003). The ambitious package of reforms included actions such as 
elimination of price controls, a flexible exchange rate, subsidies for export-oriented 
companies, privatization of the state economic enterprises, financial liberalization, import 
                                                 
50 Close to 600 decrees were  used for the purpose of economic regulation by the Özal governments in the 1980’s 
(Eder, 2004; Ünay, 2006) 
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liberalization, and the promotion of foreign investment (Nas, 2008; Ünay, 2006). The ANAP 
governments launched a trade liberalization program in 1984 and introduced capital account 
convertibility in 1989 (Boratav and Yeldan, 2006: 419).  
The structural adjustment program changed the direction of economic policy from 
import-substitution to export promotion, thereby effecting a rupture with the previous policy 
paradigm of national developmentalism (Öniş, 1998; Buğra, 2003). These structural reforms 
were implemented with the assistance of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and 
the IMF, which provided financial assistance with loans (Nas, 2008; Şenses and Öniş, 2007). 
An important aspect of the policy position of the ANAP governments from 1983 to 
1991 was the centralization of decision-making, possible because of the strengthened role of 
the executive branch with the 1982 Constitution. According to Öniş (1998), this period 
witnessed the concentration of decision making in the executive branch, where reform teams 
composed of ministers and high-level bureaucrats prepared and implemented the reform 
program (1983 to 1989). Heper (1991: 165) characterizes the decision-making through reform 
teams under ANAP governments as the “autonomization of an executive inner circle” in 
government. Özbudun (2000: 136) emphasizes as well this executive dominant, top-down way 
of making policy, in which the economic interest groups, both business associations and civil 
society organizations including labor unions, had little influence in shaping policies.  
The 1982 constitution also limited the role of labor unions by defining their political 
activities as illegal, curtailing the right to strike and restricting collective bargaining (Adaman, 
Buğra and İnsel, 2010: 174; Blind, 2009: 49). The constitutional and other legal changes 
introduced three particularly important modifications to the law affecting unions.51 Strikes 
other than on wage-related issues were prohibited and state authorities could suspend legal 
strikes for reasons related to national security, defined in a very vague manner such as the 
national economic interest. Secondly, unions’ collective bargaining rights were strictly 
regulated by threshold requirements; the union was required to attain a membership level of at 
least 10% of all workers in the relevant sector and 50% in any given enterprise to be able to 
engage in any collective bargaining process. Thirdly, provisions for registering new members 
became more difficult and therefore costly for unions as the rules and paperwork increased. 
                                                 
51 See Law No. 2821 on Labor Unions and Law No. 2822 on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-outs. 
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Moreover any cooperation between political parties, unions, professional organizations, 
foundations, associations, and cooperative societies was forbidden (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 
2009: 21).  
The 1982 Constitution banned all associations from any political activity (Özbudun, 
2000:131).52 For instance, the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye 
Devrimci İşçi Senikaları Konfederasyonu, DİSK), the left-wing union confederation, was 
banned from any political activities, their assets were frozen and most of the leaders were also 
banned from political activity. Not surprisingly these were years in which governments were 
hostile towards unions and interest-based representation (Adaman, Buğra and İnsel, 2010: 
175) and there were tense relations between the business associations and the state as the 
government pressured and obliged business associations to conform to its economic policies 
(Öniş and Türem, 2001; Buğra, 1994: 264).  
Although the structural reform packages under the first Özal government attempted to 
diminish the state’s involvement in the economy, the state maintained its dominant role in 
many areas until the mid-1990’s (Öniş, 1991; Buğra, 1994; Uğur, 2004). In the period from 
1983 to 1991, the ANAP governments with a majority of seats in the parliament enjoyed a 
high power concentration for the implementation of the economic structural reform agenda. 
President Evren was only a weak veto point in this period, supporting the economic reforms in 
general while the Constitutional Court acted as a veto point in this period. Moreover the 1982 
Constitution limited the participation of civil society actors in politics, thereby reinforcing the 
power concentration of the ANAP governments.  
II.b. The politics of social protection in the post-1980 period 
In the 1980’s, the fragmented and corporatist hierarchical character of the social 
security system was consolidated in Turkey in the first phase of liberalization.53 The social 
protection system in Turkey provided health and pension benefits to formally employed 
persons and their dependents according to their labor market status (Buğra and Keyder, 2006). 
It has been added to and remodeled over the years, as we will describe in Chapter IV.  
The changes on social protection introduced in the first phase of liberalization were 
                                                 
52 These bans on civil society organizations were only removed in 1995. 
53 Boratav, Yeldan and Köse (2000) characterize two distinct phases of liberalization as 1980-88 and 1989-98.  
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meant to be responses to the economic changes but still kept the historical legacy of the 
fragmented and hierarchical nature of social protection intact. The changes to the social 
security system were introduced in a top-down manner by the military regime and then by 
ANAP governments with limited participation of corporatist actors. Moreover the changes 
aimed to increase the coverage of the system by adding new layers for agricultural workers 
and new functions for exiting pillars, entrenching the fragmented characteristics of the social 
security system. In 1982, there is an administrative change made to the composition of the 
Board of Directors of the Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, SSK) by 
increasing the number of state representatives, giving them the majority compared to the 
employee and employer representatives. Another change was institutional; in 1983, when the 
Ministries of Labor and Social Security were merged to become the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security. When the ANAP government introduced a super pension for high-income 
groups in 1987, the policy was vetoed in 1990 by the Constitutional Court, on the grounds of 
undermining the equality principle (Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 119).  
In the realm of social assistance, the establishment of the Social Solidarity and 
Assistance Fund (Sosyal Yardimlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu, SYDTF) in 1986 by the 
Özal government reflected a philanthropic approach to social assistance, instead of extending 
public coverage. It was the creation of a fund and an umbrella institution of local organizations 
that involved cooperation with charities in providing emergency relief for the citizens in 
severe deprivation and poverty (Buğra, 2008). 
The late 1980’s brought a re-emergence of political parties on the right and left.54 
There was a return to multi-party politics, with the re-emergence of the powerful parties of the 
pre-1980 era, and also of old leaders. The old parties were re-established under new names 
and a broader left-right spectrum reappeared. Nonetheless, the 1987 elections preceded the 
constitutional amendment rehabilitating the old parties and thus the ANAP under Özal’s 
leadership gained for a second time the largest number of votes and the majority of TBMM 
seats. The elections were followed by waves of mass demonstrations and strikes, primarily 
around demands for wage increases. The second ANAP government partially addressed them, 
                                                 
54 A key development occurred towards the end of P.M. Özal’s first government. The political rights and liberties 
of former politicians were reinstituted in 1987 (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009).  
  68 
such that the return of competitive multi-party politics also brought a public spending increase 
in several spheres, including education, health, agricultural subsidies and support purchases 
(Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006). 
II.c. Fragmentation under Coalition Governments during 1990’s: 
Particularistic Competition  
Given the dominance the ANAP had enjoyed in electoral and parliamentary politics, 
the first multiparty elections55 in 1991 and its result symbolized a new juncture in Turkish 
politics. It brought coalitional governments as well as severe economic crisis.  In 1991, the 
liberal-conservative True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the left-of-center Social 
Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Partisi, SHP) formed a coalition 
government when the ANAP lost its majority.  
The coalition governments in the 1990’s were involved with pension reforms and 
changes in the social protection system with a vote-seeking logic.56 According to Mine Eder 
(2004: 61), the electoral concerns shaped the side payments and extension of state patronage 
during the 1990’s. The DYP-SHP coalition government had to forge electoral coalitions and 
used changes to social protection system as a way of getting votes.57 In 1992, the DYP-SHP 
coalition government abolished the minimum retirement age for all three social security 
institutions and launched early-retirement schemes (Yakut-Çakar, 2007). This coalition 
government argued these changes in the retirement age would lead to a decrease in 
unemployment, as younger workers could take the jobs of the retired cohorts. 
Another major policy to appeal to their voters was the Green Card scheme introduced 
in 1992 for the low-income population not covered by social security insurance. It provided 
health care to the poor. Buğra (2006) argues that the Green Card Scheme reflects the welfarist 
                                                 
55 Although legal restrictions on the political participation of the former politicians and political parties were 
removed in October 1987 following a referendum, these actors could not compete in fair conditions in the 
November 1987 elections due to the short-time span. Thus 1991 was the first election in which all political actors 
participated in a fair setting.  
56 Vote-seeking logic is used to characterize the strategies and the public policy choices of the coalition 
governments during the 1990’s. This means that political parties developed public policies for electoral gains 
rather than in a programmatic competition. Thus I do not refer to these patterns as clientelist, patronage, or 
populist policy choices as is often done in Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1992).  
57 In fact, DYP used subsidies for agriculture and certain industrial incentives, including lowering import tariffs, 
for its constituencies while the CHP targeted incentives in terms of wages and benefits to urban workers. 
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discourse of the DYP leader and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, grounded in his liberal-
conservative approach to social policy.58 However other scholars such as Boratav and 
Özuğurlu (2006) and Eder (2004) consider the policy initiatives of Demirel during the 1990’s 
more as mechanisms for building electoral coalitions among different segments in society, 
ranging from urban poor to agricultural workers. For their part, center-left parties had few if 
any discourse and policy initiatives to tackle poverty and the urban poor.59 Buğra (2006) and 
Cizre-Sakallioğlu and Yeldan (2000) argue that center-left political parties such as the SHP 
and Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), whether in the coalition or in 
opposition, were overwhelmingly interested in the economic situation of civil servants and 
urban workers in the formal sector, in terms of their wages and protecting rights.  
State spending under the DYP-SHP coalition government increased from 1992 to 
1994. However, increasing fiscal and financial fragility led to the first economic crisis of 
decade in 1994, a crisis characterized by a large outflow of capital and an appeal to the IMF. 
The IMF stabilization program included measures such as devaluation, privatization targets, 
severe budget cuts and additional taxes (Eder, 2004).  The involvement of the IMF and the 
World Bank meant greater discipline in the fiscal system and budgetary control as well as 
maintaining liberalization reforms (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006).  
Starting in 1991, domestic politics was characterized by a multitude of coalition 
governments. Following the 1994 economic crises, the Tansu Çiller (DYP leader) government 
adopted the IMF program in which cost containment and deficit control became the primary 
goals. This has represented a significant change from the welfarist agenda when Demirel was 
Prime Minister.60 However this coalition government collapsed after the SHP united with 
another social democratic party, the CHP, in September 1995. After an unsuccessful attempt 
                                                 
58 Eder (2004) and Öniş (2004) have argued that ANAP governments from 1983 to 1991 can be characterized as 
neo-liberal populist, defined as the co-existence of liberal economics with illiberal politics or a kind of shallow 
democracy. The style of policy implementation tended to be autocratic and this autocratic style of policy 
implementation tended to undermine representative institutions and to personalize politics where reforms were 
initiated in a top-down fashion, often launched by surprise and without the participation of organized political 
forces. 
59 Buğra (2006) indicates that CHP’s approach to poverty was founded on a policy approach of a paternalist state. 
It was historically grounded during the single party period from 1920’s to 1950’s, and emphasized the state’s 
limited economic resources to provide poverty relief. Thus the idea was to use charitable aid to tackle problems 
related to urban poverty rather than developing institutionalized social assistance (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006).  
60 After the death of President Turgut Özal in 1993, Suleyman Demirel, who was the leader of DYP, became the 
ninth President. 
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by Tansu Çiller to form a minority government, a new DYP-CHP coalition was established in 
November. During the fragile coalition of the DYP-CHP government, the Customs Union with 
the European Union was finalized, bringing further measures of trade liberalization (Eder, 
2004: 66).   
One of the conditions demanded by CHP for its participation was to hold new 
elections. These came on 24 December 1995 (Özbudun, 2000: 120). The results further 
exacerbated governmental instability and the difficulties of reforming social policy, as the next 
chapters detail. These elections saw the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP) become the biggest 
single party in parliament. It took months of bargaining before the ANAP under the leadership 
of Mesut Yilmaz formed a coalition with DYP in March 1996, but this fell apart just one 
month later (Hale, 2000). Subsequently Tansu Çiller, formed an alliance with Necmettin 
Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and Erbakan became Prime 
Minister (Özbudun, 2000: 120). However the coalition government of the RP-DYP faced 
serious criticism from the National Security Council, fearful of an Islamisation of the 
education system. On 18 June 1997, in the face of repeated warnings from the military 
dominated National Security Council, Erbakan resigned, the hope being to reconstruct the 
coalition government under Çiller as Prime Minister (Hale and Özbudun, 2010; Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). As several parliamentarians from DYP resigned, this coalition lost its 
majority (Hale, 2000). A minority government was formed, as a coalition of the Democratic 
Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi, DTP) with the support of CHP on 30 June 1997 that lasted only for thirteen 
months (Hale, 2000: 197-199) The DSP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, formed a 
minority government with the support of ANAP and DYP, which took Turkey to the April 
1999 general elections. 
The coalition governments during the 1990’s generated a fragmented structure of 
power different from the concentration that had existed under the majority government of 
ANAP. The disagreements among the coalitional partners on several instances illustrate 
partisan veto points. The constitutional framework that allowed the military to influence the 
politics through NSC also was forcefully visible in 1997. Moreover institutional veto points 
such as President Demirel have constrained the coalition governments. Therefore the 
fragmented power of the coalition governments during 1990’s provides an underpinning and 
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reason for the absence of change in social policy in this period, despite the policy discussions 
going on in the bureaucracy and even in the coalition negotiations. 
 
II.d.Political Party competition and social policy framework in the post-1980 period  
The literature on political competition orients us to focus on strategies of political 
parties grounded on the political party system, taking the context of competition whether 
particularistic or programmatic in explaining preference formation of political parties. Julia 
Lynch has argued that a programmatic mode of party competition on welfare policies where 
parties are supposed to promote certain policy programs such as universal coverage tend to 
evolve towards citizenship based policies. On the other hand, particularistic competition 
targeting incentives for certain occupational groups orient political parties in government to 
establish occupational based welfare policies where parties do not have incentives to move 
towards more universal-right based policies (Lynch, 2006). Emphasizing as well the relevance 
of party competition for social policy development and reforms, Georg Picot (2009) argues 
that the social policy preferences of parties are driven by the appeal of attracting a crucial 
group of voters. These theoretical arguments can shed light on the politics of social policy 
developments of the 1990’s in Turkey. The overview of the Turkish politics in the post 1980 
period and the parallel developments in the social policy environment considering economic 
and labor market characteristics aim to complement the institutional conditions of policy 
change characterized in the first section.  
With the transition towards the multi-party democracy, coalition governments during 
the 1990’s implemented vote-seeking policy choices involving the social security system. 
Research demonstrates that political parties in Turkey were involved in vote-seeking practices 
in the post-1980 period which owed a good deal to the historical roots of patronage politics 
since the transition to multiparty politics in 1945 (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 158).  
This dominant pattern of using policies for electoral gains shapes the politics of the 
social policy environment in Turkey in the post-1980 period. Partisan politics allowed 
governments and political parties to be involved with such practices, either by making legal 
changes in institutional settings or providing additional benefits targeting specific groups for 
electoral gains. As we will see in more detail in the next chapters, social assistance payments 
for pensioners and changes to the retirement age were delivered and increased in pre-election 
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periods from 1981 to 1999, examplifying use of social policy instruments for electoral gain 
(Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Heper and Keyman, 1998).   
Unstable coalition governments and economic instability shaped the politics of social 
policies from 1991 to 2001. The policy choices and the mismanagement of resources 
combined with cyclical economic crisis starting from 1994 influenced the discussions 
concerning the social security system.  From the mid-1990’s to 2002, the multitude of 
coalition governments could not introduce the structural modernization reforms of the social 
security institutions and labor law due to various conflicts among its constituent parts as well 
as between business associations and union confederations (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006; 
Yakut, 2007).  
In this period, the context of competition of political parties was more particularistic 
than programmatic. The right-wing political parties mainly dominated electoral competition 
while left-wing political parties were only minor partners of coalition governments during the 
1990’s. The right-wing parties’ approach to social policies did involve two main 
characteristics: liberal-conservative orientation and a philanthropic-religious emphasis (Buğra, 
2006). Prime Minister Özal had a liberal orientation combined with a religious discourse that 
was apparent in the establishment of the Social Cooperation and Solidarity Encouragement 
Fund (Buğra, 2006). In the 1990’s, P.M. Demirel adopted a welfarist discourse targeting the 
economic context of various groups, from retirees to housewives, and prioritizing the 
problems of the rural areas.  Right-wing parties combined these two orientations. 
However, from the 1991 elections on, no party had a sufficiently solid parliamentary 
base for implementing its own preferences and therefore no programmatic clarity emerged. 
For example, the Welfare Party (RP) with its conservative and religious overtones was able to 
capitalize on some segments of its constituency by propagating the idea of a “just order” 
targeting especially the problems of the urban poor (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000). It 
increased its votes in the 1991 and 1995 elections but had trouble entering or remaining in a 
coalition.  
Öniş (2007: 255) argues that the right-of-center parties, such as ANAP and DYP, and 
parties that have Islamist roots such as the WP, have adopted a discourse emphasizing social 
justice for the poor grounded on religious and nationalist symbols while using a paternalist 
notion of the state. In this way they have been able to build cross-class coalitions for electoral 
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support. It appears that the right-wing political parties’ approach to social protection in Turkey 
is based primarily on electoral considerations in order to build cross-class coalitions.  
For their part, Turkish left-wing political parties have adopted a rather defensive 
position concerning the social protection system and labor law reform in the face of market-
oriented structural reforms implemented in the post-1980 period. As we will see in more detail 
in Chapters IV and V, they remained focused on the problems of the civil servants, urban 
workers and the positions of the unions that represented the members of the formal labor 
market. 
Political party competition in Turkey orients political parties to consider short-term 
electoral consequences rather than precise and long-term programs concerning the social 
protection system and labor markets. Why did a particularistic political competition of 
political parties in Turkey develop during the 1980’s and 1990’s? Some scholars have 
examined the characteristics of the political party system and voting patterns in Turkey 
through analysis of social cleavages. They insisted that the political party system in Turkey 
has not been shaped by a dominant socio-economic cleavage or left-right cleavage. They see 
more mutually reinforcing multiple cleavages (Sayari and Esmer, 2002). The main cleavage 
that shaped the political party system until the 1980’s was the center-periphery cleavage (Hale 
and Özbudun, 2010). This cleavage describes a cultural divide between a center dominated by 
modernizing military-bureaucratic elites who control the state apparatus and a periphery that is 
under-represented and excluded.  This periphery has a heterogeneous character (Sayari, 2002). 
In the post-1980’s period, the cleavage on religious issues between secularist and Islamist as 
well as on ethnic lines over the Kurdish issue became more salient, reinforcing the center-
periphery cleavage.  
With respect to the usual left-right divisions, Hale and Özbudun (2010) argue that in 
Turkey the right corresponds to political parties committed to conservative, religious and 
nationalist principles while left-wing political parties primarily adhere to secularism. This 
characterization does not correspond to a standard left-right cleavage based on socio-economic 
issues. Hale and Özbudun (2010) emphasize that the voting pattern and fragmented political 
party system during the 1990s reflected this cleavage pattern rather than a standard socio-
economic cleavage. 
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In recent analysis, Ziya Öniş (2007; 2009b) argues that the political party system 
during 2000’s involved a demarcation along the lines of conservative globalists and defensive 
nationalists. On the one hand, the conservative globalists correspond to the political elite and 
segments of the society that have a positive view of globalization, thereby considering 
Turkey’s membership in the European Union and EU integration generally as positive 
processes. They also have a reformist position on political and economic reforms. On the other 
hand, defensive nationalists consider globalization and interrelated process of EU membership 
as a danger for the erosion of national sovereignty generating risks for the unity and secular 
character of the state and they oppose the political and economic changes that would be 
required to enter the EU. The three partners of the coalition government from 1999 to 2002 
(the DSP, the Nationalist Movement Party-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP- and the ANAP) 
belonged to opposing camps on this division and this difference can partly explain the political 
stalemate during this period.  
Öniş (2007) argues that the AKP overcame this division and had electoral success 
since 2002. It fashioned itself as a reformist political party, supporting EU membership, 
democratization and modernization while defending conservative values with religious 
overtones. In this political context, AKP with roots in political Islam appeared as a 
conservative but democratic party endorsing liberal principles as well as adopting a reformist 
position.  The AKP could break the reform stalemate after 2001 as it had a majority in the 
parliament. 
In this chapter we analyzed until now the institutional conditions of policy change and 
partisan politics and public policy making in the post-1980 period in Turkey. The 1982 
Constitution established veto points. The President and Constitutional Court in Turkey would 
be able to intervene in social policy making. Beyond that, the institutional arrangements were 
such that a single party or majority government provides a power concentration in the 
executive that can allow major reforms. The politics of social protection in the post-1980 
period demonstrate that on the one hand the power fragmentation under coalition 
governments, as the presence of partisan veto points, accounts for the failure of reforms during 
this period. On the other hand the politics of this period is indicative of social policy 
preference formation of political parties by the particularistic competition that oriented them to 
develop social policy proposals to seek the votes of diverse segments of the Turkish 
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population. Moreover the existence of multiple and overlapping cleavages rather than a 
dominant right-left divide oriented political parties to develop social policy proposals to 
address the issues of numerous groups in order to build their coalitional base.  
 
III. Political elite and public opinion: Attitudes on the EU in the 
post 1999 period 
Graziano, Jacquot and Palier suggest that the specific uses of Europe depend on 
attitudes to the relationship of each country with the EU. They see two kinds of attitudes as 
key: elites’ attitudes towards Europe and public opinion towards Europe.  
The political elite in Turkey has been in general supportive of Turkey’s membership in 
the EU. This stance is congruent with the Kemalist orientation towards westernization. Indeed, 
Turkey’s project for accession to the EU has been characterized as one that is above politics 
(Çınar, 2006: 471). Despite this consensus, political parties have different positions 
concerning the reforms necessary to comply with the membership conditions (Keyman, 2005: 
274).  
Öniş (2009b) indicates that mainstream political parties have been supportive of EU 
membership and that any hard form of Euro-skepticism comes only from political parties at 
the extreme end of the political spectrum, as opposition from the left, from nationalists, or 
from radical Islamists. Nonetheless, he finds that there is a divide over the conditions for 
membership rather than membership itself. This type of soft Euroscepticism shapes the 
positions of mainstream political parties to the EU. The next part of the chapter examines 
these attitudes and opinions.  
III.a. The political elite’s approach towards EU membership in the post 
1999 period 
The DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government formed in 1999 expressed a general 
commitment to Turkey’s EU membership (Avcı, 2004; Eralp, 2004). In the coalition program, 
it wrote (57. Hükümet Programı, 1999):  
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“The membership of Turkey in the EU is a right that arose from history, 
geography and agreements. The government will work for the goal of membership 
with same rights and status of other member states. Turkey, while engaging in the 
European integration process, will protect its national rights and interests. In this 
perspective, our government will observe each opportunity that could deepen our 
relations with the EU.”  
 
This statement from the coalition program indicates that the goal of membership was a 
general and consensual goal. However, the three coalition partners had different stances 
regarding EU membership generally and the reforms necessary to meet the conditions for 
membership (Chapter III presents these in detail) (Avcı, 2004; Öniş, 2009b). The effectiveness 
of this coalition government was therefore badly damaged by disputes among its constituent 
parties, notably between Bülent Ecevit’s DSP and the ANAP led by Mesut Yılmaz on the one 
side and the nationalist MHP led by Devlet Bahçeli on the other (Hale, 2000: 339). DSP and 
ANAP were vaguely in favor of introducing structural economic reforms and for extending 
human rights and cultural rights as well as abolishing the death penalty.61 However, the MHP 
opposed certain conditions, including the extension of cultural rights and the abolition of the 
death penalty, necessary for meeting the EU’s political criteria (Öniş, 2003a: 35).  
The major partner of the coalition, the MHP, was particularly critical of some of the 
EU’s conditions for membership. It successfully blocked the extension of cultural rights and 
the abolition of the death penalty between 1999 and 2002 (Öniş, 2003a). Frequently, the 
MHP’s attitude led to deadlocks within the coalition. Although DSP and ANAP were 
committed to the EU membership and supported the reforms necessary for fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria, they did not challenge MHP because they feared the collapse of the 
coalition government. The ANAP and DSP were able, however, to pass the demanded reforms 
by the Commission about broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish as well 
as the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, with the support of opposition parties and 
despite the opposition of the MHP (Avcı, 2004: 203). Accordingly, the political attitude of 
these governmental elites towards EU membership has to be characterized as fragmented. 
A survey of Turkish parliamentarians after the 1999 elections was conducted by 
Lauren McLaren and Meltem Müftüler-Baç (2003). It is informative about this portion of the 
                                                 
61 These issues are all related to the first Copenhagen criterion for membership, political democracy and 
fundamental rights. See Chapter III. 
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political elite’s attitude towards EU. The study is based on interviews with 61 of the 550 
members of the TBMM, and respondents respect the distribution of seats among the parties 
(the ANAP, DYP, DSP, and Virtue Party-Fazilet Partisi, FP). The conclusion that emerges is 
MPs’ views about the EU are, to a great extent, shaped by their political party affiliations 
(McLaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003). But this survey also confirms the general consensual 
support of the political elite for Turkey’s membership in the EU. Only one MP announced any 
opposition to joining, while an overwhelming 64% of the sample was “strongly in favor” of 
full EU membership.  
The survey results also reveal the limited knowledge of the MPs in 1999 about the 
acquis and membership requirements (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003). The main benefits 
they expected related to democratization and human rights and improved socio-economic 
conditions. The survey also found that there was less support when questions asked about 
specific reforms, changes that might be needed to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, or the EU’s 
conditions on Cyprus.  
Given the past involvement of the main figures of the AKP62 with Islamic-rooted 
political parties and that it formed a majority government after 2002, the AKP’s political 
stance and ideology is crucial in terms of understanding elites’ attitudes towards the EU (Avcı, 
2011; Öniş and Keyman, 2003). Since its initiation, the AKP tried to make it clear that it was 
not an Islamist party and defined itself as conservative democratic, trying to associate itself 
with the Christian Democrats in Europe (Hale, 2005: 293). With this center-right position, the 
AKP adopted a pro-EU stance and supported the reforms necessary for satisfying the 
Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, the party’s program confirms its commitment to EU 
membership. 
AKP cadres and the leadership have been characterized as pragmatic (Çavdar, 2006; 
Doğan, 2005; Öniş and Keyman 2003), and this is apparent in their approach to EU 
membership (Avcı, 2011). The goal of membership served AKP political cadres by giving 
them legitimacy in power and by easing the party’s relationship with the secular state 
                                                 
62 The November 2002 elections brought the victory of AKP whose affiliations with political Islam raised issues 
(Doğan, 2005; Nasr, 2005). The AKP was formed only eighteen months before the elections by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, the former Mayor of Istanbul from RP, and a group of reformists, including Abdullah Gül, that were 
involved with Islamic-rooted FP until its closure by the Constitutional Court (Hale and Özbudun, 2010).  
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establishment, including the military, judiciary and bureaucracy. AKP’s support for EU 
membership and their commitment to continue democratization reforms also comforted 
business elites and liberal segments of the society (Doğan, 2005: 430).  
Support for EU membership served as an empowering tool domestically and as a way 
of sustaining the pace of democratization and economic reforms (Avcı, 2011: 416-417). The 
AKP government widened its societal support uniting different groups and segments around 
reforms while deepening its legitimacy through pursuit of EU membership as a means of 
building a broad-based electoral coalition (Öniş, 2009b).63 Thus, major reforms for fulfilling 
the political criteria were implemented rigorously from 2002 to 2004, via reform packages 
covering the most contested issues including extending cultural rights, addressing the question 
of the Kurds and curbing the role of the military (Doğan, 2005: 421). Prime Minister Erdoğan 
declared on October 4, 2005 that “we will just rename the Copenhagen political criteria as the 
Ankara criteria” (Patton, 2007: 339). Moreover, Erdoğan also addressed the Kurdish problem 
publicly, an act rarely seen from Prime Ministers in Turkey (Kirisçi, 2011).64 As we will see in 
the next chapter, however, this active enthusiasm for EU membership was not sustained. 
Sait Akşit, Özgehan Şenyuva and Işık Gürleyen (2011) conducted a survey of 
parliamentarians in the TBMM formed after the 2007 general elections. The survey data is 
based on the responses of 62 MPs from the AKP, CHP, MHP, DSP and DTP. This study 
found the general and thin consensus remained. Only one MP declared membership to be 
“neither a good nor a bad thing.” The rest of the 62 MPs described EU membership as a “good 
thing.” A very large majority (79%) had a positive image of the EU. However, questions about 
trust in EU institutions revealed only a moderate level of trust.  On a scale of 0 to 10, the 
Commission received a trust score of 5.4 and the Council of the European Union only scored 
at 4.8, with the European Parliament even lower at 4.3. Moreover the survey results 
demonstrate that MPs overwhelmingly (86.5%) agree that those who make decisions at the EU 
level do not take Turkey’s interests into account. 
                                                 
63 Hale and Özbudun (2010) describe the social base of AKP as a coalition of diverse socio-economic groups and 
diverse political forces encompassing rural segments, urban lower-income classes, a part of the working class, 
artisan and small traders and medium size entrepreneurs in the cities, and the rapidly rising Islamic bourgeoisie. 
64 P.M. Erdoğan visited Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish populated city in Turkey, in August 2005 with a 
delegation of Ministers from his Cabinet. Erdoğan acknowledged during this visit the mistakes that had been 
made in the past by the Turkish state. Moreover he recognized the existence of a “Kurdish problem,” suggesting 
that the solution lay in more democracy, more rule of law and economic prosperity. 
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III.b. Public attitudes in Turkey: From Euro-enthusiasm to Euro-Fatigue 
Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011) suggest that the specific uses of Europe depend on 
public opinion as well. They claim that there are more likely to be recurrent and positive uses 
of Europe by policy-makers if the public is strongly supportive of EU membership. The 
historical development of Turkish mass public support for EU membership will be analyzed in 
the light of different survey data.  
Ali Çarkoglu’s survey analysis demonstrates that in 2002 “those who would vote in 
favor of full EU membership in a referendum comprise 64% of the sample while 30% indicate 
they would vote against” (Çarkoglu, 2003: 173). Çarkoglu and Kentmen (2011) have analyzed 
various national surveys and have found a fluctuating pattern since the mid-1990’s. The 
support for EU membership in 1995, when the Customs Union Agreement had just been 
signed, was just over 50% of Turkish population. Public support then declined between 1995 
and 1999. But starting from 1999, with the recognition of candidacy status, public support 
increased, reaching over 70% in 2001 and settling over 60% from 1999 to 2006. However 
since the Council’s decision on the accession negations and the debates among the member 
states about Turkey’s accession, public support for EU membership has been declining. 
Çarkoglu and Kentmen (2011) report that support for EU membership in Turkey dropped to 
57% in 2006, 50% in 2007, 56% in 2008 and was down to 46% in 2009.  
According to study by the German Marshall Fund “the ratio of Turks who see 
membership in the EU as a ‘good thing’ fell from 73 percent in 2004 to 54 percent in 2006” 
(World Public Opinion, 2007). Euro-barometer data indicate that those who think membership 
to EU is a “good thing” dropped from 71% in 2004 to 54% in 2006, to 52% in 2007 and to 
49% in 2008 (European Commission, 2008a).  
The survey and Euro-barometer data indicate that public attitudes towards membership 
have changed since 2004, reaching the lowest levels since 2006 following the stalemate in the 
accession negotiations related to the extension of the Customs Union to the Republic of 
Cyprus. In 2007 and 2008 public support for EU membership was around 50% among Turks.  
Çarkoglu and Kentmen (2011) argue that Turkish public opinion’s high enthusiasm for 
membership in the beginning of the candidacy process and the falling trend with the launch of 
accession negotiations, as the public gained a better understanding of the details of the 
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process, are very similar to other candidate countries from the Eastern enlargement. What is 
different in Turkey is the timing in the fall of the public support for the EU membership; this 
followed immediately after the launch of accession negotiations in 2006. One part of the 
explanation of this drop of the timing is the position of certain member states and their public 
debates about the “Europeanness” of Turkey that came out during the negotiations of the 
accession. In other words, the Cyprus issue as well as the discourse of European leaders has 
influenced public opinion in Turkey. On the other hand, Çarkoglu and Kentmen (2011) have 
found that utilitarian expectations of individuals about the positive gains of Turkey’s EU 
membership helped generate high public support in the 1999 to 2004, when the 2001 
economic crisis affected the public’s expectation about the benefits from EU membership. 
III.c. Contextual Conditions for Uses of Europe: Political Elite Attitude and 
Public Opinion for EU membership 
The elite attitude and public opinion towards EU constitute one of the necessary 
conditions for the types of uses of Europe, according to the authors of this approach 
(Graziano, Jacquot and Palier 2011). They argue that general attitudes in each country, 
constituted of the national elites’ attitudes towards Europe and the national public opinion’s 
attitude towards Europe, influences whether Europe is used positively or negatively and used a 
great deal or very little. These are contextual factors that are necessary conditions for Europe 
to be used (Woll and Jacquot 2010: 116).  
The above analysis demonstrates that political elite attitudes and public opinion in 
Turkey are in general supportive of EU membership. However it is important to look at 
changes in time and the characteristics of this support in order to be more conclusive on how 
these elements can influence the uses of Europe.  
Although the goal of EU membership has the character of being “above politics” in 
Turkey, the attitude of political parties on the specific conditions of membership is probably a 
better indicator. Accordingly, since the recognition of candidacy status in 1999, the AKP 
government demonstrated a clearer commitment to EU membership and a political will to 
introduce the necessary economic and political reforms to comply with membership 
conditions than did the coalition government of the DSP-MHP-ANAP. However since the 
launch of accession negotiations in 2006, the AKP government has shown less enthusiasm for 
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EU membership and a certain reform fatigue. Public opinion too has also been generally 
supportive of Turkey’s membership in the EU but trends have fluctuated in time. The public 
support was considerably higher in the beginning of the membership process, at over 60% 
from 2011 to 2005, but declined to just above 50% from 2006 to 2008. These results lead to an 
expectation of more positive uses of Europe and more consistent uses in some years than 
others.  However, only detailed process-tracing can reveal if this is the case. 
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Chapter III. The Institutional Relationship between the 
European Union and Turkey: Instruments and Resources 
The institutional relationship between Turkey and the European Union has evolved from the 
launch of Customs Union in 1995 through the recognition of its candidate status in 1999, and 
to the start of accession negotiations in 2005. Accordingly, it is important to understand how 
European resources and their supply to Turkey have evolved with this changing relationship. 
This chapter will consider in particular the hypothesis that European resources provided by the 
EU institutions tend to vary according to the institutional relationship that a country has with 
the Union (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011: 8). This scrutiny aims to identify the specific 
resources (legal, financial, institutional, political and cognitive) that are linked to social 
policies and the welfare state in Turkey and their change over time. The analysis will also 
focus on how the Commission and other EU institutions have considered Turkish labor law 
reform (2003), restructuring of the employment agency (2003) and social security reform 
(from 2006 to 2008).  
Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011) argue that as institutional ties grow stronger, it is 
more likely both that a candidate country will be subject to greater scrutiny by the Union’s 
institutions and that there will be more resources available for national reforms. As a general 
analytical and theoretical tool, the Uses of Europe approach focuses on particular resources 
provided by the process of European integration and the intersection of the supranational and 
domestic level, considering the involvement of various types of actors in the policy process. 
According to this approach, it is important to differentiate between resources, constraints and 
uses. The EU may provide legal resources such as directives, budgetary resources such as the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, as well as cognitive resources such as policy frames, 
or political resources for framing arguments. The constraints can be: benchmarking conditions 
for the launch of accession negotiations on a specific chapter; the alignment with specific 
directives in policy sectors; targets to attain in employment rates or services. However, as 
Woll and Jacquot (2010: 116) emphasize “resources and constraints are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for strategic behavior. They are only a contextual element that usages are 
based on; actors intentionally transform them into political practices in order to reach their 
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goals.” Following this theoretical argument, we will describe and categorize the various 
resources provided by the EU membership process in the social policy domain for Turkey.  
Empirical research on EU resources related to labor regulation and social security 
reform in Turkey must pay attention to the fact that it involves an accession process, which is 
structurally different from the processes of Europeanization in member states. On the one 
hand, EU conditions for membership are a moving target (Grabbe, 1999), changing and 
increasing with the different waves of enlargement, especially in the domains of social and 
employment policies. On the other hand, the candidacy process involves a hierarchical mode 
of governance (Dimitrova, 2002) based on asymmetry of power, conditionality 
(Schimmelfennig, 2012), a monitoring role for the Commission (Grabbe, 2003) and gate-
keeping by the Commission and the Council (Christoffersen, 2007). The European 
Commission is key in specifying and clarifying the accession requirements.  
 Governance mechanisms vary, ranging from the legal transposition of the acquis, 
alignment with the directives, drafting of Joint Inclusion Memorandums (JIM) and Joint 
Assessment Papers for Employment Priorities (JAP). These involve the participation of the 
EU institutions and governmental and non-governmental actors in candidate countries. 
Institutional mechanisms used are sub-committees on specific aspects of the acquis such as 
Regional Development and Employment and Social Policy, with the participation of the 
representatives of Directorate-Generals (DG) and the candidate state’s bureaucracy. The 
monitoring of the Commission is played out through instruments such as progress reports, 
Accession Partnership documents and screening reports. 
This chapter characterizes first the institutional characteristics and governance 
mechanisms concerning the context of the candidate states. Then it illustrates the historical 
evolution of the institutional relationship between the European Union and Turkey over 
various stages of its own accession process. The third part of the chapter concentrates on 
analysis of EU resources deployed in the reform of labor law in 2003, the reorganization of the 
employment agency in 2003 and the restructuring of social security system in 2008.  
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I. Considering the situation of candidate states: An hierarchical 
mode of governance, conditionality and EU resources 
Candidate states face a particular situation when they engage in a process of accession 
to the European Union. Four institutional features are important for characterizing their 
context: the asymmetrical power relation; the hierarchical mode of governance and gate-
keeping; the conditionality and socialization mechanisms; the monitoring role of the 
Commission. The preparation of candidate states has been driven by a set of enlargement rules 
characterized by asymmetrical power relations and an hierarchical mode of governance 
(Schimmelfennig, 2012; Dimitrova 2002). These characteristics shape the salience and use of 
EU resources in the candidate countries.  
The Eastern enlargement of the EU involved 10 countries (Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that 
joined in 2004 while Romania and Bulgaria entered in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. This large 
wave of enlargement with the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries is most 
relevant for understanding the EU’s approach with respect to Turkey. Candidates were 
required to adopt the acquis communautaire and comply with membership conditions. This 
one-sided approach illustrates the asymmetrical power relation between the EU institutions 
and candidate countries. Ulrich Sedelmeier (2011:6) emphasizes that “as non-member states, 
the candidates had no voice in the making of the rules that they must adopt, and the power 
asymmetry vis-à-vis the incumbents has led to a top-down process of rule transfer.” 
 The conditions for accession, namely the Copenhagen criteria65 set for the Central and 
Eastern European countries at the Copenhagen Council in 1993 were the most comprehensive 
                                                 
65 The Copenhagen Criteria consist of four components. (1) Membership requires that the candidate country have 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. (2) Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. (3) Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. (4) Adoption of the entire body of European legislation and its effective 
implementation through appropriate administrative and judicial structures. The Copenhagen European Council in 
1993 set the conditions for membership insisting on the above stated Copenhagen criteria. In the original 
formulation of the European Council in 1993, conditions for membership were listed and the absorption capacity 
was also mentioned. In time, the absorption capacity has become a part of the criteria for membership, first 
emphasized by the Helsinki European Council in 1999 (Smith, 2011: 306). The Brussels European Council in 
2006 emphasized that “the pace of enlargement must take into account the capacity of the Union to absorb new 
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ones prepared for any wave of enlargement (Grabbe, 2003). The Copenhagen criteria and the 
accession negotiations are not open to bargaining or compromise but characterized by unequal 
power and gate-keeping. The Commission judges progress and the Council of the European 
Union decides at each key phase of accession whether the process can go forward. 
Schimmelfennig (2012) and Dimitrova (2004) insist that given the asymmetrical power 
relationship between the EU and candidate countries, the process is primarily one of 
“downloading” EU policy into the national policies. 
The criteria set in 1993 are part of this hierarchical mode of governance, requiring 
candidate states to comply with membership conditions. On the one hand, because of the 
complexity of the candidacy process, the Copenhagen conditions leave considerable space for 
interpretation, especially by the Commission, to judge the extent of compliance (Dimitrova, 
2004; Maniokas, 2004). On the other hand, the conditions are also a moving target as the 
evolution of the acquis communautaire occurs and new conditions are added and developed 
(Grabbe, 1999). Nonetheless, despite the asymmetry and moving target, candidate countries 
must work within the framework of the EU’s resources and instruments. 
I.a. General EU instruments in the pre-accession process 
The EU introduced new institutional tools and instruments with the Eastern 
enlargement (Maniokas, 2004; Bailey and Propis, 2004; Bache, 2010), starting with 
Copenhagen criteria. Additions renewing the enlargement policy came with the Madrid 
Council Decisions in 1995 and  the Agenda 2000 prepared by the Commission in 1997 and 
accepted by the European Council in 1999 (European Commission, 2003a). A revised 
Enlargement Strategy designing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) was 
introduced by the European Council in 2006 (European Council, 2006).  
Institutional tools such as Accession Partnerships and Regular Reports, prepared by the 
Commission with the assistance of established delegations in the candidate states, allow 
screening and monitoring of the policies and politics. The Accession Partnership prepared by 
                                                                                                                                                         
members” (European Council, 2006: 3). For instance, the Negotiating Framework for Turkey insists that  “In 
accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union's capacity to absorb 
Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and Turkey” (EU Council, 2005: 6).  
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the Commission and endorsed by the EU Council sets the short, mid and long-term priorities 
with which the candidate states is required to comply. Following the screening process of 
domestic policies and institutions of the candidate state by the Commission, candidate states 
need to respond to Accession Partnership Documents by preparing National Programmes for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (European Commission, 2003a: 11). The NPAAs 
prepared by the candidate government establish the road map for adoption, specifying the 
legal changes and reforms that will be implemented. The Regular Progress Reports presented 
yearly by the Commission from 1997 onwards are an institutional instrument of monitoring 
(Maniokas, 2004). They are crucial in judging the candidate’s progress as well reflecting the 
Commission’s opinion on the progress and characteristics of 35 negotiation chapters of the 
acquis communautaire (European Commission, 2003a: 24). 
In line with the priorities reflected in the Accession Partnership and NPAA, the EU 
provides financial assistance through instruments that have evolved over time and as the 
variety of candidate states increased (Dimitrova, 2004). The main financial assistance 
instruments developed for the Eastern enlargement was the PHARE program66 that provided 
financial assistance for the adoption of the acquis, for building administrative and institutional 
capacities in the applicant states and for financing investment as well as supporting 
environmental, transport, agricultural and rural development measures (European 
Commission, 2004a).  
An instrument involving aid to agriculture (SAPARD)67 and a structural instrument 
(ISPA)68 related to the priorities of the Cohesion Fund were both incorporated into PHARE in 
1999 (European Commission, 2003: 16). The PHARE program as the main financial 
instrument had two priorities: the improvement of administrative and legal capabilities (30%) 
and investment linked to the adoption and application of the Community acquis (70 %) 
(European Commission, 2004a). 
However Turkey was not included to the PHARE process due to its particular 
institutional relationship with the EU that follows from the signing of the Association 
                                                 
66 PHARE stands for Pologne-Hongrie, Aide à la reconstruction économique. The program was launched in July 
1989 to support changes in these two countries. It was later extended to all CEEC.  
67 SAPARD stands for Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. 
68 ISPA stands for Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession. 
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Agreement in 1963, where the country’s eligibility for full membership was first recognized. 
The Customs Union Agreement established in 1995 has strengthened the institutional 
relationship between the EU and Turkey. With the establishment of the customs union, Turkey 
became a beneficiary of the Mediterranean Economic Development Area (MEDA) program as 
part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (European Commission, 2003a: 16). 
After the recognition of candidate status in Helsinki in 1999, a pre-accession 
orientation was added to the financial assistance programs available to Turkey and a pre-
accession assistance program replaced the MEDA program. The pre-accession financial 
assistance had six objectives: addressing the Copenhagen political criteria; providing support 
for economic reform and for new regulatory bodies; strengthening public administration, 
justice and home affairs; improving economic and social cohesion and supporting candidate 
activities and projects that benefit from Community programs (European Commission, 2002a: 
23). These six objectives aimed to provide support for institution building, investment to 
strengthen the regulatory infrastructure needed to ensure compliance with the acquis, 
investment in economic and social cohesion and promotion of the civil society dialogue.  
In 2006, with the Commission’s recommendation, a new financial Instrument for the 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) to Turkey was introduced for the period 2007-2013 
(European Commission, 2007a: 3). The IPA is provided in accordance with the Accession 
Partnerships of the candidate countries that include the Western Balkan countries, Turkey and 
Iceland (European Commission, 2009). The IPA has been designed as an encompassing 
instrument aiming to cover five main areas of institution-building: financing capacity-building 
and institution-building; a cross-border cooperation component to support the beneficiary 
countries in the area of cross-border cooperation among themselves, with the EU member 
states or within the framework of cross-border or inter-regional actions; a regional 
development component, aimed at supporting the countries’ preparations for the 
implementation of the Community’s cohesion policy, and in particular for the European 
Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund; the human resources development 
component, which concerns preparation for participation in cohesion policy and the European 
Social Fund; the rural development component, which concerns preparation for the Common 
Agricultural Policy and related policies and for the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (European Commission, 2009: 8, EU Council, 2006a: 85). The IPA is intended 
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as a flexible instrument providing assistance depending on the progress made by the 
beneficiary countries, measured by the Commission’s evaluations (European Commission, 
2007b: 1). Accordingly the IPA constitutes the most comprehensive instrument by unifying 
different instruments and programs for candidate and potential candidate states. 
The IPA replaces the 2000-06 pre-accession financial instruments PHARE, ISPA, 
SAPARD, the Turkish pre-accession instrument, and the financial instrument for the Western 
Balkans (European Commission, 2009: 7). The IPA is based on strategic multi-annual 
planning and a multi-annual financial framework established for each country covering the 
main intervention areas envisaged by the Commission (European Commission, 2007b: 1). IPA 
assistance can take different forms such as investment, procurement contracts, grants, special 
loans, financial assistance, administrative cooperation involving experts sent from the member 
states (twinning), or budget support. It may be implemented and managed in different ways 
such as centralized, decentralized or shared management and via participation in community 
programs (European Commission, 2009: 6).  
An important institutional tool used in several assistance programs is “twining” to 
cover institution-building assistance (European Commission, 2003a: 17). Twining focuses on 
the development of efficient administrative capacity to implement the acquis communautaire. 
The twining framework foresees cooperation of administrations in the beneficiary countries 
with their counterparts in the member states to allow mutual learning by working on specific 
projects. The twinning programs aims to support the transposition and implementation of a 
specific part of the acquis considering the priority areas set in the Accession Partnerships 
(European Commission, 2004a).  
Following the recognition of candidacy status, the European Commission prepares an 
Accession Partnership and the government of the candidate government responds by 
delivering an NPAA clarifying the specific reforms and their timing (European Commission, 
2004a: 14).69 In the first phase of the candidacy process, the goal of the NPAA is the 
fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria, in order to gain a recommendation of the 
Commission to the Council to launch the accession negotiations (European Commission, 
                                                 
69 This process also accompanied by the preparation of a framework regulation concerning financial assistance 
targeting the priorities set at the Accession Partnership. 
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2001a: 12-13; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 211; Grabbe, 2003: 316). In this first 
phase, sub-committees on specific chapter headings70 are set up with the duty of monitoring 
the process and screening specific chapters.   
Following a recommendation of the Commission that the candidate country 
sufficiently fulfills the political criteria (a prerequisite for the launch of Accession 
negotiations), the European Council approves and the EU Council confirms the Negotiation 
Framework that includes the principles governing the negotiations, the substance of 
negotiations, negotiating procedures and list of negotiation chapter headings (European 
Commission, 2003a: 27). Following the opening of accession negotiations, the screening 
process of the negotiation chapters is launched during which individual DGs meet with the 
ministerial bureaucracy of the candidate state, presenting the details of the acquis 
communautaire as well as EU policy objectives, initiatives and norms on specific policies 
(European Commission, 2003a: 26-28). Accordingly, the national bureaucracy presents its 
policies and their institutional characteristics within each chapter, by self-assessing their level 
of accordance with the EU acquis.  
Following these exchanges, a screening report is prepared by the input of the specific 
sub-committee and the Commission, providing a review of the policy areas involved under the 
chapter heading while analyzing the conformities or nonconformities with specific part of the 
acquis. Following the screening report, the EU Council can decide on setting benchmarks that 
need to be fulfilled by the government of the candidate country in order to launch accession 
negotiations for each chapter (European Commission, 2007c). If the Council decides to open a 
chapter, the candidate state presents a negotiating position (European Commission, 2007c). 
The Commission prepares a proposal for the Union’s common position on the chapter which 
needs to be adopted by the Council (European Commission, 2007c). The negotiations for 
opening a chapter are conducted between the candidate country’s negotiating team and the 
Commission representatives. For the provisional closing of a chapter to occur all member 
states must unanimously agree. The accession negotiations are based on the principle that 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, meaning that definitive closure of chapters 
                                                 
70 “Chapters” in the vocabulary of the EU means a policy field. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-
towards-joining/index_en.htm 
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takes place at the end by the unanimous decision of the member states (European 
Commission, 2007c: 9). 
I.b EU Resources in the areas of social and employment policies 
The EU uses a variety of institutional and legal instruments to prepare candidate states 
more specifically in the area of social policy, and these instruments supply legal, political and 
particularly cognitive resources for the candidate states, including in this case for Turkey.  
Regular Progress Reports, Accession Partnership Documents and screening reports 
supply legal resources by clarifying in detail the content of the necessary reforms for 
complying with the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis communautaire. In the 
phase following the opening of accession negotiations, the Commission scrutinizes most 
closely the candidate country’s policies under each chapter heading, and the opinions of the 
Commission and Council can be a supply of political resources for national actors.  
Finally these instruments also provide cognitive resources such as ideas about the 
policy logic and content of policy. Even in the case of candidate states where the institutional 
power asymmetry is very large, such resources may flow from activities such as drawing up 
Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM) to prepare the candidate states for their eventual 
involvement in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on the subject of social inclusion 
and writing Joint Assessment Papers (JAP) which aim to define employment policies of the 
candidate states in line with the priorities of the European Employment Strategy (EES). These 
processes were designed to familiarize the candidate states with the functioning of the EES 
and the OMC and to prepare their full participation following the accession. Preparing the JIM 
and JAP involve the analysis of poverty levels, assessment of social inclusion and exclusion 
indicators, evaluation of labor market outcomes and institutions based on national indicators, 
which are supposed to be comparable with EU indicators. This is done in order to identify the 
major challenges. It involves the participation of a variety of actors including representatives 
of the Commission and bureaucratic and government actors as well as stakeholders such union 
confederations and non-governmental actors from the candidate country. De la Rosa (2005: 
626) terms the JIM and JAP processes a “joint apprenticeship” between EU institutions and 
the candidate states that involves the development of administrative capacities and includes 
the participation of academic networks as well. Grabbe (2003: 313) described the non-binding 
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character of these tools; candidate countries were oriented to what was in essence to shadow 
the Lisbon process. These processes are quite different from the top-down processes of 
conditionality for membership or the adoption of the acquis communautaire (de la Rosa, 2005: 
619).  
II. Turkey-EU relations: From candidacy status in 1999 to the 
accession negotiations in 2005 
Turkey has had a long association with the European Union, beginning with the 
Ankara Agreement in 1963 and the institutional relationship evolved with the signing of a 
Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1995, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate 
country at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 and the launch of accession negotiations in 
2005 (Öniş 2009a, 3; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Tocci 2005).  
Turkey became an associate member of the EU following the Ankara Agreement on 
September 12, 1963. This Agreement, which came into force on 1 December 1964, aimed to 
secure Turkey’s full membership through the establishment of a customs union (Saatçioğlu, 
2012: 3). The Additional Protocol of November 13, 1970 set out in a detailed manner how the 
customs union would be established (Güney, 2004: 140). In other words, the steps Turkey 
would have to take to become a European Economic Community (EEC) member country were 
clear. However the domestic situation in Turkey and the stalemate in the EEC during the 
1970s slowed down the development of Turkey-EU relations.  
Relations were then frozen following the military coup d’État of September 12, 1980. 
Only after the multiparty elections of 1983 did relations between Turkey and the EEC begin 
returning to normal. With the restoration of democracy, Turkey further pushed for the pursuit 
of membership in the Community, and applied for full membership in 1987 (Saatçioğlu, 2012: 
5). The Commission’s Opinion on Turkey’s membership, endorsed by the Council on 
February 5, 1990, stated that “it would be inappropriate for the Community, which is itself 
undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux, to become involved 
in new accession negotiations at this stage” (Güney, 2004: 140). It continued “furthermore, the 
political and economic situation in Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would not 
be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away.”   
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Although Turkey's application did not attain its main goal at the time, it did revitalize 
Turkey-EEC relations. Government efforts to further develop relations intensified. The 
Commission prepared a cooperation package even though it was not ratified, due to the 
objection of the Greek government (Saatçioğlu, 2012: 6). Thus, the most important interaction 
between Turkey and the EU in the 1990’s was the signing of Customs Union Agreement. It 
came into effect on 1 January 1996 (Nas, 2011). Then the EU became a major actor after 1999 
with the Helsinki Council Decision that recognized the candidacy status. Following the 
Helsinki Council Decision in 1999 on Turkey’s candidacy, the credibility of membership 
perspective and the supply of resources have increased considerably (Uğur, 2010). 
There are institutional mechanisms established between Turkey and the EU based on 
the Association Agreement of 1964 and further developed in the post-1999 Helsinki process. 
The Association Council established in 1964 is the highest-level institution, composed of the 
Foreign Ministers of Turkey and the EU Member States and representatives of the 
Commission. The Turkey-EU Association Committee is the secretarial institution of the 
Association Council and is responsible preparing the agenda of the Association Council, while 
deliberating and evaluating the technical problems arising (Çakır, 2002: 330). It is composed 
of experts at the ministerial level from Turkey and member states. The Association Council 
has provided the main channel of intergovernmental exchange between Turkey and the 
member states and has been key to the evolution of the institutional relationship (Çakır, 2002: 
337). The Customs Union agreement was negotiated at the Association Council during 1994 
and 1995, while specific committees, established by the Association Agreement (such as the 
Customs Cooperation Committee), worked on technical trade, tariff and custom legislation 
(Çakır, 2002: 339). The Joint Parliamentary Commission examines annual activity reports of 
the Association Council and makes recommendations. This Committee is composed of 18 
members from the Turkish parliament and the European Parliament (European Parliament, 
2009). 
 Following the Helsinki Decision, the Association Council established eight sub-
committees71 to screen various issue areas covering the acquis communautaire, including an 
                                                 
71 The negotiations chapters are discussed in eight sub-committees organized as: Agriculture and Fisheries 
Committee; Internal Market and Competition Committee; Trade, Industry and ECSC Products Committee; 
Economic and Monetary Issues Committee; Innovation Committee; Transport, Environment and Energy 
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EU-Turkey sub-committee on Regional Development, Employment and Social Policy (EC-
Turkey Association Council, 2000). Moreover the Turkish government in 2000 established the 
Secretariat-General for EU Affairs (Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, ABGS) to ensure 
internal coordination and harmonization in the preparation of Turkey for membership (Avrupa 
Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, 2007). The Secretariat-General become the main coordination body 
and is responsible for technical aspects of various issue areas, in order to assist different 
ministries and public agencies about the dimensions of the acquis. It is also responsible for the 
preparation of the NPAA.  
Four Accession Partnership Documents were prepared for Turkey (2001, 2003, 2006 
and 2008) which set out short and medium-term measures that needed to be introduced in the 
pre-accession process. The Turkish state prepared three NPAA (2001, 2003 and 2008), 
following the short and medium-term priorities indicated in the Accession Partnership 
Documents.  
After the launch of accession negotiations, the ABGS was moved in 2007 to be under 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then became a new ministry responsible from all EU 
affairs in 2011 (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2012a: 2). This represented an institutional 
innovation and increased administrative capacity as the EU ministry has fifteen directorates 
with an increased budget and more staff and experts on Europe.  
The EU membership process has also evolved from 1999 to 2008. In particular, 
negotiations on specific chapters, including social policy and employment, started in 2005. 
From 1999 to 2004 attention focused on compliance with the political criteria. 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 211; Grabbe, 2003: 316). The Council of the 
European Union decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 denoted 
that Turkey had fulfilled the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria.  
The negotiations then started the screening process in 2005. This consisted of meetings 
between Turkish bureaucrats and members of different DGs of the Commission to assess 
where adaptation in Turkish legislation were needed and which institutions the government 
would need to establish to conform to EU conditions. Accordingly, and concerning each 
                                                                                                                                                         
Committee; Regional Development, Employment and Social Policy Committee; Customs, Taxation, Drug 
Trafficking and Money Laundering Committee.   
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negotiation chapter, information on the legislation relevant to the acquis was provided, the 
differences between EU legislation and Turkish legislation were determined, and a broad 
calendar on each negotiation chapter was set in 2005 and in 2006 through a series of screening 
meetings. Following the completion of the screening process for a given chapter, the European 
Commission would submit to the Council a screening report, which is the key document 
determining whether the chapter is ready to be opened. In the screening reports, Commission 
reviews the information given by Turkey, assesses whether Turkey is ready for the opening of 
the specific chapter, and either recommends opening of the chapter or identifies benchmarks to 
be satisfied in order for this chapter to be opened. 
Following the submission of such screening reports by the Commission in 2006 and 
2007, the Council made important decisions concerning negotiation chapters. It announced 
that eight chapters72 were blocked because Turkey refused to recognize the Republic of 
Cyprus and did not extend the Additional Protocol of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement 
that requires Turkey to give access to its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes 
(Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2013, Avcı, 2011).73 On two chapters (Science and Research and 
Education and Culture) Turkey was invited to present a negotiation position. The Council 
decided provisionally to close the Science and Research chapter. In 2007, Turkey was also 
invited to present its negotiation position on Economic and Monetary Policy. The Council has 
approved the screening reports of nine other chapters74 and determined opening benchmarks 
including for the chapter on Social Policy and Employment. The accession negotiations are 
going through on the other 13 opened chapters75 for which closing benchmarks exist (Avrupa 
Birliği Bakanlığı, 2013).76 
                                                 
72 Ministry for EU Affairs indicates that the eight blocked chapters in February 2013 are: Chapter 2 Freedom of 
movement for workers; Chapter 13 Fisheries; Chapter 14 Transport policy; Chapter 15 Energy; Chapter 23 
Judiciary and fundamental rights; Chapter 24 Justice, freedom and security; Chapter 30 External relations; 
Chapter 33 Financial and budgetary provisions.  
73 Member states such France, Germany Austria and Cyprus have also blocked certain chapters since 2005 (Avcı, 
2011: 412), arguing that accession negotiations are open-ended, referring to the Negotiating Framework (EU 
Council, 2005) decided for Turkey. 
74 These nine chapters are: Chapter 1 Free movement of goods; Chapter 3 Right of establishment and freedom to 
provide services; Chapter 5 Public procurement; Chapter 8 Competition policy; Chapter 9 Financial services; 
Chapter 11 Agriculture; Chapter 19 Social policy and employment; Chapter 22 Regional policy and coordination 
of structural instruments; Chapter 29 Customs union. 
75 These thirteen chapters are: Chapter 20 Enterprise and industrial policy; Chapter 18 Statistics; Chapter 32 
Financial control; Chapter 21 Trans-European Networks; Chapter 28 Consumer and health protection; Chapter 6 
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III. The supply of EU resources available during reform of the 
labor law, restructuring of the employment agency and reform of 
the social security system  
In this section, the aim is to illustrate empirically various EU resources that were 
generated through the post-Helsinki period from 1999 to 2008 for the reforms of the social 
security system, labor regulation and the restructuring of the employment agency.  
Accordingly several EU instruments will be analyzed, such as the Accession Partnership 
Documents and NPAAs, the Progress Reports of the Commission, financial assistance under 
the MEDA program, a pre-accession assistance program and the IPA, screening and 
negotiation process under the chapter heading of Social Policy and Employment, and twinning 
and mutual learning programs. The analysis will focus first on the categorization of various 
resources while aiming to examine the evolution of their supply through different stages of the 
accession process. 
During the membership process, Progress reports, Accession Partnership Documents 
and screening reports provide legal resources.  They clarify in detail the content of the reforms 
necessary to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire. These are conditions for moving towards membership. They also provide 
political resources for national actors, who can make a link between the introduction of the 
reforms and the conditions by the Union for membership.  Finally these instruments also 
provide cognitive resources. They set out the expectations of the European Commission in the 
pre-accession process and intellectually frame the analysis of an issue.  
III.a. Accession Partnerships and NPAAs: Legal and political resources for 
social policy reforms 
Turkey’s four Accession Partnership Documents constitute an important instrument 
through which the EU influenced political and economic reforms during these years. The 
                                                                                                                                                         
Company law; Chapter 7 Intellectual property law; Chapter 4 Free movement of capital; Chapter 10 Information 
society and media; Chapter 16 Taxation; Chapter 27 Environment; Chapter 12 Food safety, veterinary and  
phytosanitary policy.  
76 The Commission did not conduct any screening for the Chapter 31 Foreign, security, defense policy. Therefore 
the accession process has not been launched yet for this chapter.  
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Accession Partnerships described where pre-accession assistance would be targeted, provided 
a framework for the short and medium-term priorities, objectives and set the conditions 
Turkey would have to meet.  
The 2001 Accession Partnership Document (EU Council, 2001a) established that the 
reform of the social security system and labor law were conditions of membership.  In other 
words, the EU institutions were insisting on reform. The reform of social security and labor 
law were identified in the Accession Partnership Documents as a medium-term priority. For 
instance, the 2001 Accession Partnership Document emphasized as a medium-term priority in 
the Economic Criteria section that Turkey should “Ensure the sustainability of the pension and 
social security system” (EU Council, 2001a: 19). Furthermore the document treated social 
security reform in the Employment and Social Affairs section as a medium-term goal, being 
to: “Further develop social protection, notably by consolidating the reform of the social 
security system with a view to making it financially sustainable, while strengthening the social 
safety net” (EU Council, 2001a: 20). The reform of the labor law was described as a medium-
term goal too, being to (EU Council, 2001a: 20):  
“Transpose EU legislation in the fields of labour law, [including] equality of 
treatment between women and men, occupational health and safety and public 
health; Reinforce related administrative structures and those required for the 
coordination of social security while requiring development of effective 
implementation and enforcement of the social policy and employment acquis.”  
 
Furthermore the Accession Partnership Document in 2001 called for preparation of a 
national employment strategy in line with the EES and development of the capacity to monitor 
labor market and social developments.  
In a similar vein, the Accession Partnership Document prepared in 2003 referred to the 
social security system in the same section as in 2001 document, that is under the Economic 
Criteria and under the Social Policy and Employment headings. Again they were medium-
term goals (EU Council, 2003a). Reform of labor law was also referenced in almost the same 
way as in 2001, under the Social Policy and Employment heading and emphasizing the 
transposition of EU legislation in the field of labor law and development of administrative 
capacity to implement a national employment strategy and create the necessary monitoring 
mechanisms of labor markets. 
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The NPAAs are the Turkish governments’ detailed road map clarifying the reforms 
that it would prepare in order to comply with the priorities emphasized at the Accession 
Partnership Documents and to align Turkish laws with the acquis communautaire. 
Accordingly the 2001 NPAA refers to both social security and labor law reforms (NPAA, 
2001). On the one hand, social security reform is mentioned as a structural reform to be 
implemented to comply with the Economic Criteria (NPAA, 2001:31) :  
“Structural reforms play a key role in terms of ensuring economic stability and 
permanently decreasing public deficits, which is the most significant problem in 
the disinflation program. Regulations on social security institutions and tax 
reforms, speeding up privatisation activities, and providing discipline on public 
expenditures will ensure a rapid and permanent recovery of the public balance.”  
 
More details were given in the Structural Reforms section regarding social security. 
First the relevant characteristics of the social security system were described while illustrating 
the related laws and schemes of social protection.77 Following this characterization, the 
problems of the social security system were defined, in terms of public finances and their 
impact on the deficit while also emphasizing the limited and unequal coverage and inadequate 
administrative capacity (NPAA, 2001: 31). This section indicated also the reforms planned 
that touched on the retirement age, minimum premiums, and increased levels of pensions 
while emphasizing administrative and institutional restructuring reforms planned for a more 
efficient coordination among the different social protection schemes. In the section regarding 
the capacity to assume the obligations for membership, the 2001 NPAA set the goals of co-
ordination of social security systems between Turkey and the member states in order to 
provide a legal ground for the transferability of coverage and benefits once there is free 
movement of persons and of equality of treatment (NPAA, 2001: 120). Accordingly the social 
security legislation in Turkey would need to be harmonized with Regulation 1408/71/EEC in 
terms of covering both paid and unpaid employees and including foreigners working in 
Turkey. Moreover, it indicated that (NPAA, 2001: 122):  
 
 
                                                 
77 These laws are: Law No. 1479, Social Security Institution for Craftsmen, Artisans and Other Self-Employed; 
Law No. 506, The Social Insurance Institution; Law No. 2926, Social Insurance for the Self-Employed in 
Agriculture; and Law No. 2925 Social Security for Agricultural Workers. 
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“The complete set of modifications that need to be introduced to the Turkish 
Social Security legislation in order to harmonise with the EU acquis on social 
policy and co-ordination of social security, have been separately laid down in 
terms of each and every social security law, and these modifications have been 
arranged under the Draft Law on the Social Security for Harmonisation with EU 
Legislation”. 
 
However, in the section regarding Equal Treatment of Men and Women, the 2001 
NPAA indicates that some provisions of the social security legislation have certain 
contradictory characteristics related to equal treatment (NPAA, 2001: 329). Accordingly two 
main issues existed: paid maternity leave and the legal status of the family. The NPAA 
indicated there was a need to standardize and institutionalize paid maternity leave,78 because 
provisions varied according to the employment status and participation in different social 
security schemes. The 2001 NPAA also argued that there was a need to enlarge the coverage 
and maximum leave period as well as to convert it to a parental leave. The 2001 NPAA 
announced that a Draft Bill on the Re-organization of Maternity Leave was in preparation 
(NPAA, 2001: 329). Moreover certain provisions of the social security legislation were 
evaluated to be contrary to the equal treatment norm, because the social security coverage of 
women depended on their role as wife or daughter of the man legally designated as the head of 
family (NPAA, 2001: 329). Accordingly the NPAA emphasized the need to reform the 
conditions related to the “head of the family” in order for women to be insured in their own 
right. 
The reform of the labor law was mentioned under the Labor Law. In a similar way, this 
section first described the characteristics of the legal framework (NPAA, 2001: 316), and then 
identified the reform and indicated that studies related to reforming the Labor Act No. 1475 
had started. It went on to describe the absence of a legal framework for flexible work 
arrangements and said that one would need to be developed (NPAA, 2001: 318). The Labor 
Law section of the 2001 NPAA also made reference to a number of specific directives that 
would be considered during the revision of the Labor Act, such as Council Directive 98/23/EC 
                                                 
78 The 2001 NPAA indicated that maternity insurance would be incorporated into Law No. 2926, Law No. 2925, 
Social Security for Agricultural Workers, and Law No. 1479, The Social Insurance Institution for Craftsmen, 
Artisans and Other Self-Employed. 
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and Council Directive 97/81/EC for the preparation of legal regulations for flexible and 
atypical work, Council Directive No 91/533/CEE to modify the provisions regarding the 
contract of service, health and safety rules, and rules about notification and consultation of 
workers, and Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning the minimum annual paid leave period 
(NPAA, 2001: 322-324). Moreover the 2001 NPAA indicates in the section regarding “Equal 
Treatment of Men and Women” that the Labor Act and Law No. 657 on Civil Servants are on 
their way of being harmonized with the EU acquis by modifying provisions touching on 
gender discrimination in terms of wages, admission to employment, working conditions, 
vocational training. 
 Moreover, in the section regarding Employment, the 2001 NPAA referred to the 
Council Decision 98/171/EC concerning the institutions and organizations related to the labor 
market and employment (NPAA, 2001: 333). Accordingly the NPAA indicated that “The 
activities leading to the restructuring of employment services have been completed by 
converting the Labour and Employment Agency into the more compatible Turkish 
Employment Institution” (NPAA, 2001: 333).  The reform of the employment agency was 
prepared in 2000, as Chapter IV discusses in detail. It enlarged the duties of the employment 
agency, mandating it to implement active labor market policies and to assume the 
unemployment insurance services and so on (NPAA, 2001: 333). All of this signaled that the 
2001 NPAA was promising employment policies in line with the EES guidelines and to 
comply with the acquis. It also announced that Turkish statistical data would be brought into 
conformity with EU standards. The Household Labor Force Survey would be prepared 
according the EU standards and the new Turkish Employment Institution would be responsible 
for coordinating data collection with the Turkish Statistical Institute, all in line with EU 
Directives (NPAA, 2001: 279).  
Regarding the social dialogue, the emphasis in the 2001 NPAA was on strengthening 
the legal status of the tripartite social dialogue mechanisms especially at the national level. It 
reviewed the current mechanisms of social dialogue (NPAA, 2001: 324). The conclusion was 
that representation at the sectoral level of collective bargaining needed to be strengthened in 
order to conform to the acquis. Despite the existence of social dialogue mechanisms at 
institutional and committee level at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, moreover, there 
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was a lack of social dialogue mechanisms at the national level where the Economic and Social 
Council did not work properly (NPAA, 2001: 325).  
The 2001 Accession Partnership Document and NPAA provided extensive legal 
resources, exposing in detail the various directives and Council Decisions required to be 
transposed to Turkish legislation. By relating the reform of the labor law, the restructuring of 
the employment agency to EU membership conditions, these documents supplied legal 
resources to be potentially deployed in the reform process by Turkish actors.  
Following the 2003 Accession Partnership Document, the newly elected AKP 
government prepared another NPAA (NPAA, 2003). It referred directly to the priorities of the 
2003 Accession Partnership Document. It indicated that the government aimed to maintain the 
Document’s emphasis on the reform and development of the social security system and 
improvement of the financial structure of social security institutions: “the Urgent Action Plan 
of the 58th Government has envisaged the establishment of an integrated social service 
network and relevant administrative structure” (NPAA, 2003: 512). Accordingly the NPAA 
indicated that the priority would go to the establishment of a general health insurance system, 
providing unity among norms and standards in social security institutions, and establishment 
of an integrated social security network. In addition, the Turkish state announced plans to 
participate as an observer in the Liaison Group for Elderly People and in the Social Protection 
Committee, in line with Commission Decisions 93/417/EEC and 91/544/EEC and in line with 
the Council Decision 2000/446/EC in the context of the Community Programme combating 
social exclusion (NPAA, 2003: 512). The NPAA reported signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding for participation in the Community Programme to Combat Social Exclusion, a 
process initiated in anticipation of the preparation of a Joint Inclusion Memorandum (NPAA, 
2003: 489). The 2003 Accession Partnership document had set out as a medium-term goal to 
“Take measures to promote access to and quality of health care and to improve the health 
status of the population” (EU Council, 2003a: 53). The NPAA in 2003 then indicated that 
Turkish government would participate in the first programme of Community action in the field 
of public health (2003-2008), initiated by Directive 1786/2002/EC during 2004-2005 (NPAA, 
2003: 487-488). The NPAA pointed out that such participation would allow Turkey’s 
integration into EU initiatives to improve information for promoting public health and health 
systems, improving the ability to respond rapidly and coherently to health threats, and 
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developing analysis of health determinants (NPAA, 2003: 508). The participation in this 
program would provide financial resources for specific projects in the area of public health. In 
this way the EU was providing cognitive resources for Turkey to evaluate the quality of its 
healthcare and its coverage, in line with reform attempts initiated by the AKP government. 
The 2003 Accession Partnership and NPAA illustrate the cognitive resources and political 
resources made available on this dimension of the social security reform.  
Regarding labor law, the 2003 NPAA emphasized the legislative amendments to 
regulate flexible working patterns and measures to prevent child labor. These reforms were 
needed to comply with and align Turkish legislation with the relevant acquis (Council 
Directives 80/987/EEC, 2002/74/EC and 91/383/EEC and relevant provisions of Council 
Directive 94/33/EC, 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC, 91/533/EEC, 97/81/EC, 93/104/EC and 
99/70/EC) (NPAA, 2003: 488-489). The NPAA also indicated that the government would 
move toward new regulations on flexible working (NPAA, 2003: 488).  
Indeed, the 2003 NPAA foresaw full completion of compliance with the acquis via 
legislation to be introduced in 2004 and 2005. The NPAA indicates that relevant studies were 
being conducted by the Department of EU Coordination within the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security on the areas of equal treatment and social dialogue (NPAA, 2003: 489). 
Beyond that, “it is essential to strengthen the administrative capacity of the Department of EU 
Coordination under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Within this context, it will be 
necessary to restructure this department as a Directorate General” (NPAA, 2003: 517).  
The 2003 NPAA continued to stress the area of equal opportunity: “Turkey envisages 
the adoption of a program for the transposition of relevant EU legislation in the short term, 
and transposition and implementation of relevant EU legislation in the medium term” while 
also emphasizing reform of the labor law removing some of the legal barriers for women’s 
labor force participation (NPAA, 2003: 517). It also raised the issue of social dialogue 
reforms, including the abolition of restrictive provisions on trade union activities and assured 
that introduction of new union rights was planned. The 2003 NPAA continued to indicate that 
in the area of social dialogue there was a need for effective implementation of the Economic 
and Social Council.  
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The Accession Partnership documents in 2006 and 2008 also took up reform of the 
social security system as well as labor law, all needed in order to align the legal framework 
with the acquis communautaire (EU Council, 2006b; EU Council, 2008).  
In 2006, the Council of the European Union prepared an Accession Negotiation 
document following the Commission’s recommendation about the launch of accession 
negotiations in 2005 and the screening process on specific chapters. However there was 
quickly stalemate in the membership process due to the opposition of a number of member 
states that insisted on the open ended character of the accession negotiations by referring to 
the Negotiating Framework decided for Turkey in 2005 (EU Council, 2005).  Turkey was also 
hesitant to extend the Additional Protocol for Cyprus.  By opening its ports and allowing 
travelling, it would give de facto recognition to the Republic of Cyprus. Accordingly the 
Turkish government did not prepare a NPAA responding to the priorities emphasized by the 
2006 Accession Partnership Document.  
The stalemate in Turkey-EU relation has since softened to a certain extent as the 
Cyprus issue has been put on the backburner and the member states have focused more on the 
technical details of accession within specific chapters. Accordingly an Accession Partnership 
Document was prepared in 2008 indicating the priorities and the compliance needed by the 
Turkish government (EU Council, 2008). The Turkish government also prepared a NPAA in 
2008 reflecting the reforms planned to be introduced from 2007 to 2013 (NPAA, 2008). 
The reform of the social security system and labor law and employment were 
referenced under the same sections in the 2006 Accession Partnership and in a similar ways to 
what was said in 2001 and 2003. The 2006 Accession Partnership Document called for action 
to “ensure the sustainability of the pension and social security system” (EU Council, 2006b: 
29) and to “Further develop social protection, notably by consolidating the reform of the social 
security system with a view to making it financially sustainable, while strengthening the social 
safety net” (EU Council, 2006b: 40). It also continued to call, in the medium term, for reforms 
to the legal framework so as to ensure further harmonization with the social policy and 
employment acquis (EU Council, 2006b: 43). Indeed the document called for preparation of a 
national employment strategy in line with the EES and greater capacity to monitor labor 
market and social developments.  
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The 2008 Accession Partnership Document was insistent about changes to the social 
security system, calling for “implementing a sustainable and effective social security system” 
as a short-term priority (EU Council, 2008: 6). It also referred to labor regulation under the 
Economic Criteria section as a short-term priority to: “…address labor market imbalances. To 
this end, improve incentive structures and flexibility in the labor market to increase 
participation and employment rates; improve education and professional training efforts, 
thereby encouraging the shift from agriculture to a service-based economy…” (EU Council, 
2008: 10). It continued, under the chapter heading Social Policy and Employment to call for 
harmonization with the acquis and strengthening administrative and enforcement structures as 
a medium-term goal (EU Council, 2008: 13). 
The 2008 NPAA responded to the priorities identified in both the 2006 and 2008 
Accession Partnership Documents as well as the screening process and chapter negotiations 
(NPAA, 2008). It took up parental leave and the need to reform the general labor law and 
regulations related to civil servants in the area of parental leave so as to harmonize with 
Directives 92/85/EEC and 96/34/EC. These changes would enable the mother and father to 
share an unpaid parental leave (NPAA, 2008: 212). It also mentioned the social security 
reforms needed to align with the Directive 79/7/EEC, Directive 2006/54/EC and European 
Strategy for Social Inclusion (NPAA, 2008: 22). Union rights were also taken up and a whole 
range of other labor laws. The goal of these reforms was to harmonize the legal framework 
regarding labor regulation in terms of gender equality and struggle against discrimination.79 
The Accession Partnership Documents and NPAAs supplied political and legal 
resources for labor law reform and restructuring the employment agency in 2003 and for social 
security reform in 2008. These instruments have clearly indicated that the reforms must 
happen in order to comply with the EU membership conditions. The documents place the need 
for reforms under the Economic Criteria. It is clearly stated that there is a need to develop a 
more coherent employment policy to address labor market imbalances, to increase 
participation and employment rates and also to improve the institutional capacity and legal 
                                                 
79 The social harmonization package aims to align the EU acquis: 2006/54/EC, 2000/78/EC, 2003/72/EC, 
2004/113/EC, 96/71/EC, 97/81/ EC, 2003/88/ EC, 2005/47/ EC, 91/383/EEC, 91/533/EEC, 99/63/ EC,  
99/95/EC, 2002/15/EC, 99/70/EC, 94/45/EC, 2002/14/EC, 80/987/EEC, 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC, 2001/86/EC, 
2000/43/EC. 
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framework in line with the EES. Moreover it is clearly emphasized that there is a need to 
improve the financial sustainability of the social security system especially pensions via 
relevant legal and institutional changes. These instruments thereby provide political resources 
for Turkish actors wishing to make a case for EU membership. According to the categories of 
the Uses of Europe approach, they provide legal resources as well. They indicate in detail the 
relevant directives and the acquis communautaire, thereby indicating quite explicitly what the 
content of reform will be.  
III.b. Progress reports and EU resources:  Detailed analysis of the social 
policy framework in Turkey 
An important instrument that EU uses to trigger political and economic reforms in 
candidate countries are the Progress Reports that are prepared by the European Commission. 
The Progress Reports for Turkey have been published since 1998 and they have continuously 
addressed social security and employment since the beginning.  The 1999 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress toward Accession said:  “the degree of alignment of Turkish legislation 
with the acquis in the field of health, social security, labor and equal opportunities is limited… 
The social security system continues to be in grave financial difficulty” (European 
Commission, 1999a: 38). Although the 1999 Report recognized the improvements made by 
the 1999 reforms on retirement age and alterations in the contribution period, it was also 
concerned about the need to control the fiscal deficit of the social security system (European 
Commission, 1999a). The 2000 Progress Report underlined the urgency of reform in order to 
deal with the fiscal deficit as well as improving healthcare coverage with a universal approach: 
“The social security system continues to be in serious financial difficulty. The reforms in 
progress are essential. On major health indicators, such as infant mortality, maternal mortality 
and life expectancy, Turkey continues to be significantly worse than EU member states. 
Decent standards of primary health care must be ensured for the whole of the population” (EU 
Commission, 2000b: 50). The same Report assessed the labor code, identifying as key issues 
reform of the employment relationship, health and safety of temporary workers, organization 
of working time, part-time work, and protection of young people at work. 
The 2001 Progress Report emphasized that “Progress in the ongoing reform of the 
Turkish social security system is urgently needed. Overall, the social security system 
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continues to experience serious financial difficulties” (European Commission, 2001b: 69). The 
2001 Report was positive about the reform that added private pensions to the compulsory 
pension system even it was critical of tax exemptions being excluded from the private pension 
regime.  But the 2001 Report was less sanguine about labor market policy, saying: “Labor 
market policy remains to be developed. Due to Turkey's traditional focus on short-term 
stabilization, labor market policies are hardly discussed during policy formulation. However, 
recently the institutional set-up and the involvement of the social partners have been 
improved. Tri-partite commissions, representing the state, employers and employees, are 
preparing reports and proposals on how to improve the efficiency of Turkish labor market 
policy” (European Commission, 2001b: 43). 
 The 2002 and 2003 reports claimed that legal and administrative changes were still 
needed in order to ensure the proper functioning of the social security system and to ensure its 
fiscal sustainability (European Commission, 2002b: 150; European Commission, 2003b: 65).  
The 2003 Progress Report emphasizes that “Inefficiencies and cases of irregularities in the 
pension system and social security institutions are partly due to legal defects and partly to 
insufficient administrative capacity... Turkey should continue its efforts to stabilise its social 
security system” (European Commission, 2003b: 65). The 2002 Report recalled that “a 
scientific committee has been set up to prepare a revision of the Turkish Labor Code” 
(European Commission, 2002b: 91) and in considering the reform of labor law in 2003, the 
Progress Report (European Commission, 2003b: 53-54) admitted that: 
“Labor market policies have been brought closer to international standards, 
although the attention paid to labor market issues is far from sufficient. The 
adoption of the labor law in June 2003 has been an important step towards meeting 
international standards in this field. The legal position of employees has been 
improved and important workers’ rights, such as holidays, social protection, 
flexible working times, severance payments and protection from unjustified 
dismissal have been officially established. Incentives for formal employment have 
been increased. However, the number of employees benefiting from this 
legislation is still rather low. In order to improve the matching process in the labor 
market, an employment agency has been established.” 
 
The 2004 Progress Report insisted that existing structures to promote social inclusion 
and to insure social protection were insufficient and indicated that “In the field of social 
protection, the Government should pursue its ongoing efforts aimed at bringing about a reform 
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of the social security system. Its main current weaknesses remain the lack of financial 
stability, the presence of a large informal sector and administrative and management problems. 
Efforts currently undertaken to upgrade the administrative capacity of the social security 
institutions are also strongly encouraged” (European Commission, 2004b: 113). 
The 2005 report (European Commission, 2005a: 96) reaffirmed that the lack of 
financial stability as the main weakness of the social security system and the need to improve 
the equal coverage of the system, despite some changes:  
“In an effort to reform the social security system, and gathering the social security 
institutions under a single framework, a law was adopted in January 2005 
transferring all hospitals belonging to the social security institutions to the 
Ministry of Health. Furthermore, in February 2005, all beneficiaries of the social 
security system have been entitled to obtain medications from all pharmacies. 
However, further efforts are required in the field of health care to improve 
population coverage and equity of access. Addressing geographical disparities of 
care supply is also a matter of concern. Efforts currently undertaken to upgrade the 
administrative capacity of the social security institutions should continue.”  
 
The 2006 Progress Report saluted the significant social security reform bill introduced 
by the AKP government in 2006 (European Commission, 2006: 53): 
“In the field of social protection, Parliament adopted legislation on social security 
reform in May and June 2006, providing for a complete overhaul of the Turkish 
social security system. This will be simplified and bureaucracy reduced, benefits-
liabilities will be equal for everybody, free healthcare will be provided to all 
children under 18 years old. The reform aims to ensure the long-term financial 
stability of the social security system and to regulate assistance to the poorest. 
Upgrading of the administrative capacity of the newly established Social Security 
Institution is ongoing.”  
 
But the 2007 Progress Report criticized the delay in implementation of the social 
security reform and the fiscal deficit: “In the field of social protection, little progress has been 
achieved. The enforcement of the social security reform was postponed to 2008” (European 
Commission, 2007d: 53-54). Moreover the report emphasized the weakness of the institutional 
structures and policy measures concerning social inclusion and criticized the non-completion 
of the Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM), underlining that: “The percentage of the population 
at risk of poverty is among the highest when compared to those of member states and 
candidate countries. The lack of efficient social transfers, together with the high percentage of 
‘working poor’, leads to an important child poverty rate” (European Commission, 2007d: 54). 
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The 2008 Progress Report admitted that Turkey had made some advances in the field 
of social policy and employment through the parliamentary adoption of the Law on Social 
Insurance and General Health Insurance in October 2008 (European Commission, 2008b: 62):  
“In the field of social protection, some progress has been achieved. The most 
significant pillar of the social security reform, the Social Insurance and General 
Health Insurance Law, entered into force in October 2008. Its aim is to regulate, 
among others, the pension parameters and the general health insurance system 
with a view of ensuring adequate and sustainable pensions.... However, there has 
been no development as regards new legislation on social assistance and services. 
Preparations in this area have started”. 
 
The 2008 Progress report also evaluated some efforts for fostering social inclusion 
because the new health law provided general health insurance coverage for everyone under 18 
and the health premiums of those who cannot afford to pay were covered by the state. 
Since 1999, the Progress Reports systematically stressed three general themes 
regarding the social security system: the urgency of controlling the fiscal deficit; 
administrative and management problems created by having different institutional 
frameworks; and the non-universal character of social protection, health-care and social 
assistance. The social security reform was treated under two sections in the Progress Reports; 
in the one regarding Economic Criteria and in the Social Policy and Employment chapters. 
The Commission emphasized in the Economic Criteria chapter the need for reform measures 
to control the fiscal deficit of the social security system. The administrative and management 
problems related to different institutional structures and the non-universal coverage of the 
social security and healthcare system came up under the chapter of Social Policy and 
Employment.  
Beginning with the 2002 Progress Report, the Commission started to emphasize the 
“social inclusion” aspect of social policies and social protection. Accordingly the evolution of 
Progress Reports also indicates that the EU emphasis on developing social policies in line with 
EU standards has strengthened since 2002. Following the opening of accession negotiations in 
2005 with the launch of the screening process under the chapter headings of Social Policy and 
Employment, the EU has a better assessment of the problems related to the Turkish welfare 
state.
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Labor law was addressed in two sections of Progress Reports from 1999 to 2002: 
Economic Criteria and Social Policy and Employment. The two main themes regarding the 
labor law were, on the one hand, the lack of employment policy and the weakness of the 
institutional structure to support the formulation of such strategy and on the other hand the 
lack of a legal framework for the employment relationship, health and safety of temporary 
workers, the organization of working time, and part-time work. The Progress Reports assessed 
as a positive development the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency in 2001 and 
the adoption of the labor law in June 2003 that introduced social protection and flexible 
working time.  
The European Commission’s Progress Reports for Turkey stressed the need to develop 
social dialogue mechanisms with the social partners. Social dialogue as the tripartite and 
bipartite social dialogue mechanisms is a requirement for membership. The Progress Reports 
ask for the development of bipartite social dialogue mechanisms and collective agreements as 
well as strengthening union rights. The Turkey Regular Report 2006 indicates that “As regards 
social dialogue, no progress can be reported on the pending draft laws aimed at bringing the 
currently applicable Trade Union and Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout Laws in line 
with ILO and EU standards” (European Commission, 2006: 53). The EU emphasis on the 
development of social dialogue has influenced to a certain extent the social security reform 
process. The AKP governments have used the social dialogue mechanisms, such as Economic 
and Social Council, to discuss the reform with the social partners.  
III.c. Budgetary and financial resources for social policy reforms in Turkey 
Another important aspect of the candidacy process is the EU’s financial assistance. It 
provides significant budgetary resources and these were used for remodeling the employment 
agency and reforming both the social security system and labor law. Financial assistance under 
the program for the MEDA (1996-2001) and Turkey’s Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) 2002-2006) covered areas relevant for institution building.   
Turkey was a recipient of MEDA funds as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
program since 1996 (Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 118). Accordingly, under MEDA I (1996 to 1999), 
€376 million in financial assistance was provided for 55 projects (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı 
(2012b: 2-3). Under MEDA II €889 million was committed as grants and €1.47 billion as 
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credits although a certain portion of this financial assistance was later transferred to the Pre-
accession Assistance program (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2012b: 4; Tatham, 2009: 314-315). 
As already noted, a Pre-accession Assistance program replaced the MEDA in 2002 in 
order to “provide support for institution building, investment to strengthen the regulatory 
infrastructure needed to ensure compliance with the acquis, investment in economic and social 
cohesion and the promotion of the civil society dialogue” (European Commission, 2007b: 2). 
Budgetary allocations under the pre-accession assistance for the six objectives in the period 
from 2002 to 2006 have reached in total to €1,235,520,000 and the amount for the economic 
and social cohesion80 and social policy sectors have increased steadily (European 
Commission, 2007b: 8).  
 
Table 2. Budgetary allocations under the Turkey National Programs (Pre-accession 
assistance program) 2002-2006, millions of euros (€) 
 
In line with the 2001 and 2003 Accession Partnership Documents, the EU’s emphasis 
has been oriented towards strengthening the institutional capacity of the new Turkish 
Employment Agency. Under the economic and social cohesion objective of Pre-accession 
Assistance, a program called the Active Labor Market Strategy Programme provided funds for 
the Turkish Employment Agency aimed at institution building, support for the modernization 
of the offices and for active employment measures with a budget of €50 million from 2003 to 
2006 (European Commission, 2002c). A second phase of the project involved investment in 
the local capacity of the Turkish Employment Agency and was implemented from 2006 to 
2009 with a budget of €20 million (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 
2012a). These programs provided substantial financial resources to the Turkish Employment 
                                                 
80 The economic and social cohesion component aims to address regional differences in various areas including 
structural labor market problems in parallel to European Structural Funds. 
Sector 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Social 
Policy 7 
 17.174 7.757 5 36.931 
Economic 
Social 
Cohesion 
40 45.3 77.556 117.059 182.054 461.969 
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Agency and for it efforts to implement active labor market policies. 
Starting in 2007, Turkey began to benefit from a new IPA in which the human 
resources development component supported activities addressing social inclusion as well as 
other issues such as employment, education, and training (European Commission, 2007b: 16). 
The human resource development assistance under the IPA aimed to increase general labor 
market participation and employment rates, especially women’s low level of participation; 
improve the quality of education, so as to improve the linkage between education and the labor 
market, and to raise enrolment rates especially for girls; improve the coordination and 
effectiveness of social services providing education, training and employment opportunities, 
towards the disadvantaged. Accordingly 40% of the financial assistance under the human 
resources development component went towards employment while 35% was oriented 
towards education and 25% towards social inclusion. The planned budget from 2007 to 2013 
reached €479.6 million for human resource development where the total financial assistance of 
all components of IPA for this period would reach €4,831.6 million. This indicates a 
substantial increase in financial resources supplied compared to the previous period from 2002 
to 2006 (European Commission, 2007b: 17).  
 
Table 3. Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), 2007-2013, millions of euros (€) 
Components  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL 
Institution Building 256.7 256.12 239.55 217.8 231.26 227.49 246.28 1,675.2 
Cross-border 
cooperation 
2.09 2.87 3.04 3.09 5.13 2.17 2.21 20.6 
Regional 
Development 
167.5 173.8 182.7 238,1 293.4 356.8 378 1,790.3 
Human Resources 
Development 
50.2 52.9 55.6 63.4 77.6 83.9 96.0 479.6 
Rural Development 20.7 53.0 85.5 131.3 172.5 189.8 213 865.5 
TOTAL 497.2 538.7 566.4 653.7 779.9 860.2 935.5 4,831.6 
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An institution-building project under the IPA was launched in 2007, titled “Capacity 
Building of the Social Security Institution” (Coucheir and Hauben, 2011: 8).  This project had 
two goals. On the one hand it sought to strengthen the institutional and administrative capacity 
of the new Social Security Institution so as to develop aligned policies in the field of 
coordination of social security schemes and social security policy and on the other hand, it 
targeted compliance with the EU acquis on the coordination of social security schemes and 
overall social security policy (Coucheir and Hauben, 2011: 8). The project provides financial 
assistance of €1.10 million for three years to increase the institutional capacity of the Social 
Security Institution (European Commission, 2007e). The initial project was extended in 2011 
with addition IPA financial resources (Delegation of the European Union in Turkey, 2012b). 
III.d. Institutional and programmatic resources: Sub-committees, screening 
processes and twining projects 
 
The most important institutional resource supplied during Turkey’s candidacy is the 
sub-committees established on specific areas of the acquis communautaire. Following the 
Helsinki Council decision, the Association Council in 2000 established eight subcommittees to 
monitor progress with the priorities of the Accession Partnership Document and with moving 
towards legislation (European Commission, 2000a). One of these was the EU-Turkey 
subcommittee on Regional Development, Employment and Social Policy.  Accordingly this 
subcommittee has provided an important space for information exchange and has been a 
coordination mechanism. The subcommittees’ role is to provide an overview of developments, 
to exchange information and to screen specific issues related to the acquis communautaire. 
The information gathered by the subcommittees is used in the preparation of Progress Reports. 
Although the subcommittees do not have decision-making capacities, they have provided the 
main institutional tool for allowing the encounter between the representatives of different 
Directorates-General and the bureaucracies of Turkish ministries (European Commission, 
2000a).  
The Subcommittee on Regional Development, Employment and Social Policy met 
several times from 2000 to 2004 and that served as a screening exercise (EC-Turkey 
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Subcommittee on Regional Development, Labour and Social Affairs, 2002: 2). For instance, at 
the 2004 meeting of the Subcommittee, after the Turkish side made a presentation of the 
reform of the labor law, the Commission side communicated its evaluation of certain 
shortcomings related to the provisions regarding non-discrimination in the termination of 
contracts to businesses with more than 30 workers and to workers and employees with at least 
six months of service, mentioning that these restrictions are not in line with the relevant EU 
legislation on non-discrimination (EC-Turkey Subcommittee on Regional Development, 
Labour and Social Affairs, 2004).  
When in December 2004 the Council concluded that Turkey had fulfilled the 
Copenhagen political criteria and accession negotiations could open, the situation changed 
somewhat.  When negotiations started on 3 October 2005 the Council adopted a Negotiating 
Framework, dividing the acquis into 35 chapters. The analytical examination of the EU 
legislation, which is the screening process at the first stage of negotiations, started in March 
2006 (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2006: 8-9). The screening process 
of the chapter on Social policy and Employment was completed by November 2006 conducted 
by the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and a screening report was 
published. This report addressed the problems of the social security system, stating:  “In 2005, 
Turkey’s social security deficit reached 4.81% of the GDP, the highest among OECD 
countries. The main cause of the ballooning deficit is early retirement. In 2006, the minimum 
retirement age is 43 for women and 47 for men, and 60% of the retired people are under 60” 
(Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2006: 9). Moreover, the screening report 
analyzed the social security reform package and concluded that it would decrease the fiscal 
deficit and also increase the coverage of the social security system to all the population: “The 
social security system will thus be simplified and reduced in bureaucracy, benefits-liabilities 
will be equal for everybody, free healthcare will be provided to all children under 18 and the 
retirement age is to be gradually raised to 65 by 2048… the whole population will be covered 
by the General Health Insurance” (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2006: 
6).  
The screening report also analyzed the legal framework of labor law and assessed the 
degree of alignment with the acquis as well as the implementing capacity. The screening 
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report evaluated positively the 2003 labor law reform (Delegation of the European 
Commission to Turkey, 2006: 2):  
“The Turkish Labour Law was revised in May 2003 and is complemented by by-
laws. The Labour Law provides for rights and obligations regarding working 
conditions and work environment of employers and workers. Latest revisions 
aimed at introducing provisions inspired by the acquis in the fields of working 
time and working conditions.”  
 
Accordingly the screening report assessed that a satisfactory level of alignment has 
been reached in the field of labor law where most of the principles of the acquis were in place. 
The screening report found that the scope of application of the labor law was still too limited, 
considering the degree of informal employment as well as in certain sectors such as 
agriculture. There are certain shortcomings in terms of administrative capacity where there is a 
need to strengthen the recruitment of staff and training capacity. 
The screening process provided extensive legal resources by analyzing Turkish 
legislation and comparing it to the EU acquis requirements. This practice demonstrated the 
serious shortcomings of the Turkish legislation and provided resources for Turkish actors in 
their debates about reform. Moreover the screening exercise provided cognitive resources for 
bureaucratic actors by focusing on conformity to EU acquis and policy directions more 
generally. 
Although the screening process of the social and employment policy chapters have 
been completed and approved, the Chapter on Social Policy and Employment was not opened 
for actual negotiations. Instead, the Commission recommended that the Council set two 
opening benchmarks to be fulfilled in order to open negotiations of the chapter (Avrupa Birliği 
Bakanlığı, 2013). The opening benchmarks set for the opening of the chapter on Social Policy 
and Employment are the establishment of full trade union rights81 in line with EU standards 
and ILO conventions and the preparation of an action plan for the transition, implementation 
and enforcement of the relevant acquis communautaire covering all aspects of employment 
policy and the labor market (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2013). An action plan was prepared 
and submitted to the Commission in 2010. The reform related to trade-union rights was dealt 
                                                 
81 The benchmark for the opening of the chapter insists on legal reforms concerning trade unions’ rights to 
organize, trade unions’ right to strike and trade unions’ right to bargain collectively both in public and private 
sectors. 
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with in the draft laws on Collective Labor Relations and on Public Servants’ Trade Unions and 
Collective Agreements prepared by the AKP government after the 2010 referendum. However 
the Commission did not recommend the opening of the chapter to the Council, asking further 
reform of the legislation on trade unions in the private and public sectors. 
The preparation of Joint Inclusion Memoranda (JIM) started in 2004 with the 
participation of different ministries and state agencies and including social actors (Yakut-
Çakar, 2007: 118). The JIM is an exercise in which the Commission can inform Turkey of the 
necessary statistical indicators to measure the extent of poverty and social exclusion and 
emphasize the development of a comprehensive approach considering regional aspect of the 
poverty including exclusion of certain minority groups. The JIM process has also revealed the 
absence of relevant data and statistics in analyzing the extent of poverty as well as social 
exclusion. The drafting of the JIM process stalled, however, from 2007 to 2009 due to a major 
disagreement between the Turkish side and European Commission on the definition of ethnic 
minorities in assessing social exclusion. The Commission insisted on disaggregating poverty 
rates of ethnic and linguistic minorities such as Kurdish and Roma population as well as by 
region. However the representatives of the ministries claimed that the Turkish state recognizes 
only religious minorities, based on the Lausanne Treaty, and it is not possible to provide data 
on ethnic minorities’ poverty.  
 The exercise for the preparation of the Joint Assessment Paper82 of employment 
priorities has been crucial to provide the analysis of the Turkish labor market identifying key 
challenges and employment priorities (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2011: 22). 
Considering the priorities of the European Employment Strategy, the drafting process of the 
JAP initiated through the formulation of the Employment Background Report in 2003 with the 
participation of ministerial actors and the Turkish Employment Organization (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, 2011: 22). Although a draft JAP was prepared, the process is not 
finalized as the Council of the EU did not approve it and the Turkish government did not agree 
on this draft version. The JAP process has provided cognitive resources with participation of 
                                                 
82 The JAP aims to orient candidate countries to define employment policies to be ready for membership and to 
progressively adjust institutions and policies to be able to fully participate in the EU wide employment policy 
coordination following accession.   
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various bureaucratic actors defining the main challenges related to the employment policy and 
labor market institutions. 
An important aspect of the candidacy process are the twinning, mutual learning 
projects and IPA institution building components that aim to assist the candidate state in the 
development of modern and efficient administrations, making available the structures, human 
resources and management skills needed to implement the acquis communautaire. 
Accordingly, twinning and the IPA institution-building component provide legal, budgetary 
and cognitive resources allowing candidate countries’ administrations and semi-public 
organizations to work with their counterparts within the EU. 
A project entitled Harmonisation and Implementation of Legislation on Flexible Work 
in Turkey was developed from 2003 to 2005 with the cooperation of the Netherlands Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW) and Turkey’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
and the Turkish Employment Agency with the assistance of the University of Tilburg 
(Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2005). On the one hand, the 
twinning project foresaw exchange of information among the involved parties, with the aim of 
providing a general level of understanding and knowledge of Directives 93/104/EC, 99/70/EC 
and 97/81/EC on flexible working.83 Through the twining project, Turkish labor law was 
analyzed, recommendations for harmonization were formulated, and draft legislation on 
flexible working and social security in accordance with the Directives prepared (Pennings and 
Süral, 2006). The project provided technical assistance for the drafting of the legislation on 
flexible working as well as institution building. Its budget was €415,605 (Netherlands 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2005). The screening process and sub-regulation 
that emerged following the reform of the Labor Act in 2003 drew significantly on this 
twinning project that provided technical expertise and legal resources related to the acquis 
communautaire, while providing cognitive resources regarding the social security system and 
flexible working time and budgetary resources related to institution building. 
                                                 
83 Directive 93/104/EC concerns certain aspects of the organization of working time, Directive 99/70/EC 
concerns the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre of 
Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP), and Directive 97/81/EC concerns the framework agreement on 
part-term work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and ETUC. 
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IV. Findings and conclusions about the research hypothesis 
The European Commission’s main emphasis, through all these multiple and varied 
instruments, was to provoke the modernization of Turkish labor law and social security so as 
to adapt to the changing conditions of the labor market and allow flexible work arrangements 
as well as improve equality and non-discrimination towards vulnerable groups such as young 
workers, women or minorities.  In doing so, it has emphasized the legal resources associated 
with the process of a required alignment with specific directives and acquis communautaire. 
But political resources have also been generated by the deployment of these instruments.  
Those promoting Turkish membership in the EU could appeal to these reforms as conditions 
of membership and emphasize the new financial resources, while those opposed to 
membership could point to the constraints imposed. The institutional resources such as sub-
committee meetings and screening exercises have raised the awareness and understanding 
among Turkish bureaucrats about social policy trends in the EU and thereby provided 
cognitive resources. Moreover the financial resources have supported various training 
programs and organization of workshops and conferences where problems related to the social 
security system and labor law were discussed towards harmonizing legislation. Accordingly, 
the EU has provided legal resources with the acquis communautaire, cognitive resources via 
the guidelines of the EES and political resources by framing these institutional and policy 
developments to the EU membership conditions. 
The EU membership process has evolved from 1999 to 2008, with a major change 
when the accession negotiations on specific chapters including social policy and employment 
started in 2005. The institutional evolution of Turkey-EU relations since 1999, considering 
different legal and financial resources supplied by the EU for Turkey, indicates that the social 
security system and labor regulation including employment policy has been more extensively 
under the scrutiny of the Commission since 2005 with the launch of the accession 
negotiations.  
This chapter enables me to address the hypothesis, coming from the Uses of Europe 
approach, that European resources provided by the EU institutions tend to vary according to 
the institutional relationship that a country has with the EU (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 
2011: 8). Certainly the data on the financial resources support the hypothesis. The amount of 
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financial assistance for social and employment policies increased considerably between 1999 
and 2008, under the various programs from MEDA to the Pre-accession Assistance Program 
to the IPA. The evolution of the institutional relationship from recognition of Turkey’s status 
as candidate (1999 to 2005) to the launch of accession negotiations (2005 to 2011) brought 
increased financial assistance, especially for specific projects such as institution building, 
particularly with reference to the Turkish Employment Agency and the Social Security 
Institution.  
The observation of the institutional and legal resources confirms also the research 
hypothesis; there were increasing institutional resources in the period from 2004 to 2008 that 
allowed the Turkish bureaucrats to participate in various programs and attend the Committees 
of the EU on social and employment policy, compared to the first phase from 1999 to 2004. 
Legal resources also increased with the start of accession negotiations in 2005. At that 
moment, efforts increased to provoke conformity, by laying out the discrepancies between 
Turkish law and practices and providing clear advice (via negative or positive evaluations) 
about what was needed to conform to the acquis communautaire and the directives.  While 
such work on discrepancies and models was present in the first phase from 1999 to 2004, the 
emphasis was on compliance with the political criteria. Opening negotiations meant that 
attention and the supply of resources shifted to the social and employment fields.  
The findings about the increase in cognitive resources are less conclusive. Little 
change in the cognitive resources was observed with the evolution of the institutional 
relationship from the first phase to the second. The more appropriate conclusion is that 
cognitive resources in the EU instruments have been qualitatively constant.  This is no doubt 
due to the constancy in the European Union’s own positions since Lisbon about the need for 
higher employment rates and labor market flexibility (European Commission, 2007f).   
With respect to political resources in the EU instruments, providing the arguments for 
these resources have changed significantly over the whole the period from 1999 to 2008. In 
the first phase (1999-2004), the political resources were available to argue for reforms in order 
to start the accession negotiations. In the second phase, the emphasis turned to the need to 
comply with specific conditions of the negotiation chapters for the goal of EU membership. In 
both periods opponents and enthusiasts of EU membership had the resources to hand to make 
their case. 
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The above findings do not contradict the research hypothesis under study, and support 
it to a large extent. However, only more detailed examination of the processes of reform in the 
areas of social and employment policy will allow for detailed assessment of the uses of Europe 
over these years. Having resources tells us little about how they are used. 
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Chapter IV. Reforming Labor Legislation and Building a 
New Institution: Uses of EU Resources in Legislative and 
Institutional Changes 
 
This chapter focuses on the revision of the Labor Law84 with the enactment of the Law No. 
4857 in 2003 that replaced the previous legislation, Law no. 1475 of 1971 and the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, that replaced the Turkish Job Placement 
Agency (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu, İİBK)85, with the enactment of the Law No. 4904 in 2003.  
Although both laws passed in 2003, their reformulation formally started in 1999 with the 
involvement of various state and corporatist actors and their full implementation, with 
additional related legislative changes and institution building continued until 2006.86  Debates 
about changing the legislative framework of the 1971 Labor Act and restructuring the Job 
Placement Agency date back earlier in the 1990’s. At that time coalition governments could 
not agree upon on legislative and institutional changes nor could compromises on the specific 
terms of the changes be reached between employer associations and union confederations.  
In this chapter and concentrating on the uses of Europe in the reform of labor 
legislation and restructuring of the employment agency undertaken by the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) government, I observe the following: 
whether Europe is used in a cognitive, strategic or legitimizing way depends on the domestic 
actors’ interest and coalition-building strategies in the reform process. I specifically examine 
which domestic actors were actively using Europe, exploring EU resources such as EU 
membership conditions, the acquis communautaire, EU standards and norms (especially the 
                                                 
84 Labor law had two components historically in Turkey: individual and collective (Süral 2004; Sur, 2009). The 
reform focused on in this thesis involves individual labor law regulating the relations between an employer and 
an employee arranging the conclusion, form, type, content, or termination of labour contracts; the reciprocal 
rights and duties of the worker and the employer; and the dispute settlement mechanisms and rules.   
85 Turkish Job Placement Agency is the official English name used by the agency. In the literature the term Job 
Brokerage Agency is sometimes used for the same organization.  
86 The reform of the labor law and the restructuring of the employment agency with the establishment of the 
Turkish Employment Agency involve changes in employment policy that consists of “laws that establish the 
rights and entitlements of workers and structure the work relationship” and policies and measures “to protect and 
promote employment more generally” in a systematic manner (Rhodes, 2005: 280). 
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European Employment Strategy, EES). I inquire about their impact on the content and the 
dynamics of the reform process.87 The European Commission has expressed its priorities for 
labor law and employment policy via Progress Reports, Accession Partnership Documents and 
the screening process. In addition to the prerequisite of aligning employment regulation with 
the acquis, the EU has specific policy priorities on the use of active labor market policies, 
targeting measures promoting young workers, and women’s employment developed through 
the EES.  
With this analysis, my goal is to follow a theoretical explanation of why a certain type 
of actors as governmental, bureaucratic or corporatist is involved with certain type of uses of 
Europe. Using process-tracing, the aim is to understand actors’ uses of Europe, among other 
strategic tools available to them. Such analysis involves, of course, also reporting when there 
are no uses of Europe in the reform process. In line with the neo-institutionalist theoretical 
framework developed in previous chapters, the policy legacies that conditioned the revision of 
the Labor Act and the restructuring of the employment agency will be described and assessed 
by analyzing the historical trajectory (timing and sequencing) of reform debates and actions 
since the mid-1990s.88   
Debates about changing the Labor Act of 1971 and restructuring of the Employment 
Brokerage Agency proliferated among employers’ associations and union confederations. The 
coalition governments were also under pressure from international institutions such as World 
Bank concerned about structural reforms of labor market institutions and regulations. 
Although no legal changes and reforms were implemented at the time, the debates in the mid-
1990’s were important in framing the definition of the problems and shaping the policy 
choices. 
This chapter proceeds through three sections. First it describes the legal framework of 
Turkish labour law, presenting its origins and evolution in order to expose the policy legacies 
                                                 
87 The analysis and empirical evidence are based on the parliamentary minutes of major laws, texts of reform 
proposals, reform programs announced by various political parties, five year development plans of the State 
Planning Organization, policy papers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the JDP  [is the the name 
you are using?] government including draft laws, programming documents, action plans and ministerial 
programs, including the parliamentary hearings and discussions during the reform process; EU documents 
concerning Turkey’s accession such as the Progress Reports, Accession Partnership Documents and screening 
reports; World Bank and OECD reports and data; and searches of Turkish newspaper databases and web sources.  
88 As noted in the Introduction, the perspective on change is that it is “a sequential process of change whereby 
one reform is partly to be explained by the consequences of the previous ones” (Palier and Martin, 2008: 8).  
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that have influenced the direction of the reform. It focuses on policy debates and economic 
context during the 1990’s that induced the problem definition. This section will also describe 
the institutional legacies of the Job Placement Agency in shaping the process leading to the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency. 
The second section follows the reform of the Labor Act, focusing on the policy 
formulation by a specific committee with an epistemic character and negotiations between 
corporatist actors from 1999 to 2003. In its later phase this reform involved several uses of 
Europe. The third section then centers on the restructuring of the employment agency and the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, examining bureaucratic dynamics of this 
institution building and the use of EU resources from 2000 to 2003.  
I. Policy legacies in the domain of labor regulation and the 
institutional framework for employment policy in Turkey 
In the early years of the Turkish Republic from 1923 to the 1950’s, one of the main 
goals of the Kemalist political elite89 was to encourage industrialization as part of the 
modernization project and economic development (Ünay, 2006: 36). However the economy 
that was inherited from the Ottoman Empire was overwhelmingly dominated by the 
agricultural sector and large segments of the society were living in rural areas (Pamuk, 2008: 
275). The Republican state aimed to promote a flourishing national industrial and commercial 
bourgeoisie through incentives and privileges distributed to groups to favor capital 
accumulation while state-led industrialization and “étatism” became the official economic 
development strategy in 1932 (Ünay, 2006: 37; Buğra, 1994: 98). The political elite’s 
modernization project involved constructing a classless society (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 
158), and therefore it prohibited associations based on social classes. Strikes, collective 
bargaining and trade unions were banned.90  
                                                 
89 Şevket Pamuk (2008: 276) writes “the former military officers, bureaucrats and intellectuals who assumed the 
positions of leadership in the new republic viewed the building of a new nation-state and modernisation through 
Westernisation as two closely related goals.” 
90 The first legal regulation of the labour market in 1924 instituted a weekend vacation on Fridays (changed to 
Sundays in 1935). Turkey became a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1932. 
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I.a Regulation of working conditions and the labor market institutions from 
the early Republican years to the end of 1970’s 
 
The early legislation and institutions first targeted civil servants and the military and 
then workers in the larger state-controlled enterprises.91 The Turkish government passed the 
first Labor Act of the Turkish Republic in 1936 (Law no. 3008), targeting workers in 
manufacturing industry, setting regulations on working conditions and providing limited 
protective measures for enterprises with more than ten employees (Özbek, 2006: 132-133).92 
The 1936 Labor Act (no. 3008) also foresaw the establishment of a public agency responsible 
for employment services while prohibiting private employment agencies (Özbek, 2006: 134).  
This institution was intended to be responsible for job matching and employment 
promotion but it could not actually be created in these years due to scarcity of resources and to 
an economic and political context shaped by the start of the Second World War. With Law no. 
4837 introduced in 1946, the İİBK was founded with the goal of “finding appropriate work for 
the qualified labor force and assisting employers in their search for workers with sufficient and 
necessary qualifications” (İŞKUR, 2011a: 17). Offices were established in Istanbul, Eskisehir, 
Ankara and Izmir. The İİBK was administratively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Labor93 but was designed as a quasi-independent organization that would be responsible for 
job matching and also collecting data on the labor market, advising governments on policies, 
investigating the level of salaries, brokering the preparation of labor contracts and planning the 
amount of trained personnel for developing sectors (Özbek, 2006: 226). However the İİBK 
had limited resources which meant that it was concerned mainly with job-matching functions. 
The legal framework of industrial relations was quite restricted in the early years of the 
Republic. Trade unions were banned between 1938 and 1946 (Sur, 2009: 191). The first law 
on trade unions, allowing their formation was introduced in 1947. Moreover disputes on 
                                                 
91 In 1945, the Law on Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases and Maternity Insurance (İs Kazalari ve Meslek 
Hastalikları ve Analık Sigortaları Hakkında Kanun) introduced a social insurance scheme for those workers 
covered by the Labor Law, which was elaborated with an old-age pension scheme with the Old-Age Insurance 
Law (İhtiyarlık Sigortasi Kanunu) of 1949. 
92 After Turkey joined the ILO in 1932, this relationship became crucial. ILO experts were involved in the 
preparation of the draft legislation (Sur, 2009: 191). 
93 In 1946, the Ministry of Labor was established.  
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individual labor contracts were to be resolved by compulsory arbitration, according to the 
1936 labor law (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 167). Coverage was also limited. In 1952, the 
Labor Act was applied to workplaces employing four to nine workers in cities with at least 
50,000 inhabitants. But even this meant that only a limited portion of the 14.5 million workers 
in the active labor force was covered, and those working in the large agricultural sector were 
excluded completely. Agricultural employment constituted 80% of total employment in 1950 
(Buğra, 2008: 161; Pamuk, 2008). Although there is an increase in the number of people 
covered by the Labor Code from 1947 to 1960, reaching 19% of the active population (Sur, 
2009: 192), large segments of those working in the service sector and manufacturing in the 
cities were not covered by this legislation that remained intact without any changes until the 
1960’s.  
After the coup d’État of May 1960, the military regime imposed a shift in economic 
policies towards the protection of the domestic market from international competition and an 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy. With the adoption of this nationalist 
development strategy, a series of legal and institutional changes were introduced, oriented 
towards state-led planning (Aydın, 2005: 35).94  This period also saw reforms of labor 
legislation and the regulatory framework of workers’ rights and their representation.  
The 1961 Constitution specified the social aspect of the state. In this legal framework, 
employees gained rights to social security, to form trade unions, to engage in collective 
bargaining and to strike (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006). In the post-1960 period, the Law on 
Unions (no. 274) and the Law on Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts (no. 275) were 
introduced. The number of working population covered by the Labor Code almost doubled 
from 1947 to 1965 (Sur, 2009: 193).  
The development strategy based on ISI was supported by a large coalition of civil 
servants, working-class organizations as well as industrialists and entrepreneurs of medium 
                                                 
94 The State Planning Organization was established in 1960 and five-year plans to organize Turkey’s industrial 
development were introduced starting from 1963 (Ünay, 2006: 102). The transition towards import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) was influenced by internal and external factors. A coalition of domestic actors constituted 
of industrialists, small and medium-size business owners, workers and civil servants supported the idea of 
national developmentalism with protected markets (Pamuk, 2008: 284; Aydın, 2005: 35).  In this period, the 
Turkish economic bureaucracy also adopted Keynesianism as an economic doctrine (Şenses and Öniş, 2007: 
266). The international institutions such as the World Bank and OECD also supported protectionism as well as 
the idea of planned development as a way of supporting rapid industrialization and development (Ünay, 2006: 
103; Pamuk, 2008: 283).  
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and small enterprises (Aydın, 2005: 35-36 266; Ünay, 2006: 61). State enterprises as well as 
medium and even large private firms benefited from being protected from international 
pressures (Ünay, 2006: 56-60). Şevket Pamuk (2008: 283-285) describes the key policy tools 
of import substitution as the heavy use of a restrictive trade regime, investments by state 
enterprises, and subsidized credits, with the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama 
Teşkilatı, DPT) being the crucial institution with centralized capacity in policy-making via its 
five-year development plans. The first five-year development Plan (1963-1967) foresaw (SP0, 
1963: 10, Cited in Ünay, 2006: 103): 
“The projected targets to promote economic growth in Turkey in the next fifteen 
years are the creation of a highly qualified labor force led by scientific and 
technical experts, realization of a growth of 7 per cent per annum, finding 
solutions to the employment problem, realizing a sound balance of payments and 
fulfillment of all of these goals in accordance with the principles of social justice 
in Turkish society.” 
 
Although expressing some broad social goals, the Planning Organization prioritized 
the attainment of economic growth and industrialization based on ISI while downplaying the 
employment objectives or improving income distribution in this period (Ünay 2006: 104). The 
planned structural shift in the development strategy towards industrialization also aimed to 
trigger a decline in agricultural employment. Ünay (2006: 104-105) indicates that the first 
three development plans all sought to advance industrialization and increase employment in 
the manufacturing sector.   
It is also important to emphasize that with the return to electoral politics and 
democratic competition in 1961, the technocratic autonomy enjoyed by the Planning 
Organization was reduced as it became subject to political pressures in the mid-1960’s. 
Priorities changed, including the introduction of incentives and subsidies for the agricultural 
sector (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 174).  
With the economic growth from 1960’s to late 1970’s,95 civil servants, industrial 
workers, and to a certain extent agricultural workers prospered in the context of a protected 
domestic market (Ünay, 2006; 61). The urban bourgeoisie grew and migration from rural areas 
                                                 
95 The average annual growth rate was 4.3% during1963–77 (Pamuk, 2008: 284). The GNP grew 6.4% in the 
period from 1960 to 1979 (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 179). 
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to urban centers also increased (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 176).  
An additional component of the policy legacy that influenced the later reforms was the 
migration patterns that emerged in the 1960’s. They shaped the functioning of the İİBK. 
Following the Second World War, the continental European countries’ faced labor shortages 
with rapid industrialization and economic growth; and they turned to a strategy of guest 
workers (İŞKUR, 2011a: 18). The first agreement on accepting guest workers was signed 
between Turkey and Germany in 1961 and it gave the İİBK responsibility for brokering and 
selecting the workers (İŞKUR, 2011a: 18). Several such agreements were signed in 1964 with 
Austria, Netherlands and Belgium, in 1965 with France, and in 1967 with Sweden and 
Australia.96  
In the 1970’s more than one million workers were registered under the guest workers 
program and went to European countries through the brokerage actions of the İİBK that 
developed its institutional capacity by opening new offices in different regions of Turkey 
(İŞKUR, 2011a: 6). This new pattern also responded to labor market developments in Turkey; 
the labor force with low skills could find working opportunities as guest workers. Through the 
1970s, the İİBK remained the formal channel for sending Turkish workers abroad. 
There were also important legal and institutional developments aimed at establishing 
organized and state-led industrial relations that were put into place in parallel to the planned 
industrialization strategy by the central government. In 1963 the definition of legal union 
activities was broadened, while bargaining over pay, strike and lockout regulations were 
legislated in 1965 (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992). The Turkish Trade Union Confederation (Türkiye 
İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-İŞ) was the only union confederation until 1967. 
Then the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DİSK) was formed as a leftist 
alternative to TÜRK-İŞ in 1967.97 From 1967 to 1980, DİSK was active with a successful 
collective bargaining strategy and use of strikes, leading to important economic gains for its 
members (Adaman, Buğra and İnsel, 2010). 
One of the main issues that unions actively targeted was reforming the regulative 
                                                 
96 The range of countries to which İİBK has sent workers changed over time. With the changing economic 
context in the late 1970’s, the European countries’ demand for guest workers diminished considerably. However 
the İİBK developed new bilateral agreements with countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and 
later the Russian Federation since 1980’s (İŞKUR, 2011a). 
97 Union density reached its peak point in 1979 at 27%  (Cam, 2002: 108). 
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framework of the labor market and employment regulations.98 A new Labor Act (no. 1475) 
was introduced in 1971 and systematically consolidated the by-then quite scattered legislation, 
while covering both white-collar and blue-collar employees and their employment contracts.99 
Toker Dereli (2012) argues that Labor Act of 1971 was based on a Fordist model of work, 
which implied continuing (not time limited) employment contracts with rigid regulations 
governing working time and the organization of work.100.  
The 1971 Act covered the main and standard components of a labor contract, such as 
the form, wages, working hours, rest days, annual paid leave, the protection of children and 
pregnant women, workers’ compensation and work rules.101 This legislation that remained in 
force for more than three decades reflected the political alignment at the time of its passage in 
which the state and union confederations had an interest in the institutionalization of 
employment (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 720).  
The 1971 Act has also modified the goals and duties of the İİBK, making it 
institutionally responsible for the planning of employment policy (İŞKUR, 2011a: 18). With 
the 1971 Labor Act, the İİBK also gained a new role as responsible for labor-market 
integration of disadvantaged groups, such the disabled and ex-convicts, and it became 
responsible for their job matching as well as implementing the regulation of their labor 
contracts. These regulations obliged the private and public sector to hire a certain number of 
disabled persons and ex-convicts through the İİBK. 
The normative assumption and logic of the Labor Code of 1971 reflected a male 
breadwinner model of employment, targeting mainly industrial workers in urban settings, 
emphasizing full-time work, with no recognition of a-typical types of contracts or part-time 
work. The underlying assumption of the planning period in the 1960s was that with policies 
                                                 
98 A new labor law was prepared and accepted in 1967 but later was cancelled by the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in 1970 that evaluated as unconstitutional the procedure followed to legislate this reform (Üçkan and 
Kağnıcioğlu, 2004: 230). 
99 The Labor Act (Law no.1475) regulated the relationship between the worker and the employer as individual 
parties in a contractual context while Law no. 657 regulated working conditions of civil servants. 
100 Dereli (2012) concludes that the Labor Act of 1971 provided a low degree of job security considering the 
requirements of notice to be respected to terminate the employment status and the payment of severance pay in 
certain dismissals. 
101 In 1975, there were important changes about severance pay, which went from a half month’s wage to a month 
of wage for each year of employment. It also increased eligibility for severance pay from after three years of 
employment to only one year. The extension of the severance pay program was related to the lack of an 
unemployment insurance program and job security. 
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oriented towards industrialization with import substitution, the share of agricultural 
employment in Turkey would shift towards industrial and manufacturing sectors and male 
workers would enter into standard employment contracts with adequate wages to support their 
dependents.  
The Labor Act of 1971 based on male breadwinner arrangements reflecting the 
characteristics of the Fordist period constituted the policy framework and formed the policy 
legacy. These arrangements would be challenged by economic and political changes in the 
1980’s requiring the reform of the institutional and policy settings. Turkey was not alone in 
breaking with its past but the way it did reflected its own political and economic conditions.  
I.b. Labor market institutions in the post-1980 period in Turkey 
Following the military coup d’État in 1980, a new economic strategy was adopted, 
including a transition to market-oriented policies within an export-oriented growth strategy 
(Aydın, 2005: 43; Keyder, 2004: 67-68; Buğra, 2003: 459). The reforms implemented aimed 
to transform Turkey’s economy towards an outward oriented one (Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 
1990:1345; Öniş and Webb, 1994).  
From 1980 to 1987, the policy package that was introduced under the military regime 
and the first Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) government under Prime Minister 
Turgut Özal’s leadership was particularly harsh for the agricultural sector whose subsidies and 
price-support programs were eliminated. Workers’ incomes also fell, with considerable drops 
in real wages (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 180). The 1982 Constitution also limited the role 
of labor unions, making illegal their political activities, restricting their right to strike as well 
as collective bargaining mechanisms (Adaman, Buğra and İnsel, 2010: 174; Blind, 2009: 
49).102 
The export-oriented growth strategy had important implications for the labor market in 
Turkey. On the one hand, the integration of Turkey into international markets increased 
pressure on Turkish companies to minimize production costs so they could compete in terms 
of prices (Aydın, Hisarcıklılar and İlkkaracan, 2010: 1). With increasing migration from rural 
to urban areas in this period (because of the worsening economic context for agricultural 
                                                 
102 The union density decreased to 9.5 % in 1985 from its highest level of 27% in 1979 (Cam, 2002: 108).  
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employment), informal employment became much more significant (Buğra and Keyder, 2006: 
216).103 The privatization of public enterprises (Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 1990: 1345) affected the 
formal employment sector, leaving the former employees of these enterprises either in 
unemployment or in less secure jobs and often in informal employment (Adaman, Buğra and 
İnsel, 2010: 176; Blind, 2009).104 With liberalization and spread of flexible modes of 
production, many companies became involved either with informal employment or complied 
poorly with social security legislation (Cam, 2002, 94; Buğra and Keyder, 2006: 216). From 
the late 1990’s, enterprises are increasingly involved with subcontracting and outsourcing 
practices that linked the formal sector with informal employment practices popular in 
subcontracted companies (Cam, 2002: 95; Adaman, Buğra and İnsel, 2010). In fact, the 
demand side factors in small and mid-size export-oriented companies (seeking to lower the 
cost of labor) can explain to a certain extent the increases of informal employment (World 
Bank, 2010).  
The labor market in the post-1980’s period was characterized by informal employment, 
structural unemployment,105 unpaid family labor and self-employment as well as by a low 
participation rate of women in the labor force (Buğra and Keyder, 2006: 212).106  
It is important to emphasize that it is the duality of the labor market in Turkey, with 
formal sector workers under legal protection and a large informal sector,107 which provides de 
facto flexibility for employers (European Training Foundation - ETF, 2011).  
Nonetheless, considering the changing economic policy context and the post-1980 
policy reorientation, the 1971 Labor Act, albeit having been revised in 1989, was kept mostly 
                                                 
103 Using the broadest definition, Bulutay and Taştı (2004) argue that the share of the informal sector in non-
agricultural employment approached 40% during the mid to late 1990s. In assessing informal employment, 
Kaşnakoğlu and Yayla (2000) estimate the size of the unrecorded economy in Turkey using three different 
methods offered in the literature and found that the share of the unrecorded economy increased from the mid to 
late 1980s, eventually amounting to 30% of the official GNP in 1997. 
104 The share of public sector employment has declined incrementally. The share of public sector employees 
among all wage workers was 33% in 1990, 28% in 1996 and 12% in 1998 (Tunalı, 2003: 16). 
105 The rate of structural unemployment is calculated as 7.5 % in 1996 (İŞKUR, 2011a: 18). 
106 The labor force participation of women declined from 57.5% in 1988 to an even lower 46.2% in 2007 (Aydın, 
Hisarcıklılar and İlkkaracan, 2010: 7).  
107 Aydın, Hisarcıklılar and İlkkaracan (2010: 26) calculate the share of informal employment in non-agricultural 
wage employment as 34% in 1988 and 36% in 2007 based on the Household Survey. The share of informal 
employment in total non-agricultural employment has been 33.2% in the 2000-2007 period (OECD, 2009: 2). 
Only around one-quarter (23.5%) of the working age population (defined as those aged 15-64) were contributing 
to a social security institution, while approximately half were not participating in the labor market and the 
remainder were working in the informal sector (Brook and Whitehouse, 2006). 
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intact. In addition, the İİBK continued its institutional legacy in the field of employment 
brokerage in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In the liberal policy orientation, the overwhelming 
emphasis in the discourse of state actors and governments was providing economic growth, 
developing the internal market, increasing productivity for export orientation and integrating 
Turkey into the global economy (Öniş and Webb, 1994; Arıcanlı and Rodrik, 1990: 1345). 
Little time was devoted to talking about improving employment opportunities or identifying a 
strategy to tackle unemployment and informal employment (Buğra, 2003: 459). 
The policy legacy of the 1971 Labor Act and the institutional legacy of the İİBK were 
both, therefore, based on a development model that focused on expanding industrial and 
manufacturing employment in order to support the economic transformation of Turkey from 
an agriculture-based economy to an industrialized one. By the late 1980’s and 1990’s the new 
economic and policy context meant that the legal framework of both the Labor Act and the 
employment brokerage institution had become defunct. Several actors began to consider 
possible reforms. 
II. Economic crisis, international financial institutions and 
corporatist actors: Diagnosing the problems of the labor market 
with conflicting agendas during the 1990’s 
With the return of a competitive electoral regime and multiparty politics after 1987, the 
economic decisions under the second ANAP government had distributional consequences and 
meant to satisfy some of the demands from the unions and other groups. The early 1990’s saw 
limited increases in public sector wages and in salaries more generally and higher subsidies for 
agricultural products.  This all increased the public sector deficit (Öniş and Webb, 1994: 172). 
Although corporatist actors saw the removal of certain restrictions on their activities and they 
could become more active in the mid-1990’s,108 the coalition governments in this period did 
not move to make the reforms called by these domestic actors.  
During 1990’s under the coalition governments, the public sector deficit continued to 
                                                 
108 The legal restrictions on the activity of civil society organizations, including unions, introduced by the 1982 
Constitution were removed in 1995, which allowed them to increase their political activities (Özbudun, 2000: 
131). 
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increase as a result of distributional dynamics in which various segments of the electorate 
benefited from cheap credit (to small and medium-size businesses), from the lower retirement 
age and more generous retirement benefits, and from provision of high price supports for 
agricultural products (Pamuk, 2008: 290). Considering the key role of domestic and 
international borrowing to finance the public sector deficit, the Turkish economy also became 
much more vulnerable to external shocks and outflow of capital. This vulnerability combined 
with unregulated financial and banking sector and inflation led to an economic crisis in 1994 
(Ünay, 2006).  
 
Table 4. Total Employment and Sectoral Distribution of Workforce109 
Year Total 
Employment 
Agriculture Industry Construction Services 
1980 18 552 332 60 % 11.6 % 4.1 % 23.4 % 
1985 20 556 786 59 % 11.4 % 3.7 % 25.5 % 
1990 23 381 893 53.7 % 12.8 % 5.1 % 27.9 % 
2000 25 997 141 48.4 % 13.3 % 4.6 % 33.5 % 
 
If we consider the distribution of employment in various sectors, there were important 
structural changes in the 1990’s as well. In 1990, as Table I shows, in the labor force of 18.5 
million, three in five Turks worked in agriculture, only slightly more than one in 10 in 
industry, and less than a quarter in services (Tunalı, 2003: 26). By 2000 agricultural 
employment had fallen to 48%, while service sector employment increased as more than one 
in three worked therein this sector (İŞKUR, 2011a: 18).  
Segmentation of the labor market was further entrenched. One segment consisted of 
the formal sector workers that included public servants, those in manufacturing, some parts of 
the formal and generally unionized private sector, and those working in finance and financial 
services. A second segment constituted of agricultural workers, the self-employed in both the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and salaried workers in the services and construction 
                                                 
109 The information is gathered from İŞKUR (2011a: 18). 
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sectors, where informal practices predominated (Tunalı, 2003; Yakut-Çakar, 2007). 
The policy and regularity framework dragged behind these realities. Reflecting the 
policy and institutional legacies of the 1960’s, it was based on passive measures such as 
severance payments110 for workers with indefinite employment contracts. Active labor market 
policies were limited mostly to vocational training (Tunalı, 2003).  
Numerous actors sought reform. In the early 1990’s, the union confederations and 
employer associations began to call for reform, but presented opposing positions on a series of 
legal and policy changes touching on labor regulation for flexible work arrangements, the 
introduction of an unemployment insurance program,111 the establishment of a job security act 
and reducing severance payments (Van der Valk and Süral, 2006: 62). Employer associations; 
the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu, TİSK), the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association112 (Türk 
Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB), were opposed to the 
rigidities of the Labor Act and called for changes to regulations about severance payments. 
Union confederations, both the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-İŞ) and especially the Confederation of Progressive 
Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Senikaları Konfederasyonu, DİSK), advocated 
                                                 
110 Labor Law No 1475 requires the employer to compensate an employee who has qualified for an indefinite 
contract for the accumulation of the services in the event of: death, voluntary termination of employment (as a 
result of retirement, marriage (female workers) or military service obligations (male workers), or for an 
involuntary discharge (Tunalı, 2003; Süral, 2005a). A worker who worked for at least a year without a written 
fixed-term contract was automatically granted an indefinite contract with the firm. Severance pay had two 
components: seniority payment (kidem tazminati) and (advanced) notice payment (ihbar tazminatí). Seniority 
payment was equal to a full month’s (30 days) salary for every year of service. Notice payment covered wages 
payable to a worker for the period indicated under the advanced notice requirement in case of firing the worker 
immediately. 
111 The lack of unemployment insurance in Turkey was related to the particular historical development of the 
labor code and social security system. Due to the focus on economic development in the 1960’s, unemployment 
was not an issue prioritized by state agencies. In the period from 1960 to 1975, in the era of the national 
development strategy based on ISI, the growth rate was high. The dominance of the State Economic Enterprises 
in the economy also prevented unemployment by providing job security to their employees. In 1975, the social 
democratic Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, increased severance pay and increased eligibility. The rationale behind 
the extension of the severance payment program was the lack of an unemployment insurance program and job 
security. 
112 The Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association is a non-governmental voluntary association 
composed of owners and managers of individual firms, groups of companies and holding companies operating in 
the Turkish manufacturing and service sectors. 
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the establishment of an unemployment insurance program and the introduction of job security.  
 The return of multiparty politics in 1987 and political competition during the 1991 
elections brought the involvement of several political parties. In the 1991 election, the social 
democratic party, Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, SHP)113, 
promised the introduction of unemployment insurance and a job security act as well as 
improving the coverage of the social security system (Kömürcü, 2009: 10; Akat 2004: 75).  
After the 1991 election, the coalition government established between the True Path 
Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and SHP agreed on the enactment of both a job security law 
and unemployment insurance program and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security prepared 
the draft law in 1992. TÜRK-İŞ asked for a law on job security and supported the proposal of 
the Ministry (Koç, 2002: 8-9) but the employer associations opposed them on the grounds they 
would increase non-wage costs. In 1993, TİSK, TOBB and TÜSİAD publicly expressed their 
opposition to the preparation of a regulation on job security (Koç, 2002: 9).114 The coalition 
majority partner, DYP, aimed to find a balance, considering the opposition of the employer 
associations. The Minister of Labor and Social Security, Mehmet Moğultay, facing strong 
opposition from employer associations, put on the agenda Turkey’s signature of ILO 
Convention 158 on the Termination of Employment. This strategy triggered an extensive 
debate among union confederations, employer associations and academic circles (Koç, 2002: 
10). The coalition government agreed to sign the ILO Convention, and passed it through the 
Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in 1992. However, acting as a veto point, President Özal 
sent the law back to the TBMM, arguing that the economic context in Turkey was not 
appropriate for the implementation of this Convention. After the election of President 
Süleyman Demirel in 1993, the government again sought to ratify the ILO Convention, the 
law was passed at the TBMM in 1994, and approved by President Demirel.  
ILO Convention 158 would become the main reference for the demands of job security 
legislation by the union confederations. The coalition governments in the 1990’s did not enact 
a law on job security despite ratifying the ILO Convention. This led the union confederation to 
                                                 
113 A list of the abbreviations for Turkish political parties is presented in the List of Abbreviations as well. 
114 Koç (2002: 8) indicates that TİSK opposed forcefully the proposals of the union confederations on job 
protection from 1992 to 1994. In the early 1990’s, TİSK’s position criticizing the rigidities of labor market 
regulations is stated in its 1994 report titled Çalışma hayatında esneklik (Flexibility in Working Life).  
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appeal to the ILO in order to demand the enforcement of the Convention. The union 
confederations’ emphasis on the ILO Convention 158 would continue into the post-1999 
period after the recognition of candidacy status for the EU membership. Even though the EU 
acquis does not directly cover the job security aspect of labor law, the EU institutions 
recommend the signing of the ILO Convention 158. In the reform process of the Labor Act, 
these resources would influence the strategies of the union confederations.  
Concerning the İİBK, a project to modernize its services was implemented with the 
cooperation of the German Employment Organization and with a grant provided from 1990 to 
1993 (İŞKUR, 2011a: 20). This project involved training Turkish personnel in Germany and 
German specialists working at the İİBK. In 1991, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
prepared a reform proposal for restructuring the İİBK but the coalition governments failed to 
be implement it (İŞKUR, 2011a: 20). These policy and institutional changes could not be 
implemented during the 1990’s due to the instability of the coalition governments.  
At a more technical level, the World Bank was active in shaping the analysis of the 
labor markets, framing definition of the problems and launching programs to promote new 
policy orientations. World Bank established close cooperation with with the bureaucracy of 
several Turkish ministries with the preparation of the Human Resources and Developing 
Employment Systems Policy Document in 1991 (Tunalı, 2003: 95; İŞKUR, 2011a: 20). The 
main World Bank program on employment policy and the labor market was the Employment 
and Training Project that ran between 1993 and 2000 (World Bank, 2001: 2). The 
multipurpose project aimed at improving the employment services of the İİBK, including the 
introduction of employment counseling for job seekers and screening of job seekers, the 
modernization of job placement practices, improved management of employment services and 
development of occupational standards and certification.115 This World Bank project aimed to 
promote women’s employment and conducted research to analyze constraints on women's 
employment. The Labor Market Information Project (LMIP) component of this program was 
                                                 
115 In parallel to both World Bank programs, the number of training courses that the İİBK provided and the 
number of participants in these programs increased considerably in the mid-1990’s: in 628 courses organized by 
İİBK, there were 11,536 participants trained in 1993; in 841 courses organized by İİBK, there were 15,695 
participants trained in 1994; in 1,092 organized by İİBK there were 20,937 participants trained in 1995; in 611 
courses organized there were 11,426 participants trained in 1996 (Tunalı, 2003). 
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used to upgrade data collection and dissemination capabilities.116 
 The World Bank’s Employment and Training Project showcased new and “modern” 
labor market policies, while also exposing the lack of administrative capacity and the limited 
resources of the İİBK.  It also importantly provided capacity for analysis of labor market 
characteristics by collecting comparable data. This data would be used in developing the 
policy reforms in 2000’s (Tunalı, 2003: 95-07). The World Bank sponsored a pilot program of 
job-insertion training developed in cooperation with İİBK, which constituted an example of 
active labor market programs promoted in this period.  
Nonetheless, the World Bank in its self-assessment of the program said that “policy 
implementation in a time of unstable coalition governments is difficult, particularly if 
implementation may involve legislative action” (World Bank, 2001: 17). Accordingly the 
World Bank evaluation found that the program had given positive results on the technical 
level, in cooperation with relevant bureaucracies, but the legislative frame could not be 
changed because the coalition governments had difficulty making legislative changes in 
parliament to both the Labor Act and the employment agency.  
Another relevant program of the World Bank was related to the privatization drive of 
the 1990’s. This was the Privatization Implementation Assistance and Social Safety Net 
Program initiated in 1994 (World Bank, 2000: 7). This project was prepared in accordance 
with the DYP-SHP government privatization program that asked the assistance of the Bank in 
1993.  According to the World Bank, there was a need to incorporate a social dimension 
(social safety net measures) into the program, in order to address the consequences of 
privatizations. The social safety net aspect of the project was composed of income support 
programs and a labor adjustment program. The income support program would provide early 
retirement and severance pay for those affected by a privatization. The labor adjustment 
component, designed as an active labor market measure, involved providing counseling and 
                                                 
116 The World Bank program on The Labour Market Information Project (LMIP) helped to upgrade data 
collection and dissemination capabilities and this was key to assisting the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye 
İstatistik Kurumu, TÜİK) to improve its institutional capacity. The Program provided training to collect labor 
market statistics comparable to international standards. The World Bank program, built on an earlier study of the 
ILO project from 1986 to 1993, which had developed measures for the analysis of key variables (employment 
and labor force participation rates, flows into and from the labor force, migration rates, creation and loss of jobs) 
providing periodical labor market measurement especially in the form of Household Labor Force Surveys.  
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training for displaced workers and strengthening the İİBK so it could be responsible for 
fulfilling this function. Financing came partly from the World Bank (World Bank, 2000: 56). 
The labor adjustment component was meant to complement the Employment and Training 
Project.  
Both World Bank sponsored programs were important in providing justification for the 
revision of the labor law and the restructuring of the İİBK. They revealed again the continuing 
structural limits of the labor market in Turkey but also its transformation.  Based on its 
empirical studies, the World Bank (1995), in line with other international organizations such 
as the OECD (1994),117 argued that there was a strong connection between employment 
protection legislation and employment outputs. This approach focusing on the close 
connection between labor law, employment objectives and economic development constituted 
the insertion of a novel element into the Turkish policy world, considering the policy legacy in 
which labor law was primarily designed only to protect workers’ rights and to clarify 
employers’ and employees’ obligations.  As the World Bank pointed out, disseminating this 
approach to labor market policy and law was not easy in the political context of the 1990’s.  
Change was coming, however. 
II.b. Diagnosing the problem following the 1994 crisis: Conflicting agendas 
of domestic actors  
The 1994 economic crisis increased the involvement of the international institutions. 
The IMF signed a loan agreement in 1994 and the World Bank had several programs in place 
in the mid-1990’s when the crisis hit. In addition the Under-secretariat of the Treasury 
increased its role in labor and social policy-making in this period, moving into policy domains 
that were not directly related to public finances (Ünay, 2006: 143).118 
At the time, a whole series of related issues entered the policy reform agenda, such as 
social security reform, privatization, and changes to the Labor Act. The corporatist actors had, 
                                                 
117 OECD’s (1994) emphasis was more on the positive relation between stricter employment protection 
legislation and less informality.  
118 Ünay (2006: 143) says that following the economic crisis of the mid-1990’s, “At this juncture, with insertion 
of mini-departments dealing with policy implementation in major economic sectors as well as a close association 
with the Economy Minister, the Undersecretariat of Treasury was increasingly transformed into a makeshift 
pivotal institution as well as a monitoring site for international institutions.” 
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as noted above, also addressed these issues in an interconnected way; the union confederations 
were against the social security reforms and were asking for a law on job security and 
unemployment insurance while employers’ associations supported to a certain extent the 
social security reforms as long as they would not increase their premium payments and they 
advocated lowering severance pay and introducing flexibility119 arrangements in the labor law. 
The legal situation changed, however in 1994. 
After the initial use of a veto point by the President Özal, ratification ILO Convention 
158 on the Termination of Employment was reintroduced into parliament, passed and accepted 
by the new President Demirel in 1994.  This ratification meant that the Turkish government 
became required to enact legislation on job security. The two union confederations, TÜRK-İŞ 
and DİSK, had already made extensive use of the ILO convention on job security pressuring 
the government on their international obligations, even as employers’ associations remained 
opposed. No new legislation was brought to the TBMM, however, despite the strong pressure 
of the union confederations (Koç, 2002: 10).  
In reaction, TÜRK-İŞ applied in 1997 to the ILO to investigate the lack of 
implementation by the Turkish state.120 The ILO then began to pressure the Turkish 
government to enact legislation in order to fulfill its obligations (ILO, 1999). In this period 
from 1994 to 1998, the union confederations, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ121 and DİSK, kept up their 
pressure on the coalition governments for job security legislation.  
As the 1994 economic crisis deepened, the employers’ associations (TİSK, TÜSİAD 
and TOBB) followed another route that eventually led them to make use of European 
resources rather than international ones. They called for the introduction of flexibility 
arrangements in the labor law (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir, 2008: 98-99; Özdemir and 
Yücesan-Özdemir, 2006: 315). According to TİSK (1999: 28-34), competition was becoming 
much more difficult for Turkish firms as technological developments moved forward in 
                                                 
119 In this research, the term “flexibility” refers to the characteristics of the employment protection legislation, as 
the main institution that set the parameters for hiring and firing of workers as well as the types of labor contracts 
that could be established. 
120 This demonstrates that the domestic actors have a variety of strategies and practices. The TÜRK-İŞ strategy 
on the ILO Convention was to pressure the Turkish government and it follows a boomerang pattern allowing 
domestic actors to by-pass domestic indifference and to pressure by transferring debate onto the international 
level (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
121 HAK-İŞ is the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyounu) 
that supported conservative or right wing political parties (RP during 1990’s and AKP during 2000’s). 
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advanced industrial nations. TİSK argued that there was a need to introduce more flexibility 
into Turkish labor law, particularly with respect to regulations for hiring and firing employees 
(TİSK, 1999: 28).  
It is here that the establishment of a Customs Union with the EU provided further 
resources to these actors. The employers’ associations began to argue for revisions to 
regulations of labor relations in order to provide more balanced and fairer incentives and 
constraints in the context of their increasing competition with European companies as trade 
barriers fell. The stronger institutional relation with the EU also helped shape the reform 
agenda of the coalition governments and corporatist actors’ as they took up revision of the 
Labor Act and set out to develop another employment policy during the mid-1990’s. 
The coalition government of DYP and Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) negotiated the Customs Union Agreement with the EU between 1992 to 1994 
removing tariffs and duties between EU member states EU and Turkey (Eder, 2004: 66). The 
employer association TİSK published a technical report and analysis prepared by university 
researchers in 1994, titled Flexibility in Working Life, that was revised and republished in 
1999. TİSK argued that in order to increase the ability of Turkish firms to compete with their 
European counterparts within a customs union, there was a need to remove labor market 
rigidities such as costly severance payments, and to change the existing labor law that 
prevented other flexibility arrangements (TİSK, 1994a and 1999). TÜSİAD, representing large 
business, also insisted on the need for reforming labor law.  
The 1995 reform package of the DYP-CHP government, prepared by the Minister of 
Labor and Social Security, Aydın Güven Gürkan during his short tenure of four months, aimed 
to address these domestic and international pressures (Özkan, 2009: 9). The Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security suggested a package that included social security reforms, creation of an 
unemployment insurance program, and a job security act. The package aimed both to satisfy 
IMF and World Bank demands and to respond to the union confederations via the 
unemployment insurance program and job security. This draft reform package was never 
enacted.  
Despite the absence of movement, debate and uses of Europe continued, shaping 
among other things the analysis of the State Planning Organization, as reflected in its Plans. 
The State Planning Organization called for reform of labor law in the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
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(1996-2000) that advocated measures very similar to those in the European Employment 
Strategy. It stated that “the number of international agreements has increased substantially but 
they are not reflected in the domestic regulations both in job security and flexibility... there 
should be planned changes in labor law in order to allow part-time work, flexible contracts and 
atypical work.” (DPT, 1996a: 51). The Seventh Plan also insisted on the need to restructure 
the İİBK (DPT, 1996a: 54-55):  
“There is a need to prepare the workforce to respond to changing market 
conditions by introducing new training programs to provide the necessary skills 
and education … In this framework, considering globalization processes and the 
necessary harmonization to the EU, there is a need to restructure the İİBK, to 
adopt active labor market policies and transform this organization into the Turkish 
Employment Agency.”  
 
The Seventh Plan also emphasized that “the planned changes of labor law and the 
regulation of the working life would aim to harmonize with the EU and to comply with ILO 
agreements.” (DPT, 1996a:  54). 
The above analysis demonstrates that the reform of labor law and the restructuring of 
the İİBK constituted a significant portion of the issues discussed among corporatist actors as 
well as between the coalition governments and corporatist actors. International institutions 
such as the World Bank, IMF and ILO were involved but so too was the EU. World Bank 
projects were influential in particular by providing technical expertise and justification for the 
legal and institutional reforms.  
In the political domain, however, the coalition governments until the mid-1990’s had 
trouble balancing their policy seeking and vote-seeking objectives, because they faced strong 
opposition from corporatist actors. The coalition governments generally relied on 
compensation practices, preparing packages combining reforms to provide unemployment 
insurance and job security, at the same time as revising labor law and the social security in 
order to ease the opposition of corporatist actors. Over time, however, these reforms lost their 
momentum on the agenda of the coalition governments after 1997. Through the second half of 
the 1990s, state agencies, employer associations and unions as well as international 
organizations continued to be involved in discussions regarding the regulatory framework of 
labor relations and the employment agency. Despite the enthusiasm within state agencies and 
the bureaucracies of key ministries for reform of labor law and institutional restructuring of 
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the İİBK, changes could not be introduced, however, because of the instability of the coalition 
governments and their inability to agree in the TBMM.  
There continued to be diverging diagnoses within the political realm, despite the 
agreement among bureaucratic actors with the positions of the international institutions that 
something needed to be down about labor law and that the İİBK needed remodeling. Other 
domestic actors had diverging interests on a several interrelated issues, and there was no 
agreement on which policy options to prioritize in the design of policy reforms and 
institutional restructuring.   
 
III. Revising the Labor Act and restructuring the İİBK: EU 
resources and domestic actors in the formulation of the reform 
proposals and institutional changes 
 
The analysis in this section concentrates on the preparation and introduction of a 
reformed Labor Act and the restructuring of the employment organization, İİBK that 
eventually became the Turkish Employment Agency from 1999 to 2003. The section focuses 
particularly on the use of European resources in both processes.  
Reform of the Labor Law and institution-building with respect to the Turkish 
Employment Organization have certain similarities. First, both the policy and institutional 
changes were prepared during the coalition government established between the Democratic 
Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), ANAP and the Nationalist Movement Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). They were initiated after the Council of the European 
Union recognized Turkey’s candidacy for membership in December 1999. After the 2002 
elections, it was the AKP government that enacted and implemented both changes in 2003. 
Moreover both changes had little visibility in public debates, especially in their preparation 
phase, as they involved technical and legal issues.  
Nonetheless, each process also represents important differences. Revision of the labor 
law involved a major disagreement among employer associations and union confederations, 
around a range of issues including unemployment insurance, severance pay and job security. 
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This lack of agreement put the governments under pressure from these domestic actors. 
Restructuring of the İİBK was a less contentious issue. Bureaucratic actors initiated the 
process following World Bank advice in the 1990’s and both corporatist actors and political 
actors agreed on the need to modernize the employment agency. In this regard both processes 
had their own dynamics that require separate analyses. The next sections concentrate first on 
the reform process of the Labor Act and second on the restructuring of the Turkish 
Employment Organization, while analyzing the uses of Europe in both processes. 
III.a. Reforming of Labor Act: complex negotiations, persuasion and 
powering 
Through the 1990’s as described already, reform of the Labor Act was discussed in 
several milieux but coalition governments could not implement the revisions, despite both 
domestic and international pressures to do so. The political scene changed following the 
elections of April 1999. As a result of the elections a coalition government was established 
between the left-of-center DSP, center-right ANAP and right-wing nationalist MHP (Hale, 
2000; Avcı, 2004).122 The Minister of Labor and Social Security, Yaşar Okuyan, came from 
the center-right and liberal ANAP and he was a key actor in the preparation of the reforms and 
legislative changes between 1999 and 2002 (Koç, 2002: 11).   
In the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition protocol and the 57th government program, there 
was a no direct reference to reform of the Labor Act (No. 1475), but it was indicated that 
reforms and legislative changes would be introduced in order to increase employment 
opportunities, by creating a political and economic context favorable for employers and 
employees (57. Hükümet Programı, 1999). One of the first reforms prepared by the DSP-
ANAP-MHP government was in the area of social security. The strategy of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security was to establish an unemployment insurance program123 at the same 
                                                 
122 The 1999 election could be considered as a victory for the DSP, a nationalist-left party, which became the 
largest party (Hale, 2000). The MHP, which had a nationalist-conservative tradition, also significantly increased 
its votes, becoming the second largest party in the parliament. ANAP, a center-right liberal party, was a minor 
partner of the coalition government. 
123 The unemployment insurance scheme was a  fund set up to cover unemployment benefits, health benefits for 
the unemployed and their training and job placement expenses. The first contributions started in June 2000 and 
the first payments were made in March 2002. Insured workers who lost their jobs were eligible, excluding civil 
servants and the self-employed. The duration of unemployment payments depends on the length of service and 
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time as the social security reform and to combine both changes under the same legislative 
framework. It was thought this would lessen the opposition of the union confederations. The 
reform (Law No. 4447) was prepared quickly and introduced without negotiating and 
consultation with the union confederations and employer associations (Yakut-Çakar, 2007).124 
The Ministry of Labor and Social Security aimed thereby to lower the opposition of the union 
confederations to social security reform by offering unemployment insurance as an integral 
part of the package. 
 In 1999 legislation no. 4447 was passed, titled “Changes to the Law of Social 
Insurance, Law of State Retirement Fund, Law of Insurance Self-employed Institution, Social 
Security Law for Agricultural Workers, The Social Security Law for Self-Employment in 
Agriculture and Labor Law, Law on the Establishment of Unemployment Insurance” (TBMM, 
1999a). The pace of the preparation of the social security reform law was notable. It was 
brought to the parliament and enacted just four months after formation of the DSP-ANAP-
MHP coalition government. The Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit (leader of the DSP), supported 
the introduction of unemployment insurance as did his party (Koç, 2002: 18). 
Passage of this legislation and introduction of an unemployment insurance program did 
not settle the issue by any means, however. Indeed, it left on the agenda a number of 
interrelated policy and legal issues. These included job security and reform of labor 
regulations that corporatist actors had been advocating throughout the second part of the 
1990’s. Here the union confederations and employer associations had differing positions.  
The union confederations, including TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK, considered the coverage and 
benefits provided with the unemployment insurance too limited and they continued to call for 
the introduction of job security measures, still linking them Turkey’s obligations under the 
ILO declaration it had ratified (Özkan, 2009: 11). For their part, the employer associations, 
especially TİSK, also had concerns about the unemployment insurance program and they 
continued to argue for removing or lowering severance payments and for legal changes to 
                                                                                                                                                         
the contributions made. Contributions are jointly paid by the employer, worker and the state The amount of 
unemployment benefits is 50% of the worker’s daily net wage, but not exceeding the net minimum wage. To be 
eligible the worker must have been working as an insured worker for at least 600 days during a three-year period 
and must have been working continuously and paying contributions for at least 120 days prior to termination of 
the contract. 
124 The legal framework for unemployment insurance was established in August 1999, the premium collections 
were started in June 2000 and the first payments were made in March 2002. 
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introduce greater flexibility into the labor code (TİSK, 2001a; Koç, 2001: 13). 
The result was that the coalition government and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, rather than satisfying the corporatist actors with the unemployment insurance 
program, found that they still needed to bargain and negotiate for further reforms with the 
corporatist actors around job security, the labor code and employment policy. Accordingly, the 
main arena of discussion and negotiating became the corporatist arena. Employer associations 
and union confederations continued to pressure and lobby heavily the coalition government, 
itself composed of political parties with varying partisan orientations.  
The context was, then, one in which the corporatist arena had become a main locale for 
policymaking and negotiations among actors and this coincided with the recognition of 
Turkey’s candidate status for EU membership in December 1999.  This change in the 
institutional relationship altered the resources available for domestic actors. But their positions 
on Europe also varied. On the one hand, the employer associations such as TİSK were already 
closely following European developments since the initiation of the Customs Union in 1995.  
They had developed knowledge via expert reports on EU labor standards and were aware of 
EU’ employment policy orientations, albeit mainly related to the flexibility issue.125 The union 
confederations on the other hand had a more complicated approach to the EU, having varying 
amounts of support and acceptance of EU standards. For instance, DİSK had established a 
close relation with European institutions since mid-1990’s when it became a member of the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (Alemdar, 2009). TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ had 
developed a more distant approach to Europe during the 1990’s.  
The parties also differed in their proximity to Europe. The coalition government 
supported Turkey’s membership in the Union but the three political parties had diverging 
positions on a range issue areas related to the membership conditions. The ANAP and DSP 
were supportive in general of the political and economic reforms necessary for EU 
membership, but the MHP was opposed to certain changes.  
In this situation, the coalition government did not use Europe or make any references 
                                                 
125 TISK published four research reports in 2000 and 2001 on the EU’s social and employment policies: The 
Social Policy Agenda in the EU, Flexibility Policies in Europe: Creating Employment in Europe, Comparing EU 
member states and candidate states, The policies towards tackling informal employment at the EU and reflections 
on Turkey. 
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to the membership process while developing Law No. 4447 on the social security reforms and 
unemployment insurance program between June and September 1999. Moreover, while the 
reforms were not in contradiction with European standards, they tended to be drawn more 
explicitly from earlier policy development when the World Bank and ILO influence was 
significant. However, starting from December 1999 with the recognition of Turkey’s 
candidate status, a wider set of European resources, both incentives and constraints, were 
available to domestic actors.  
III.b. Towards the preparation of the Labor Law with the Scientific 
Committee 
After the introduction of the social security reform and the unemployment insurance in 
1999, the union confederations insisted on the preparation of legislation on job security. Here, 
the main resource still used was the ILO convention ratified by Turkey. Accordingly, TÜRK-
İŞ applied a second time in 2000 to the ILO to investigate the Turkish state’s lack of adoption 
a law on job security in accordance with ILO Convention 158 (Koç, 2002: 13). The ILO 
initiated an investigation and reminded the Turkish government of its obligation to prepare 
such legislation. This recommendation coincided with the agenda of the Minister of Labor and 
Social Security who had already declared his willingness to act on the matter (Koç: 2001: 8). 
Yaşar Okuyan was a key figure of the DSP-ANAP-AMHP government pushing a 
controversial reform agenda in various policy domains from 1999 to 2002 (Özbek, 2006). A 
draft law on job security was prepared in September 2000 by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security.  
Faced with this draft law on job security, TİSK brought forward its own proposal for 
labor law reform in 2000, reminding the coalition government that action on job security 
without a broader revision of labor regulations created additional advantages for employees 
and restrictions on employers (Koç, 2002:14). TİSK also mobilized two other employer 
associations, TÜSİAD and TOBB, to oppose the law on job security (Koç, 2002: 14; TİSK, 
2000). The President of TİSK also called for the resignation of the Minister if the legislation 
were enacted. All of this opposition resulted in the job security legislation failing to pass in 
2000 (Koç, 2002: 15).  
In this context, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Yaşar Okuyan, established a 
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scientific committee composed of academics specialized in Turkish labor law and industrial 
relations. They were asked to prepare draft legislation reforming the Labor Act (Dereli, 2012: 
4; Koç, 2002:17). The tripartite scientific committee was composed of nine experts: three 
appointed by the government, three by the Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Association 
(TİSK); and one by each of the three labor confederations (TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, DİSK) (Çelik, 
2003).  
The committee was established in June 2001 by a Protocol negotiated among TİSK, 
representing the employers, the employees (the three union confederations), and the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security (Süral, 2005b: 407, TİSK, 2001c).126 The Protocol stated that any 
binding decisions would be taken unanimously by the Scientific Committee (TİSK, 2001c). 
Then the government and corporatist actors agreed to enact, without any changes, the draft 
unanimously accepted by the Scientific Committee (Koç, 2002: 17). In the absence of 
unanimity, the Committee would publish a report clearly identifying the main points of 
disagreement.  
The goal of establishing such a Scientific Committee and the strict rules set down in 
the Protocol was to push for a consensus solution to the revision of the Labor Act (Çelik, 
2003: 3). For this group of academics, the ILO Conventions and the EU Directives constituted 
reference points as the Committee discussed the revision of the Labor Act (Dereli, 2012; 
Süral, 2005a: 251).  
This Scientific Committee was an original example of a tri-partite corporatist 
institution composed of academics and experts created for negotiations among corporatist 
actors and the government in Turkey. It was also the only example of a Turkish government in 
the post-1980 period allowing the preparation of crucial legislation by a committee composed 
of academics whose members were selected by corporatist actors and the government. The 
committee was not only innovative.  It also had the character of an epistemic community.127 
                                                 
126 The document of the protocol signed is gathered from TİSK (2001c). Prof. Dr. Sarper Süzek  represented 
TURK-IS, Prof. Dr. Devrim Ulucan represented DİSK, and Prof. Dr. Öner Eyrenci reprsesented HAK-İŞ. Prof. 
Dr. Münir Ekonomi, Prof. Dr. Algun Çifter and Prof. Dr. Teoman Akünal were selected by TISK and Prof. Dr. 
Metin Kutal, Prof. Dr. Toker Dereli and Prof. Dr. Savaş Taşkent represented the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security.  
127 The epistemic community is defined by Haas as networks formed by knowledge-based experts that have 
competence in a specific domain (Haas, 1992: 3). These groups of experts share “normative and principled 
understandings”, “common beliefs on the cause-and-effect relationship” between policies and their outcomes, 
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The members were known experts in the fields of labor law and industrial relations who had 
close connections with international policy circles and detailed knowledge about ILO 
conventions and the EU acquis (Dereli, 2012: 4).128  
The coalition government had prepared the 2001 National Program for the Adoption of 
the Acquis (NPAA) clarifying the reforms that would be prepared in order to comply with the 
priorities emphasized at the Accession Partnership Document and to align the Turkish laws 
with the acquis communautaire. The NPPA identified enactment of job security legislation as 
a short-term priority (within a year), as a mechanism for further strengthening the civil society 
(NPAA, 2001). This meant that preparation of job security legislation had become part of the 
accession process.  
This was not easy to do, however. Koç (2002: 16) insists that Yaşar Okuyan and the 
bureaucracy of the Ministry had worked hard to include the law on job security as one of the 
short-term priorities of the NPAA. The President of TİSK, Refik Badur, did not agree and 
claimed that job security was not part the acquis. He argued, based on his association’s 
research on the EU, that matters of job security were left to the member states’ discretion 
(Koç, 2002: 1). However, the European Union recommends following ILO Convention 158. 
Moreover the European Social Charter article 24 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union Article 30, both require proof and validity in the case of dismissal of a 
worker.  
Despite these disputes, we can observe that the acquis communautaire, and directives 
as well as EU standards based on ILO conventions were used in a legitimizing way in the 
work of the Scientific Committee and as justification of its draft legislation.  Indeed, one goal 
of the Committee was to transplant the acquis and ILO labor law into Turkish legislation 
(Dereli, 2012: 3). Before focusing on the work of the Scientific Committee, I look more 
generally at the EU resources available for the reform of Turkish labor law between 1999 and 
2003.  
                                                                                                                                                         
“share a notion of validity” in their policy domains and a set of common practices related to the set of problems 
that they focused on (Haas, 1992: 3).  
128 The Committee also had a strong corporatist character and was not therefore independent from political 
influence and interest representation. Because the members were selected either by the corporatist actors or by 
the government, and the Protocol assigned them a role of interest representation, they needed to consult the party 
that they were representing throughout the process (Dereli, 2012: 3-4). 
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III.c. EU resources for the reform of the Labor Act in the early phase of the 
candidacy process 
As noted, this reform process coincided with the recognition of candidacy status in 
December 1999. The strengthening of the institutional relationship with the EU brought new 
legal, cognitive, financial and political resources for the reform of Turkish labor law, including 
the institutional tools such as Accession Partnerships and Regular Progress Reports and 
instruments such as twining projects and financial assistance.  
The EU’s main emphasis in the domain of labor regulation was on “adaptability” and 
“modernization” of employment regulation in Turkey, so as to prepare its labor market for 
accession. The adaptability emphasis of the EU Commission has been based on adjusting labor 
market regulations to economic developments related to globalization and technological 
change (ETF, 2011: 7; EU Council: 2003b). The modernization emphasis of the EU implied 
developing an approach balanced between flexibility in the labor market and security of 
employment, often labeled “flexicurity” by scholars as well as by the European Commission 
(ETF, 2011). The 2001 European Employment Guideline identified the need “to negotiate and 
implement at all appropriate levels agreements to modernise the organization of work, 
including flexible working arrangements, with the aim of making undertakings productive and 
competitive, achieving balance between flexibility and security and increasing the quality for 
jobs” (EU Council, 2001b).129 Such notions informed the reports that were prepared, as well as 
2001 and 2003 Accession Partnership Documents prepared by the Commission.  On the 
Turkish side, they influenced the preparation of the 2001 and 2003 NPAAs. In other words, 
these employment guidelines constituted cognitive resources provided by the accession 
process  
There were also longstanding European standards that constituted regulatory 
conditions, including Framework Agreements,130 Directives and Guidelines on labor rights.131 
                                                 
129 In the 2003 revised European Employment Strategy, the Employment Guidelines also said “providing the 
right balance between flexibility and security will help support the competitiveness of firms, increase quality and 
productivity at work and facilitate the adaptation of firms and workers to economic change” (EU Council, 
2003b). 
130 Framework Agreements are between the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the UNICE-
CEEP.  These are the European-level social partners. 
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Directives were binding as part of the acquis for candidate states. The most relevant of these 
on individual labor rights were related to employment rights and work organization, health and 
safety at work, and equality of women and men. These directives provided both cognitive 
resources and legal constraints. They were cognitive resources about how to balance flexibility 
arrangements with job security concerns via both legislation and cooperation of corporatist 
actors. Turkey was required to align its legal framework with these directives.132 
On the job security aspect, the EU’s approach has developed less through binding rules 
in terms of Directives than by the use of Guidelines.133 The EU did not develop a competence 
on the termination of employment relationships within the EU acquis while the member states 
regulate this area according to the subsidiarity principle. However the EU recommends the 
ratification of the ILO Convention 158 on the Termination of Employment,134 as well as the 
European Social Charter135 (revised in 1996) (Articles 24; as well as 1.29 and 20) (European 
Commission, 1997).136  
The 2000 Progress Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession (European 
Commission, 2000b: 49) assesses Turkey’s legal framework and labor code, saying: “In the 
field of Labor law much remains to be done in areas such as collective redundancies, the 
protection of employees with regard to the transfer of undertakings and insolvency, the 
contract or employment relationship, health and safety of temporary workers, the organization 
of working time, part-time work, the protection of young people at work, European Works 
Councils and posting of workers.” 
The 2001 Progress Report (European Commission, 2001b: 43) took up gaps in Turkish 
labor market policy: 
                                                                                                                                                         
131 Because we focus in this research on the reform of labor relations affecting individuals, EU resources related 
to collective labor rights are not analyzed. 
132 They were: Directive 91/383/EEC supplementing measures to encourage improvements in the health and 
safety of workers with fixed-duration employment; Directive 91/533/EEC on information for employees; the 
Directives 93/104/EC and 2000/34/EC concerning the organization of working time; Directive 94/33/EC on the 
protection of young workers; the Directive 97/81/EC on the Framework Agreement on part-time working and 
Directive 99/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work. 
133 The area of collective redundancies is covered by the Directive 98/59/EC. 
134 ILO Convention 158 on the termination of employment relationships at has been ratified by Finland in 1982, 
Spain in 1985, France and Portugal in 1994, Sweden in 1983 (European Commission, 2006). 
135 The European Social Charter is not an EU document but a Council of Europe treaty that guarantees social and 
economic human rights. It was adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996. 
136 European Commission has conducted two studies, one in 1997 and another in 2006 to monitor the regulation 
of the termination of employment relationships in the member states. 
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 “…labor market policies are hardly discussed during policy formulation. 
However, recently the institutional set-up and the involvement of the social 
partners have been improved. Tri-partite commissions, representing the state, 
employers and employees, are preparing reports and proposals on how to improve 
the efficiency of Turkish labor market policy.” 
 
 In addition the 2001 Progress Report (European Commission, 2001b: 67) said: “The 
main challenges for Turkey remain the high level of youth unemployment, the structural 
changes associated with the transition from a labor market which is still dominated by the 
agricultural sector and the extent of the informal economy.”  
In the 2001 Accession Partnership Document (EU Council, 2001a: 20) reform of labor 
law was listed among the medium-term priorities objectives that needed to be addressed:  
“Transpose EU legislation in the fields of labor law, equality of treatment between 
women and men, occupational health and safety and public health, reinforce 
related administrative structures and those required for the coordination of social 
security while requiring development of effective implementation and enforcement 
of the social policy and employment acquis.”  
 
The Accession Partnership Document in 2001 called for preparation of a national 
employment strategy in line with the European Employment Strategy (EES) and development 
of the capacity to monitor labor market and social developments (EU Council, 2001a: 21). In a 
similar vein, the Accession Partnership Document prepared in 2003 referred to the reform of 
the labor law under the social policy and employment heading, emphasizing the transposition 
of EU legislation in the field and development of administrative capacity to implement a 
national employment strategy in line with EES and invest into the necessary monitoring 
mechanisms of labor markets (EU Council, 2003a: 13-14). 
In the NPAA, the Turkish government responded by indicating the reforms to be 
implemented in the upcoming period in order to comply with the priorities emphasized in the 
Accession Partnership Document and to align Turkish laws with the acquis communautaire. 
Accordingly the 2001 NPAA, referred to labor law reforms in several sections of the 
document, and indicated that enactment of a law on job security was a short-term priority 
(NPAA, 2001).  
Under the heading “capacity to assume the obligations for membership”, the section on 
labor law first describes the characteristics of the legal framework of Turkish labor regulations 
(NPAA, 2001: 316). The NPAA mentions that studies on reforming the Labor Act have 
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started. However, it also recognizes that there is no legal framework yet for flexible work 
arrangements and that this needs to be included in the revisions of the law (NPAA, 2001: 318). 
The same section of the NPAA makes reference to a number of specific Directives that will be 
considered during the revision of Labor Act such as Directive 97/81/EC and Directive 
98/23/EC for the preparation of legal regulations for flexible and atypical work, Directive No 
91/533/CEE to modify the provisions regarding the contract of service, health and safety at 
work rules, and the notification and consultancy rules, and Directive 93/104/EC concerning 
minimum annual paid leave period (NPAA, 2001: 322-324). The NPAA further indicated in 
the section regarding “Equal Treatment of Men and Women” that the Labor Act and Law No 
657 on Civil Servants are on their way to being harmonized with the European Union’s acquis 
treating gender discrimination in terms of wages, admission to employment, working 
conditions, and vocational training (NPAA, 2001). 
Regarding labor law, the 2003 NPAA emphasized the legislative amendments to 
regulate flexible working patterns and measures to prevent child labor, both intended to 
comply with the relevant acquis.137 The same NPAA explained in detail the ways that the 
reform of the Labor Law would help comply with the relevant part of the acquis and 
announced full compliance with the acquis when new with legislation was introduced in 2004 
and 2005. 
This announcement followed from the existence of a project, entitled Harmonisation 
and implementation of legislation on flexible work in Turkey that had been developed between 
2003 and 2005 with the cooperation of the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (SZW), Turkey’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Turkish 
Employment Agency and with the assistance of the University of Tilburg (Netherlands 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2005). The twinning project involved the 
exchange of information between the involved parties with the aim of providing a general 
level of understanding and knowledge of EU Directives 93/104/EC, 99/70/EC and 97/81/EC 
on flexible working.138 This twining project involved an analysis of Turkish labor law, 
                                                 
137 These were Directives 80/987/EEC, 2002/74/EC and 91/383/EEC and relevant provisions of Directives 
94/33/EC, 98/59/EC, 2001/23/EC, 91/533/EEC, 97/81/EC, 93/104/EC and 99/70/EC. 
138 A relevant aspect of this is related to the Directives 99/70/EC, 97/81/EC and 93/104/EC. Directive 93/104/EC 
concerns certain aspects of the organization of working time, Directive 99/70/EC concerns the framework 
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formulation of recommendations for harmonization, and development of draft legislation on 
flexible working and social security. In accordance with the directives mentioned, the project 
provided technical assistance and a draft was prepared with the involvement of Turkish 
bureaucrats and experts, bureaucrats from the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment and experts from University of Tilburg (Pennings and Süral, 2006).  
The screening process and the sub-regulation produced following the reform of the 
labor law in 2003 have benefited significantly from this twinning project that provided 
technical expertise and analysis of the legal situation related to the acquis communautaire, 
while providing cognitive resources regarding the social security system and flexible working 
time, and budgetary resources related to institution building. 
The EU accession process also provided political resources. On the one hand, the 
directives on labor standards and flexibility arrangements as part of the acquis communautaire 
were part of the membership conditions. As constraints, they were political resources for those 
supporting the goal of becoming a member of the Union. On the other hand, with the EU 
actors encouraging employment and labor market efficiency as part of the EES to promote 
economic growth, competitiveness and employment, they provided political resources for 
those whose economic policy orientation were congruent with such goals. 
The EU membership process has provided legal, cognitive and financial resources in 
line with its emphasis on “adaptability”, “modernization” and “flexicurity” for the reform of 
the labor law from 1999 to 2003.  
III.d. The formulation of a new Labor Act by the Scientific Committee: 
Negotiations by “using Europe”  
 
The Scientific Committee composed of nine experts appointed by the corporatist actors 
and the government started its work in June 2001. The government representative, Professor 
Dr. Metin Kutal, was appointed chair (Dereli, 2012). The Committee concentrated on the issue 
                                                                                                                                                         
agreement on fixed-term work concluded by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of 
Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public 
Participation (CEEP), and Directive 97/81/EC concerns the framework agreement on part-term work concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and ETUC. 
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of job security in the first phase. This emphasis followed from two important processes. 
Although Turkey has ratified the ILO Convention 158 on the Termination of Employment in 
1994, the government had not enacted any legislation on job security despite significant 
pressure from the union confederations. Moreover in the preparation of the 2001 NPAA, the 
coalition government had identified such legislation as one of the legal reforms that would be 
introduced within a year, placing it within the urgent structural reform package of the EU 
membership process (Koç, 2002). This was done despite TİSK’s argument that the EU did not 
require this piece of legislation as one of the membership conditions (Çelik, 2002; 2004a).  
There are several reasons why this priority was identified. Koç (2002: 16) claims that 
the Minister of Labor and Social Security included job security on the list of short-term 
priorities precisely in order to counter the opposition of the employer association. Moreover, 
given the economic crisis in 2001 and the turbulent political context that followed the 
appointment of Kemal Derviş as Minister of Finance and the negotiation of a new IMF-led 
stabilization program, the Minister of Labor and Social Security specifically asked for the 
inclusion of this legislation among the structural reforms planned for 2002.  He calculated that 
identifying it as part of the EU membership process would enhance its enactment in a 
parliament in which there was only a fragile majority for the coalition government (Koç, 2002: 
19). Finally, the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government had promised during negotiations 
with TÜRK-İŞ the enactment of job security legislation.  
We can interpret this concentration and prioritizing of job security as “policy seeking” 
derived from the coalition’s bargaining strategy in the corporatist arena as well as being a vote 
seeking objective in preparation for the up-coming election in 2002. The inclusion of the Law 
on Job Security in the 2001 NPAA is a strategic use of EU resources by the Minister of Labor 
and Social Security. 
The Scientific Committee set out to align Turkish legislation with the ILO Convention 
158 on the Termination of Employment that specifically required valid reasons for any 
dismissals, regulations on procedural requirements that had to be fulfilled by employers as the 
burden of proof, and on the rights of employees when dismissed (Dereli, 2012: 6; Süral, 
2005a). As noted in the previous section, the European Commission recommends adoption of 
Article 24 of the European Social Charter on the termination of employment, a provision that 
is in line with the ILO Convention 158. In its work the Scientific Committee went somewhat 
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further. In designing articles on collective dismissals, the Committee also considered Directive 
98/9/EC, which deals with collective dismissals in a way that is consistent with Convention 
158 (Dereli, 2012: 8).  
Nonetheless, in the first phase of its work, the Scientific Committee made use of 
European legal resources only in a limited way. By November 2001 the Committee had 
prepared draft legislation on job security and sent it to the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security and in this draft it used the ILO Convention as the reference point (Süral, 2005a). For 
the Committee this legislation was only the first phase of changes; a more far-reaching reform 
of the Labor Act was still needed.  
The Law on Job Security (no. 4773), enacted in August 2002, increased protections 
against and in the case of dismissal. A worker who had worked for at least six months without 
a written fixed-term contract was automatically granted an indefinite contract. Workers in 
establishments with 10 or more workers fired on grounds other than those allowed under the 
new law (No 4773) would qualify for further compensation (Tunalı, 2003: 96).139 
The Minister of Social Security, however, made more use of Europe. During a 
conference organized by TİSK on “Towards a Modern Labor Law and Job Security” in June 
2001, just after the preparation of the NPAA, Yaşar Okuyan argued that the Law on Job 
Security followed from obligations set down in the 2001 NPAA as well as being required by 
the ILO Convention 158 (TİSK, 2001b).  Okuyan emphasized that the reform was one of the 
urgent 15 laws to be introduced part of Kemal Derviş’ structural reforms in order to satisfy the 
EU membership conditions (TİSK, 2001b). Accordingly, we can say that the Minister was 
involved with a legitimizing use of political resources. At same conference, TİSK President 
Refik Baydur called, however, for postponing the enactment of a separate job security 
regulation and treating the matter in a Labor Act. 
In March 2002, in another TİSK conference on working life, Okuyan expressed again 
the relation between the Law on Job Security and EU membership (Hürriyet, 2002a): “We 
                                                 
139 The new law allows the worker fast access to legal action. If there is a finding of wrongful dismissal and the 
firm does not take her or him back, the law imposes a penalty of no less than six, and no more than 12 months of 
wages, plus up to four months of additional wages for compensation for the time taken for the legal proceedings 
(Süral, 2005a). In addition, the Job Security Law enlarged the definition of mass dismissal, expanded job security 
to journalists, and included additional protection for workers working for unions. 
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promised the EU with the NPAA to enact the Law on Job Security on 19th of March. The 
employers misunderstand the job security legislation. It would not prevent firing workers but 
would bring specific rules and judicial mechanisms.” 
The pressure of the employer associations increased on the coalition government 
before the parliamentary hearings and discussion of the Law on Job Security. The enactment 
of the Law on Job Security became a political crisis inside of the coalition and more precisely 
inside of the ANAP. The leader of ANAP and Deputy Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz asked 
Okuyan to withdraw the Law on Job Security proposal just a day before the parliamentary 
discussions. This led to a serious conflict inside of the ANAP which ended up with the 
resignation of Okuyan on 8 August 2002 (Hürriyet, 2002b). Okuyan explained that Yılmaz 
was under pressure from the main figures of the employer associations asking for the 
postponement of the reform law (Çelik, 2002; Hürriyet, 2002b). 
Despite the resignation of the Minister and the political stalemate, the Law on Job 
Security passed the parliament on the 9th August 2002 and received the President’s approval 
on the 15th of of the same month. While passed shortly before the general elections held in 
November, its implementation was postponed to March 2003 because of the election period.  
Süral (2005a: 249) argues that passing the Job Security Law before drafting and 
preparing a new Labor Act in the parliament can be explained by the upcoming elections 
where the members DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government would want to gain the support of 
the union confederations.  
In the meantime the Scientific Committee continued its work on drafting a new Labor 
Act that would cover both job security measures and flexibility arrangements. Tokeli (2012: 
20) reports that the members of the Committee had extended discussions about the specific 
clauses of the Labor Act and could not agree upon several issues, including flexible work 
arrangements.  
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III.e. A New Labor Act: Use of EU legal and cognitive resources by the 
Scientific Committee and political resources by the AKP government and 
TİSK 
 Following the November 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party gained a 
majority of votes and seats, although it was only founded in 2001 (Cizre, 2008). AKP is a 
conservative liberal political party. As a result of the elections, it formed the first government 
with a single party parliamentary majority since 1987. The AKP favored EU membership and 
political and economic reforms, although it had to build a reputation for these positions and to 
legitimate its reformist agenda, given its roots in political Islam.  
As noted in Chapter II, this political context of a majority government provided 
institutional conditions conducive to the introduction of reforms, including to the labor law. 
The Action Plan prepared in 2002 by the AKP government included the rapid reform of labor 
law (promised in six months) so as to make “legislative changes in order to allow flexible 
modes of working” (58. Hükümet Programı, 2002). The Action Plan (Acil Eylem Planı, 2002) 
also states clearly that the legislative changes related to flexible working arrangements would 
take EU norms and acquis as a reference.  
Although the AKP was commited to reforming the labor law, it was less clear how the 
content of the reforms would be formulated. After the formation of the AKP government, the 
Minister of Labor, Murat Başesgioğlu, announced support for the Scientific Committee’s draft 
law while insisting that it was necessary to introduce additional flexibility and to alter rules 
about severance payments.  
Moving beyond the ILO Convention, the draft law prepared by the Scientific 
Committee specifically set out to align Turkish law with the EU’s acquis communautaire, as 
indicated in its preamble justifying the changes introduced in the form, types, content of 
contracts, the reciprocal rights and duties of the worker and the employer during the course of 
the employment relationship, with respect to labor disputes and their settlement (TBMM, 
2003a).  
On several issues, there were important differences among the members of the 
Scientific Committee. The EU Directives constituted focal points to reach agreement (Dereli, 
2012). Thus in the preparation of the draft proposal of the Labor Act, the Committee 
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considered Directive 93/104/EC, Directive 2000/34/EC, Directive 94/33/EC, Directive 
97/81/EC and Directive 99/ 70/EC while deliberating about flexibility and atypical types of 
employment (Süral, 200b5: 408). For instance, the principles developed for fixed-term 
employment contracts took into consideration Directive 1999/70/EC which improves the 
quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the observance of the principle of non-discrimination 
and establishes a framework to prevent abuse by means of successive fixed-term employment 
contracts (Taymaz and Özler, 2004: 10). The draft also addressed part-time work by following 
Directive 97/81/EC which prevents abusive use of this type of contract and requires employers 
to prioritize employees’ requests to move into full-time from part-time jobs. 
 We see, therefore, that in designing the working time and flexibility measures that 
constituted major points of disagreement between employers and unions, the Scientific 
Committee made use of the European models to introduce measures of flexibility and different 
types of more flexible employment contracts. These were consistent with EU directive 
93/104/EC (Dereli, 2012: 15).140 Foreseeing the creation of temporary work, the Committee 
argued that it should be regulated according to EU standards and practices (Dereli, 2012: 13).  
With respect to job security, the draft Labor Act prepared by the Committee 
incorporated the Law on Job Security (no. 4773) but with some changes (Dereli, 2012). In a 
similar way to the Law on Job Security, the criteria for coverage and its application in the 
Labor Act were set for establishments with 10 or more workers. Introducing novel norms that 
were missing in the previous Labor Act, the Committee also addressed the equal treatment of 
workers regardless of their contractual arrangements as well as in terms of gender, race, 
religion, and language, all this being in line with EU acquis. The draft also regulated the 
responsibility of the employer to provide the worker with a written document setting out the 
general and special working conditions. This too was directly in line with the EU acquis and 
an innovation for Turkey. The draft included increases in annual leave with pay and maternity 
leave. Maternity leave was increased from 12 to 16 weeks in total, in line with the 
commitments made at the NPAA. Another important change was the abandonment of the 
long-lasting prohibition of night-work by women in industry, encouraging the provision of 
                                                 
140 The weekly normal working time was defined as 45 hours, but in accordance with European practice, can be 
reduced upon agreement of the parties or can be agreed through a contract either to divide the hours into daily 
hours or in a different way, allowing employers to meet their need for extra time in some periods.  
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equal opportunities for women and men in access to employment (Kılıç, 2009: 497). This too 
involved a direct import of European norms. 
We see here the cognitive use of European legal resources in the preparation of the 
draft law by the Scientific Committee. EU standards and norms were deployed to provide 
justifications of decisions on the critical issues about which corporatist actors disagreed. 
The draft Labor Act, mostly prepared during 2002 by the Scientific Committee, was 
sent to the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Murat Başesgioğlu, in early 2003. The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security had already decided to discuss the draft law further with 
the corporatist actors (union confederations and employer associations). Even though this was 
against the protocol agreed in 2001, the union confederations and employer associations were 
pressuring the new AKP government because they were not satisfied with the draft law 
prepared by the Scientific Committee.  
During the discussion of the draft law following the report in the Health, Family, 
Employment and Social Affairs Commission in parliament in March 2003, Minister 
Başesgioğlu said that as the new AKP government found itself in the middle of the reform 
process, arriving in office when the Scientific Committee had already finished most of its 
work on the new Labor Act, it was willing to consider the demands of the union 
confederations and employer associations (TBMM, 2003c). During the negotiations, however, 
Murat Başesgioğlu insisted that the corporatist actors needed to find an agreement or 
otherwise the draft law, as prepared by the Scientific Committee, would be sent to parliament 
(Koç, 2003: 2).  
 In winter and spring 2003, the AKP government and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security were subjected to intense pressure from the corporatist actors to alter certain articles 
of the draft law. In fact, there were six meetings organized from January to April 2013, during 
which 126 articles of the draft law were analyzed by the corporatist actors and the AKP 
government (Koç, 2003: 2). The union confederations argued that there was not adequate 
protection provided to them in the articles related to the fixed-term contracts, flexible forms of 
employment, and temporary employment relations (Çelik, 2003: 12-16). In contrast, TİSK and 
TOBB claimed that these arrangements were already regulated extensively and that 
procedures and details for the implementation of flexible forms of employment were too 
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complicated (Dereli, 2012: 22).141 TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK and HAK-İŞ adopted a common position 
during negotiations with the employer associations, where 34 articles became the subject of 
most disagreement (Koç, 2003: 2). Over the course of the meetings the number of articles that 
were in dispute diminished to 11 but no agreement could be reach on these sections of the 
draft law. Accordingly, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Murat Başesgioğlu, 
announced that on those 11 articles, the government would follow the recommendations of the 
Scientific Committee (Koç, 2003: 2).  
TİSK was active throughout this process, preparing meetings, conferences, and 
research reports on the draft of the Labor Act; while insisting on the flexibility practices found 
in European law and the necessity of adopting these practices in order to qualify for EU 
membership. For example in 2003 TİSK published a research report on The Draft Labor Law 
and EU Practices (TİSK, 2003a).142 It compared in detail the articles of the draft law and labor 
law in selected member states as well as analyzing the conformity of the articles on flexible 
work arrangements with EU Directives.143 In addition TİSK organized a conference and a 
workshop in 2001, entitled “Towards a Modern Labor Law: The Relation between Job 
Security, Severance Payment and Flexibility,” on the draft law and on the reform processes 
and the proceedings were published as well (TİSK, 2001b).144 
TÜSİAD also published two research reports one on Improving the effectiveness of 
labor markets: The role of private employment agencies and improving flexibility in Turkey in 
2002 (TÜSİAD, 2002a) and another one entitled Labor Market and Unemployment in Turkey 
in 2003 in which flexibility arrangements were suggested as policy tools to increase women’s 
participation in the labor market as well as to improve employment (TÜSİAD, 2003a).  
At a TİSK Council meeting on 15 April 2003, TÜSİAD President Tuncay Özilhan 
emphasized that (TÜSİAD, 2003b):  
 
                                                 
141 Tekeli (2012: 22) quotes TİSK representative Erdogan Karakoyunlu’s statement to the Scientific Committee: 
“What we expected from you was the flexibilization of our labor legislation; on the contrary, you have 
overregulated it.”   
142 TİSK’s report published in 2003 titled İş Kanunu Tasarısı ve AB uygulamaları.  
143 TİSK report argues on the diversity of job security regulations in the EU member states, emphasizing that 
among the 15 member states in 2003, only five of them have ratified the ILO Convention 158 (TİSK, 2003a). 
144 TİSK conference and workshop in 2001 was titled “Çağdaş Bir İş Kanunu’na Doğru: İş Güvencesi, Kıdem 
Tazminatı”.  
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“As the new law will allow flexibility measures, it is more modern and developed 
compared to the old legislation … The EU that Turkey aims to become a member 
of has developed goals of promoting entrepreneurship and improving employment, 
where the European employer organization, UNICE, insists on developing flexible 
work arrangements. … Although this new law has certain shortcomings, it needs 
to be passed as soon as possible by parliament.” 
 
 All this constitutes examples of the strategic use of Europe, cognitive, legal and 
political resources by employer associations.145 
The Minister of Labor and Social Security also made use of Europe in promoting the 
reform of the Labor Act. Murat Başesgioğlu indicated in an article written for a TİSK 
publication in March 2003 (TİSK, 2003b): “The new Labor Act based on EU norms and ILO 
conventions will legislate the flexibility measures prevalent in EU member states. … In the 
European Union membership process, there was a need to harmonize Turkish labor legislation 
with EU norms, implementing missing legal arrangements”. This exemplified the legitimizing 
use of the membership process by the Minister, justifying the reform as the adoption of norms 
required for membership. 
The union confederations, especially TÜRK-İŞ, continued to make more limited use of 
Europe in the reform process and to rely on the ILO Convention 158 when addressing issues 
of job security (Koç, 2002).  Çelik (2004a) and Ehmke (2009) point out that in the early phase 
of the EU accession process, until 2004, there was strong Euro-skepticism in the labor 
movement and among union confederations. The unions claimed that European labor 
standards and the social policy dimension were too weak.146 Çelik (2004a) argues that the 
process of drafting the new labor law increased this skepticism among union confederations. 
Thus ILO standards constituted the main references for the union confederations who 
evaluated the EU directives as simply reinforcing the interests of employer associations. In 
turn this skepticism helps to explain their low organizational capacity and limited knowledge 
of the acquis and Guidelines as well as their claim that the Turkish employer associations had 
managed to manipulate the interpretation of EU directives in a way to serve their interests 
                                                 
145 Under pressure from TİSK and other employer associations, the AKP government tried to further postpone the 
implementation of the Law on Job Security (no. 4773), waiting instead for the more comprehensive reform of the 
Labor Act, which would include both job security and flexibility aspects (Çelik, 2004a; Koç, 2001). The 
President, however, vetoed this postponement and the law came into effect in March 2003. 
146 Yıldırım Koç (2004a; 2004b) summarizes the criticisms of the weak character of the social dimension of the 
European Union and presents the views of the union confederations. 
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(Çelik, 2004a; Ehmke, 2009: 115).  
There were even uses of Europe in the law itself. In the preamble of the Labor Act (no. 
4857), which summarizes the reasoning of the law, one can read (TBMM, 2003a):  
“Other than the above stated general factors requiring the preparation of a new 
labor law, another major development is Turkey’s candidacy for European Union 
membership. It is important to consider that the EU has specific regulations on 
social affairs. There is a need for Turkey to harmonize with EU norms on social 
policies, in addition to international norms and standards … Turkish legislation 
lacks certain rules and norms that are already in practice in the EU member states. 
In the candidacy process for EU membership, Turkish labor legislation needs to be 
aligned with the EU norms and standards…The alignment of the Labor Act 
conforming to the EU standards and norms will occur in the accession process that 
will take time. However the current changes will move Turkish legislation towards 
EU norms and standards.”  
 
Moreover in the section justifying the articles of the Labor Act, there are direct 
references to the Directives on working time, labor standards and flexibility arrangements. In 
addition to showing the extent to which the Scientific Committee relied on cognitive and legal 
resources coming from Europe, the passage of this law with these references can be 
interpreted as an effort by the AKP government to claim credit by aligning the new labor law 
with EU standards. 
The parliamentary discussion of the Labor Act occurred in the general assembly of the 
TBMM between 13 March and 22 May 2003. There were extensive debates between members 
of the AKP government party and members of the opposition political party, the CHP. In these 
debates, Europe was again used to argue for the law. In the parliamentary discussion on May 
22, 2003, the AKP deputy, Agah Kafkas said (TBMM, 2003c: 33): 
“We want to become a member of the EU…While becoming a member of the EU, 
there is no way to discuss the conditions, there is no way we can not not 
implement EU standards in this issue, while doing so in others. EU membership 
conditions are one piece that can not be divided…Thus if we are to conform to EU 
labor standards, we can not choose only those are beneficial for employees or for 
employers.”  
 
This speech is an example of the legitimizing use of EU political and cognitive 
resources. He links the reforms to the accession conditions and the necessity of attaining 
European standards. 
In the parliamentary debates the AKP members of parliament made reference to 
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flexibility measures in the EU member states and called for implementation of European 
norms and standards. As such, they were involved in an extensive legitimizing use of EU 
acquis and EES in order to delegitimize the opposition. They argued that policies in European 
countries constituted good practices to be replicated and that European norms were solutions 
to domestic problems.  
The opposition did not agree. In the same parliamentary discussion on May 22, 2003, 
the CHP deputy, Enver Öktem criticised the proposed law, stating that (TBMM, 2003c: 21):  
“The AKP government argues that this new labor law has taken EU 
standards as a reference. They argue that part-time work, temporary work, private 
employment agencies are current practices in the EU member states. However they 
do not consider the differences between Turkey and the EU. The economic context 
is different…The workers are asking to have employment opportunities at the 
same level with the EU, to attain the unemployment insurance system as in the EU 
member states, to lower the unemployment rate as in the EU.”  
 
In other words, this member of the opposition party makes strategic use of Europe to 
criticize the new Labor Act. 
During the parliamentary process, the union confederations and employer associations 
pressured the AKP government hard. Last minute bargaining between the corporatist actors 
and the AKP government was reflected in the final version of the law which altered the 
disputed articles of the draft law as prepared by the Scientific Committee. Following the 
position of the employers, especially TİSK, the law would apply only to establishments that 
employed 30 or more workers, up compare to the 10 workers threshold set at the draft law and 
designed in the earlier law on job security. This change represents a division strategy of the 
AKP government because the Labor Act would be applicable towards the large enterprises and 
conglomerates that employ mostly more than 30 workers, for instance members of the 
TÜSİAD, but exempt small and medium size enterprises, represented by TİSK. This change 
on the application of the Labor Law satisfies the demands of the TİSK that represents the 
interest of the small and medium size enterprises. The strategy of division affected employees 
because large segments in the labor market were employed in this type of companies. 
The state monopoly on providing employment service and establishing employment 
agency was ended; the law authorized the establishment of private employment agencies that 
could act as intermediaries between employers and workers. The establishment of private 
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employment agencies was demanded by TÜSİAD and to a certain extent by TİSK. In addition, 
no changes were made to the regulations on severance payments; these reforms were 
postponed as the union confederations had wanted. Procedures for various flexible types of 
work were introduced. However, in the draft law the provision regulating temporary 
employment through the intermediary of private employment agencies was removed in the last 
version of the Labor Act in line with the union confederation’s opposition.   
The last version of the Labor Act represented the result of the negotiations between the 
AKP government and corporatist actors. Law No. 4857 was passed by the TBMM on 22 May 
2003 and approved by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the 9 June 2003.  
With the end of this reform process we can assess the uses of Europe.  During its 
preparation, the Scientific Committee made extensive cognitive use of EU legal resources, 
following the reasoning of several key directives. Nonetheless, despite the emphasis on 
flexicurity in both EU and member state discourse at the time, it was the term flexibility that 
continued to be used by domestic actors in Turkey, whether corporatist, bureaucratic or 
political actors and even by the members of the Scientific Committee. During the reform 
process from 2000 to 2003, and using European resources, a common language was built by 
juxtaposing job security and flexibility. 
The employer associations (TİSK, TÜSİAD and TOBB) made strategic uses of EU 
legal resources when they argued for greater flexibility in labor regulation. For their part, the 
CHP and the unions also made use of EU legal and political resources when they tried to 
broaden the discussion by arguing that the membership conditions consist of a wider range of 
social policy and employment issues. 
After the Scientific Committee, it was probably the AKP as well as the coalition 
government that made most use of Europe, and in a variety of ways.  In line with the 
theoretical expectations of neo-institutionalism, the AKP government deployed credit claiming 
as well as legitimizing and strategic uses of Europe during the reform process. The previous 
DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government had made strategic use of EU political resources, by 
tying the law on job security to the short-term priorities of the NPPA and the accession 
process, and thereby trying to squeak the law through the parliamentary process. The AKP 
governments continued with this legitimizing use, linking the provisions of the law to EU 
conditionality and the need to respect labor standards in the acquis communautaire. AKP 
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credit-claiming practices included the claim that not only were the changes were in line with 
European policy orientations and a condition of membership but that the government would 
compensate the employer associations by framing a Labor Act that combined both more 
flexibility and some job security.  This was a clear effort to avoid the reaction that TİSK had 
towards the enactment of the Job Security Law by the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government 
in the first phase. The AKP government did not, however, engage in blame avoidance 
strategies. It did use a division strategy on the applicability of the Labor Act, which satisfied 
different groups on the employer side and limited the application of the labor legislation to the 
largest segments in the labor market. Moreover the AKP government negotiated different 
components of the Labor Act with corporatist actors and aimed to satisfy their demands on 
different components. In the policy sector of labor law, the technical and legal aspects of the 
regulation constitute the main disputed aspects for corporatist actors, where an obfuscation 
strategy was not available to the AKP government as the actors had already focused on these 
technical and legal dimensions of the Labor Act and they had acquired substantial technical 
knowledge developed over time. 
IV. Restructuring the Turkish Employment Agency in line with 
the European Employment Strategy  
This section will concentrate on the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, 
covering the period from 2000 to 2003 and examining the uses of Europe in this institutional 
reform that restructured the employment services and the organization responsible for 
employment policy in Turkey. The recognition of Turkey’s candidate status for membership in 
the European Union in December 1999 coincided with work to create the Turkish 
Employment Agency, and the cognitive, legal, financial and political resources made available 
by the new institutional relationship played a key role. The legal framework for the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency was enacted by the AKP government in 
2003 and the uses of Europe were frequent in the discussion.   
As already described in this chapter, this public agency, the İİBK, had a monopoly on 
employment services, concentrated on job-matching for the unemployed and on regulating the 
flow of Turkish workers to European countries. This was its policy legacy through the 1990s. 
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But as has also been described, with the economic changes that influenced the labor market 
characteristics after the 1980’s, the İİBK failed to function effectively. It had limited 
institutional capacity and its job-matching functions have become defunct in time (Tunalı, 
2003; ETF, 2011).  
Despite the recommendations of international organizations as well as domestic policy-
makers, the İİBK did not develop a capacity to monitor labor market transformations, to 
address the consequences of a politics of privatization on employment outputs and for the 
laying-off of workers, or to address the needs of the private sector (İŞKUR, 2011a: 24). Nor 
did it develop comprehensive and institutionalized active labor market policies. The World 
Bank’s Employment and Training Project in place between 1993 and 2000 had provided a 
diagnosis of the problems and framed the policy options. Its evaluations had demonstrated the 
limited capacity of the İİBK and its policy weaknesses, although the project had promoted and 
supported active labor market policies and training.  
The corporatist actors had been involved to a limited extent with the İİBK. On the one 
hand, employer associations and especially TİSK, TÜSİAD and TOBB considered that its 
rigid structure and inefficient policy approach did not serve their needs for trained workers in 
specific sectors. They were advocating that private employment agencies be allowed. The 
union confederations, especially TÜRK-İŞ, had been calling for a more important role in the 
management of the institution and better representation where policies for its member could be 
implemented much more efficiently. Thus, by the mid-1990’s it had become clear that there 
was a need to restructure the İİBK to create the institutional structure appropriate to a new 
policy approach.   
The establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency was related to two other reform 
processes: introduction of unemployment insurance and the unification of the three social 
security institutions under the Social Security Institution (İŞKUR, 2011a: 25). The creation of 
the unemployment insurance program in 2000 and described above, probably constituted the 
main reason to restructure the İİBK and transform it into the Turkish Employment Agency as 
the responsible institution for the management of the unemployment insurance fund. The 
legislative framework of the Law no. 4447 that established the unemployment insurance 
program at the same time introduced the social security reform in 1999. However the 
legislative framework did not establish the institutions, namely the Turkish Employment 
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Agency and Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, SGK), which were planned 
to be formed with a decree within a year. The institution building of both institutions was 
connected, as the SGK was responsible of collecting the unemployment insurance premiums 
and the Turkish Employment Agency was responsible for the management of the fund. Both 
institutions also shared similar problems in the lengthy process of their establishment through 
law-making via decree. 
The first phase of the restructuring of Turkish Employment Agency aimed to establish 
the necessary settings for the functioning of the unemployment fund. The transformation of 
the İİBK into the Turkish Employment Agency was initiated during the DSP-ANAP-MHP 
coalition government. In the program of the 57th Government, established via a coalition 
protocol, it was stated that “unemployment insurance will be introduced for those workers 
who lose their jobs and the İİBK will be restructured in order to properly administer the 
unemployment insurance program” (57. Hükümet Programı, 1999).  
The law no. 4447 prepared by the coalition government was passed by the TBMM in 
1999, as noted above. Thus the unemployment insurance system was established in 1999, with 
the collection of premiums planned to begin in mid-2000 and with the first benefit payments 
planned for 2002 (Tunalı, 2003). The contributions to the unemployment insurance regime 
were to be collected by the Social Security Institution, and transferred to the Turkish 
Employment Agency. However, neither of these institutions was yet in place; their legal 
framework was not enacted.  
Such a complex institutional process to implement the unemployment insurance 
regime was partly related to the reaction of the corporatist actors.  The union confederations 
and employer associations had diverging interests and agendas. On the one hand, employer 
associations argued that the new unemployment insurance program implemented without 
changes in severance payments would put an unnecessary burden on Turkish companies, as 
we noted above. On the other hand, the union confederations sought a role in the management 
of the unemployment insurance once it was housed in the Turkish Employment Agency 
(TÜRK-İŞ, 2010). Such disputes, however, were not concerned with the main functions of the 
Turkish Employment Agency.  
The coalition government began the process of creating the new agency a year after the 
enactment of the Law no. 4447. In October 2000 it issued a decree (No. 617) for the 
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establishment of the Agency with responsibilities such as protecting employment, helping to 
counter unemployment, engaging in active labor market policies and training programs, 
managing the unemployment insurance regime, and offering job and career counseling 
services (İŞKUR, 2011b: 24; Sayan, 2006). This decree also named a tri-partite committee, 
called the Unemployment Insurance Fund Management Board, responsible from managing the 
unemployment fund within the Turkish Employment Agency.  
The Health, Family, Employment and Social Affairs Commission Report on Decree 
no. 617 (TBMM, 2000) explains the reasons for the institutional reform, and here the uses of 
Europe were evident: “The İİBK needs to be modernized to a large extent and restructured 
according to EU norms. The agency needs to become similar to its equivalent institutions at 
the EU member states in line with the EU membership requirements in order to harmonize our 
employment services.” The Report of the Commission also noted that the new Agency would 
be responsible for monitoring European employment patterns and new policy initiatives 
(TBMM, 2000).  
Following the Decree no. 617, Necdet Kenar, who had worked at the Under-secretariat 
of the Treasury within the sub-department responsible for the 1999 social security reform and 
involved with World Bank programs, was the first Director of İŞKUR. His goal was to 
develop an employment policy agenda in preparation of national strategies in line with the 
European Employment Strategy (Kenar, 2003a; 2001). With respect to employment services 
and employment policy instruments, we will see, the process involved a major restructuring of 
employment services and a reorientation of the employment agency towards active labor 
market policies. In the first General Assembly of İŞKUR in May 2001, in which participated 
the representatives of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, state institutions, union 
confederations and employer associations, the goal of preparing a national employment 
strategy was front and centre (TİSK, 2001d). 
However the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency would not be easily 
concluded, as veto points were available to its opponents. Deputies from the opposition 
political party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) applied to the Constitutional Court for the 
cancellation of Decree no. 617 on 24 August 2001.  They claimed that this institutional 
transformation could not be done with a decree and that it should be enacted only by passing a 
law in parliament. The Constitutional Court canceled Decree no. 617 on the grounds that using 
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a decree in these circumstances was inappropriate and parliamentary legislation was necessary 
to set up this new institution (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 2000). However, the Constitutional Court 
also decided that the decree would remain valid for nine months following its own decision, 
considering the level of public interest involved. This decision and process complicated 
institution-building. The Turkish Employment Agency was enfeebled because it lacked the 
necessary legal framework while the coalition government needed to initiate a new legislative 
process.  
By this time, however, EU resources for employment policy had increased with the 
preparation of an Accession Partnership Document and the related NPAAs and Regular 
Progress Reports. Therefore, before analyzing the political and bureaucratic process that 
completed the restructuring, it is worth reviewing the EU’s position concerning the 
restructuring of the İİBK into the Turkish Employment Agency. 
IV.a. The EU Position on the new Turkish Employment Agency 
Various European actors emphasized the advantages of such an employment agency in 
order to permit modernization of employment services, to develop employment policy in line 
with the European Employment Strategy (EES) and to enable the introduction of active labor 
market policies (European Commission, 2007f; European Commission, 1999b). These 
conditions could become resources within Turkey for moving the reform forward. The EES 
and Guidelines developed since the Amsterdam Treaty promoted this orientation. Therefore, 
Turkey’s accession process, taking place in this context, made available a number of legal, 
cognitive, financial and political resources that could be deployed during the structuring of the 
Turkish Employment Agency. 
Concretely, the EU’s approach towards this reform developed through the institutional 
tools of the accession process after 1999. The 2001 Accession Partnership Document called 
for the preparation of a Turkish employment strategy in line with the EES as well as a greater 
capacity to monitor labor market and social developments.  With a similar approach, the 
Accession Partnership Document prepared in 2003 identified the national employment agency 
as a medium-term goal: “Strengthening the administrative capacity in the field of social policy 
and employment by supporting Turkish government efforts to structure and develop İŞKUR, 
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the Turkish Employment Organisation” (European Commission, 2003b: 14).147 In other 
words, via these conditions and encouragements, the accession process provided cognitive 
resources about employment policy directions and political resources for the restructuring the 
employment agency, linking the institutional reform to the membership conditions. 
The Progress Reports also provide examples of the European position on this 
restructuring of the employment agency and the pressure being exerted for change. The 2000 
Progress Report indicates that, “…the Employment Organization is not effective and urgently 
needs to be improved…” (European Commission, 2000b: 51).  
The 2001 Progress Report looked favourably on the Turkish coalition’s actions but 
also pushed for more (European Commission, 2001b: 68):  
 
“The Turkish Employment Organization is the agency in Turkey dealing with 
matters relating to employment and unemployment issues, job finding, placement 
of workers into public and private organizations and vocational training activities. 
Following a restructuring on the basis of a decree in 2000, Turkish Employment 
Organization has started to design pro-active labour market policies at the 
provincial level in conjunction with the social partners, but it still lacks the 
financial resources required.” 
 
 The 2002 Progress Reports insisted that Turkey should accelerate its efforts to develop 
a national employment policy in line with the EES, with the aim of having higher employment 
rates and lower levels of youth and female unemployment. It also emphasized that the extent 
of the informal economy remained a concern (European Commission, 2002b: 92). The 
Progress Report demonstrates the monitoring that the EU Commission was doing of the 
restructuring of the employment agency. 
The EU’s emphasis has been, therefore, oriented towards strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the new agency and it provided financial resources for the reform. The 
European Commission launched a programme called the Active Labour Market Strategy 
Programme, under the MEDA and provided pre-accession assistance. The three main 
components of the program focused on institution building, support for the modernization of 
the offices and a fund for active employment measures. The budget was €50 million from 
                                                 
147 The EU referred to the Turkish Employment Agency as the Turkish Employment Organisation. I use the 
official English name for the İŞKUR rather than EU’s reference. 
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2003 to 2006 (European Commission, 2002c; İŞKUR, 2005).  
The budget of the Active Labour Market Strategy Programme (ALMSP) increased 
substantially from 2003 to 2009. As part of this phase of ALMSP, €50 million was provided 
for investing in institutional capacity where 241 projects were implemented between 2003 and 
2005 with 48,000 people receiving training and other active labor measures (İŞKUR, 2005). A 
second phase of the project, termed the Active Labour Market Strategy Programme and 
Investment in Local Capacity of the Turkish Employment Organization (European 
Commission, 2006) was implemented from 2006 to 2009, with a budget of €20 million 
(Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2012a). These programs provided 
substantial financial resources for the consolidation of Turkish Employment Agency and for 
its active labor market policies. 
The exercise involved in the preparation of a Joint Assessment Paper of employment 
priorities was also a crucial moment in these years. It provided an analysis of the Turkish labor 
market, identifying key challenges and employment priorities (Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, 2011: 22). It took into account the priorities of the European Employment Strategy 
throughout the drafting process of the Employment Background Report in 2003, which 
included the participation of ministerial actors and the Turkish Employment Agency itself. 
This analytic process was a moment in which cognitive resources coming from Europe were 
used by the bureaucratic actors so as to define the main challenges related to employment 
policy and labor market institutions.  
The EU membership process provided cognitive, political and financial resources for 
the institution building of the Turkish Employment Agency from 2000 to 2006. Most of the 
resources provided from 2000 to 2005 were prior of the screening process.  It was at this time 
that uses of Europe in the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency were most 
numerous.  
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IV.b. From a failed attempt to success: Bureaucratic dynamics, government 
strategies and EU resources in the creation of the Turkish Employment 
Agency 
The DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government in the 2001 NPAA responded to the 
priorities set out in the Accession Partnership.  It indicated that “The activities leading to the 
restructuring of employment services have been completed by converting the Labor and 
Employment Agency [İİBK] into the more compatible Turkish Employment Institution” 
(NPAA, 2001: 333).  The NPAA indicates that the institutional reform would enable the 
agency to enlarge its duties to include active labor market policies as well as to assume the 
unemployment insurance services. In other words, the 2001 NPAA emphasized that the 
establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency was a way of adopting a policy orientation 
in line with the EES and Guidelines as well to comply with the acquis. In this way the 
coalition government was making use of both European cognitive and political resources as it 
undertook the restructuring of the Turkish Employment Agency. 
The veto by the Constitutional Court of the coalition government’s effort to establish 
the Agency by Decree no. 617 created a certain vacuum. The Agency established by decree 
would cease to exist in August 2001, after the nine months grace granted by the Court.  The 
economic crisis of 2001 made the context even more complex as the coalition government had 
to prioritize its agenda to address the financial and economic crisis. Accordingly, passing 
legislation for the (re)establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency lost its urgency and 
dropped far down the coalition government’s agenda in 2001. Nor during the election year of 
2002 did the partners of the coalition government treat the restructuring of the Turkish 
Employment Organization either as a priority or as a tool for vote-seeking purposes.  
Between 2001 and 2003 the Director of the Turkish Employment Agency, Necdet 
Kenar, and the management team of the new organization continued to implement the 
restructuring despite the serious shortcomings and the lack of legitimacy after the 
Constitutional Court’s use of a veto point (Kenar, 2003b). The Turkish Agency continued its 
activities but with limited financial resources (Çetinkaya, 2011: 40).  Doing so, it used Europe 
and the various resources available via the on-going accession process. 
Proposals were designed by the team at the Agency in order to benefit from a range of 
  170 
European resources for institution building and for introducing active labor market policies 
and they were submitted to the Active Labour Market Strategy Program under the EU pre-
accession assistance in 2002 (European Commission, 2002a). In the second General 
Assembly148 of the Turkish Employment Agency, held in 2003, bureaucrats as well as the 
social partners attended and heard that the institution aimed to develop a national employment 
strategy in line with the EES and implement active labor market policies in line with the EU 
recommendations (TİSK, 2003c).  
Following the November 2002 elections, the majority AKP government promised to 
regularize the agency’s situation, all the while being supportive of the EU membership 
process. The Action Plan prepared by the AKP government for the 58th government included 
the (re)establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, via legislation this time, and the 
restructuring of employment services. They were described as medium-term measures to be 
accomplished within 12 months (58th government, 2002).  
The draft law establishing the Turkish Employment Agency (Law no. 4904) was sent 
to the Commission on Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs on December 11, 2002, a 
month after the formation of the AKP government (TBMM, 2002). The preamble of the law 
indicates that (TBMM, 2002):  
“The Job Placement Agency aims to function in a similar way to its 
counterparts in western countries. But there are serious shortcomings in terms of 
services provided and the policies conducted. There is a need to modernize the 
institution and restructure its services. Modernizing the institution like its 
counterparts in the West would assist the harmonization process with the European 
Union in which we intend to become a member and would help us to tackle the 
unemployment problem.”  
 
The parliamentary discussion of the law occurred between the 19th and 24th of June 
2003, in two sessions. Debate among the AKP deputies and the deputies from the opposition 
political party, the CHP, was limited. Nonetheless in the time available, the AKP deputies 
made legitimizing use of Europe’s political resources. On 24 June 2003 the AKP deputy, Sabri 
                                                 
148 The social partners are represented at the level of the General Assembly and the executive board.  Out of 50 
members of the general board of İŞKUR, 28 represent employer organizations, trade unions, chambers of 
commerce, and civil society organizations. Other members are government appointees. The Executive Board of 
İŞKUR includes one representative each from TESK, TISK and TURK-IS. Moreover the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund Management Board and the Occupational Standards Commission under İŞKUR have 
representatives from employee and employer organizations.  
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Varan, argued that “It is necessary to restructure the employment organization to modernize its 
services and transform it into a real employment agency. The new agency should look like the 
ones in the European Union member countries, this is necessary for harmonizing our 
employment policies with the European Union and a necessary condition for membership…” 
(TBMM, 2003d). 
The CHP deputies who spoke also made strategic use of European political resources, 
but this time to oppose the imported model. In the debate that same day the CHP deputy, Izzet 
Cetin, asserted, “Arguing that similar institutions exist in the EU member states is not logical, 
as the unemployment problems in Turkey, the production and investment problems in Turkey 
are quite different” (TBMM, 2003d). In the same parliamentary discussion the CHP deputy, 
Yakup Kepenek, expressed his skepticism too. “We must really prioritize the development of 
national employment plans. …In a country where women are not working, child labor is 
pervasive, informal employment is around 53%, where young people lack training, we can not 
become a member of the EU” (TBMM, 2003d). These criticisms from the CHP deputies were 
directed at the ways the Turkish Employment Agency would be responsible for the 
preparation of a Turkish employment strategy and organize the local delivery of services.  
The Law no. 4904 establishing the Turkish Employment Agency was accepted by the 
TBMM on 24 June 2003 and approved by the President on 4 July 2003. Passage of the law 
allowed the Turkish Employment Agency to benefit from the European Union’s Active 
Labour Market Strategy Programme, which brought with it a capacity-building component, 
modernization of the Agency’s offices and capacity to invest in active labor market measures 
(European Commission, 2002c). Thus under the scope of the Active Labour Market Strategy 
Programme 241 projects were implemented and new local offices were opened with the 
financial assistance provided (İŞKUR, 2005).   
Murat Başesgioğlu, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, claimed credit and made 
use of EU political and cognitive resources in an article that he wrote for a TİSK publication 
in 2003 after the enactment of the Law no. 4904 (Başesgioğlu, 2003):  
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“We restructured the Turkish Job Placement Agency in order to conform to the EU 
norms and standards that asked for the modernization of employment services. The 
new Employment Agency will prepare annually the national employment strategy 
in line with the EU requirements and priorities and will be key to the transposition 
of EU acquis in employment policy in Turkey”  
 
Furthermore Başesgioğlu (2003) emphasizes that:  
“The first step towards conforming to the European Employment Strategy is the 
preparation of the Joint Assessment Paper through the cooperation of the İŞKUR 
and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security with the Commission. İŞKUR has 
prepared the background paper for the official start of the process…Considering 
the General Assembly decision of İŞKUR, all these steps will help to prepare a 
national employment strategy in line with the European Employment Strategy”. 
 
 The opening ceremony of the Turkish Employment Agency Office on 7 October 2005 
in Kayseri, financed by Europe’s Active Labour Market Strategy Programme, was attended by 
the Union’s Enlargement Commissioner, Oli Rehn, and the Turkish Minister of Labor and 
Social Security, Murat Başesgioğlu (İŞKUR, 2005). Commissioner Rehn said (İŞKUR, 2005): 
“We know that unemployment is one of the major issues Turkey has to overcome. 
There are some long lasting issues waiting for solutions. One of them is the low 
contribution of women to the labor force; another issue is the division between 
urban and rural areas. All these issues have to be dealt with during accession 
negotiations. The aim of assistance given to Turkey is to contribute to make the 
reform process go further. The main aim is to increase the economic development 
level in Turkey. When this building completely fulfills its services, it will make an 
important contribution to solve unemployment problem in Kayseri on regional 
base. I wish success both in terms of continuing economic reforms and decreasing 
the level of unemployment.”  
 
At same opening ceremony the Minister of Labor and Social Security emphasized that 
with a budget of €50 million, active labor market projects could be implemented with the 
support of the EU: “The only purpose of these efforts in our country is to reduce 
unemployment to a reasonable and to increase employment. Turkey is now in a phase in which 
there are many projects with the EU covering a large spectrum and we wish these projects to 
be continued” (İŞKUR, 2005). This speech was clearly an example of credit-claiming by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security and of the uses of Europe. 
In the process of the restructuring of the employment agency and the establishment of 
İŞKUR from 2000 to 2003, there are various uses of Europe by domestic actors. The 
bureaucratic actors, as the İŞKUR management cadres, made cognitive use of Europe in 
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setting employment policy orientation of the institution towards active labor market policies 
and modernization of employment services. Considering the legal problems in the formation 
of the İŞKUR, strategic use of European membership process, including references to the 
NPAA, by these bureaucratic actors was important in keeping the restructuring on the 
government agenda. The DSP-ANAP-MHP government made limited legitimizing uses of 
Europe, linking the establishment of the new institution to the EU membership conditions, and 
hoping to by-pass opposition that way. However the choice of establishing İŞKUR through a 
decree was a part of obfuscation strategy related to the establishment of unemployment 
insurance, and it did not work because of institutional veto points.  
The AKP government did manage to establish the Agency and then claimed credit for 
the modernization of employment services with the establishment of İŞKUR and made 
extensive legitimizing uses of EU membership and cognitive uses of European Employment 
Strategy. İŞKUR made strategic use of EU financial assistance in institutionalizing the new 
policy orientation and cognitive use of the EES in its various activities. This chapter has not 
found practices of blame avoidance or other strategies such as obfuscation or division by the 
AKP government that could be explained by its access to reliable majority support in 
parliament when the issue again came up. 
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Chapter V. The Social Security Reform Trajectory in 
Turkey: Exploring the Uses of Europe 
 
This chapter focuses on social security reform in Turkey between 2003 and 2008 that involved 
the restructuring of pension and health care systems and the administrative unification of the 
social security institutions. Concentrating on the uses of Europe in the social security reform 
process implemented by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 
AKP), the chapter explores whether Europe is used in a cognitive, strategic or legitimizing 
way and shows that the use depends on the domestic actors’ interest and coalition-building 
strategies in the reform process. It specifically examines which national actors have been 
involved with what types of use of which European resources. These include reliance on 
membership conditions, the acquis communautaire, European standards and norms on social 
protection and the European Social Model or administrative practices.149 The goal in this 
chapter, as in the previous one, is to assess how certain actors (governmental, bureaucratic and 
corporatist) make use of Europe through process-tracing. 
In line with the neo-institutionalist theoretical framework developed in previous 
chapters, the policy legacies in the social security system will be described by following the 
historical trajectory (timing and sequencing) of reform debates since the mid-1990s. In 
particular there were parametric changes to the pension system in 1999 and the introduction of 
a third private pillar to the pension system in 2002. These were important precursors to the 
major reform of the social security system in 2008.  
This chapter proceeds through two main time periods, divided into four sections. First I 
describe the social security system before the reform, discussing its origins and evolution in 
order to expose the policy legacies, especially those of the reform debates during the 1990’s 
                                                 
149 The analysis and empirical evidence are based on the parliamentary minutes of major laws, texts of the reform 
proposals, reform programs announced by various political parties, five year development plans of the State 
Planning Organization, policy papers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the AKP government 
including draft laws, programming documents, action plans and ministerial programs, including the 
parliamentary hearings and discussions during the two reform processes. EU documents used are those 
concerning Turkey’s accession to the Union, such as the Progress Reports, Accession Partnership Documents and 
screening reports. World Bank and OECD reports and data are also analyzed and searches of Turkish newspaper 
databases and web sources were undertaken. The interviews listed in Appendix A also inform this chapter. 
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that shaped the problem definition and diagnosis. In the second section, I focus on the politics 
of the first phase of social security reform initiated in 1999. Then attention turns to how the 
social security reform process progressed after 2003, to examine the uses of Europe 
considering increasing EU resources. 
I.  Overview of the social security system up to the 1980’s 
Until the most recent reforms the social security system covering pensions and health 
insurance consisted of three institutions: the Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar 
Kurumu, SSK); the Retirement Chest (Emekli Sandigi, ES), and the Institution for the Self-
Employed (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, 
Bağ-Kur). 150 This tripartite institutional structure established varying protection schemes, 
differentiated by eligibility and benefits in accordance with the beneficiary’s occupational 
situation (Buğra and Keyder, 2006: 213). The system covered five occupational groups: 
workers, public servants, self-employed, agricultural workers151 and those self-employed in 
agriculture152 (Şahin, 2012: 146).   
Turkey’s formal social security system, introduced for the most part after the Second 
World War, was built as a social insurance regime initially composed of two organizations 
providing old age and health benefits to employed workers (in the formal sector) and civil 
servants (Gümüş, 2010: 6). The Worker’s Insurance Institution, relabeled as the Social 
Insurance Institution (SSK)153 in 1965, was established in 1945 to protect private-sector 
                                                 
150 The social security system, under this tri-partite institutional structure, provided six protection functions 
against social risks: job accidents and occupational disease; sickness; maternity; invalidity; old age; and 
survivors. It is important to note that the social security institutions assumed these functions over time with 
piecemeal and fragmented institutional developments via legislation, as the welfare state developed in Turkey. 
For the SSK, the legislation for each function providing coverage against social risks was enacted from 1949 to 
1964 (Özbek, 2006: 245).  For the ES, the Law on the Retirement Fund in 1949 provided pension protection with 
insurance and income maintenance in the form of pensions for the retired, widow and orphans covering the 
occupational group of civil servants. The Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657) regulated the health benefits of 
civil servants covering protection against the risks of illness, maternity, accident and disease. The Bağ-Kur 
provides coverage for old age, disability and death risks; with the Law no.3235 enacted in 1985, health insurance 
was established for the members of the Bağ-Kur (Özbek, 2006, 318-319). 
151 The Law no. 2100 in 1977 included in the SSK those working in the agricultural sectors with an indefinite 
contract. 
152 With the Law no. 2926 in 1983, those working in the agricultural sector independently were covered by Bağ-
Kur. 
153 The law no. 4792 on the Worker’s Insurance Institution enacted in 1945 constitutes the legal framework.  
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employees and blue-collar154 public workers. It was financed by employer and employee 
contributions. The Retirement Chest (ES) was introduced in 1949 for civil servants, and 
therefore the state as employer makes contributions.155 The third social security organization, 
Bağ-Kur was founded in 1971. It provides coverage of pensions and health insurance for the 
self-employed and agricultural workers and was extended to include independent farmers in 
the 1980’s.156 Entitlements are provided for dependent family members as well, although 
arrangements differ in the three social security institutions (Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010: 752). 
These three institutions provide pensions according to a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system157 
(Elveren, 2008: 217). The state guaranteed to cover the deficit of all three institutions, but only 
made direct public contributions in the case of civil servants.  
The healthcare system, in it its original form, was based as well on social insurance 
through a parallel and equally fragmented structure (Üstündağ and Yoltar, 2007). The state 
had the main responsibility for the provision of health care services,158 supplied jointly by the 
Ministry of Health, SSK, universities, other state institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, 
municipalities and private hospitals. Health benefits were tied to membership in one of the 
three social security institutions and were therefore based on occupational status. Benefits also 
varied across different social insurance funds (Ağartan, 2012: 60-61). There were significant 
differences among the three social security institutions in terms of access to healthcare 
facilities, the quality of services and the benefit packages provided (Ağartan, 2008).  
The social security system in Turkey in these years has been correctly characterized as 
“corporatist” and “inegalitarian” (Buğra, 2012; Yakut-Çakar, 2007), although the 
                                                 
154 Workers employed by state owned enterprises. 
155 The law no. 5434 on the Retirement Chest enacted in 1949 is the legal framework. The ES serves as the 
pension fund administration for white-collar workers employed by local and the central governments. The 
pension benefits and healthcare services of the Retirement Chest are financed in part through deductions from the 
salaries of state employees. 
156 The law no. 1479 on Bağ-Kur was enacted in 1971. Law no. 2229 in 1979 allowed for the membership of 
housewives and others seeking voluntary membership. The Law no. 2926 in 1983 included those working in the 
agricultural sector.  
157 PAYGO involves a transfer from the employed labor force to the retired.  
158 The public system was based on the provision of primary care services through state-owned health centers and 
facilities by physicians that were state employees. The secondary and tertiary care was vertically organized 
through hospitals and health facilities owned by the Ministry of Health (MoH), the hospitals owned and operated 
by the SSK, university hospitals and health facilities owned and managed by public institutions and 
municipalities. 
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corporatist159 feature was less apparent in the management of social security institutions. The 
main corporatist features derived from the fact that claims for benefits and coverage are highly 
dependent on membership of occupationally defined corporatist groups. As a Bismarckian 
corporatist160 regime the aim was to preserve status, based on the normative assumptions of 
the male breadwinner model and combined with strong familialism (Kılıç, 2009).161 The social 
security institutions assume that the “father” or “husband” provides coverage to the dependent 
members of the family.162  
The inegalitarian character of the social security system reflected in its corporatism and 
its limited coverage of only those working in the formal sector.163 Everything from pension 
entitlements to healthcare services varied according to occupational groups. Civil servants 
covered by the ES had generous pensions and quality healthcare services with access to the 
university hospitals (Sayan, 2006; Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010: 752; Ağartan, 2012).164 The 
workers’ pension benefits under the SSK fluctuated in time while their members and 
dependents received healthcare services in SSK owned hospitals (Kılıçdaroglu, 1998). The 
pension benefits for the self-employed including agricultural workers under Bağ-Kur were 
                                                 
159 SSK and Bağ-Kur were designed as autonomous social security institutions where the board of directors was 
composed of the representatives of union confederations, employer associations, representatives of retirees and 
professional associations and state representatives appointed by the Ministry of Labor (later in the 1970’s by 
Ministry of Social Security; and after 1980’s following their merger by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security).  The balance in the composition of the Board of Directors between the corporatist actors and state 
representatives has varied in time but state actors dominated in the post-1980 period. The ES, however, was 
institutionally under the authority the Ministry of Finance. Despite the autonomous status of SSK and Bağ-Kur, 
ministries and state agencies set the rules for insurance funds, decided the criteria for entitlement, the premium 
rates and co-payments. Özbek (2006) emphasizes that this interference into the management of insurance funds 
dates back to the early formation phase of the SSK in the 1950’s, where the Ministers of Labor commanded 
certain decisions and interfered into the affairs SSK Directors and Board. 
160 Although the term “Bismarckian” is used in different ways by scholars (Bonoli, 1997), it refers to the 
conservative corporatist regime type described by Esping-Andersen (1990). Palier (2010: 24) characterizes the 
four main characteristics of Bismarckian tradition of social insurance: “Entitlements are associated with 
employment status…primarily aimed at insuring salaried workers who paid contributions…; Social benefits are 
earnings-related…; Financing mechanisms are based principally on social contributions…; Administrative 
structures are para-public, involving the social partners in the management of the social insurance funds….” 
161 Familialism is defined by the extent to which families can be held responsible for their members’ welfare 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
162 Male breadwinner was also reflected in the survivor pension, which favors female over male survivors (Kılıç, 
2009). Accordingly, women left without a male breadwinner were protected by the state, until they (re)married.  
163 The informal and formal segmentation of the labor market also constitutes an important dimension that 
demonstrates the inegalitarian structure of the social security system. Aydin, Hisarciklilar and Ilkkaracan (2010: 
26) calculate the share of the informal employment in total non-agricultural sectors as 34% in 1988.   
164 ES members also could access public hospitals and private healthcare facilities with which the fund had 
established a contractual agreement.   
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comparatively less generous, healthcare coverage was fragmented and quality lower (Sayan, 
2006). The formal system and social insurance schemes reinforced the inequalities over time 
among different groups of beneficiaries.  
With a Bismarckian regime of this type, Turkey’s non-contributory social assistance 
mechanisms were limited (Buğra, 2012: 24).165 Introduced in 1976, a means-tested social 
assistance program, in the form of a minimum pension targeting the disabled and elderly, was 
conditional upon the absence of close relatives (Özbek, 2006: 360). The establishment of the 
Social Solidarity and Assistance Fund (Sosyal Yardimlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu, 
SYDTF) in 1986 provided emergency relief for citizens in severe deprivation and poverty. 
Benefits were mostly in-kind, as a last-resort mechanism. The Fund was an umbrella 
organization for a network of local Social Cooperation and Solidarity Foundations which 
cooperated closely with the local authorities on the district or provincial level in the provision 
of social services (Eder, 2010: 174). In addition, informal mechanisms of social protection 
based on family and kinship relationships were an important pillar of the welfare regime in 
Turkey. 
This overview of the social security system up through the 1980s illustrates the 
institutional characteristics and provides a description for the subsequent analysis of the 
reforms. However the above overview informs little about the politics that generated this 
inegalitarian and corporatist system grounded on the structural economic and societal changes 
at the time. The analysis of these historical dynamics is key in order to characterize 
empirically the policy legacies of the social security system.  Of course, an exhaustive 
historical analysis of the Turkish social security system is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The characterization of the policy legacies is based on the findings of the scholarly research 
already undertaken into the historical development of social policies in Turkey such as Özbek 
(2008; 2006); Buğra (2008; 2007a; 2006) and Boratav and Özuğurlu (2006). 
                                                 
165 Social assistance and social services were underdeveloped and not institutionalized until the reforms in 
2000’s. The policies were strongly means-tested and designed as a last-resort safety net for the poor. 
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I.a. The historical development of social security in Turkey: From the early 
Republican period to the 1980’s 
 
The aim in this section is to analyze  the genesis and evolution of social policies in 
various sequences. In what follows, the scope of analysis will concentrate on the overview of 
institutional and legislative measures in the social security system, analyzing the relation 
between the state, political elites and corporatist actors while considering the realignments of 
domestic actor coalitions.  
In a first period from 1923 to 1946, and as already sketched in Chapter IV, 
modernization and economic development were the two main projects of the political cadres 
who, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, embarked on the societal project of 
reforming the ancien régime (Pamuk, 2008; Eralp, 1994). In the early years of the Republic, 
and despite its étatism, there were few legislative and institutional developments in the realm 
of social security. The Law no. 151 in 1921 (amended in 1923) established an insurance fund 
for the mineworkers of the Ereğli region that provided workmen’s compensation, sickness and 
old-age pension coverage. In 1930, the Military and Civil Retirement Fund (Askeri ve Mülki 
Tekaüd Kanunu) was established as a fund for military personnel and civil servants (and their 
widows and orphans) against the risks of old-age, sickness and job accident. This was done by 
uniting the old Ottoman retirement funds. 
In the period 1923 to 1946, state ideology was characterized by a nationalist civic 
republicanism that framed an organic relationship between state and society and rejected class-
based or interest-based representation (Baban, 2005: 54). Buğra (2008) and Boratav and 
Özuğurlu (2006) indicate that the state elite considered child poverty as the main social 
problem.166 Thus the Public Health Law (Law no. 1593) introduced in 1930 aimed to tackle 
major illnesses and emphasized building and growing a healthy nation. It prioritized pro-
natalist policies on the grounds that rising birth rates were needed for modern state-building 
(Ağartan 2008: 139; Özbek, 2006: 90-91).167 However the development of healthcare services 
                                                 
166 The Red Crescent Society (Kızılay) inherited form the Ottoman Empire and the Society for the Protection of 
Children, established in 1921 (Himaye-i Etfal Cemiyeti, later Cocuk Esirgeme Kurumu) exemplify the quasi-
public charity associations that used limited state funds to address the poverty and health problems of children. 
167 The Ministry of Health was established in 1921. 
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was also shaped by the limited state capacity to finance centralized health services and by 
shortages of health personnel particularly in rural areas. The Law no. 1593 recognized the 
need to provide insurance-based health benefits for the working population but never fully 
implemented this regime. In reflecting the main concerns of this period, this legislation has 
prioritized the protection of children and women by regulations on the minimum age of 
employment, working time and health conditions (Özbek, 2006: 132). Another important 
innovation was the Labor Law no. 3008, targeting workers in manufacturing industry. It 
regulated working conditions and provided limited protective measures for enterprises with 
more than ten employees (İŞKUR, 2011a: 6).168 This period was characterized by social policy 
initiatives constrained by a scarcity of resources and shaped by the political and economic 
goals of the Turkish elite before the Second World War.  
In a second period from 1946 to 1980 major institutional and policy developments 
concerning the social security system occurred, as Turkish elites sought to respond to the 
needs of an industrialized and then import-substitution economy, which was the strategy 
behind developmentalism in these years.  The main institutions were built in a top-down 
manner by the state. The transition towards multiparty democracy in 1946 and the election of 
the Democrat Party (DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes in 1950 represented new 
dynamics in the social policy environment in Turkey (Aydın, 2005). 
In 1945 the Worker’s Insurance Institution (later the SSK) was established for private-
sector employees (more than 10 employees) and blue-collar public-sector workers (Özbek, 
2006: 162).169 The fund provided coverage first against the risk of industrial accidents and 
occupational diseases. Then pensions were added in 1949170 and health insurance171 in 1950. 
With the introduction of the Retirement Chest (ES) in 1949 for civil servants, two of the major 
institutions of the social security system had been established. Buğra (2007a) indicates that the 
Turkish context of transition to multi-party democracy in 1945 was conducive towards the 
                                                 
168 Turkey joined the International Labor Organisation (ILO) in 1932, with the result that ILO experts became 
involved in the preparation of draft legislation (Sur, 2009: 191). 
169 Ayse Buğra (2007a) and Adem Y. Elveren (2008) indicate that German experts who escaped from Nazi 
Germany, such as Ernst H. Hirsch who was the First General Director of the Worker’s Insurance Institution 
(Özbek, 2006: 170), were instrumental in the establishment of the modern social security institutions.  
170 The first legislation set the minimum age for retirement at 60 years old, and required contributions for 25 
years (200 working days per year). 
171 The Social Insurance Institution added health insurance in 1950 and coverage extended from urban city 
centers to all regions over ten years.  
  181 
establishment of the two main pieces of the institutional structure. An important issue that 
emerged in these years was the problems of the rural areas, in terms of both adequate income 
and health services. Agricultural price support policies and subsidies were introduced to 
address the first and primary care was developed at the district level to deal with the second 
(Ağartan 2008: 150). 
After the coup of May 1960, as already noted, the military regime imposed a shift in 
economic policies towards the protection of the domestic market from international 
competition and an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) (Aydın, 2005).172 With the 
adaptation of a nationalist developmentalist strategy, a series of legal and institutional changes 
were introduced, oriented towards state-led planning and industrialization including the 
establishment of the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT) as already 
described in Chapter IV (Ünay, 2006: 104). This period brought crucial changes to social 
security legislation, and as we have already described in Chapter IV, to labor law.  
The 1961 Constitution specified the social aspect of the state, institutionalizing the 
access to education, health and employment as constitutional rights for citizens (Boratav and 
Özuğurlu, 2006: 174; Buğra, 2007:178). The Constitution also provided a legal framework for 
industrial relations. In this framework, employees had a right to social security as well as to 
form trade unions and engage in collective bargaining and strike. Tripartite representation was 
institutionalized as well (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006).173  
With respect to the social security system, the First Five Year Development Plan 
(1963-1967) (DTP, 1963: 109) prepared in 1963 indicated the policy direction chosen for this 
period: 
“One of the main issues regarding income inequality involves expanding the 
coverage of social security. In the next 15 years, the fragmented and limited social 
security system will be expanded and unified incrementally to provide adequate 
coverage.” 
                                                 
37 The transition towards import-substitution industrialization (ISI) was influenced by internal and external 
factors. On the one hand, a coalition of Turkish actors (industrialists, small and medium size business owners, 
workers and civil servants) supported the idea of national developmentalism with protected markets (Pamuk, 
2008: 284; Aydın, 2005: 35). The international institutions such as the World Bank and OECD also supported 
protectionism as well as the idea of planned development as a way of supporting rapid industrialization and 
development (Ünay, 2006: 103; Pamuk, 2008: 283).     
173 These rights were granted in a top-down manner by the military regime and they were not the result of labor 
struggle (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006). Ünay (2006) argues that the developmentist economic policy necessitated 
the support of the working classes for planned industrialization and wage arrangements. 
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One of the main goals expressed in the first Five Year Development Plan (DTP, 1963: 
111) was to expand the coverage of health insurance following passage of a Law on the 
Socialization of Health Services”174 in 1961 by the National Unity Council after the 1960 
coup. It represented major changes in terms of financing and provision of services (Ağartan, 
2008).175  
 In 1964 the Social Insurance Law (no. 506) unified several different social insurance 
regimes for workers under a single legislative framework and at the same time adopted the 
name Social Insurance Institution (SSK) (Özbek, 2006: 245). This law expanded the regime 
by obliging all employers and workers to pay into social insurance even in companies with 
less than 10 employees (which had been the previous limit) and coverage was extended to new 
occupational groups and new retirement ages were set. The institutional capacity of the SSK 
was also reinforced. The Bağ-Kur,176 founded in 1971, provided coverage of pensions for the 
self-employed, and agricultural workers as well as local administrators, allowing participation 
of these groups in the social security system, even though it was less generous than the pillars 
for civil servants and industrial workers (Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Sayan, 2006; Aybars and 
Tsarouhas, 2010).  
In 1974, the Ministry of Social Security was established and SSK and Bağ-Kur were 
put under its jurisdiction, while the ES was kept under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Finance (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2012).  With amendments in 1979177, 
voluntary participation in Bağ-Kur was opened to all, including housewives. However the 
Bağ-Kur did not provide healthcare benefits until the mid-1980’s. The retirement age was also 
adjusted, and the contribution period was reduced to 20 years for women (Özbek, 2006: 295). 
From 1977, the SSK covered agricultural workers with a permanent contract.178 The first 
means-tested social assistance scheme in the form of a pension was introduced in 1976 
                                                 
174The Law No: 224. 
175 Although certain components of the reform were successful such as the reorganization of the health facilities 
in rural areas, its implementation was finalized only in the 1980’s while certain elements planned were never 
fully realized (Ağartan, 2008). 
176 Law no. 1479. 
177 Law no. 2229. 
178 This law has also allowed those working with a salary from home to contribute to and be covered by the 
system.   
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(Karadeniz, 2009). Those benefiting from minimum pension has also benefited free from 
publicly provided healthcare.  
Concerning the healthcare system, the transfer of various healthcare facilities owned 
and managed by public institutions to the Ministry of Health was never fully realized 
(Ağartan, 2008). The SSK owned hospitals where union confederations such as the Turkish 
Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, 
TÜRK-İŞ) and employer associations such as the Turkish Confederation of Employer 
Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu,TİSK), were active in their 
management with quality healthcare service and benefits (Kiliçdaroglu, 1998).179 Thus the 
dual character of the healthcare system was consolidated in this period. The public healthcare 
system financed from the general budget developed in this period addressed mainly the 
population living in rural areas, also with healthcare facilities in urban areas providing services 
to the poorer population (Ağartan, 2008: 195).  
We see, in other words, that in these years social insurance to address various social 
risks was prioritized by the state that invested in and regulated these regimes. These 
institutional developments of occupationally based insurance regimes from the mid-1960’s to 
the 1970’s substantially expanded the coverage of the social security system (Table 5) within a 
consolidated tripartite institutional structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 In fact SSK invested resources for establishing new healthcare facilities and hospitals for its own members 
starting from the mid-1970’s (Ağartan, 2008). 
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Table 5. Population covered by social security institutions 180 
The coverage of the SSK, ES and Bağ-Kur (after 1971) 
% of population covered by 
Years 
Pensions Health 
1965 20.2 20.2 
1970 26.9 26.9 
1975 41.7 33.6 
1980 48.9 38.4 
1985 59.0 42.1 
1990 72.7 54.4 
1995 81.3 64.3 
2000 87.0 83.0 
 
 
Following the military coup d’État, the post-1980 period in Turkey witnessed the 
transition to more market-oriented policies and integration into the global market, as already 
described in Chapter IV (Ünay, 2006; Keyder, 2004: 67-68; Buğra, 2003: 459). Under military 
rule (1980 to 1983) and then by Turgut Özal’s government, which took office after the 
elections of 1983 (see Chapter II), a series of economic reforms were implemented which 
substantially shifted employment patterns. The new economic policy restricted the 
employment in state economic enterprises, such that employment in the public sector declined 
(Adaman, Bugra and İnsel, 2010).181 Reforms appeared to be necessary to the social security 
                                                 
180 Information for the Table is compiled from Boratav and Özuğurlu (2006: 175).  
181 The share of public sector employees among all wage workers was 33% in 1990, 28% in 1996 and 12% in 
1998 (Tunalı, 2003). 
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system. One change was institutional; in the 1983, the Ministries of Labor and Social Security 
were merged to become the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In 1986, the retirement age 
for female workers was set as 55 and 60 for male workers with 5000 days of contribution 
(Aktuğ, 2010).182 One important change183 involved the inclusion of self-employed (or 
independent) farmers into the Bağ-Kur regime in 1983 and the addition of health coverage 
(Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 176).  
These changes reflect the emphasis of the period from 1980 to 1983, under military 
rule, to increase coverage of the social security system. As for the first ANAP government 
under Özal’s leadership, its major reform attempt was a Basic Health Law in 1987 (Ağartan, 
2008: 24). However, this effort never came fully to fruition because the Constitutional Court 
exercised its veto and overruled some of its provisions.  
The 1980s also saw the deterioration of the economic situation in rural areas, with 
declining subsidies to agriculture and cuts to price-support programs following trade 
liberalization (Eder, 2004). The result was a reduction of agricultural employment and an 
increase in migration towards urban centers. However the context and settings of this 
migration was different than earlier. It was no longer possible to construct illegal settlements 
in the same way as in the 1960’s; liberalization entrenched the rules of the property market 
(Buğra, 2003). Moreover, the new migrants in urban settings could no longer rely as much on 
extended family ties and kinship relations from their hometown (Buğra and Keyder, 2003:31-
33). The weakening of informal support mechanisms for new migrants in urban centers led to 
worsening conditions among the poor and creation of a new type of urban poor (Aran et al., 
2010; Buğra and Keyder, 2003).  
The central state’s response was the creation of the Social Solidarity and Assistance 
Fund (Sosyal Yardimlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Fonu, SYDTF) in 1986, intended to 
address new risks of poverty by mobilizing private donations and organizing charitable funds 
(Buğra and Keyder, 2003: 36; Buğra and Candas, 2011: 519).184 A second major policy 
development was the establishment of the Green Card by the coalition government composed 
                                                 
182 This criterion for retirement is similar to the previously (25 years of employment), but it is stricter as it is 
based on the days worked per year and making contributions. 
183 The Law no. 2926 in 1983. 
184 There are other formal and informal mechanism of social assistance in Turkey but the reforms under study are 
not directly related to this pillar. 
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of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and Social Democratic People's Party 
(Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, SHP) in 1992. This program for the low-income population not 
covered by social security insurance provided income-tested healthcare for the poor. As a 
means-tested measure for one segment of the population, it reinforced the fragmented 
character of the healthcare system (Yoltar, 2009).  
I.b. Policy legacies in the social security system 
The main aim of tracing these major developments concerning the social security 
system from the early years of the Republic through the institutionalization of occupationally 
based corporatist system in the 1960’s and its evolution in the post-1980’s period is to 
characterize the policy legacies. An important continuing character of the social security 
system (pension and healthcare benefits) is the dominant policy approach based on social 
insurance and occupational status. The insurance principle was apparent in the two social 
security institutions established for workers in 1945 and for civil servants in 1949. The risk 
coverage of these institutions has evolved in time from providing coverage against 
occupational accidents and disease to including old-age pensions and healthcare. The drive for 
modernization and the use of examples from European countries was influential in setting the 
policy design, already a practice in the Ottoman period (Buğra, 2008; Özbek, 2006). The 
social security system created and reformed in these decades provided coverage for a small 
segment of the population - workers in the formal sector and civil servants (Buğra, 2008). The 
healthcare system became a dualistic one, with insurance coverage (of various qualities) and a 
non-insurance based coverage for the poor (Ağartan, 2008). 
This insurance-based social security system providing differentiated coverage and 
benefits was consolidated from the 1960’s to the 1980’s. Alongside the state’s move to 
import-substitution industrialization as a national development strategy, the SSK and ES 
increased their insurance-based coverage for workers and civil servants and a new institution 
and insurance-based schemes was established with Bağ-Kur in 1971. The expectation was that 
expansion of the formal sector employment would swell membership in the social security 
institutions (Ünay, 2006: 60). Çağlar Keyder (2005: 125) describes the expectations of these 
years: 
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“During the period of successful modernization, the literature on migration and on 
urban growth focused on problems of integration of the new population  …. 
Employment was the focus of economic integration. Problems of absorption of the 
immigrants into the modern sector were acknowledged, especially through the 
construct of the informal sector, yet formal employment was always considered a 
possibility, and economic development promised the eventual dominance of the 
wage relationship in the organized sector. The modernist model that became the 
aspiration for developmentalist purposes derived from the first-world experience, 
where, during the post-war boom of Fordist regulation, most of the population was 
successfully incorporated into formal wage relations under legal supervision. It 
was hoped that industrialization through import substitution and the imitation of 
the Fordist model would permit a transformation of the informal into the formal in 
due time.”  
 
Therefore the focus remained on expanding the insurance-based social security system 
and the privileges of the employed increased as they gained new rights and risk-coverage. The 
same type of regime was extended to the self-employed and agricultural workers with Bağ-
Kur in the 1970’s.  
The commitment to these principles of occupationally based regimes meant that the 
social security system grew as a highly fragmented structure with three institutions providing 
different benefit packages with varying premium rates. Access to healthcare facilities was also 
dependent on membership in one or the other of the social security institutions, and the result 
was variation in the quality of services provided in different facilities.  
But informal employment practices did not disappear. Moreover, low rates of 
compliance with social security laws, a high dependency ratio, a low active-passive ratio all 
meant that the social security institutions were at risk of serious fiscal and institutional 
challenges during the 1990’s (Gümüş, 2008: 5) and would come under pressure to change in 
the next decade.  
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II. The social security system in the narrative of economic crisis 
during the 1990’s: Diagnosing the problems and limiting reform 
options with the involvement of international actors 
 
If one focus of this thesis is the 2008 social security reform and the uses of Europe, this 
reform needs to be located in the historical trajectory of reform debates since the mid-1990s. 
Reform of the social security system came onto the agenda of coalition governments during 
the 1990s and was discussed extensively among corporatist actors and received substantial 
media coverage. Özbek (2006: 343-344) describes the debates that followed the liberalization 
reforms in the economy as focusing on the crisis of the social security system. The imbalances 
and fiscal deficit of the social security institutions were described as a black hole.  
Turkey’s discussion of reform options also involved international actors. The policy 
deliberations among national actors were influenced by the involvement of international 
institutions whose policy recommendations often shaped the policy options considered.  
II.a. From early retirement schemes to the economic crisis in the 1990’s: 
Domestic politics under IMF constraints  
 
At the beginning of the 1990’s, the key event was the DYP-SHP coalition 
government’s introduction of early retirement schemes and their reduction of the minimum 
retirement age for all three social security institutions in 1992 (Yakut-Çakar, 2007). Süleyman 
Demirel, as the leader of DYP, was instrumental in this change, which kept an election 
promise of early retirement (Gümüş, 2010: 12).185 The coalition government argued at the 
time that early retirement would lead to a decrease in unemployment, as younger workers 
would pick up the jobs of the early retirees and it would also allow a reduction of employment 
in the public sector. What happened was more often that the early retirement programs 
                                                 
185The 1992 legislation brought down the minimum retirement age to 38 for females, and 43 for males. A World 
Bank Report (2006b: ix) indicates “The abolition of the minimum pension age in 1992 provided a significant 
incentive for early exit from the labor force. Analysis of micro data from household surveys in 1994 and 2002 
show a significant increase in young pensioners.” 
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allowed the young retirees to take up informal employment (Oral, 2008: 137).  
The introduction of politically stimulated early retirement schemes caused the system 
to generate cash deficits and also exacerbated the active-passive ratio.186 The fiscal imbalances 
of the social security system were exacerbated also by the use of its funds for financing the 
domestic debt during the 1990’s and unwise investment decisions associated with this (Yakut-
Çakar, 2007: 119; Sayan, 2006: 257; Özbek, 2006: 294-296). Kemal Kılıçdaroglu (1998) 
argues that the SSK funds were used to finance overspending on other budget items and for 
agricultural support purchases. Gümüş (2010: 18) indicates that the publicly managed funds of 
the social security institutions (SSK, ES and Bağ-Kur combined) have lost 25% of their value 
from 1984 to 1988 because of not being invested in proper financial instruments. Table 6 
provides the budgetary balances of the ES, showing the deficit of the regimes increased 
steadily after 1992. Table 7 documents the budgetary balances of the SSK.  
 
Table 6. ES Budgetary Situation during the 1990’s (Millions US $) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
186 The deficit of the social security system as a percentage of GNP rose from 0.3% in 1990 to 4.5% in 2004 
(Brook and Whitehouse, 2006: 7).  
Year Budgetary Balance  
1990 97 (surplus) 
1991 208 (surplus) 
1992 199 (surplus) 
1993 -360 (deficit) 
1994 -204 (deficit) 
1995 -105 (deficit) 
1996 -486 (deficit) 
1997 -676 (deficit) 
1998 -712 (deficit) 
1998 -1 218 (deficit) 
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Table 7. SSK Budgetary Situation during the 1990’s (Millions US $) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public spending under the DYP-SHP coalition government increased from 1992 to 
1994. Various groups in the electorate benefited from cheap credit to small and medium-size 
businesses, the lower retirement age and more generous retirement benefits and provision of 
high price supports for agricultural products (Pamuk, 2008: 290). There was a resulting 
increase of public deficits (Boratav and Özuğurlu, 2006: 181). The increasing fiscal and 
financial fragility led to first economic crisis in 1994, characterized by a large outflow of 
capital from Turkey (Özatay, 2000: 329). The financial crisis led to a severe devaluation of the 
currency. The IMF arrived with a stabilization program including measures such as 
devaluation, privatization targets, severe budget cuts and additional taxes (Eder, 2004).  
Accordingly the debates surrounding the social security system in the mid-1990’s were 
shaped by this economic crisis. The mid-1990’s also brought the involvement of the World 
Bank and the ILO187 in discussions about the social security system. An ILO report, titled The 
                                                 
187 An earlier ILO report in 1972 documented actuarial calculation problems in the Turkish social security system 
(Özbek, 2006). 
Year Budgetary Balance (US$) 
1990 531 (surplus) 
1991 30 (surplus) 
1992 -365,4 (deficit) 
1993 -720,7(deficit) 
1994 -641(deficit) 
1995 -1 749,9 (deficit) 
1996 -1 738,6 (deficit) 
1997 -2 221 (deficit) 
1998 -1 692 (deficit) 
1998 -2 662 (deficit) 
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Turkish Government Social Security and Health Insurance Project was prepared in 1995 and 
proposed a variety of pension reforms, including alternative mixtures of a reformed and 
expanded pay-as-you-go and new private funding schemes as well as institutional reforms, all 
intended to control the deficit in the social security system (ILO, 1995a; Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 
117). 
 Following the economic crisis in 1994, Turkey signed a Stand-by Agreement with the 
IMF that called for the introduction of structural reforms, including in the social security 
system (Karagöl, 2008: 2; Özatay, 2000: 340). As a part of the stabilization program, a social 
security reform was prepared in 1995 by Aydın Güven Gürkan, Minister of Labor and Social 
Affairs in the DYP-CHP coalition government (Özkan, 2009: 9).188 But there were 
disagreements over the content of the social security reform among the partners of the 
coalition government and more specifically between Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and Aydın 
Güven Gürkan (Milliyet, 1995). The employer associations and union confederations were 
also opposed to the social security reform that would have changed the advantages and 
incentives for their members. The employer association was against the increase in the 
minimum contribution rate (TİSK: 1994b), while the union confederations opposed the 
increases in the minimum retirement age (TÜRK-İŞ, 1998). The reform proposal was not 
brought to parliament, due to this fragmentation of the executive and the upcoming elections 
in 1995. 
Although the stabilization program was not passed in 1995, the IMF continued to put 
pressure on the government, insisting on the need to control government expenditure in order 
to sustain the budgetary discipline as “fiscal sustainability is threatened by the costs of an 
overly generous and poorly managed social security system, whose deficit reached 2% of GNP 
in 1996” and suggesting an increase in the minimum retirement age and tighter links between 
contributions and benefits (IMF, 1998).189 
The short-lived coalition government of the ANAP and DYP in 1996 promised in its 
government program to reform the social security system by developing obligatory private 
                                                 
188 This reform proposal aimed to increase the minimum retirement age to 55 for women, 60 for men, as it was 
before 1992, with a minimum contribution rate of 25 years for men and 20 years for women.  
189 “IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Turkey,” Press Information Notice Number 97/17, August 5, 
1997. 
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insurance funds and encouraging private investment in healthcare (53. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Hükümeti, 1996). The minority ANAP government in 1997 argued for the necessity of 
introducing the social security reform that it promised would be prepared with the 
participation of employer associations and union confederations. However the coalition 
governments during the 1990’s failed to pass any reforms.  
In this context, maintaining budgetary discipline and cost containment in the social 
security institutions continued to be priorities, and the pressure of the IMF did not let up. 
Social expenditures in Turkey continued to rise despite – or perhaps because of – the fiscal 
crisis following 1994. The central state’s responsibility for covering the deficit in the social 
security institutions also increased substantially in the mid-1990’s. State agencies such as the 
SPO, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Undersecretariat of Treasury and all the social security institutions prepared 
reports analyzing the problems of the system and discussing options for reform that shared 
many of the IMF’s premises.  
The Five Year Plans are representative of these various discussions. These documents 
indicate the long-term strategic thinking of the state bureaucracy regarding the healthcare 
system and pensions and show the main trends they imagined the reform should take. The 
Sixth Five Year Plan (1990-94) proposed extending the coverage of social security to 75% of 
the population by including agricultural workers (DPT, 1990: 304). There was also a call for 
investments in the efficiency of the healthcare system via a reorganization of services. The 
Seventh Five Year Plan (1996-2000) set the goal of increasing the coverage of social security 
system to 90% of the population in 2000 (DPT, 1996a: 112). After diagnosing the problems of 
the system (low active-passive ratio, short contribution periods, early retirement and a weak 
financial structure) the Seventh Plan called for the establishment of a single institution 
unifying the different social security schemes and creation of a single healthcare insurance 
fund. It also favored the introduction of private insurance funds into the system.  
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II.b. International actors during the 1990’s: Framing the problems and 
deciphering the policy options 
 
From the early 1990’s, the World Bank has been active in Turkey especially in 
healthcare policy making and it supported several projects. The first Health Project, jointly 
financed by the Bank and the Turkish government, started in 1989 with the aim of improving 
access to provincial healthcare services with 15 projects for investing in the infrastructure in 
the ten most underdeveloped provinces. Developing the Ministry of Health’s administrative 
capacity in the organization of healthcare services was also a focus (World Bank, 1989: 2). 
The World Bank’s emphasis was on reducing inequalities in access to health care services. 
The need to do so followed from its analysis of the main health indicators. With similar 
objectives and also jointly financed, the Second Health Project initiated in 1994 aimed to 
reach the 23 eastern provinces in order to improve the equity of access to essential health 
services, especially primary healthcare and to invest in the organization and management of 
healthcare (World Bank, 1994: 2).190 These two projects provided fellowships for training 
health professionals who would work in these provinces and investing in the infrastructure of 
the health facilities.  
 A third project supported by the Bank was the Primary Health Care Project initiated in 
1997 whose objectives were to improve access and quality of primary health care in two 
provinces, as a pilot to prepare a basis for the Turkey-wide reform (World Bank, 1997: 2). The 
aim was to assist the Turkish government to introduce comprehensive health insurance to 
cover all segments of the population as well as to reform primary care and introduce changes 
in organizational structure and human resources. However the laws needed to make this 
change could not be passed in the parliament in 1998 and 1999.  Again the weakness of the 
executive dependent on a functioning coalition blocked the change. 
                                                 
190 There are significant delays in the implementation of Second Health Project, as the Turkish government could 
not meet its share of the financing because of the 1994 economic crisis. With the 1999 earthquake, the project 
was also extended to provide emergency relief in the provinces hit by the earthquake.   
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The increasing involvement of the World Bank in healthcare and social insurance 
reform efforts also led to research reports that influenced the debates and provided road maps 
for the reforms. In the framework of the World Bank Loan in 1994, research on healthcare 
financing was contracted to the Australian Health Insurance Commission. World Bank funds 
were also used to partly finance an ILO research project on the social security system (Alpar, 
2000: 2-3).191 
The ILO research was conducted in 1993 and 1994 (ILO, 1995a: 2). The study aimed 
initially to analyze the organization and the financing of the SSK but the scope of the research 
was extended to all social security institutions, and including pensions and health insurance. 
This comprehensive research on the legislation, structure, organization and operation of the 
social security institutions focused on financial balances and actuarial projections of various 
scenarios.  The findings of the research published in 1995 were that reform was needed to 
make the system sustainable.  The financial deficit was labeled a major problem to be 
addressed (ILO, 1995d: 17).192 The ILO predicted the situation would only worsen.193 The 
ILO report also clearly indicated that the early retirement scheme introduced in 1992 was 
having an adverse effect on the financial situation of the social security institutions (ILO, 
1995a: 3). Finally the report targeted the unclear division of responsibility between the state 
and the social security institutions (ILO, 1995a: 13). Although the SSK and Bağ-Kur were 
institutionally designed to be autonomous, governments had been dipping into their funds to 
pay social support supplements to pensioners outside these regimes.194 Insisting that that the 
                                                 
191 The 1995 report prepared by Australian Health Insurance Commission, titled Studies on Healthcare Financing 
Options, after analyzing the current situation of the healthcare system and making projections about the financial 
structure, focused on the lack of coordination among insurance based healthcare expenses and healthcare 
expenses from the general budget (Alpar, 2000: 8; Gökbayrak, 2010: 6). 
192 Analyzing the demographic dynamics and the financial situation the report found an imbalance in the pension 
regimes where contributions did not cover expenditures because of weak actuarial balances, the high level of the 
dependency ratio, the worsening of active-passive ratio, low labor force participation and low compliance of 
employers with the pension laws and poor enforcement of this legislation by authorities (ILO, 1995d: 18).    
193 In the case of SSK, the public corporations were evading their social security contributions. Bağ-Kur suffered 
especially from failing to collect regularly the contributions from its members and thereby increasing its 
dependency on state deficit financing (ILO, 1995b).   
194 These pensioners had not made any contributions.  Accordingly, for the ILO report, these payments should 
have been covered from the general budget rather than using social security institutions. As a consequence of 
these practices as well as the actuarial issues, the SSK and Bağ-Kur pension regimes were in financial deficit and 
had become dependent on state transfers in order to fulfill their commitments. 
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social security system with this current characteristics was not sustainable in the long term, the 
report also saw a place for introducing private insurance schemes on a voluntary basis.  
The ILO report with the analysis of the problems of the social security system has 
provided “justification”195 of the reforms as necessary for long-term sustainability of the 
system. The ILO report shaped the reform process by providing projections on the 
sustainability of the social security system and framing the available reform options. It became 
a reference document for the bureaucracy of several ministries, the State Planning 
Organization, the Treasury and different coalition governments.  
Starting from the mid-1990’s, employer associations and union confederations became 
more active and involved in these discussions, preparing various reports focusing on the 
problems of the social security system.196 Although these actors agreed on the need for the 
social security reform, there were significant differences in the content of the reform options 
they proposed. TÜSIAD (1996) argued for the introduction of a third pillar by making 
individual retirement accounts compulsory. In its report titled Retired and Happy (TÜSIAD, 
1996: 11-12), it claimed the problems of the social security system were related to the 
inefficient use of funds, early retirement programs and mismanagement in social security 
institutions. It therefore suggested the Chilean model197 as a successful example of private 
pension schemes.  For its part, the unions, as reflected in TÜRK-İŞ (1998) documents, 
demanded reform of the governance and administrative structure of the social security system 
so as to provide more autonomy from state interference.  
Numerous other research reports and publications focused on social security reform. 
The SSK prepared a research report in 1996. The Special Commission of the State Planning 
Organization on Social Security prepared a report in 1996 that was used in the preparation of 
the Seventh Five Year Plan (DPT, 1996b). The Under-secretariat of the Treasury prepared a 
structural reform agenda in 1995 that included social security and health reform, including a 
special issue of the Journal of the Treasury in 1996 (Kenar, Teksöz and Coşkun, 1996). The 
                                                 
195 Green-Pedersen (2002) argues that justification of reforms by governments is an important mechanism that 
can minimize the opposition of political parties and unions.  
196 Legal changes regarding associations as well as union confederations in 1995 shaped the increasing activity of 
civil society organizations (Özbudun and Gençkaya , 2009). 
197 Chile implemented structural reform programs with World Bank credits in 1980s that introduced the 
privatization of pensions.  
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Commission on Social Security of the parliament published a research report in 1996 
discussing the problems and various reform options (TBMM, 1996).  
This burgeoning literature demonstrates that state agencies, employer and employee 
associations and international organizations were all involved in the social security reform 
discussions in the second half of the 1990’s. The international actors were influential in the 
diagnosis of the problems of the social security system and for elaborating various reform 
options. The ILO report on the social security system in 1995, the report of the Australian 
Health Insurance Commission on healthcare financing in 1995 and the World Bank projects 
were influential in providing technical expertise and justification for the reforms. Turkish state 
agencies also produced research reports that identified the problems and considered various 
reform options. The employer associations and union confederations were also involved in 
these debates, proposing changes that reflected their opposing positions on crucial issues such 
as the introduction of private pension funds or increasing the retirement age and contribution 
period. Framing the problems of the social security system by the use of the financial 
indicators and projections such as actuarial calculations, imbalances and budget deficits 
certainly shaped the diagnosis of certain actors, such as the Ministry of Finance and Under-
secretariat of the Treasury who had a key role in designing the reform proposals at the end of 
1990s.  
III. The reform process of the social security system: Phase one 
(1999 to 2001) 
The coalition and minority governments in Turkey from 1994 to 1999 could not 
successfully pass reforms of the social security system and health insurance.198 The 
fragmentation of the power of these governments had a significant influence on the process, as 
governments without any clear majority in parliament sought the support of several political 
parties. Despite the pressure of the IMF to control spending, the technical expertise provided 
by the ILO and World Bank, and the consensus in state agencies about the need to introduce 
the reforms, the reforms were not implemented. 
                                                 
198 See Chapter II for a list of these numerous governments. 
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Moreover, over time reform became more controversial as the union confederations 
and organizations of retired workers and civil servants mobilized to avoid losing their acquired 
benefits and privileges. Nor did the employer associations want any increase in their 
contributions or any regulations that could threaten their international competitiveness. 
Although the accumulated deficit in the social security institutions seemed to make change 
urgent, these weak governments could not find a balance between a policy seeking and vote 
seeking logic. 
Following the elections of April 1999, a coalition government was established between 
the left-of-center Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the center-right 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and right-wing Nationalist Movement Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) (Hale, 2000; Avci, 2004). In the economic sphere, this 
coalition government adopted a stabilization program with another Stand-by Agreement 
signed with the IMF in 1999, involving strict monetary policies, an anti-inflationary program 
and measures to introduce fiscal discipline as well as a commitment to introduce structural 
reforms and major privatization attempts (57.Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, 1999). The 
coalition government announced in its government program and coalition protocol that it 
would introduce the reforms of the social security system, create a new pillar for a private 
pension scheme, change the social assistance regime, establish a general health insurance 
system and promote family medicine. But rather than a macro reform combining these 
elements, the coalition government planned to introduce the laws in two steps, differentiating 
short-term and medium-term measures. Reform of pensions was among the short-term 
measures. The second step would involve restructuring the health system by moving towards 
universal coverage, unification of the three social security institutions but with administrative 
separation of health insurance. Önis and Bakır (2007: 152) argue, however, that the coalition 
government had only a weak commitment to key aspects of the structural reforms on 
privatization and regulation of the banking sector that were also part of the IMF Stand-by 
Agreement and this is what triggered the 2000-2001 economic crisis. 
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III.a. The social security reform process from 1999 to 2001: Government 
strategies, anti-reform coalition and veto points 
The first phase of the reform process began in 1999 with a reform package that 
included parametric changes regarding the retirement age and contribution periods to the 
system as well as the introduction of voluntary private pension schemes (Özbek, 2006: 345). 
However the establishment of the third pillar to the pension system with the voluntary private 
pension schemes was postponed to 2001, due to the 1999 earthquake, which had an important 
impact on the overall economy (Şahin and Elveren, 2012: 176-177). The reform package 
introduced in 1999 included the minimum retirement age for all new entrants to the SSK, Bağ-
Kur and ES regimes  (age 58 for women and 60 for men) (Özbek, 2006: 349). The reform also 
expanded the reference period for the calculation of pension benefits and pension indexation 
was linked to the Consumer Price Index for SSK and Bağ-Kur members (Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 
120). This Law no. 4447 also introduced unemployment insurance with contributions 
beginning in 1999 and disbursement beginning in 2002 (Tunalı, 2003).199 
 In other words, the design of the legislation was part of the coalition government’s 
strategy. But changes were introduced in the technical parameters of the pensions that were 
difficult to understand and that constituted obfuscation, which is a way for governments to 
introduce reforms by obscuring or hiding the consequences of the reforms through changes in 
the technical parameters. The coalition government’s obfuscation strategy by making changes 
in the pension parameters was less obvious than cutting directly the benefits.  
In addition, with the aim of dampening the opposition of the union confederations, 
including civil servants and their retired members, the coalition government designed the 
institutional restructuring towards unification of the three institutions to occur a year after the 
eneactement of social security reform laws, in October 2000.  The restructuring of these 
important institutions was done by decree (No. 618), setting up a unified a social security 
administration that would coordinate the standardization of rules, regulation and benefits 
under one umbrella organization for the three social security institutions (Sayan, 2006: 261). 
This administrative restructuring was also achieved through an obfuscation strategy by making 
changes through decrees and avoiding parliamentary discussion. 
                                                 
199 There was not any institutionalized unemployment insurance coverage in Turkey until 1999. 
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The social security reform also included phasing-out periods for the increase of the 
retirement age, in order not to affect the existing beneficiaries. The reform introduced an 
eight-year transition period. This involved a strategy of division, in which the increase in the 
retirement age from to 58 for women to 60 for men would not immediately affect those 
nearing retirement but change the entitlement settings for the future generations. Despite this 
division strategy, however, the increases to the retirement age would constitute the main issue 
during and after the social security reform process, the issue being kept alive by the union 
confederations and professional associations. 
Another strategy used by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was to link the 
establishment of an unemployment insurance program to the social security reform, in order to 
weaken the unions’ opposition to the changes to pensions and so on. The Minister, Yaşar 
Okuyan, stated in an interview in 2006: “I knew that the union confederations would oppose 
the social security reform, I decided to include the unemployment insurance proposal in the 
same reform to ease their reaction to the reform…. maybe we increased the retirement age but 
we have also passed this key law” (Özbek, 2006: 351). However the eligibility requirements 
for unemployment insurance remained extremely stringent and the replacement ratios 
remained low (Kenar, 2009: 16). 
Thus the unemployment insurance program and certain job security reforms were 
included when the Social Security Act went to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) (Koç, 2002: 11). But employer associations were against 
making these changes if severance pay and employment flexibility were not included (as 
described in Chapter IV). Faced with these positions, the coalition government used a 
compensation strategy to gain support from the unions.  
Yaşar Okuyan also claimed credit for being able to enact this major program as draft 
laws for unemployment insurance had failed to be introduced in the 1990’s despite the 
insistence by the union confederations (Koç, 2002; Özkan, 2009).  
The pace of change in 1999 from the preparation of the draft legislation to the passage 
through parliament was remarkable. The coalition protocol was signed on May 28, 1999 and 
the coalition government program was approved by the parliament in June 6, 1999. The 
Minister of Labor and Social Security announced the preparation of the reform proposal in 
June 1999 and the reform proposal was sent to the parliamentary Health, Family, Labor and 
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Social Affairs Commissions and the Plan and Budget Commission on 13 July 1999. The Law 
(No. 4447) was discussed in the General Assembly of the TBMM from August 12 to 25, in 
nine meetings and accepted by the parliament on 25th of August. It was approved by the 
President, Süleyman Demirel on September 7, 1999.  
Analysis of the parliamentary discussions of the reform law in these nine meetings 
indicates that the opposition political parties, the FP and DYP, focused their concerns on the 
lack of participation from various actors in the preparation of the reform law.200 The FP 
parliamentarians were also critical of the increases of the retirement age, arguing that the 
demographic context and the low life expectancy in Turkey made them inappropriate (TBMM, 
1999b). One major criticism voiced by the members of opposition political parties was their 
view that the IMF had imposed these changes on the government as a part of stand-by 
agreements.  
Also striking is the lack of any reference to membership in the European Union or 
even of European countries’ social protection systems in the parliamentary discussions. 
Neither the coalition parties nor the opposition political parties raised it. In large part this may 
be because candidate status for Turkey was not recognized until December of that year. In 
other words there were no uses of Europe by these parliamentarians. It is only with the 
preparation in 2001 of the NPAA, following the 2000 Accession Partnership Document that 
Europe began to provide a reference point for both social security and labor law reforms, in 
the form of cognitive, legal and financial resources. 
The corporatist actors did not accept these strategies of obfuscation and division easily. 
The main union confederations and various professional associations strongly opposed, 
expressing their opposition from the start in June 1999 (Çelik, 2007a; 2004b). In July a Labor 
Platform is established composed of main union confederations, professional organizations of 
doctors, pharmacists, dentists, vets, engineers and lawyers and associations of the retired. Not 
surprisingly, the Labor Platform was composed of organizations and associations with 
diverging interests and various ideological affiliations (Ağartan, 2008: 304). In the mid-July 
                                                 
200 The Ministry of Labor and Social Security excluded both unions and employer associations from the 
preparation of the reform proposal (Hürriyet, 1999a). Yaşar Okuyan presented the social security reform proposal 
to the three union confederations (TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, HAK-İŞ) and the employer association (TİSK) just before 
the launch of the parliamentary process.  
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1999, however, it mobilized against the social security reform, especially the higher retirement 
age, with the slogan “Say no to retirement in the grave” and organized a large rally on 25 July 
in Ankara (Hürriyet, 1999b). The union confederations led by TÜRK-İŞ threatened the 
coalition government with a general strike if their demands were not considered. 
 Facing serious mobilization and criticisms that was covered by the media, the Minister 
of Labor and Social Security promised to seek a compromise but the only concessions made 
were to reduce the minimum premium payment period required to access a pension and on the 
transition period (Hürriyet ,1999a).  
The union confederations cancelled their demonstrations as a result of the earthquake 
on 17th of August 1999 in the northwest part of Turkey where approximately 40,000 people 
died, and many people lost their homes. Thus the coalition government could pass the reform 
laws at the end of August under less pressure. Nonetheless and despite the disagreements 
among members of the Labor Platform, their opposition to the social security reforms 
constituted a common ground that oriented the reappearance of the Labor Platform coalition in 
the second phase of the social security reform from 2003 to 2008. 
Opposition to the social security reform continued such that 126 MPs from the 
opposition political parties appealed to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of 33 
articles and requested a halt to the implementation of five articles in 2000 (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi, 2001). They challenged the higher retirement age, the non-linear scheme for 
gradual increases in the entitlement age during the transition period and the loss of acquired 
benefits by ES members, arguing that these changes violated the equality principle and the 
constitutional rights of workers in certain age groups.  
The Constitutional Court decided in November 2001 that the eight-year transition 
period to incrementally increase the retirement age violated acquired rights of workers in 
certain age groups, but the Court decided that the reform respected in general constitutional 
principles (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 2001). Accordingly the Constitutional Court asked the 
coalition government re-define the transition period to respect acquired rights of workers 
(Sayan, 2006: 260).  
This appeal to the Court and its decision demonstrates the weakness of the division 
strategy, by which the coalition government hoped that an eight-year transition period would 
dull the opposition. Because the Constitutional Court can act as a veto-point in the policy-
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making process the coalition government was forced to revise its position on reforms of social 
security.  
As already noted, the DSP-ANAP-MHP government had planned to redesign the 
institutions by relying on a decree (no. 618). The social security administration thereby 
established would coordinate the standardization of rules, regulation and benefits for the three 
social security institutions. The opposition political party, FP, then appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the decree, arguing it was unconstitutional to make 
such a major institutional reform through decree (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 2000). The 
Constitutional Court found the decree unconstitutional and thereby annulled the establishment 
of the new social security administration.  
Next the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government introduced the legislation (Law no. 
4632) to establish Individual Pension Savings in March 2001 (Özbek, 2006: 394). The 
economic context in 2000 and crisis of 2001 had postponed the enactment of a legal 
framework. After deliberations in the Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs Commission 
and the Plan and Budget Commission, this law was discussed in eight parliamentary meetings 
from March 14th to 28th (TBMM, 2001). The representatives of opposition political parties 
were critical of such voluntary private pension funds as well as the timing of the change, in the 
midst of the severe economic crisis in 2001.201 The law passed the parliament in 2001, and the 
legal framework was completed by 2003 with six pension companies and private funds 
established under jurisdiction of the Under-secretariat of the Treasury (Şahin and Elveren, 
2012: 177).202   
 Even these changes did not, however, solve all the difficulties of the system. A report 
prepared in 2001 by the Expert Commission of the Planning Agency on Social Security (DPT, 
2001) for the preparation of the Eighth Five Year Plan detailed the issues still to be resolved.  
Participants in this Commission came from a wide range of organizations from the public and 
private sectors and civil society. The first section of the report analyzes the current situation of 
the three social security institutions and in doing so documents agreement on the need for 
                                                 
201 Pension mutual funds are managed by specialists from portfolio management companies established within 
the Capital Market Law.  
202 The basic feature of the Individual Pension Savings (Law No. 4632) is that individuals can voluntarily 
participate in the system and gain an additional income on top of their pensions after 10 years of participation. 
Contributors are eligible to retire at the age of 56. 
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further reform of the social security institutions if they are to be sustainable and efficient. It 
says (DPT, 2001: 2):  
“The current crisis of the Turkish social security system can not be explained by 
the factors that trigger the crisis of social protection system in developed countries 
such as aging nor by the lack of economic development…The decisions taken and 
implemented in contradiction with fundamental objectives of social security and 
principles of social insurance are the underlying factors that lead to an ‘early’ 
crisis of social security system despite favorable demographics. The financial 
crisis of social security system has created pressures on the public finances that 
influenced the chronic high inflation and other major macro economic indicators 
triggering economic instability in Turkey.” 
 
The report recognized that political decisions taken during the 1990’s such as early 
retirement had triggered the current financial crisis. In the analysis of the actuarial balances, 
the union confederations also argued there had been a misuse of SSK funds (DPT, 2001: 147-
150). The report argues that the reform laws implemented in 1999 would support financial 
balances of the social security institutions, but the union confederations such as TÜRK-İŞ and 
DİSK voiced their opposition to the parametric changes (DPT, 2001: 147-154).  
The report argues that further reforms on the unification of social security institutions, 
standardization of norms and rules, separation of pensions from health insurance and 
administrative restructuring were still necessary. And the Commission report said that 
improving norms, standards and the quality of social security to reach international standards 
was closely related the goal of EU membership (DPT, 2001: 12). Indeed throughout the report 
there are several references to the legal framework of the EU concerning the social security 
systems in setting standards and legal obligations of member states. Use of Europe was 
beginning. 
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IV. Reforming social security system from 2002 to 2008: The 
macro reform of pensions, healthcare and social security 
administration  
Although incremental changes implemented in the sequence from 1999 to 2001 were 
important in setting the agenda and the direction of change, their implementation proved to be 
difficult, given the opposition of corporatist actors that formed an anti-reform coalition with 
the support of opposition political parties and professional associations. The reform was also 
prepared in a top-down fashion without extensive negotiations with corporate actors and was 
not extensively justified and communicated to the public before being enacted. A significant 
part of the reform was vetoed as having been undertaken unconstitutionally.  
Nor did these reforms adequately deal with the deficit of the social security 
institutions; imbalances worsened and therefore threatened the sustainability. Table 8 presents 
the transfers from the Turkish state’s general revenues needed to cover the deficit. Coverage 
and benefits remained fragmented and problems accumulated since the 1980’s were still 
present. Finally, 1999-2001 phase of the reform did not involve the healthcare system where 
the problems related to its coverage and accessibility had also accumulated. 
 
Table 8. Transfers to the Social Security Institutions from 1999 to 2004203 (combined for 
SSK, ES and Bağ-Kur) 
 
Year % in the Budget % of the GDP 
1999 10.5 3.8 
2000 6.9 2.6 
2001 6.9 3.1 
2002 8.4 3.5 
2003 11.3 4.5 
2004 12.6 4.5 
                                                 
203 The information of the Table is gathered from Özbek (2006: 306) and Gümüs (2008: 7). 
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IV.a. Contextualizing the changes in the economic conjuncture and political 
context  
The economic, social and political contexts changed following the 2001 economic crisis. This 
banking and financial crisis brought an end to the Turkish currency being pegged to the US 
dollar, while triggering a major depreciation of the Turkish lira, and afall in GDP by 5.7% in 
real terms. Job losses and decreases in real income were significant (Öniş, 2003b: 12-13). 
Poverty rates rose significantly in the early 2000s (Buğra, 2007a; Yeldan, Voyvoda and Telli, 
2006). The access to healthcare worsened as 30% of the population was without any 
healthcare coverage (Şahin, 2012; World Bank, 2004). Other surveys found high levels of 
criticism of the management of health and social security as well as the quality of care 
(TÜSİAD, 2002b: 75).204 In fact, the economic crisis has made more visible the inadequacy of 
the social security system’s coverage of risk situations. Given the exclusionary and 
fragmented features of the still Bismarckian system, there were significant groups in the 
population that were not part of social security institutions because being outside of formal 
employment. Moreover, the crisis and the changing context including internal migration meant 
informal support mechanisms such as extended family ties and kinship relationships were 
weakened in the urban settings (Buğra and Keyder, 2003). 
Following the 2001 economic crisis, a novel political context emerged. The economic 
conjuncture in 2001 led to political instability and the coalition government of the DSP-MHP-
ANAP called for early elections. Following the November 2002 elections, the AKP (Justice 
and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) received a majority of the votes although 
it had only been founded in 2001 (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012). The AKP formed the 
first majority government since 1987 and this changed the partisan situation in a significant 
way.  
The AKP favored EU membership and the political and economic reforms necessary to 
achieve it. As Chapter II had already documented, this political context was conducive to the 
introduction of social policy reforms. As the AKP cadres sought legitimacy to govern, support 
for the goal of EU membership served to ease their relationship with Turkey’s secular state 
                                                 
204 The survey found that 61.9% considered the management of the social security system as “bad or very bad” 
while 62.2% evaluated the governance of healthcare as “bad or very bad” (TÜSİAD, 2002b: 75-76). 
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establishment (Doğan, 2005). The AKP situated its self as a reformer and support for 
accession could be used as an empowering tool domestically and as a way of promoting 
democratization and economic reforms (Öniş, 2009b).  
The new political context had two important implications for the social security 
reform. On the one hand, the AKP government had promised to introduce structural reforms in 
line with the recommendations of international actors and it began to show more 
determination than previous governments for implementing the reform program (Müftüler-Baç 
and Keyman, 2012). On the other hand, AKP’s “conservative-liberal” ideological orientation 
rooted in political Islam generated a mixture of liberal economic policy choices coupled with 
attention to social issues and poverty that drew on a traditional and patriarchal value system 
and a populist orientation in distributional politics (Buğra, 2012: 24; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, 
2010: 517; Eder, 2010: 152; Buğra, 2007b). The ideological inclinations of the AKP meant the 
development of a discourse sensitive to poverty and social cohesion. One solution to the 
problems of low-income groups was, then, to provide access to healthcare. There were also 
conservative elements in the AKP’s discourse such as strengthening the role of the family to 
support cohesion in society and enhancing the involvement of voluntary organizations, 
especially charities with religious overtones (Buğra, 2012: 28-30). An important aspect of this 
novel political context is related to the on-going EU membership process. This period also 
brought changes in EU-Turkey relations, with the launch of accession negotiations in 2005. 
This shift increased the supply of EU resources available to Turkish actors. As Chapter III has 
already documented, the EU closely scrutinized issues related to the social security system.  
The EU developed a trio of themes about the social security system, prioritizing sustainability, 
modernization and adequacy.  
In the analysis of uses of Europe in the social security reform process from 2003 to 
2008, we will first concentrate on the AKP government to understand its strategies in this 
major reform and its practices of using Europe and EU resources. We will consider as well the 
role of various state actors and their uses of Europe. This will then be followed by the analysis 
of uses of Europe by other domestic actors. 
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IV.b. Formulation of the social security reform proposal: Government 
strategies and bureaucratic politics 
The preference of the AKP government for the reform of the social security system 
including the pension and health components was apparent in several early documents. The 
AKP’s party program in 2001 announced that (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 2001): 
“…social security services and units, having reached a significant budget size, are 
organized within the various ministries and they appear scattered. The social 
security units shall be brought together under the roof of a single ministry and a 
consolidated social security budget shall be created with the inclusion of social 
insurance, social services and social assistance regimes and sub-sectors. Necessary 
arrangements shall be made for this budget to sit on a rational basis in terms of 
norms and standards.”  
 
Accordingly the AKP was promising to introduce finally the administrative reform of 
the social security system that had thus far escaped the previous governments’ efforts, so as to 
unify the scattered institutional structure into one system and to diminish the fiscal imbalances 
of the whole system. 
The Action Plan prepared by the AKP government in 2002 included the reform of the 
social security institutions, health services and social assistance (58. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Hükümeti, 2002). This program for government emphasized that “the weakening of traditional 
mechanisms of solidarity requires the establishment of strong social security systems to 
provide protection for the individuals in modern societies.” Although the reformist attitude of 
the AKP was apparent, it was less clear what the precise content of the reforms would be. The 
Action Plan called for the establishment of an integrated social service network and relevant 
administrative structure, to provide unity of norms and standards in social security institutions, 
the establishment of a general health insurance system, including a social assistance 
component within an integrated social security network (DPT, 2002). 
In the first years of the reform from 2002 to 2005, the AKP government initiated 
parallel processes for the preparation and formulation of proposals using reform teams 
composed of bureaucrats drawn from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, Ministry of Finance and the Undersecreteriat of the Treasury. The AKP government 
decided to prepare the policy reforms for social security and health through two distinct but 
linked processes.  
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The policy formulation phase had a rather technocratic character using committees 
composed of bureaucrats and experts (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 6). Specific 
commissions dealing with four components of the reform were established in December 2002: 
universal healthcare insurance and system; establishment of a single institution; the reform of 
the pensions; unification of social services and assistance programs under a single 
administrative structure. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security also established a 
secretariat for the implementation of the Action Plan on 16 December 2002 (Sosyal Güvenlik 
Kurumu, 2007: 68).  
These projects, prepared under the guidance of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security and Ministry of Health, benefited from analysis made for the first phase of the reform 
implemented in 1999 (Teksöz, 2003). For this reason, the arguments for the reform and the 
analysis of the problems of the social security system developed in these reports and draft laws 
from 2003 to 2005 are very similar to the ones presented of the 1999 to 2001 reform process. I 
will demonstrate the analysis and proposals of the bureaucratic actors while examining their 
uses of Europe. 
In fact, these documents indicate as well that the new reform process aimed to address 
what the previous reform failed to implement because of the veto of the Constitutional Court: 
unifying all three social security institutions including ES and increasing the retirement age 
and changing the parameters of the pension for all three groups of beneficiaries, including the 
civil servants under ES. There were two new components: the healthcare reform and the social 
assistance. The 1999 reform foresaw the reform of the healthcare component in the second 
phase of the reform but never planned how to do do in detail nor related it directly to the other 
components. The social assistance component was novel and reflected the AKP’s concern 
about the “poverty problem” emphasized in the party program in 2001 (AKP, 2001) and part 
of the election promises of 2002 (AKP, 2002). Later in the process, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security took up the social assistance reform. However social assistance would 
eventually be dropped from the agenda because of the disagreements inside of the AKP 
government. The reform of the healthcare system, in contrast, became a major initiative of the 
AKP government, transformed as well to a strategy to ease the introduction of the macro 
reform and to claim credit for vote seeking objectives.  
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From the earliest stages, the government was aware of the opposition of various 
corporate actors as well as professional associations. In response, it developed a compensation 
strategy. The establishment of the universal health insurance and restructuring of healthcare 
under the Ministry of Health aimed to increase equality of access to facilities while improving 
the quality of services. These issues were of particular concern to the members of the SSK and 
Bağ-Kur (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlik, 2005: 55). The healthcare services component 
would benefit the Bağ-Kur members by improving their access to better quality services. The 
plans to enlarge the coverage of the healthcare system would benefit those excluded, who 
were not direct beneficiaries of the three insurance-based institutions and were not covered by 
the healthcare system (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 69). Thus the healthcare component 
offered opportunities for the AKP on the one hand to negotiate and ease the opposition of the 
corporatist actors and on the other hand to offer benefits to those excluded that could provide 
electoral gains and credit claiming. Reflecting on corporatist actors’ opposition to earlier 
reform proposals, the AKP government aimed to provide sufficient justification in 
communicating to corporatist actors, professional organizations and the general public the 
need for reform to create long-term sustainability of the system. 
It is important to emphasize that the reform process from 2003 to 2008 was complex 
and lengthy because of three reasons. The macro character of the reform in combining various 
policy domains has made the technical design by the bureaucratic actors lengthy, requiring the 
coordination of various Ministries and state agencies. Moreover the macro reform was related 
to three interconnected process: the structural reforms under IMF program; the World Bank 
programs on the technical aspects of social security and healthcare system; and the EU 
membership process. Each of these processes had its own dynamics and I will represent the 
EU resources in the next section. This complex and lengthy reform process is related as well 
to the veto points in the law-making process in Turkey, which might veto the AKP 
government efforts. This led to several repetitive initiatives taken to implement the same 
components through different formulations. 
If we look at the structural reform dynamics under the IMF program, we can observe 
the constraints on the AKP government to introduce the social security reform. The AKP 
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continued Kemal Derviş’205 economic program based on the 2001 stand-by agreement (Hale 
and Özbudun, 2010: 102; Öniş and Şenses, 2007: 268). IMF support, as well as loans, was an 
integral part of the AKP’s strategy to reassure financial and economic actors (Önis and Bakir, 
2007: 156). In the letter of intent prepared for the IMF in 2003 and 2005 by the AKP 
government, the social security reform was a “structural performance criterion”206 and the 
unification of the social security institutions was a “structural benchmark”207 becoming a part 
of IMF conditionality (58. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, 2003). Thus IMF conditionality 
was a constraint208 leading the AKP government to demonstrate early political commitment to 
reform.  But it was less directly indicative of the content and of the reform process.  
In fact, the EU membership process provided various resources for the AKP as it faced 
domestic pressure and opposition from corporatist actors and international constraints from 
IMF government in the introduction of the social security reform. The World Bank projects 
have also provided various opportunities that overlapped with EU resources.  
IV.c. EU resources in the interaction of national and international actors  
Following the AKP government’s early commitment to a major social security reform, 
covering pensions, health and social security, the actual formulation of the proposals was 
initiated in close cooperation among bureaucrats from ministries and other state agencies and 
representatives of international and supra-national actors, particularly the World Bank and the 
EU. The World Bank had been actively involved in the social security reform, preparing 
guidelines since 1999. The World Bank’s 2003 Report on Reforming the Health Sector for 
Improved Access and Efficiency provided a strong analytical groundwork for the reforms 
(World Bank, 2003: 2). The Bank also supported reforms with a Programmatic Public Sector 
Development Policy Loan (PPDPL) initiated in 2004. One of the stated goals was to assist 
                                                 
205 Following the financial crisis in 2001, Kemal Dervis, the World Bank’s vice president for poverty reduction 
and economic management, was appointed Minister for the Treasury and Economic Affairs. Kemal Derviş 
introduced the economic reform program in 2001 that included major structural reforms and a new stand-by 
agreement with the IMF. See more in Chapter IV. 
206 Structural performance criteria are binding conditions to be met during the implementation of a program and 
to trigger subsequent installments of IMF financing. 
207 Structural benchmarks are measures that are critical to achieve IMF program goals and are intended as clear 
criteria to assess progress.  
208 For instance, the IMF representative in Turkey, Hugh Bredenkamp, expressed concerns about delays in the 
introduction of reforms to the social security system in 2005, stressing the IMF’s expectation about the pace of 
the reform process (IMF, 2005). 
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Turkey’s effort to improve the compatibility of its macroeconomic framework and social 
protection system with the EU conditions (World Bank, 2006a). The World Bank also 
supported a Health Transition Project initiated by the Ministry of Health to provide financial 
assistance and guidelines via a project loan in 2004 (World Bank, 2004: 3). The World Bank’s 
projects on health in Turkey emphasize the saliency of the reforms to meet European health 
and service standards and indicating that “the development objective of this project is to 
narrow the gap in access to, quality and utilization of health services between Turkey and 
other middle-income and EU accession countries by extending health insurance coverage to all 
the Turkish population and reducing inequalities in access to health care” (World Bank, 2007: 
1).  
The EU’s membership process also shaped the policy formulation stage of the social 
security reform. As seen in Chapter III, the EU had a variety of institutional and legal 
instruments at its disposal, such as the Progress Reports, Accession Partnership Documents, 
Assessment of Pre-Accession Economic Programs and the screening reports. Thus, the 
Progress Reports on Turkey’s accession emphasize three main issues regarding the social 
security system since 1999: the urgency of controlling the fiscal deficit, administrative and 
management problems related to the different institutional frameworks, and the limited 
coverage of the social security system including and health (European Commission, 1999a: 
38). The Accession Partnership Document in 2003 for example called for achieving 
sustainability, modernization and adequacy through setting priorities to satisfy economic 
criteria and to assume membership obligations with respect to social policy and employment 
(EU Council, 2003a: 52-53).  
The the 2003 NPAA prepared under the AKP government indicated in detail which 
policy reforms and legal changes would be undertaken in order to align with the acquis 
communautaire, in the sections on Economic Criteria and Social Policy and Employment 
(NPAA, 2003: 512). The EU institutions’ principal concern was for the sustainability of the 
social security system. The Commission emphasized the reform measures for controlling the 
fiscal deficit of the social security system in the Economic Criteria chapter of the Progress 
Reports, precisely because a condition to be met for membership is strong public finances and 
a balanced budget. 
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The 2003 NPAA prepared by the AKP government responded directly to these 
priorities stating that: “the Urgent Action Plan of the 58th Government has envisaged the 
establishment of an integrated social service network and relevant administrative structure” 
(NPAA, 2003a: 512). It also indicated that the social security reform that would be prepared 
from 2003 to 2005 aimed for financial sustainability by strengthening the actuarial balances, 
and all this in order to satisfy the economic criteria emphasized by the 2003 Accession 
Partnership Document. The government’s NPAA indicated that following the 58th 
Government Action Plan, priority would go to the separation of supply and financing of health 
services, the establishment of a general health insurance system, providing unified norms and 
standards in social security institutions, the establishment of an integrated social security 
network, abolishing non-premium based payments while separating short term and long term 
insurance measures (NPAA, 2003: 512).  
The NPAA provided the policy and institutional measures and their timetable that 
would be implemented to address the development of social protection by investing in the 
institutional capacity in order to implement the acquis requirements (NPAA, 2003: 490-499). 
It lays down as well a budget that demonstrates the planned financial expenses for the reform 
measures that would be financed jointly by the Turkish government and by the EU pre-
accession resources. Giving the priority of developing social protection, the NPAA indicates 
that projects assisting reforming the social security system were comprised of a new integrated 
information system, 300 new personnel, training of 40 personnel including their participation 
in the EU sponsored training programs in Turkey and at the EU level, and translation of 
relevant documents of the acquis to be implemented during 2004 and 2005. This reform 
project for the unification of three social security institutions had a budget of €42,750,000 
where the EU financial assistance covered  €30,081,000 (NPAA, 2003: 512-514). The NPAA 
also said a law would be introduced at the end of 2003 for the administrative unification of the 
SSK, Bağ-Kur and ES in order to standardize norms, rules and eligibility conditions.  
We see here the EU’s membership process was providing cognitive, legal and financial 
resources in the formulation phase of the social security reform starting from 2003 to 2005 and 
support for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  
 In this regard, the EU had begun to act as a reform supporter albeit focusing on the 
cost-containment objective. This position provided political resources to the AKP government 
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that could argue, in addition to claims it was improving social security and health systems, that 
its major reforms were absolutely necessary in order to satisfy membership criteria. Such 
resources were available because the reform process coincided with the accession process 
opened in 2005. This timing allowed the AKP government to make its arguments that reform 
was a membership condition, thereby linking two issues (reform and EU membership) when 
addressing opposition political parties, corporatist actors and the general public. 
Another important aspect on EU resources for modernization of the social security 
system involves institutional and financial resources provided after the unification of the social 
security institutions. An institution-building project under the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) was launched in 2007, titled Capacity Building of a Social Security 
Institution (European Commission, 2007c: 2). This project had two main goals. On the one 
hand it aimed to strengthen the institutional and administrative capacity of the newly created 
Social Security Institution and on the other hand it targeted compliance with the acquis. The 
project referred directly to the 2003 and 2006 Accession Partnership Documents and the 2003 
NPAA. Accordingly this project aimed to support the reform process, especially its component 
to establish an equal social security and general health insurance system for all citizens.  
Because the unification of the three social security institutions under a single 
framework, as the Social Security Institution, was in line with the accession requirements of 
the EU, this capacity building IPA project was the next step. This project therefore had three 
priorities: informing and training Turkish staff about EU law in the social security area; 
increasing the institutional capacity of the Social Security Institution via the European 
Research, Training and Projects Unit; and the provision of the necessary equipment and 
material. Accordingly the project received €1.10 million for three years. (European 
Commission, 2007c: 4-5; 9). 
The modernization emphasis of the EU membership process is related to the equal 
treatment of men and women in social security and health (Couchier and Hauber, 2011: 13). 
Accordingly the EU accession process set conditions around eliminating gender inequalities in 
policies that assigned rights and benefits to women as wives or daughters on the basis of the 
labor market status of their husband or father (Kilic, 2009: 497). Taking up this issue, the 2003 
NPAA announced laws would be introduced in order to comply with Directives 79/7/EEC; 
86/378/EEC and 96/97/EC all of which touch on the principle of equal treatment for men and 
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women in the matters of social security (NPAA, 2003: 499). Furthermore the NPAA indicated 
that changes would be made in the maternity leave arrangements in line with Directives 
96/34/EC on parental leave and those dealing with working conditions of women during 
pregnancy (Directives 92/85/EEC and 86/613/EEC).  
Another aspect of the Commission’s modernization emphasis is related to the use of 
social dialogue mechanisms. The European Commission Progress Reports (European 
Commission, 2004b; 2005a) emphasize the use of social dialogue mechanisms during the 
preparation of the social security reform proposals and in restructuring of the system. The 
2003 Accession Partnership Document calls for developing social dialogue in policy making 
as a short-term priority (EU Council, 2003a: 47).  
In responding to the Accession Partnership Document’s emphasis on social dialogue, 
the 2003 NPAA indicates that the Turkish government is aware of its obligations in supporting 
social dialogue mechanisms as part of the membership conditions as well as ILO conventions, 
and reported that the EU Coordination Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security had initiated monthly consultation meetings since 2002 between employer and 
employee representatives in order to keep them informed of the reform agenda (NPAA, 2003: 
488-489). Moreover, the NPAA indicated that the Economic and Social Council was Turkey’s 
main institution of tri-partite social dialogue and it had been reformed in 2001 and had started 
to function more effectively. The emphasis on the use of social dialogue mechanisms during 
the EU membership process was providing political resources for the union confederations and 
employer associations.  
Health was dealt with somewhat differently. Although the 2003 Accession Partnership 
Document listed as a medium-term goal to “Take measures to promote access to and quality of 
health care and to improve the health status of the population” (EU Council, 2003a: 53), as a 
policy goal it was less specific than with respect to social protection. The harmonization of 
healthcare legislation was not as part of the acquis conditions as EU had no specific 
competences in health matters. Nonetheless the 2003 NPAA indicates that Turkish 
government would participate in the first Programme of Community Action in the field of 
public health (2003-2008), initiated by Directive 1786/2002/EC, in order to monitor European 
policies and programs in the field of health (NPAA, 2003: 487-488). Such participation in the 
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program would provide financial resources for specific projects on public health as well 
cognitive resources for the field of public health.  
The preparation of Joint Inclusion Memoranda (JIM) was a joint exercise between the 
European Commission and Turkish officials from the EU Coordination Department of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 118).209 In the process five 
dissemination seminars and several meetings were held with representatives of the relevant 
institutions and Commission officials.  
The JIM was an exercise in which the Commission informed its Turkish partners about 
the necessary statistical indicators to measure the extent of poverty and social exclusion, 
emphasizing the development of a comprehensive approach including adequate statistical 
indicators (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2011). Buğra (2007b: 147) found that the 
preparation of the JIM raised awareness in Turkish policy circles of poverty and social 
exclusion, encouraged attention to several different dimensions of poverty (and not just 
monetary poverty) and the absence in Turkish policy of mechanisms to tackle with poverty 
and social exclusion.  
The 2003 Accession Partnership Document also called on the Turkish government to 
“prepare a national strategy on social inclusion, including data collection, in line with EU 
practice” as a medium-term goal (European Commission, 2003b: 53). The 2007 Progress 
Report commented on the weakness of the institutional structures and policy measures 
concerning social inclusion and was critical of the non-completion of the Joint Inclusion 
Memorandum (JIM); underlining that “The percentage of the population at risk of poverty is 
among the highest when compared to those of member states and candidate countries. The 
lack of efficient social transfers, together with the high percentage of ‘working poor’, leads to 
an important child poverty rate” (European Commission, 2007d: 54). 
The EU’s emphasis on the adequacy of social protection and social assistance 
mechanisms with the goal of social inclusion did not specify institutional mechanisms and 
                                                 
209 There was complementarity between the European Union’s priorities and pre-accession financial assistance 
for the social security reform and World Bank programs in these areas (European Commission, 2003b: 56). 
Considering the timing of the candidacy process that started in 1999 and accession process that started in 2005, 
the EU was a late comer compared to the World Bank whose technical assistance and loans for reform had begun 
in the mid-1990’s. Indeed the European Commission benefited from World Bank expertise until the screening 
process in 2005 which provided its own analytical tools and increased assessment capacity.  
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instruments that needed to be implemented by the Turkish government. Rather, it supplied 
cognitive resources specifically for bureaucratic actors for analyzing poverty and social 
exclusion.  
The 2003 NPAA had announced the Turkish government’s intention to establish an 
integrated social service network, social assistance system and relevant administrative 
structure in order to align with the European Community Action Programme on Combating 
Social Exclusion. The NPAA indicates specifically that the World Bank would finance 
projects worth $500 million US , while $36 million US would be dedicated to institutional 
capacity building for the Social Solidarity and Assistance Fund and development of databases 
and statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institution (NPAA, 2003: 511-513).  
As we have seen, an important aspect of the EU accession process is related to 
institutional capacity building. The 2003 Accession Partnership Document called for 
development of the capacity of all institutions involved in implementation and enforcement of 
the social policy and employment acquis (EU Council, 2003a: 53). The 2003 NPAA then 
indicated the need to develop the institutional and administrative capacity of the EU Affairs 
Directorate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in order to strengthen its capacity to 
monitor the EU acquis and their transposition to Turkish legislation as well as in order to 
enable its participation and monitoring of the committees of the European Social Fund, the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the Liaison 
Group on the Elderly (NPAA, 2003: 517-518). In other words, the call in the Partnership 
Document became a resource in national policy-making. 
As a first step, this would involve harmonization with Directive 1784/99/EC on the 
European Social Fund that would involve institutional restructuring to transform the EU 
Affairs Directorate into a Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. This was 
to occur during 2003 and 2004. This restructuring involved preparation of organizational 
structures for the absorption of EU pre-accession assistance, recruitment of EU experts, and 
preparation of the department for the screening process and the accession negotiations. The 
NPAA reported that EU financial assistance would be used for the training of 10 departmental 
experts within the EU institutions during 2004 and 2005; for the appointment of consultants in 
the area of social policy and employment; and for the translation of key documents. The 
budget for the institutional capacity building of the EU Coordination Department of the 
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Ministry of Labor and Social Security was set at €485,000 with the Union’s pre-accession 
financial assistance. 
 Although a Directorate had been in place since 1989 and was responsible for the 
coordination of social policy issues in preparation for candidacy, its role in social 
policymaking and capacity was significantly strengthened by this infusion of policy and 
financial resources. The representatives of the Directorate attended the EC-Turkey 
Subcommittee on Regional Development, Labor and Social Affairs established in 2000. It 
served as an important arena for information exchange and a coordination mechanism 
providing an overview of developments, exchange of information and screening of specific 
issues related to the acquis communautaire (EC-Turkey Subcommittee, 2002).  
The role of the EU Coordination Department was stronger after accession negotiations 
began and when it was assigned the responsibility of monitoring and coordinating the 
negotiations on the Social Policy and Employment chapter in 2005 and informing ministry 
representatives of legal and policy changes required, while having an advisory role on the 
other 13 chapters. This position increased the involvement of the EU Coordination 
Department with representatives of the European Commission during the screening process. 
Moreover the Department was called on to inform and orient the AKP government and the 
Secretariat-General for EU Affairs about the benchmarks and policy reforms required.  
The EU Coordination Department grew considerably between 2003 and 2007 with the 
use of European pre-accession funds and the recruitment of EU experts.210 The Department’s 
role and institutional capacity increased further in 2007 when it was assigned the management 
and coordination of the human resources development component of the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). 
All of this is indicative of the kind of institutional and financial resources that the EU 
accession process provided after 2003. In turn, the Department used the European information 
made available to inform relevant actors about transposition of EU law and the Union’s 
various programs and priorities for improving healthcare quality and services and for tackling 
poverty and social exclusion throughout the social security reform process. In this regard, the 
                                                 
210 The number of experts and assistant experts in the Department increased from eight in 2003 to 36 in 2007 
(Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı, 2011: 5).  
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Department was a major user of European cognitive resources in bureaucratic politics during 
the preparation phase of the social security reform.  
The opening of accession negotiations at the same moment in time as the initial phase 
of the social security reforms meant there were significant uses of Europe and EU resources in 
its formulation. The EU supported and even promoted the reform of healthcare, pensions and 
social security administration components. The European Commission insisted that a 
sustainable social security system and healthy public finances including budgetary discipline 
was a condition of membership. The AKP government thereby gained political resources as 
well as being able to deploy blame avoidance and credit claiming practices when 
communicating the social security reform to the general public, corporatist actors and during 
the parliamentary discussions. The EU membership process has also injected cognitive 
resources about social inclusion and the quality and coverage of the healthcare system into the 
bureaucratic process.  
 
IV.d. Examining uses of Europe in the formulation of reforms by 
bureaucratic actors from 2003 to 2005 
I concentrate in this section on the uses of Europe by bureaucratic actors in the 
formulation of the reform. As emphasized earlier, the bureaucratic actors have benefited from 
the work on the previous reform in 1999 that shaped diagnosis of the problems and 
formulation of the policy choices. These attempts aimed to provide sufficient justification for 
the reform and argumentation for its content in communicating to corporatist actors and 
general public. After summarizing bureaucratic actors’ diagnosis of the problems and choices 
for the reforms, we examine uses of Europe by bureaucratic actors in the period from 2003 to 
2005.  
The formulation phase of the social security reform involved the participation of 
bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Health, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Under-secretariat of the Treasury, the Plan and including the SSI 
after its establishment in 2003. The decision about undertaking the macro reform was decided 
as early as 29 December 2002 through an agreement reached between the Minister of Finance, 
Kemal Unakitan, the Minister of Health, Recep Akdağ, and the Minister of Labor and Social 
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Security, Murat Başesgioğlu (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 68). In that meeting, the three 
Ministers agreed upon the introduction of one macro reform that would combine changes 
touching on healthcare, social security, and social assistance with an administrative unification 
component as well. The Ministry of Health was involved with the planning of the universal 
healthcare insurance that would eventually be combined with a social security component 
(Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 45).  
The AKP government finally succeeded in establishing the single social security 
institution, which had been vetoed in 2000. Legislation (Law no. 4947) enacted on 23 July 
2003 established the Social Security Institution (SSI) under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security. It was managed under the general budget and unified the SSK, the 
Bağ-Kur but did not integrate the ES (Egeli, 2008:135). The institution was formed in order to 
manage the restructuring and unification process of the social security institutions and related 
insurance schemes, through a new administrative structure that would be central to the 
preparation of the reform process (Egeli and Özen, 2009). Moreover the law foresaw a 
transition period to organize the SSI and to restructure the social security institutions. This 
choice was made in part so as not to provoke the veto points, namely President Sezer and the 
Constitutional Court.  
 The aim of the Law was to unify the fragmented structure by equalizing the norms, 
rights and benefits across the social security institutions (Egeli and Özen, 2009).211 The 
governance structure was corporatist and healthcare was included. The establishment of a 
single social security institution was in line with the EU’s call for the unification of Turkey’s 
fragmented institutional structure and standardization of rules and norms.  
The Ministry of Health announced in 2003 the Health Transformation Project (HTP). 
This reform aimed to improve access to the healthcare system and establish a high quality and 
effective system with a comprehensive and long-term strategy (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlik 
                                                 
211 A centralized structure strengthened the role of the General Director in the organizational structure and 
Tuncay Teksöz, a key bureaucrat during the 1999 social security reform at the Under-secretariat of the Treasury, 
was appointed as the first Director. Teksöz claimed in 2006 that the social security reform involved more 
important changes than did the 1999 reform: “This time, the reform does not involve the parameters of the system 
nor aims only at financial sustainability. The goal is to improve its efficiency and improve the institutional 
structure. We aim first for the simplification of the system and secondly the equal treatment of different groups 
which will have access to the same benefits and rules across the social security system…These changes were not 
a part of the 1999 reform” (Özbek, 2006: 349). 
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Bakanliğı, 2011: 16). The HTP would require changes in the administration, financing and 
delivery of health services (Varol and Saka, 2006: 29) as well as the re-organization of the 
Ministry of Health to improve its policy-making capacity and to develop regulatory functions 
for controlling and ensuring the quality of healthcare facilities. It would also restructure health 
services by the separating the purchaser and provider, introduce universal health insurance, 
strengthen primary health care, family medicine and establish an efficient referral system, 
improve administrative capacity and the financial autonomy of healthcare facilities. It 
promised to restructure education and science institutions to ensure skill formation and to 
support the health system by establishing a national quality and accreditation agency, to invest 
in a health information system, and introduce national drug and medical device agencies 
(Tatar et al., 2011: 80-83; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlik Bakanlığı, 2011: 29-49; Varol and 
Saka, 2006: 30).  
The Ministry of Health claimed that the HTP would face up to the main challenges of 
the healthcare system, from service delivery to financing and from human resources to 
information systems. The HTP also was supposed to address inequalities in access to 
healthcare due to different insurance regimes as well as the considerable regional differences 
in the public system (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlik Bakanlığı, 2011: 344). With the HTP, equal 
access to services was meant to be improved by providing means-tested coverage for low-
income groups, including pharmaceuticals and outpatient benefits. Moreover the reform 
covered everyone under the age of 18 without them having to pay premiums.  
The Ministry of Health described the HTP as being aligned with the Health for All in 
the 21st Century policy of the World Health Organization (WHO) as well as the 2003 
Accession Partnership Document (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sağlik Bakanliğı, 2011: 16). In fact, 
the Ministry of Health used cognitive resources coming from the EU in the formulation of 
HTP. 
As a comprehensive reform program, HTP had several components that would need to 
be introduced via several legal changes. The reform plan had also foreseen gradual 
implementation through pilot projects for certain elements, such as the establishment of family 
doctor and referral systems.  
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The key bureaucratic coordination mechanism for the preparation of the social security 
reform and the health reforms was the Social Security Reform Orientation Committee212 with 
participation of ministerial bodies and state agencies, for the preparation of a White Paper 
(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 2005: 7).213 The newly established SSI (in 2003) was key 
for the functioning of the Committee in the preparation of the reports and the draft laws. 
The White Paper that presented the first draft of the Social Security Reform and the 
Universal Health Insurance reform, titled Social Security Reform: Problems and Proposals for 
Resolution, was prepared by a committee and disseminated in April 2005.  The White Paper 
identified three main problems that made reform necessary: demographic changes with aging 
of the population, financing problems, and fragmented standards and norms (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 2005: 33-52). The document described in detail the policy changes 
needed. The White Paper presented draft legislation of this major reform proposal, with four 
components: the establishment of universal health insurance, the restructuring of social 
assistance and services, the reform of pensions and the foundation of an institutional structure 
aiming to harmonize the other three pillars.  
The draft law on the Social Security Institution involved a revision of the 2003 law, 
this time unifying the three social security institutions (that is including the ES), to create a 
single Social Security Institution (SSI) (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 2005: 6; Sosyal 
Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 45).214 The document also presented a proposal on Social Assistance 
and Non-Contributory Payments (SANCP), to establish non-contributory income maintenance 
mechanisms under the Social Security Institution. These were to be means-tested programs for 
low-income groups at risk of poverty (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık 2005: 56). The 
proposal suggested the development of standard eligibility conditions for social assistance 
                                                 
212 The Social Security Reform Orientation Committee was composed of three representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance, three representatives of the Ministry of Health, seven representatives of the State Planning Organization, 
five representatives of the Under-secretariat of the Treasury, two representatives of the Ministry of Health, and 
one representative of the SSI and one representative of the ES (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 2005: 7). 
213 The committee met eight times from 2003 to 2005. It met twice in 2003 to discuss the social security 
component, four times in 2004 to prepare the establishment of the universal health insurance reform and twice in 
2005 to prepare the non-contributory regimes and social assistance components of the reforms (Sosyal Güvenlik 
Kurumu, 2007: 69). 
214 The SSI was placed under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security with the administrative structure of a 
Director and Board responsible to a General Assembly composed of the representatives of various Ministries and 
state agencies and the representatives of union confederations, employer associations and confederations.  
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based on minimum standards and the creation of integrated databases on the income level of 
the vulnerable population. The social assistance and non-contributory schemes would be under 
the organizational structure of the Social Security Institution. This represented a major 
institutional change considering that social assistance regimes had always been dispersed and 
disjointed under several institutions with different targets.215  
The analysis of the White Paper indicates insignificant uses of Europe in the document 
that presents the proposed reform laws. In the White Paper, a diagnosis and policy options 
presented were very similar to what had been planned for the 1999 reform, aiming as well to 
complete the failed institutional and pension components. The main novelty in the White 
Paper was the presentation of the healthcare and social assistance components of the reform 
laws.  
IV.e. Social policy reform from 2005 to 2008: Uses of Europe in partisan 
politics 
The social security reform laws (Law216 on Social Security and General Health 
Insurance and Law217 on the Social Security Institution) were prepared, as noted, by 
bureaucratic reform teams composed of representatives of ministries and state agencies. They 
drew on earlier reform experiences, especially reform programs introduced from 1999 to 2001, 
and these influenced the design of the reforms and the parameters set. This version of the 
social security reform did concur with the EU membership criteria that required the policy-
makers to reflect the acquis conditions as well as to consider EU’s policy priorities. This way 
of preparing the reform gave it a top-down character dominated by the executive branch and 
committees composed of representatives of relevant ministries and state agencies.  
                                                 
215 These were the General Directorate of Foundations with a decentralized network, the Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Foundations (SYDGM), the Social Services and Child Care Institution, the Ministry of Education, and 
local municipalities. It also included invalidity and disability insurance provided by the social security institutions 
(Yakut-Çakar, 2007: 15-106). 
216 This law was brought to the parliament with number 5489 and was accepted by the TBMM in April 2006 but 
the President did not approve it and sent it back for further discussion to the parliament. The same law, associated 
this time with number 5510, was again approved by the TBMM in May 2006 the same way and the President 
signed it.  
217 This law was brought to the parliament with as 5487 and was accepted by the TBMM in April 2006 but the 
President did not accept it, sending it back to the parliament. The same law, associated this time with number 
5502, was again approved by the TBMM in May 2006 and the President signed it.  
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This section focuses on the politics of the macro social security reform process, from 
April 2005 when the Law No. 5489 on Social Security and General Health Insurance and the 
Law No. 5487 on the Social Security Institution were brought to the TBMM by the AKP 
government and until the enactment of reform laws in 2006. The process for passing the laws 
was characterized by several obstacles that made the parliamentary process complex and 
dragged over a lengthy period. On the one hand, the AKP government did enjoy a 
parliamentary majority that allowed it to organize the parliamentary agenda and insist on 
strong party discipline. This meant that institutionally there was a strong power concentration. 
The current reform was opposed by the main union confederations and professional 
associations represented under the Labor Platform (described above) that organized several 
rallies and protests against the reform proposal over the two years, 2006 and 2008. The AKP 
government also had to negotiate with corporatist actors during the parliamentary process of 
the reform from 2006 to 2008 in institutions such as the Economic and Social Council (Öke, 
2006: 6). The AKP government tried therefore to balance between vote seeking and policy 
seeking by bargaining the parameters of the social security reform with the corporatist actors, 
especially with the union confederations, using compensation strategies.  
Getting to this final step involved some uses of Europe and its resources by both the 
AKP government and opposition political parties in the parliamentary discussions in 2006 and 
2008. Social security reform was discussed with corporatist actors in line, with the 
encouragement of the EU, and this also involved use of EU resources.  
IV.f. Enactment process of social security reform laws and uses of Europe: 
From parliamentary discussions to negotiations with corporatist actors 
After the publication of the White Paper on social security reform in April 2005 and its 
dissemination to corporatist actors, the Law No. 5489 on Social Security and General Health 
Insurance was brought to the TBMM by the AKP government in April 2005 and sent to the 
Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs Commission and to the Planning and Budget 
Commission in June 2005. In these settings, both political and corporatist actors made use of 
Europe.  
The first set of actors is political, including the AKP government and opposition 
political parties in the TBMM. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
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CHP) the main opposition party in the parliament since 2002 had been critical of the social 
security reform proposals. The ANAP, MHP and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi - DTP) all participated to the TBMM Assembly discussions in 2006.  
A preliminary analysis of the parliamentary discussions in 2006 and in 2008 indicates 
that it was primarily the representatives of the AKP government that made direct references to 
the EU membership process. The Minister of Labor and Social Security in 2005, Murat 
Başesgioğlu, pledged that his ministry was “seeking a reform package that is in accordance 
with the European Social Model” (Ileri: 2007). Basegioglu stated that “We do not want a 
social security reform imposed on us …; we are seeking a stable and sustainable social 
security system in accordance with the European Social Model where the experiences of IMF 
and World Bank can be valuable assets in the reform process. However we want to enact a 
reform that is appropriate for our domestic dynamics” (Ileri: 2007). This statement 
demonstrates the legitimizing use of EU political and cognitive resources for the justification 
of the social security reform by the AKP government in 2005, just before the launch of the 
parliamentary process. Emphasizing the domestic dynamics of the reform and its conformity 
to the European Social Model, the AKP government also claimed credit for introducing 
reforms itself in an autonomous fashion and not driven by external forces.  
The same Minister of Labor and Social Security stated in a speech at a conference 
organized by TİSK in 2005 that (TİSK, 2005a): 
“We want to introduce a reform proper to Turkey’s dynamics in line with the 
European Social Model….We have prepared this reform in conformance with the 
realities of Turkey. The reform plans started to be prepared before we had any 
IMF agreement…. If we do not introduce the reform as of today, we have to 
introduce more harsh reforms five years or ten years later, as has happened in the 
European countries because of the aging of their population.”  
 
Accordingly the AKP government aimed to justify the reforms while taking European 
countries as a point of comparison, using cognitive resources supplied about the consequences 
of aging populations and the sustainability of social security systems. The AKP government 
also wanted to argue that these reforms were not introduced because of the IMF, but that the 
changes were a domestic process although related to the EU membership process. Both of 
these arguments could be used to legitimize the reform in a country like Turkey where the 
IMF is never a positive reference. 
  225 
In the parliamentary discussion of the Law No. 5489 on Social Security and General 
Health Insurance at the TBMM on April 18, 2006, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, 
Murat Başesgioğlu, defended the reform, saying “Turkey, in comparison to European 
countries, has managed to lower social tensions with its culture of solidarity and social 
assistance mechanisms. However these traditional mechanisms are not sufficient for tackling 
the current problems arising with economic and societal changes, we now need modern social 
security institutions” (TBMM, 2006a). In the same parliamentary discussion on the reform 
package, Başesgioğlu also addressed the public finances of the social security system referring 
to the EU member countries stating (TBMM, 2006a): 
“In 2005 three social security institutions, Bağ-Kur, SSK and ES, have spent 58.5 
billion New Turkish Lira which is 12.1% of our GDP. This percentage is low if we 
compare it to European countries which spend 25% or 30% of their GDP on social 
security… We should not consider 12.1% excessive. Our problem is Turkey’s high 
debt that influences macroeconomic stability. If we were not indebted that much, 
we would be able to dedicate more resources to the social security system.” 
 
 Furthermore Başesgioğlu indicated in this speech on April 18, 2006 that the social 
security reform had four components, but the fourth, a separate law on non-contributory 
schemes would be prepared later albeit in the near future (TBMM, 2006a).  
In the parliamentary discussion of the law on Social Security and General Health 
Insurance at the TBMM on April 18, 2006; the AKP parliamentarian, Faruk Çelik, argued that 
the reform of healthcare and the move towards socialization had been on the agenda of 
governments since 1960’s but it was only the AKP government that brought to the parliament. 
He said that “…these laws address all segments of the population, we believe that these 
changes are beneficial for all the population and we know that the society supports and 
expects these changes” (TBMM, 2006a). This was certainly credit claiming. 
The AKP deputy, Mahfuz Guler, who spoke in support of the government position in 
the TBMM the same day, characterized the administrative component of the social security 
reform stating that (TBMM, 2006a): 
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 “Those who are specialists on social security systems call for the unity of norms 
and standards in social security institutions and conforming to EU standards. In 
fact, this reform proposal establishes the unity of norms and standards conforming 
to EU standards …if we were to describe this reform in one phrase. The 
administrative reform is one the most important reform packages of Republican 
history, establishing one institution as Social Security Institution and ending the 
ES, Bağ-Kur and SSK.” 
  
The AKP government also engaged in blame avoidance practices by arguing that the 
social security reform was necessary for the EU membership process, in order to align social 
protection standards. In relying on these European political resources, it could sidestep the 
charge that it was the IMF agreements that was driving the reform, an argument that was used 
extensively by opposition political parties and anti-reform actors. 
Main opposition parties in the parliament were against the parameters of the social 
security reform and the way that it was brought to parliament, arguing that the AKP 
government was looking to pass it without any discussion and rush it through. In the way they 
voiced their opposition to the reform, there were references to the EU and the reform 
experiences of the European countries. 
In the Assembly on April 18, 2006, the ANAP deputy, Muzaffer Kurtulmusoglu, stated 
that (TBMM, 2006a):  
“You call the social security reform a revolution or reform…But can the 
government tell me where is the reform in this proposal? Citizens of the EU 
member states can retire after working 5,000 days but you are increasing it to 
9,000 days for Turkey…The social security institutions in the EU member states 
have as resources from 19% to 30% of the state budget. But you are setting the 
state contribution to the social security institutions at 5% of the budget. With so 
few resources how are we going to reach in our society the same level of social 
security as the European countries?”  
 
Deputy Kurtulmusoglu also emphasized that the problems in Turkey and EU countries 
differ on certain main indicators, saying that “In the EU, four active workers pay for one 
person’s retirement wage. But even the social security budget of these countries can have 
deficits due to high healthcare costs and high retirement incomes. In our country, the problem 
is different because the pension is low and the number of contributors to the system is low” 
(TBMM, 2006a).  
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ANAP deputy, İbrahim Özdoğan, also criticized the social security reform proposal as 
failing to reach EU standards (TBMM, 2006b): 
“The Minister of Labor and Social Security, Murat Başesgioğlu, has claimed that 
they wish to introduce a reform in line with European Social Model. Does the 
reform proposal conform to the European Social Model? If we look at the 
financing of social security, the reform proposal is in contradiction with the 
European standards. EU member countries have different social security systems 
but we can observe in their system two common characteristics. One is the high 
level of resources from the GDP dedicated to social security and the second is the 
state’s high contribution to finance the social security system. … Social security 
spending is high not only in the core EU member states but also in the southern 
European countries. It has increased in the Mediterranean countries. In Greece, 
social security spending has increased from 11.5% to 26%, in Spain it has 
increased from 16% to 20% and in Portugal it has increased from 11.5% to 25% 
from 1980 to 2002. Our government in arguing that 11% is too high in Turkey; it 
does not consider the transformation in these three Mediterranean countries.”  
 
 Özdoğan also insisted that European Social Model was based on a high level of state 
contribution to the social security system: “Another dimension of the European Social Model 
is the high contribution of the state to the system…In the EU 15 the state contribution reaches 
37% .... In the EU, the resources dedicated to social security and state contribution has 
increased considerably in the last 20 years and these two characteristics constitute the 
differentiating characteristic of the European Social Model” (TBMM, 2006b). Clearly the 
cognitive resources supplied by the membership process in previous years were being 
displayed and deployed by these deputies in their use of Europe to criticize the government as 
too moderate. 
In the 89th Assembly of the TBMM, the AKP government responded to these 
criticisms, by again referring to what it saw to be occurring in the EU. The AKP deputy Agah 
Kafkas responded to the opposition parties’ criticisms about increasing the retirement age and 
contribution period, stating that “There is no truth to the idea that the retirement age will be 
increased to 68 as of tomorrow. It is going to be 65 in 2048 and will be increased over time… 
The retirement age of 65 is the norm in most of the EU member countries, and we are 
projecting to be at the same standards with them in 2048 (TBMM, 2006b). The Minister of 
Labor and Social Security also referred to the standards and norms in the EU for responding to 
the criticisms on the retirement age and contribution period in the 89th Assembly of the 
TBMM, stating that “Concerning 65 as the age of retirement and 9,000 contribution days, the 
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system does not foresee any increase to the retirement age until 2036. The retirement age will 
be 65 in 2048; this is the case in most of the European Union member states. We will increase 
the retirement age to the current norms of the EU by 2048-2050” (TBMM, 2006b).  
In this parliamentary discussion, the AKP government tried legitimizing and strategic 
uses of EU resources, so as to deflect the accusation of IMF pressure. Then the representatives 
of the opposition political parties, mainly CHP and ANAP, could make use of European 
political and cognitive resources in order to weaken the AKP government’s legitimizing and 
strategic uses. The opposition political parties pointed to contradictions between the 
parameters of the Turkish reforms and EU standards and practices in the EU member states.  
Another important issue emphasized by the the Minister of Labor and Social Security, 
Murat Başesgioğlu, at the parliamentary discussions was the consensus among state 
institutions on the social security reform and the use of social dialogue mechanisms (TBMM, 
2006a):  
“In December 2002, just after taking office, we met with the Minister of Finance, 
the Minister of Health, the Undersecretary of the Treasury and representatives of 
the State Planning Organization and started working on the social security reform. 
The state institutions all agree on the necessity of the reform….we have discussed 
the reform with all social partners at the Economic and Social Council, the Social 
Security High Advisory Board, at the Labor platform…. and we have reflected 
their reasonable propositions to the reform laws…” 
 
The main barrier to the social security reform process emerged, however, from the 
institutional veto points in the Turkish constitutional system: President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
returned the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law back to the parliament in May 
2006 (Çelik, 2007b: 2). After the enactment of the reform laws without any changes at the 
TBMM, the President took it to the Constitutional Court in June 2006. Following his 
application, 118 parliamentarians of the opposition political party CHP in the TBMM also 
applied to the Constitutional Court in July 2006 for the cancellation of some articles of the 
Social Security and General Health Insurance Law (Çelik, 2007b: 4). The Constitutional Court 
decided to cancel articles in the name of protecting the acquired rights of the civil servants 
(Çelik, 2007b: 5-6).  
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IV.g. Reformulation of the social security reform considering the decision of 
the Constitutional Court 
 
Following the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the AKP government launched a 
new process of social security reform that also addressed corporatist actors’ objections and 
emphasized social dialogue with union confederations and civil society organizations. A new 
study titled Social Security Reform: New Approach Prior to Implementation was prepared in 
May 2007 by Ministry of Labor and Social Security to provide a platform for discussion 
among political parties, union confederations and employer associations, and civil society 
(Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007).  
This 2007 proposal and study were largely based on the White Paper prepared in 2005, 
but a new draft law was included on Social Security and General Health Insurance that took 
into consideration the Constitutional Court decisions (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 46). 
The preparation of the proposal allowed the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to develop 
further the justification for the social security reform and it meant a return to focusing the 
process of formulation in the hands of bureaucratic actors. In this new bureaucratic process, 
we see some limited uses of Europe. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security also 
disseminated the 2007 study Social Security Reform: New Approach Prior to Implementation 
to corporatist actors and political parties.218 
The 2007 study presents a specific section on international developments and trends in 
social protection systems, providing a review of the social security situations in the EU 
member states and OECD countries. Analysis focused on parameters in the pension systems, 
retirement age, replacements rates, actuarial rate, past earning valorisation rate and structural 
reforms; including a specific section that explored social protection regimes for public sector 
workers (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 9-12). The EU’s Mutual Information System on 
Social Protection (MISSOC) database for 2006 and 2007 was used for comparing the specific 
parameters and indicators in this document (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 12-21). The 
                                                 
218 The AKP government used the Social Security High Advisory Board and the Economic and Social Council to 
negotiate on the content of the amendments with the corporatist actors on the parameters of the reform. These 
adjustments are described below. 
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Ministry of Labor and Social Security used the comparative data to argue that the Turkish 
reforms were in line with recent changes in the EU member states’ pension systems and to 
demonstrate the ways the unreformed Turkish pension system differed on various indicators, 
from retirement age to replacement rate (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 14-17). In this 
exercise, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was involved with the legitimizing use of 
European cognitive and political resources.  
The document also took up the Constitutional Court decisions (Sosyal Güvenlik 
Kurumu, 2007: 52-53). Following the conclusions of an academic conference on 19-20 
January 2007 about the Constitutional Court’s decisions, the strategy adopted by the Ministry 
was to suggest changes to the unification of pension parameters and standardized norms for 
newly recruited civil servants and public sector workers, but to recommend the exclusion of 
current civil servants from the new system, thereby respecting their acquired rights (Sosyal 
Güvenlik Kurumu, 2007: 54). This can be seen as a division strategy between “old” and “new” 
civil servants and public sector workers, to buy peace from the current civil servants while 
displacing the costs of unifying the norms and standards on future generations.  
  However, after the general elections in July 2007, in which the AKP increased its vote 
share to 47%, and had a majority of seats with 341 deputies in the TBMM, the social security 
reform lost some of its urgency until the end of 2007. There was also a change at the Office of 
the President in 2007 following the elections. Abdullah Gül, a parliamentarian and founding 
member of the AKP, was elected President. Faruk Çelik became Minister of Labor and Social 
Security in the new AKP government after the general elections of 2007. 
 The AKP government decided to prepare amendments to the Law no. 5510 on Social 
Security and General Health Insurance rather than passing new laws in order to address the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions and reflecting the negotiations with corporatist actors. The 
ESC met to discuss the social security reform proposal on January 2008, just before the 
government brought the revised laws to parliament (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2008). 
Although corporatist actors expressed certain reservations, the proposal was brought to the 
Turkish Parliament in March 2008 by the AKP government. The Labor Platform, the umbrella 
organization of labor and civil servant unions and professional associations, decided to protest 
the reform efforts of the AKP government and launched a two-hour strike on March 14, 2008.  
The union confederations, representing workers, had expressed their frustrations with 
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the Constitutional Court decision that protected the privileged status of “old” civil servants 
(Çelik, 2007b). With already apparent ideological difference among the various unions and 
professional associations in the Labor Platform, this division between workers and civil 
servants, intensified by the Constitutional Court decision, deepened the differences among the 
members of the Labor Platform. At the last phase of the reform process, the union 
confederations such as TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ became more inclined to negotiate on the 
content of the reform package with the AKP government. The anti-reform actors (mainly 
DİSK, KESK, TMMOB and TTB) that were also members of the Labor Platform would reject 
further negotiations with the AKP government (DİSK, KESK, TMMOB and TTB Basın 
Açıklaması, 2008).   
IV.h.Uses of Europe during the parliamentary discussions of the 
reformulated social security reform law in 2008 
 
The Law No 5754, as an amendment to the vetoed law on Social Security and General 
Health Insurance began to be discussed at the Planning and Budget Commission in February 
2008 and the new social reform package was brought to the Assembly on March 4, 2008 
(TBMM, 2008a). In the discussion of the social security reform package at the Planning and 
Budget Commission in February 2008, the main issue was a comparison to the previous 
reform package and again comparison to the situation in the EU was made.  For instance, the 
changes made to regulations pertaining to income increases for actual period of service had 
been a main point of criticism of the 2006 package as well as was one of the articles that the 
Constitutional Court canceled (TBMM, 2008a). At the discussion in the Planning and Budget 
Commission at March 4 2008, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Faruk Çelik, 
indicated that (TBMM, 2008a): 
“While we were preparing the regulation on the actual service increase for certain 
occupational groups, we were very attentive not to make any mistakes that could 
worsen the current situation, in dialogue with our social partners. Accordingly we 
appointed the Deputy General Director of Insurance Affairs, Celal Özcan, to 
prepare a study on how the income increase for an actual period of service has 
been regulated in the EU.”  
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Celal Özcan then made a presentation following Çelik’s speech in the Planning and 
Budget Commission indicating (TBMM, 2008a): 
“The actual service increase concerns professions where the occupation constitutes 
a risk to the person’s physical and mental health in the long term. Accordingly the 
person in an occupation with higher health risks will have a lower life expectancy 
than people with other occupations… After the Constitutional Court decision that 
cancelled the previous reform of the regulation, we have looked at what is the 
practice in the European Union concerning this regulation. We have made a 
scientific study to find a fair and objective regulation and to avoid another 
annulation. We have studied the MISSOC 2007 report that analyzes and compares 
the social security regulations in the EU countries… We have adopted the EU 
norms and standards while considering the occupational risk for the regulation on 
the increase for an actual period of service.”  
 
This example is one of strategic use of EU cognitive resources by the AKP government 
to disarm its critics and to justify the chosen parametric levels. 
Faruk Çelik also referred to the retirement age and contribution period regulations in 
the EU member states in order to support the reform proposal in the Planning and Budget 
Commission, stating that (TBMM, 2008a): 
“The reform is necessary because of demographic changes as well. Even though 
we have a young population now, the population is getting older. In France, the 
percentage of those over 65 in the population was seven in 1865. However 115 
years later it reached 14% of the French population. The studies demonstrate that 
the percentage of population over 65 population will reach 7% in 2012 and will 
reach 14% in 2039 in Turkey … The early retirement regime set with ages 38 and 
40 is responsible for the worsening of the active-passive ratio; the active-passive 
ratio in Turkey shows that only 1.9 employees must finance 1 retired person. If we 
look to EU member states, the retirement age is set at 65 in Italy, 66 in Ireland, 65 
in Germany, 60 in France, 65 in Greece, 63 in Estonia.” 
 
In the parliamentary discussions of the social security reform on March 27, 2008, AKP 
deputy Mehmet Mustafa Açikalın defended the urgency of the reform (TBMM, 2008b):  
“Our country has a young population now but projections of demographic changes 
demonstrate that it is going to get older, even faster than European countries. We 
have the lowest contribution period with early retirement and also the highest 
coefficient for monthly installments in the OECD countries… the contribution 
period is higher in European countries being as 14,400 days in Austria and 
Portugal, 12,000 days in Spain, between 14,000 and 16,000 days in the UK.”  
 
Such a statement exemplifies the legitimizing use by the AKP government and its 
deputies to justify increases in the retirement age and in the contribution period. 
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The Justice Minister and Government Spokesman, Cemil Çiçek, after the government 
meeting on April 7, 2008, stated regarding the social security reform proposal that “The social 
security reform proposal that is discussed in the Turkish parliament is meant to bring 
alignment with the EU acquis communautaire as well as our long-term economic program” 
(Avrupa Birligi Genel Sekreterligi, 2008). Çiçek also emphasized that the government would 
implement its undertakings and obligations towards the EU by introducing the reform laws 
mentioned in the 2007-2013 Turkish National Program for Alignment with the Acquis 
communautaire (NPAA).  
The 2007-2013 NPAA prepared by the AKP government indicates that Social Security 
and General Health Insurance Law and Law on Social Assistance and Non Contributory 
Payments are considered as legislation usefully enacted between 2007 and 2009 in order to 
comply with membership conditions.219 The NPAA also foresaw passage of a Law on Social 
Assistance and Non Contributory Payments in 2009, to comply with the European Strategy for 
Social Inclusion (NPAA, 2007: 255).  
V. Corporatist actors in the social security reform process: Uses of 
Europe by employer associations and union confederations 
In the context of social security reform in Turkey, business associations and union 
confederations were also involved in the reform process. The AKP government claimed that it 
used social dialogue mechanisms since 2005 in preparing the reform proposals, especially the 
Economic and Social Council (Çalişma ve Sosyal Guvenlik Bakanligi, 2008).220 The 
Economic and Social Council met four times to discuss the social security reforms in July 
                                                 
219 Particularly relevant were directives in equal treatment of women and men (NPAA, 2008: 255). Accordingly 
the Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law and Law on Social Assistance and Non Contributory 
Payments would be introduced in order to comply with Directive 79/7/EEC, which addresses the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, Directive 2006/54/EC, aiming to ensure the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
(NPAA, 2008: 255). 
220 In Turkey, social dialogue mechanisms operate on several platforms, such as the Economic and Social 
Council, the Tripartite Consultation Board, the Minimum Wage Committee, the Supreme Arbitration Board and 
the general congresses and managing boards of the Turkish Employment Organization, the Social Insurance 
Institution, and the Vocational Qualifications Authority (Öke, 2006: 6). There are also consultative institutions 
with limited functions to address economic and social problems such as the Turkey and European Community 
Joint Consultative Committee established in 1963, the High Consultation Board of Social Security, the Labor 
Council, the Employment Board. 
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1999, March 2005 November 2005 and January 2008 (Çalişma ve Sosyal Guvenlik Bakanligi, 
2008; Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu, 2007). The Ministry of Labor and Social Security announced 
that it had received 179 recommendations from social partners, and 110 of them were reflected 
in the reform proposal in 2008 (Çalışma ve Sosyal Guvenlik Bakanlığı, 2008: 8). Out of 110 
recommendations, 81 of them had been channeled through the ESC. 
However the ESC as a social dialogue mechanism has been criticized by the social 
partners and scholars: it is still dominated by government representatives; it does not allow the 
social partners to be involved in the decision-making process; and it does not meet regularly 
(Glynos, Kaeding and Aybars, 2008: 2-5). The social security reform was also discussed in the 
High Consultation Board of Social Security where ministry representatives, employer 
associations, union confederations and other civil society organizations were kept informed 
about social security reform (Öke, 2006: 5). As we have noted, the European Commission 
Progress Reports had been emphasizing that social dialogue mechanisms must be developed 
and used more often by the Turkish governments, underlining the necessary changes to the 
ESC including setting regular meetings of the Council and altering of the Council’s 
composition.  
The uses of Europe can be analyzed by consulting the official documents and public 
discourse of the three main employer associations and three union confederations. The Turkish 
Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK), the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s 
Association (TÜSİAD), the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
(TOBB) are the main employer organizations and associations in Turkey. TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ 
and DİSK constitute the main union confederations. These actors are all represented in the 
ESC except TÜSİAD who is invited occasionally to the meetings. The analysis here 
concentrates on whether these employer organizations and union confederations made 
reference to the EU rules and standards and the EU membership process when arguing for 
social security reform.  
The preliminary analysis indicates that the employer associations acted in the pro-
reform coalition and that the union confederations and civil servant unions were the main 
actors of the anti-reform coalition. Moreover the three employer associations and three union 
confederations did not equally make use of Europe, either in frequency or manner. Among the 
employer associations, TİSK and TÜSİAD made direct references to the EU norms and 
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standards but there were almost no uses made by TOBB. Among the three union 
confederations, TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ made direct references to the EU norms and standards 
but DİSK was not involved with using Europe. 
Looking at employer associations, TİSK focused on the social security reform since 
2005, emphasizing the need to reduce the imbalances of the system, the urgency to reduce the 
premiums paid by employers as well as tackling the informal economy in order to increase the 
number of contributors to the system (TİSK, 2005b). Thus TİSK emphasized the urgency of 
parliament enacting social security reforms in a declaration dated October 27, 2005. This 
declaration said “The Social Security System is the largest black hole in public finances. The 
active-passive ratio and the low level of contributors to the system constitute two main 
problems of the system…Data indicates that the level of contributors to the system in Turkey 
is 27.4% per cent of the working population whereas in EU member countries this level 
reaches 70% to 80%” (TİSK, 2005b). TİSK also made recommendations for social security 
reform in the Economic and Social Council, which met on November 2005 and in the High 
Consultation Board of Social Security. An important issue for the TİSK is the management of 
the new Social Security Institution and its involvement in its administration; it saw a loss of 
autonomy compared to the earlier SSK (TİSK, 2004).  
TİSK recommendations on the social security reform in 2005 insisted that (TİSK, 
2008): 
 “In the EU member states, economic stability, sustainable development 
and the criteria of Maastricht Treaty have required reduced social security 
spending. EU member states are obliged also through the Monetary Union to 
control their budget deficit and inflation on certain standards …. These 
developments indicate that social policies should be reformed in light of financial 
and economic constraints.”  
 
In line with this, TİSK supported the further development of private pensions, in place 
since 2003, through tax incentives for more active and extensive participation.   
After the Constitutional Court decision to cancel certain articles of the reform laws in 
2006, TİSK called on the AKP government to cooperate with the social partners when 
preparing a revision in 2007 (TİSK, 2007). In all this, TİSK has made strategic use of EU 
resources, in ways intended to allow the confederation to have better access to the policy-
making process in order to influence the AKP government agenda and the content of the 
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reform packages.  
TÜSIAD, the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, is a non-
governmental voluntary association composed of owners and managers of individual firms, 
groups of companies and holding companies operating in the Turkish manufacturing and 
service sectors (Öke, 2006: 11). TÜSIAD has intervened in discussions of the social security 
reform, especially pension reform, since the late 1990’s (TÜSIAD, 1996; 1997). TÜSIAD has 
defended a multi-pillar pension system, arguing that the deficits of social security institutions 
and the burden of these deficits on the budget have been the reasons for the transition to a 
multi-pillar system of benefits.221  
In a workshop organized by TÜSIAD called “Reform of the Social Security Systems. 
Considering International Trends and Developments” in December 2004, TÜSIAD President, 
Ömer Sabancı, expressed the need to restructure the pension system in order to achieve full 
membership in the EU. This intervention demonstrated the association’s close analysis of EU 
developments (TÜSIAD, 2004):  
“The sustainability of the social security system constitutes one of the 
major targets of the EU in which Turkey wants to become a member. The Council 
of the EU has announced the Lisbon Strategy for economic growth and increasing 
employment. It has been clearly stated in this strategy, one of the conditions for 
economic growth and increasing employment is the sustainability of the social 
security system adapted to the changing demographic characteristics and labor 
markets…It is necessary to reform the pension and social security system in a way 
to encourage increasing employment, with attention to its impact on the 
competitive advantage in order to balance macro-economic indicators.”  
 
In healthcare, the association was also active. Its 2005 Report, titled Charting the Way 
Forward: Health Care Reform in Turkey,222 indicated that the accelerated accession 
negotiations for European Union membership requires the initiation of the Health 
Transformation Project (described above) (TÜSIAD, 2005b). The report emphasized that the 
main indicators such as the number of physicians per person, the number of hospitals, the 
financial resources devoted from the budget and investment by state in healthcare demonstrate 
                                                 
221 The 1997 TÜSIAD report on the restructuring of the social security suggests the introduction of private 
pension schemes as the third pillar and measures to increase the contribution period and retirement age following 
World Bank and IMF recommendations. 
222 This research was conducted by a group of experts in cooperation with academics from the Public Health 
Department at John Hopkins University. 
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that Turkey is far from the EU standards and the EU member countries’ healthcare systems 
(TÜSIAD, 2005a: 53).  
The 2005 reports on pension system and health care reforms were presented to the 
AKP government at the ESC meeting on November 2005. The new TÜSIAD President, 
Arzuhan Yalcindag, made five main recommendations to the AKP government regarding the 
social security reform proposals, emphasizing the strengthening of the third pillar, reducing 
employer’s contribution to the system and increasing state’s contribution (TÜSIAD, 2005a). 
TÜSIAD supported the AKP government reform attempts through 2008.  
TÜSIAD was, then, involved with the use of EU resources. Its reports demonstrate the 
cognitive use of EU legal and cognitive resources in arguing for certain aspects of the reforms 
concerning the sustainability of the system by improving its efficiency and accessibility while 
taking EU-level developments of additional pillars based on market mechanisms as an 
example. The representatives of the TÜSIAD also engaged in strategic uses of Europe in order 
to influence the AKP government’s reform agenda. 
 TOBB (The Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) is the largest civilian economic organization in Turkey and 
is a semi-public organizational partner in official, social and commercial institutions and 
establishments.223 It also participated in the management of the Bağ-Kur, the social security 
institution for the self-employed. TOBB emphasized the necessity of reforming the social 
security system, but these declarations do not make direct reference to the EU, at least 
between 2005 to 2008. Nor were mentions found in the documents of the two other employer 
associations, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD) and the 
Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TESK), although they did take part in 
the key meetings. 
Three union confederations; TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DİSK, were involved with the 
social security reform process, being members of the ESC and Labor Platform. They have 
different perceptions of EU membership; which also shifted in time influencing their uses of 
Europe (Alemdar, 2009: 21-22). TÜRK-İŞ (The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) is 
                                                 
223 In Turkey, merchants and industrialists are obliged to register with the Chamber of Commerce in their 
respective region and are categorized according to their sectors (Öke, 2006: 2). 
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the largest central organization of trade unions (Öke, 2006: 9).224 TÜRK-İŞ is characterized as 
a state-centric labor union confederation that took an openly anti-EU position after 2000, 
considering the conditionality of EU membership as threatening territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty. The Confederation shifted its position towards supporting the EU 
membership in 2005, however, with the start of the accession negotiations (Alemdar, 2009: 
10). A change in leadership and the support of of EU membership by some of its member 
unions such as Kristal-Is and Petrol-Is led  TÜRK-İŞ to mention more extensively the EU and 
its emphasis on improving social dialogue mechanisms as well as the implications of aligning 
with EU acquis when arguing on social policy issues (Alemdar, 2009: 13).  
TÜRK-İŞ has been involved with the social security reform process since 2005 
especially through the ESC. The Confederation presented to the AKP government a report 
making recommendations on the social security reform at the ESC meetings in November 
2005 and January 2008, in which the union identified the inadequate retirement incomes and 
healthcare services in Turkey. It called for further state commitment and contribution to the 
social security system as well as to maintain the autonomy of the institutions and the need for 
tripartisim in their management (TÜRK-İŞ, 2005a).225 The 2005 TÜRK-İŞ Report indicated 
that “In Turkey, fixed state contribution to finance the social security system and state 
guarantee of fiscal deficits should be implemented mutually as in the EU member countries” 
(TÜRK-İŞ, 2005a: 2).  
TÜRK-İŞ has also published a report in 2006, titled the European Union and TÜRK-İŞ 
that assessed the Turkish welfare state and the social security system, evaluating it against EU 
standards. The TÜRK-İŞ Report indicates “The problem of funding must be solved according 
to the country’s realities to ensure that our social security system is providing EU level 
payments and benefits. Protective health service in the frame of social security system is 
another fundamental right, which must be provided by the state” (TÜRK-İŞ, 2006: 10). The 
TÜRK-İŞ report emphasizes that “a structure appropriate to the objectives determined by the 
                                                 
224 The membership in TÜRK-İŞ is mainly based on workers in the manufacturing sector as well as in certain 
public sectors. 
225 Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-İŞ), Sosyal 
Sigortalar ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanunu ve Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hukmunde Kararnamelerde Değisiklik 
Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı Hakkında Gorus ve Oneriler, 2005 p.2. Available at 
http://www.turkis.org.tr/source.cms.docs/turkis.org.tr.ce/docs/file/SSVEGSKTASLAKMET1.pdf. (Accessed on 
November 25, 2008) 
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Nice Summit has to be established in order to be successful in respect to the struggle against 
poverty and social exclusion” (TÜRK-İŞ, 2006: 10). The 2005 TÜRK-İŞ report emphasizes 
that the Turkish government needs to attain EU standards and policies on old age benefits, 
death insurance and survivor benefits. 
TÜRK-İŞ made strategic and cognitive uses of Europe during the social security 
reform. The TÜRK-İŞ reports exemplify the use of EU legal and cognitive resources in 
arguing for the content of the social security reform proposals. The Confederation engaged in 
the strategic use of Europe in order to have access to the decision-making process and for 
bargaining with the AKP government about the content of the social security reform 
proposals. 
HAK-İŞ (the Confederation of Real Trade Unions) has been an active union 
confederation during the social security reform (Öke, 2006: 9).226 HAK-İŞ is a member of the 
ESC and its representatives attended the ESC meetings on social security reform in 2005 and 
2008. HAK-İŞ is characterized as a trade union close to conservative political parties and to 
the Islamist movement in Turkey. It had an anti-EU stance during the 1990’s (Duran and 
Yildirim, 2005: 228). However HAK-İŞ also changed its position, encouraging relations with 
the EU since the 2000’s and has a close relationship with the AKP government227 (Doğan, 
2003: 34; Alemdar, 2009: 18). Alemdar (2009: 19) explains the change in HAK-İŞ attitude 
towards the EU as linked to the supportive position towards accession adopted by the AKP. 
HAK-İŞ is a member of the EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee and participates in the 
activities of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (Alemdar, 2009: 19; Duran and 
Yildirim, 2005: 235).  
Among the three union confederations, HAK-İŞ is characterized as having the most 
cooperative approach to state institutions and the bureaucracy. In this regard, HAK-İŞ has 
benefited extensively from EU resources on social dialogue and pre-accession assistance 
funding.228 The HAK-İŞ has developed considerable research capacity involving the EU 
acquis through, among other things, research entitled EU-Turkey International Social Security 
                                                 
226 HAK-İŞ members are concentrated in private industry and the municipal sector. 
227 Two key leaders of HAK-İŞ were elected as AKP deputies in the 2002 elections (Alemdar, 2009: 18). 
228 HAK-İŞ has actively participated to the MEDA Program for Civil Society: Trade Union Dialogue from 2002 
to 2003 (Alemdar, 2009: 20; European Commission, 2004). 
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Norms: Harmonization and Transposition begun in 2007 by Sadi Ekdemir229 and published in 
2009. It reviews and translates the social EU acquis and compares the Turkish legislation to 
that of the 27 member states, via a comprehensive analysis of pensions, labor law, social 
protection, unemployment and social assistance (HAK-İŞ, 2009). HAK-İŞ’ approach towards 
the EU in this and related projects implies cognitive and strategic use of EU legal, financial 
and political resources since 2002.  
The HAK-İŞ President Salih Uslu insisted on the crucial importance of the EU 
membership process in Turkey for the improvement of social rights (Uslu, 2004). At a Social 
Policy Conference organized at Istanbul University titled “Reform Proposals of the Social 
Security System” on 16 December 2005, with the participation of the Minister of Labor and 
Social Security, union confederations and academics, HAK-İŞ Vice-President, Mahmut 
Arslan, gave an assessment of the reform proposal by referring to EU rules and norms: “The 
sustainability of the social security system is emphasized by the EU Lisbon strategy that 
identified it as one of the main conditions of long-term economic growth and increasing 
employment…. In a more recent initiative in 2005, the EU prioritizes increasing the 
modernization of social protection, the quality and extent of social assistance and services” 
(Hizmet-İş, 2005).  
The most remarkable aspect of Arslan’s speech deals with the social assistance 
component of the reform (Hizmet-İş, 2005):  
“It is not possible that social insurance provides protection for the all risks 
including poverty, which means an increasing demand for institutionalized social 
assistance and social services. Social assistance can not be organized through 
charity organizations based on philanthropy but should be considered a state’s 
main responsibility and a part of individual rights…. The European Social Charter 
calls for framing social assistance and services as legal rights … The EU Reports 
ask the Turkish government to tackle poverty and improve social inclusion that 
necessitates the reform of social assistance and services.”  
 
Arslan defends a comprehensive approach to the social security reform that would 
include reform measures addressing informal employment in order to increase contributions 
and coverage. The approach of the HAK-İŞ cadres demonstrates the use of EU legal and 
                                                 
229 Sadi Ekdemir is an expert on social security and labor law and an ex-bureaucrat who worked from 2000 to 
2004 at the EU Coordination Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. He worked previously as 
a consultant to TİSK for the preparation of a report on EU acquis on social policy and employment in 2005.  
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cognitive resources in order to shape the content of the social security reform. 
HAK-İŞ made eight recommendations at the ESC meeting in January 2008. HAK-İŞ 
was involved with a strategic use of EU cognitive and legal resources in ways that increased 
its role in the policy-making process and that allowed negotiation with the AKP government 
on specific parameters of the reform. As a member of the Labor Platform, HAK-İŞ 
participated in the two-hour strike protesting the social security reform proposal brought to 
parliament in March 2008. HAK-İŞ has negotiated along with TÜRK-İŞ on the social security 
reform proposal with the AKP government, reaching compromises on certain parameters. 
DİSK (the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions) established in 1967, is known 
as the confederation of unions with a left orientation and was banned following the military 
coup of 1980. It reinitiated its activities only in 1992 (Öke, 2006: 9). DİSK has been against 
the reform proposals for the social security system suggested by the AKP. But DİSK has also 
established close relations with the EU institutions since the mid-1990’s by being a member of 
the ETUC and having a permanent representative in Brussels (Alemdar, 2009: 17). DİSK’s 
anti-imperialist discourse that criticizes privatization and neo-liberal policy choices was 
complemented by a political agenda on human rights and democratization (Alemdar, 2009: 
17). DİSK supports Turkey’s membership in the EU230, arguing that it will benefit workers 
and unions. DİSK President, Süleyman Çelebi, indicates that “The EU is not only an economic 
union; it has a social character as well …. Turkey is required to make changes to its social 
policies and improve Turkish workers’ social rights…” (Doğan, 2003: 33-34). 
Even though DİSK is a member of Economic and Social Council, the confederation 
attended only the November 2005 ESC meeting, refusing to attend the ESC meeting in 
January 2008. DİSK presented a report criticizing the social security reform proposal to the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security at the Tri-partite Consultation Board in November 16, 
2007, stating that “As the one of 2006, the new proposed reform does not satisfy the needs of 
the workers  … In the EU member countries, half of the public budget is dedicated to social 
security and health care whereas in Turkey the social security and healthcare budget do not 
reach one fifth of the state budget” (DİSK, 2008). DİSK has been critical of the social security 
                                                 
230 DİSK participated in the MEDA Program for Civil Society: Trade Union Dialogue and benefited from ETUC 
experts’ training through MEDA funding from 2002 to 2003 and developed a team of expert on EU acquis and 
social policy priorities (Alemdar, 2009). 
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system reform, as it would lead to cuts in pensions and curtailment of workers’ rights.  
Two other union confederations were also involved with the social security reform 
process, the Confederation of Public Unions (KAMU-SEN) and the Confederation of Public 
Worker Unions (KESK). KAMU-SEN and KESK were against the implementation of the 
social security reform since 2005 because civil servants and workers in the public sector 
would lose their privileges (Öngün, 2011). KESK, a leftist union confederation of public 
sector workers that had legal status problems until the 2000’s, also used EU resources by 
participating in the MEDA Program for Civil Society: Trade Union Dialogue (Öngün, 2011: 
212). Although KESK adopted an anti-imperialist approach and opposed the EU membership 
process, it has shifted its approach towards EU and relationship with ETUC since 2001 
(Öngün, 2011: 215). However this did not translate into an extensive use of EU resources in its 
activities. 
The most important professional association, active during the social security reform 
process, is the Turkish Medical Association231 (Türk Tabibler Birliği, TTB). TTB was the 
most vocal opponent of the Health Transformation Project (HTP) since its initiation in 2003 
and the social security reform proposals since 2005. TTB associated the HTP program with 
commercialization and privatization of healthcare services for patients and healthcare 
professionals (Türk Tabibler Birliği, 2007). In the official documents and statements of the 
TTB on social security reform, I did not find uses of Europe. 
This analysis of the discourse and official documents of the employer associations and 
union confederations regarding the social security and health reforms reveal that corporatist 
actors  have referred to the EU in order to argue for or against certain characteristics of the 
social security reform. Employer associations and union confederations that are involved more 
with the EU membership process, TİSK, TÜSIAD, TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ, have made more 
references to the EU in arguing for the social security reform. TÜSIAD and TİSK make 
cognitive and strategic uses of EU legal, political and cognitive resources, arguing that the 
unreformed social security system was far from the EU standards and norms. TÜRK-İŞ made 
                                                 
231 The Turkish Medical Association was established and recognized as an official association in 1928 based on 
the law on practicing medicine and recognized as the representative of its members in 1953 with the Law on the 
Turkish Medical Association, allowing it to require compulsory membership and collect contributions.  
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strategic use of EU legal and political resources, comparing Turkey to the EU in order to argue 
that the reforms were not introducing standards and rules as in the EU member states. HAK-İŞ 
strategically and cognitively used EU resources that increased its access to the policy making 
process while engaging in negotiating with the AKP government. Accordingly among the 
union confederations and employer associations, the pro-EU stance and involvement with the 
membership process can be related to the uses of Europe by employer organization and union 
confederations (Alemdar, 2009).  
The analysis of the social security reform process provides rich research findings on 
the uses of European resources by various domestic actors. In this long reform process, uses of 
Europe allowed the AKP government to balance policy seeking and vote seeking objectives. 
By making legitimizing uses of Europe, the AKP government aimed to lower the opposition of 
political parties and union confederations when justifying the reforms. The relation of the 
bureaucratic actors to the EU resources is more complex. The bureaucratic actors benefited 
from cognitive resources on various aspects of the reform, everything from social inclusion to 
employment.  An important finding of this chapter is about the role of bureaucratic actors in 
institutionalizing EU policy initiatives. What is less clear, because of lack of data, is whether 
the bureaucratic actors made strategic uses during the reform process. The analysis of 
corporatist actors is informative about the differences in uses among these actors, seemingly 
closely structured by each of their stance towards the EU. In all case we could observe uses of 
Europe strategically chosen by the actor to serve its goals. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to analyze empirically and to explain theoretically the uses of Europe in 
Turkey during the EU membership process. It asks how, if at all, European resources were 
used during the reforms of the social security system and labor law, including the 
reorganization of the Turkish employment agency, paying attention to their timing and their 
content. In order to understand the uses Europe in these policy reforms in Turkey, it asks 
whether, where, and how domestic actors were using EU resources, references and policy 
developments within the dynamic processes of reform.  
To respond to the main question of this dissertation, the theoretical approach Uses of 
Europe is adopted, because as an approach it aims to provide a dynamic understanding of 
Europeanization by focusing on the domestic actors’ use of various resources made available 
by the European Union. The approach is meant to be a more appropriate way of addressing 
some of the questions about the impact of the European Union in member and candidate states 
than existing approaches to Europeanization. The focus of the approach is the resources 
supplied during a membership process. Here the Uses of Europe is also applied to welfare 
state reforms, which is a too-often ignored policy field in Europeanization studies.  
This research responds to the “when” question, through two hypotheses about the 
contextual conditions. In order to answer questions about “how” Europe is used, I mobilize 
theoretical tools and concepts developed in the welfare state change literature drawing on the 
findings of the research on formal institutions, partisan politics and policy legacies. The 
theoretical framework in this thesis incorporates these contributions into analyses of the uses 
of Europe during welfare state change. This addition is particularly relevant for addressing one 
main question of this thesis: why was it so difficult for Turkish governments to institute 
reforms in the 1990s. 
The empirical analysis of the reforms of labor regulations, the social security system 
and the restructuring of the employment agency uses process tracing and provides rich 
findings on the contextual conditions for the uses of Europe and particularly Turkish actors’ 
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cognitive, strategic and legitimizing uses of EU legal, financial, institutional, political and 
cognitive resources.  
This chapter considers the implications of the empirical findings, both the hypotheses 
examined in the empirical chapters on social policy reforms in Turkey and more generally on 
the explanatory power of Uses of Europe approach.  
I. Contextual conditions for uses of Europe: Examining two 
hypotheses  
The Uses of Europe approach, advanced by Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011) and 
Woll and Jacquot (2010) to analyze the role of EU resources in welfare state reforms, uses 
both deductive and inductive reasoning. The proponents suggest two hypotheses that orient us 
to examine the contextual factors that are the necessary conditions for various uses of Europe. 
The first research hypothesis is concerned with general political context and the relationship of 
each country with Europe, indicated by elite attitudes and public opinion. Grazino, Jacquot 
and Palier argue that if elites and public opinion are in favor of Europe, we expect to observe 
positive and explicit uses of Europe with major changes in the social policy field under 
examination. If both elites and public opinion are Euroskeptic, it is expected that there is either 
no use of Europe or a denial of any use.  
I have examined this hypothesis in Chapter II by analyzing the political elite’s attitude 
and public opinion in Turkey from 1999 to 2008. Although the goal of EU membership has an 
“above politics” character in Turkish politics, having been an objective shared by the main 
political actors, the attitude of political parties to the specific conditions of membership is a 
better indicator of their consequential attitudes. A divide on the necessary conditions for 
membership rather than membership itself shapes the main political parties’ appreciation of 
the accession process and its conditions. Accordingly, considering the position of political 
parties since the recognition of candidacy status in 1999, the coalition government established 
among the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the Nationalist Movement 
Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), 
from 1999 to 2002, had only a weak commitment to the political and economic reforms 
required for EU membership; the coalitional partners had significantly different stances 
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regarding membership conditions and the reforms needed for fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria. In contrast the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) 
government elected in 2002 demonstrated a stronger commitment to EU membership and the 
political will to introduce the necessary economic and political reforms to comply with 
membership conditions after accession talks were opened. 
Established in 2001, the AKP appeared as a “reformist” political party, supporting EU 
membership, democratization and modernization while defending conservative values with 
religious overtones. As the main figures of the AKP such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
Abdullah Gül were involved in Islamist political parties, there were initially questions about 
their political and economic intentions. Following the 2002 election victory, however, it 
became clearer that the pursuit of EU membership served the AKP political cadres. It helped 
them to overcome some of the legitimacy problems they had because of the party’s roots in 
political Islam. It served as an empowering tool domestically and as a way of sustaining the 
pace of democratization and economic reforms. In this way, the AKP government widened its 
societal support, uniting different groups around the reform while deepening its legitimacy; 
pursuit of EU membership was a means of building a broad-based electoral coalition (Öniş, 
2009). 
However since the launch of accession negotiations in 2006, the AKP government has 
shown less enthusiasm for EU membership, following from a certain reform fatigue and from 
the negative reaction of several EU member states and leaders to the idea of Turkey’s 
membership. There were important domestic developments that changed the priorities and 
reformist agenda of the AKP government, including increasing conflicts with secular state 
institutions. The 2007 election results, where the AKP increased its support among voters, 
deepened its legitimacy and allowed it to consolidate its power; it had no need to play the 
“Europe card.” At the same time, the EU was dampening any perspective of immediate 
membership for Turkey. The Negotiating Framework for launching accession negotiations 
described negotiations as open-ended. The debates among the member states on the 
“Europeanness” of Turkey and the discourse of European leaders during the negotiations of 
the Framework for Accession also influenced the AKP’s position. This change of attitude was 
not expressed as abandoning the goal of membership but as a change in the governmental 
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agenda, which has placed lower on its agenda the remaining political and economic reforms 
necessary for the evolution of the accession negotiations. 
 Public opinion has been in general supportive of Turkey’s membership in the EU but 
fluctuated in time. The analysis of the survey data and Euro-barometer data on Turkish public 
opinion towards EU membership demonstrates that the support for EU membership from 1999 
to 2006 has been high in Turkey, reaching over 70% percent in 2004. However public support 
has declined towards 50% starting in 2006 and fluctuated between 45% and 60% until 2009. 
Thus analysis of the data clearly demonstrates solid support in public opinion for EU 
membership from 1999 to 2006, but also a declining trend from 2006 to 2009.   
The analysis of the contextual conditions of political elite attitude and public opinion 
support for EU membership would lead, according to this hypothesis, to wide-spread observed 
uses of Europe. The main empirical chapters examine whether this was the case or not. 
The process-tracing analysis of the reform of labor law, the reorganization of the 
employment agency and the restructuring of the social security system provide a general but 
limited confirmation of this hypothesis. In the process of labor law reform and the 
reorganization of the employment agency from 1999 to 2003, there was a limited using of 
Europe and reliance on EU resources by the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government. But the 
uses of Europe by the coalition government actors, bureaucratic actors and corporatist actors 
increased in 2001. In both reform processes from 2002 to 2003, the AKP government made a 
variety of uses of Europe. Corporatist actors, especially business associations, have more 
extensively used EU resources and the bureaucratic actors’ reliance on EU resources increased 
substantially. Although the findings demonstrate more extensive uses of Europe from 2002 to 
2003, in the analysis of both reform processes the test of the first hypothesis is limited, as 
there was little difference in attitudes over the first phase of the reform and the second phase.  
In the first phase of the social security reform from 1999 to 2001, process-tracing 
research found no uses of Europe by the ministries, bureaucratic and corporatist actors and 
including the members of the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government. The process of the 
macro social security reform from 2003 to 2008 provides a better test because it has carried 
over a more extended period, and attitudes toward membership cooled in the later years. In the 
reform process from 2003 to 2005, the research demonstrates recurrent and continuous uses of 
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Europe by the AKP government, opposition political parties and corporatist actors. The 
parliamentary discussion of the social security reform laws during 2005 and 2006 is an 
important indicator demonstrating the positive and increasing uses of Europe by the AKP 
government and opposition political parties. Following the Constitutional Court decisions on 
the reform laws in 2006, the parliamentary part of the reform process was re-launched in 2007. 
The analysis of the parliamentary discussion in 2007 and 2008 found frequent uses of Europe 
especially by the members of the AKP government during the debates on the reform laws. The 
uses of Europe by bureaucratic actors increased slightly in the period from 2007 to 2008.  
The second research hypothesis proposed by Graziano, Jacquot and Palier (2011: 8) 
suggests a correlation between the amount and type of EU resources used and the institutional 
relationship between a country and the EU. Chapter III on the EU instruments and on various 
resources for the reforms of the social security system (2008), labor regulation (2003) and the 
restructuring of the employment agency (2003) in Turkey addressed this second hypothesis. 
The analysis of the EU instruments and resources support the causal assumption of the 
hypothesis: with the evolution of the institutional relationship from the recognition of 
candidate status in 1999 to the launch of accession negotiations in 2005, there was an increase 
in resources made available. This pattern is most evident for financial resources, where the 
amount of financial assistance for reforming and extending social and employment policies 
increased considerably from 1999 to 2008 under various programs, from the Mediterranean 
Economic Development Area (MEDA) to the pre-accession assistance program to the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). 
The findings on the institutional and legal resources confirm also the research 
hypothesis. There were increasing institutional resources in the period from 2004 to 2008 that 
allowed the Turkish state to participate in various programs and attend the EU Committees on 
social and employment policy as compared to the first phase from 1999 to 2004. Legal 
resources also increased, especially with the start of accession negotiation in 2005, when EU 
institutions redoubled their emphasis on the acquis communautaire and on the directives 
concerning the specific chapters. There was an apparent change from to the first phase (1999 
to 2004) where it was compliance with the political criteria that were the main focus.  
With respect to political resources in the EU instruments providing the arguments for 
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the reforms, these resources have changed significantly over the whole period from 1999 to 
2008. In the first phase (1999-2004), the political resources were available to argue for 
reforms in order to start the accession negotiations. In the second phase, the emphasis turned 
to the need to comply with specific conditions of the negotiation chapters for the goal of EU 
membership. In both periods opponents and enthusiasts of EU membership had the resources 
to hand to make their case. 
The findings on cognitive resources are less conclusive about the second hypothesis. 
The detailed research did not find a change in the use of cognitive resources with the evolution 
of institutional relationship from the first phase (1999 to 2004) to the second phase (2005 to 
2008). Despite this pattern, there are no contradictory results; we do not observe a fluctuation 
or decrease in either type of resources.  
The more appropriate conclusion is that cognitive resources in the EU instruments 
have been qualitatively constant. Cognitive resources are related to European-level social and 
employment policy developments. This is no doubt due to the constancy in the European 
Union’s own positions since Lisbon about the need for higher employment rates and labor 
market flexibility (European Commission, 2007f). 
The research findings of Chapter III demonstrate as well the two phases of the EU 
membership process from 1999 to 2008. In the first phase from 1999 to 2004, the main focus 
of the institutional relation was on compliance with the political criteria. Following the 
Council of the European Union’s decision in 2005 to launch accession negotiations, which 
confirmed that Turkey sufficiently met the political criteria, the focus of the institutional 
relations was on specific chapters, including social policy and employment in the second 
phase from 2005 to 2008.  
The above findings do not contradict the research hypothesis under study, but it is less 
clear how to explain the relation between increasing EU resources and the uses of Europe. The 
process-tracing analysis of the early phase of the social security reform process in 1999 is 
supportive of the causal argument of the second research hypothesis. As the institutional 
relationship between Turkey as a candidate for membership and the EU, resources increased 
and so too did the use in Turkish domestic politics of those resources. 
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During the first phase of the social security reform undertaken by the DSP-ANAP-
MHP coalition government in 1999, the analysis of various policy documents prepared in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security including the parliamentary discussions demonstrate 
almost no use of Europe by the coalition government or by opposition political parties. This 
can be explained through the difference in the timing between the implementation of the social 
security reform (from June to September 1999) and granting of candidate status for EU 
membership to Turkey (December 1999). This finding confirms that the existence of a 
relationship is a necessary condition for the uses of Europe. Without recognition of candidacy 
there are few EU resources available and we do not observe uses of Europe, even by those 
who were supporters of candidacy. Rather, they relied on a longer-standing relationship with 
the World Bank and International Labour Organisation to develop the reforms. It is only with 
the preparation of the 2001 National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) 
following the 2000 Accession Partnership Document that referred to both social security and 
labor law reforms, that our process-tracing began to uncover and reveal that the available 
cognitive, legal and financial of EU resources were being used.  
There were similar findings in the process-tracing analysis of the restructuring of the 
employment agency from 1999 to 2003. In the early phase of the reform in 1999, the 
restructuring of the employment agency occurred from June to September 1999. That was just 
prior to Turkey gaining candidate status in December 1999. There were few EU resources 
available in the early phase and even these few were not used by the coalition government. It 
preferred to justify the change in terms of the internal needs of Turkey. 
However the preparation of the Accession Partnership Document in 2001 and the 
NPAA in 2001 changed the resources available for the political and bureaucratic process of 
establishing the Turkish Employment Agency. The reform process was full of references to 
practices in EU member states as well as the need to respect the conditions of membership.  
The reform processes of the labor regulation and restructuring the employment agency 
have coincided with the first phase of the institutional relation where EU resources were most 
limited. However in both reform processes, the process-tracing research finds cognitive, 
strategic and legitimizing uses of legal and financial resources. This often came, however, 
somewhat indirectly.  
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One major issue in reforming labor regulations was job security. The DSP-ANAP-
MHP government has included the law on job security in the 2001 NPAA as one of the short-
term measures to be implemented in a year. However this legislation was not required by the 
EU acquis because the Commission encourages following the ILO Conventions on job 
security. The union confederations continued to rely on Turkey’s signature of this Convention 
when making their claims.   
However, process-tracing also uncovered a major strategic use of Europe by Yaşar 
Okuyan, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, to push this legislation through the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) despite the opposition of 
business associations. He claimed it had to be passed because it was a condition of 
membership, thereby disarming the opposition of employers. Concerning the reform of the 
Turkish Employment Agency, the story was one of major financial resources, coming from the 
EU’s Active Labour Market Strategy Programme from 2003 to 2006 with a budget of €50 
million. The bureaucratic actors have used strategically EU financial resources in 
institutionalizing the policy orientation and in investing in the delivery of services through 
local offices. 
The research also found rising legal, financial and political resources available in the 
social security reform process since 2007 have led to more extensive uses by bureaucratic 
actors. The increasing legal resources and financial resources have been more apparent in the 
later phase of the reform, represented by the capacity-building project for the Social Security 
Institution initiated in 2007 that led to a more extensive use by the bureaucratic actors.  
Accordingly the findings of the research support in a general way both hypotheses 
about the contextual factors that are necessary conditions for uses of Europe. In the period 
from 1999 to 2008, there was considerable political elite and public support for the EU 
membership in Turkey and the institutional relationship between Turkey and the EU provided 
substantial resources. However this research is less conclusive on the causal assumptions of 
both research hypotheses proposed by the Uses of Europe approach. The necessary conditions, 
as considerable political and public support for the EU and adequate EU resources, are 
important in having a partial response to the “when” research question. But it is less 
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informative about the process (“how”) by which European resources were used in social and 
labor reforms.  
Overall, process-tracing leads to the conclusion that there is no direct connection 
between the extent of EU resources available and their use in Turkish politics. The EU may 
control the supply, but it is the domestic actors who are the key to them being translated into 
practice. 
II. Explaining Uses of Europe: Integrating institutional settings, 
partisan politics and actors’ strategies and practices 
 
The Uses of Europe theoretical approach is adopted in order to address the main 
research question of this dissertation. I have argued for the theoretical advantages and 
empirical utility of adopting the Uses of Europe approach with the review of the literature on 
social policy change and Europeanization in Chapter I. Nevertheless I also argued that this 
approach does not sufficiently address how a certain type of use of Europe is adopted by 
specific national actors in a policy sector. Therefore I propose to mobilize theoretical concepts 
developed in the welfare state literature drawing on the findings of the research on formal 
institutions, partisan politics and policy legacies. Moving beyond the two hypotheses put 
forward by the originators of the approach, the goal is to analyze the strategic behavior of 
actors in using EU resources in the process of social policy reforms. To do so, I examine 
inductively via case studies whether Europe is used in a cognitive, strategic or legitimizing 
way. A main conclusion is that the type of use depends on the domestic actors’ interest and 
coalition-building strategies in the reform process rather than the use being related to the stage 
of the relationship between a candidate country and EU (Graziano, Jacquot and Palier, 2011) 
or the uses of Europe varied according to the phases of policy making suggested by Jacquot 
and Woll (2003) and Woll and Jacquot (2010: 116). 
Here I present in a synthetic way the findings of the process-tracing analysis of the 
reforms of the social security system and labor law and of the restructuring of the employment 
agency. I focus on each reform process demonstrating the findings on the various uses of 
Europe and discussing their implication for this inductive method. 
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II.a. Uses of Europe in the reform of the Labor Act, 1999-2003 
The analysis of the reform of the Labor Act from 1999 to 2003 demonstrates various 
uses of Europe by Turkish actors. There was extensive cognitive use of EU legal resources by 
the tripartite Scientific Committee, composed of nine experts representing the government, the 
employers and the employees. They made ample use of the reasoning drawn from several key 
Directives in the preparation of the new Labor Act. This Committee had the character of being 
an epistemic community as well as being having a tri-partite corporatist character. Yaşar 
Okuyan, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, from the ANAP (the center-right) coalition 
partner in the government, was key in setting up this Committee. He considered it to be a way 
of negotiating with both employees and employers by means of a committee of experts where 
the EU Directives could serve as a basis for reaching agreements among corporatist actors and 
the coalition government.  
After the Scientific Committee, it was the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government and 
the AKP government that made most use of Europe, and in a variety of ways. From 2000 to 
2002, the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government made strategic use of EU political 
resources, by tying the law on job security to the short-term priorities of the NPPA and the 
accession process. Considering the fragmented power of the executive branch under the 
coalition government of the DSP-ANAP-MHP, Yaşar Okuyan and the bureaucracy of the 
ministry included the law on job security as one of the short-term priorities of the NPAA in 
order to force its enactment by the parliament.  The Minister of Labor and Social Security was 
quite open about this strategic use of the 2001 NPAA priorities, aiming to force the 
employers’ representatives to “choose” between their support for accession and their 
opposition to the job security legislation. At the same time he could appeal to deputies close to 
the unions, who had been seeking such protections for years. This was a kind of “policy 
seeking” strategy, derived from the coalition’s bargaining strategy in the corporatist arena, 
especially to draw in the union confederations, as well as being a vote-seeking objective in 
preparation for the up-coming elections in 2002.  
Following the 2002 elections, the AKP government re-launched the process for the 
revision of the Labor Act taking the draft prepared by the Scientific Committee as a reference. 
In line with the theoretical expectations of neo-institutionalism, the AKP government 
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deployed credit claiming as well as legitimizing and strategic uses of Europe during the reform 
process. AKP credit-claiming practices involved arguing that the changes were in line with 
European policy orientations and were conditions for membership that this government could 
produce where the previous one had failed. On the one hand, the employer associations (TİSK, 
TÜSİAD and TOBB) made strategic uses of EU legal resources when they argued for greater 
flexibility in labor regulation, using the claim that this was the “European Way” of doing 
things and gaining access to the policy-making process. On the other hand, the research shows 
a more limited use of Europe by the union confederations in the reform process.  
The strategies and practices of the DSP-MHP-ANAP government and the AKP 
government illustrate how the strategic and legitimizing uses of Europe allowed the 
governments to negotiate with the corporatist actors and communicate the reforms laws to the 
public. In this process, both governments sought to balance policy seeking and vote seeking 
through the practices of strategic and legitimizing uses of Europe. The main difference 
between the DSP-MHP-ANAP government and the AKP government is related to the level of 
concentrated power that they could count on. The fragmented power of the DSP-MHP-ANAP 
government led to the strategy of Yaşar Okuyan of including the law on job security in the 
2001 NPAA in order to push it through parliament and also to the reform not being 
accomplished until later when both the European Union was supplying more resources. In 
addition, despite the opposition of the more left-wing Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP) to the reform of the labor law, the AKP government had the majority in the 
TBMM and could act more easily.  
The AKP government has negotiated with corporatist actors, making legitimizing use 
of the EU membership in communicating the new labor law. Both governments sought to 
compensate the corporatist actors either by compromises on certain articles of the law or by 
promising changes in other social policy or employment legislation. For example, the strategic 
use of EU legal resources on flexible work arrangements by the employer associations allowed 
them to pressure the AKP government into negotiating some changes in the content of the new 
Labor Act.  
The analysis of the labor law reform process in Chapter IV demonstrates also the 
“creative” uses of EU resources by national actors. This means that these actors, either 
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governmental or corporatist, selectively took up EU resources that were most appropriate for 
their agenda. During the labor law reform process, the AKP government and the employer 
associations focused on EU Directives on flexible working arrangements which were what 
they hoped to extend into Turkish law. Taymaz and Özler (2004 and 2005) conducted a 
detailed legal analysis of changes comparing the previous Labor Act (no. 1475) to the new 
Labor Act (no. 4857) taking the EU package of directives as the comparison criteria. Their 
analysis demonstrates that the new Labor Act corresponds better to the EU directives than the 
previous one. However their analysis also shows that the new Labor Act has serious 
shortcomings with respect to specific aspects of the directives and fails to adopt fully 
European labor standards. Ehmke (2009) reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that certain 
aspects of the new Labor Act are even contrary to some EU directives. Çelik (2004a) argues 
that despite the government and the employer associations’ emphasis on adopting the EU 
directives on flexibility arrangements, the final version of the Labor Act reflects a very 
selective adoption of the EU law, that which most suited the preferences of the government 
and employers.  
The analysis of the Labor Act reform process illustrates how the various uses of 
Europe, either cognitive, strategic or legitimizing, depend on the national actors’ interest and 
coalition-building strategies in the reform process rather than the stage of that process. 
II.b. Reforming the employment agency. Creating the Turkish Employment 
Agency, 1999- 2003 
The restructuring of the Turkish employment agency is also taken up in Chapter IV 
and it is also a process that reveals varied uses of Europe by national actors. The launch of the 
restructuring process was tied to a different reform, that of the unemployment insurance that 
the DSP-ANAP-MHP government introduced in 1999 in combination  with social security 
reform laws (Law No. 4447) after only four months in office. Combining the social security 
reform with unemployment insurance was part of the compensation strategy by the coalition 
government in order to weaken the opposition of the union confederations. Even if the 
contributions to the unemployment insurance regime were to be collected by a new Social 
Security Institution, management of the funds was to be a major responsibility of the new 
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Turkish Employment Agency. In this early phase, the coalition government focused on 
passing the social security reform laws combined with the establishment of unemployment 
insurance because it faced opposition from corporatist actors on several matters.  In October 
2000 it tried to move forward by issuing a decree (No. 617) for the establishment of the 
Turkish Employment Agency but this institutional ploy was blocked. Such a complex 
institutional process to implement the unemployment insurance regime was largely related to 
the reaction of the corporatist actors that had diverging agendas concerning unemployment 
insurance and related restructuring of the employment agency. Considering the fragmented 
power situation, acting by decree seemed to the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government a 
possible obfuscation strategy in order to prevent further parliamentary discussions of the 
controversial dimensions of the reform. However the opposition political parties, specifically 
the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), seized the veto points available by applying to the 
Constitutional Court for the cancellation of Decree no. 617 in 2001. The Court exercised its 
veto, on the grounds that using a decree in these circumstances was inappropriate and 
parliamentary legislation was necessary to set up this new institution. 
In line with the theoretical expectations of neo-institutionalism’ understanding of the 
effects of partisan politics, such obfuscation strategies adopted by a coalition government in 
introducing the controversial reform laws were predictable. They demonstrate as well the 
saliency of the institutional power fragmentation in a parliament with only a coalition 
government and the importance of available of institutional veto points. Following the 
Constitutional Court decision, the Turkish Employment Agency was enfeebled because it 
lacked the necessary legal framework.  
This complex process that created a certain vacuum for the establishment of Turkish 
Employment Agency has also coincided with the larger supply of various EU resources for 
employment policy made available by the Accession Partnership Document and the related 
NPAAs and regular reports. Nonetheless, despite the ample EU resources available to 
complete the restructuring, (re)establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency lost its 
urgency and dropped far down the coalition government’s agenda in 2001.  
The bureaucratic actors of the newly restructured Turkish Employment Agency, facing 
serious financial shortages without a solid legal framework to conduct its activities, however, 
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and despite being somewhat in limbo made extensive cognitive use of EU cognitive and 
political resources for institution-building and for introducing active labor market policies, 
arguing that it needed to develop a national employment strategy in line with the EES and 
implement active labor market policies in line with the EU recommendations during 2002 and 
2003. The cognitive uses by bureaucratic actors were also important in communicating the 
new policy goals of the Turkish Employment Agency to corporatist actors and in setting the 
AKP government agenda for the new policy orientation of the Turkish Employment Agency. 
The AKP government established the Turkish Employment Agency on solid ground 
via legislation this time, making use of both European cognitive and political resources in 
2003. On the one hand, during the parliamentary discussions, the AKP made legitimizing use 
by tying the restructuring the Turkish Employment Agency to the membership conditions. The 
AKP has also made cognitive use, by aligning the reform with the EES during the preparation 
of the laws and mentioning it in the preamble of the reform law. Following the establishment 
of the Turkish Employment Agency, the AKP government claimed credit for modernizing the 
employment agency and services, vaunting them as the modern way to tackle employment 
problems in Turkey, benefiting from the financial assistance provided by the Active Labor 
Market Strategy Programme, appealed to by the bureaucrats of the employment agency. 
The process-tracing analysis of the restructuring of the employment agency is 
indicative of how the various uses of Europe, either cognitive or strategic or legitimizing, 
depend on national actors’ interest and coalition-building strategies in the reform process. The 
cognitive use by bureaucratic actors of European Employment Strategy (EES) and EU policy 
developments, particularly the management cadres of the new Agency, shaped the policy 
orientation of the institution. There was strategic use by the Turkish Employment Agency of 
the financial resources institutionalized for active labor market policies and local delivery of 
employment policies. The AKP government’s legitimizing use of the EU membership 
provided justification for the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, while the 
government also claimed credit for modernization of employment services, represented as the 
way to tackle the unemployment problem with European solutions. Through these practices, 
the AKP government balanced policy seeking and vote seeking motives. 
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II.c. Reforming social security in several phases 
The process of social security reform from 2003 to 2008 traced in Chapter V is 
informative in illustrating the uses of European resources by different national actors such as 
the AKP government, opposition political parties, and corporatist and bureaucratic actors. The 
social security reform was a major modification involving the unification of three social 
security institutions, all with pension and health care components. The most controversial 
aspects of the reform involved the pension component that aimed to increase the retirement 
age and the contribution period. The administrative unification of the three institutions was 
justified by the AKP government using resources from the EU that had long argued for the 
necessity of this unification to achieve cost containment and improve efficiency.  
Both components (pensions and health) affected the benefits and the rights of the union 
confederations and their members. In this regard, these aspects of the social security reform 
have similarities with the social policy reforms analyzed by the new politics literature. 
Obfuscation strategies were employed by the reform team and the AKP government in order 
to ease possible opposition to the parametric changes in the pension component. The division 
strategy adopted by the AKP government to increase the retirement age was such that changes 
would not influence the rights of the current generation of workers, by allowing a transition 
period from 2036 to 2048 for the increases of the retirement age to 65.  
The AKP government aimed to balance policy seeking with vote seeking motives in 
the design of the social security reform. The healthcare component offered improved health 
benefits and services for large segments of the population, including for the members of the 
union confederations. The AKP government’s strategies in practice worked to a certain extent 
to lower the opposition to the reform. However, obfuscating the changes on the parameters of 
the pension component did not work due to a large mobilization of corporatist actors against 
the reform and extensive media coverage that focused on the pension component. 
Although the AKP had a parliamentary majority that allowed high concentration of 
power, this research following the complex and lengthy social security reform process 
demonstrates the saliency of veto-points. One was the Office of the President and the other the 
Constitutional Court. In 2006, the President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, sent the social security 
reform law back to the parliament. Following its passage a second time by the AKP 
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government, President Sezer applied to the Constitutional Court for the abolition of certain of 
the reforms and the Court decided to do so. The decisions triggered at these veto points 
influenced the strategies of the AKP government about the need to negotiate further with 
corporatist actors and change important dimensions of the social security reform.   
In the analysis of uses of Europe in the social security reform process from 2003 to 
2008, the research concentrates first on the bureaucratic actors active in the design of the 
reforms, where some cognitive and legitimizing uses of Europe was present. The 
parliamentary discussion in 2006 and 2008 revealed greater and more varied uses of Europe 
by the AKP government and by the opposition political parties. On the one hand, the members 
of the AKP government made extensive legitimizing use of the political and cognitive 
resources supplied by the EU accession process especially around the parameters of the social 
security reform laws. By emphasizing simultaneously the national dynamics in the 
preparations of the reform and its conformity to the European Social Model, the AKP 
government claimed credit for the successful introduction of the reforms. The AKP 
government sought to justify the reforms by taking European countries’ retirement age and 
contribution time requirements as a point of comparison.  
The strategic use of Europe by AKP government was related on the specific 
parameters of the reform in negotiating with corporatist actors on retirement age or 
contribution period, in order to argue that the changes are in line with the EU member state 
practices and EU standards. Similar strategic use of Europe has been found in the 
parliamentary discussions as well in when arguing against opposition political parties’ 
positions. Finally, the AKP government also practiced blame avoidance by arguing that the 
social security reform was necessary for the EU membership process and aligning standards 
but even more importantly to escape the accusation made by the opposition that they were 
only making the change because of the IMF agreements. This was an argument that was used 
extensively by opposition political parties and anti-reform actors. 
In the parliamentary discussions, the representatives of the opposition political parties 
used Europe, especially by using political and cognitive resources, in order to weaken the 
AKP governments’ legitimizing and strategic efforts. The opposition political parties sought to 
demonstrate the contradictions between the proposed parameters for Turkish pensions with 
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EU standards and the practices in the EU member states. Nevertheless and despite all this back 
and forth on what EU member states “really did,” the AKP government had a parliamentary 
majority in 2006 and 2008 that allowed it to prevail without negotiating further with the 
opposition political parties. 
The AKP government actually focused more on the corporatist arena to negotiate and 
bargain on the specific aspects of the social security reform in order to lower the opposition of 
corporatist actors, including as part of its communication strategy to further public acceptance. 
Employer associations and union confederations that have a pro-EU membership stance such 
as the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu,TİSK), the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Türk 
Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
(Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TÜRK-İŞ) and the Confederation of Turkish Real 
Trade Unions (Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyounu, HAK-İŞ) made quite extensive 
use of Europe in arguing for the social security reform. TÜSİAD and TİSK displayed 
cognitive and strategic uses of EU legal, political and cognitive resources, calling for changes 
in line with the EU standards and norms. The strategic use of EU political and cognitive 
resources by TÜSİAD and TİSK strengthened their negotiating position with the AKP 
government and increased their pressure. In the social security reform process, HAK-İŞ, who 
had changed its position to become more pro-EU after 2002, used strategically and cognitively 
EU resources that increased its access to the policy-making process and engage in negotiations 
with the AKP government. TÜRK-İŞ, who was skeptical of EU membership until 2005, 
involved itself with the strategic use of EU legal and political resources by arguing that the 
reforms were not meeting European standards and rules.  
Other employer associations, such as the Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB), union confederations such 
as the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Senikaları 
Konfederasyonu, DİSK), or professional associations such as Turkish Medical Association 
(Türk Tabibler Birligi, TTB) did not make use of Europe at all. In other words, European 
resources are used only when the association has a pro-EU stance and positive evaluation of 
the EU membership process (Alemdar, 2009).  
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“Creative” uses of EU resources by national actors were also found. Actors chose 
selectively the European resources appropriate for their agenda and made use of Europe when 
it suited their goals.  An example of this selective use, one of many, by the AKP government 
was most visible on the social assistance component of the social security reform.  Although a 
social assistance component had been part of the first draft of the social security proposals, it 
was never brought to the parliament in 2006 or in 2008, despite the presence of such programs 
across the EU and much used to modernize active labor market policies.  
The opposition political parties made selective strategic uses of European resources 
when they identified what they saw as the main differences between the EU and Turkey, in 
terms of demographics, and life expectancy in their efforts to undermine the government’s 
proposals to raise the retirement age and contribution period to levels similar to those in 
member states. The corporatist actors were similarly creative and selective in their uses of 
European resources, as Chapter V documents.  
There are two important findings from this analysis of the uses of Europe in the social 
security reform that require further research. The findings of the research show that the 
strategic uses of Europe by corporatist actors increased their access to the policy process. 
However there is a need for further research to understand exactly how use increases the 
access and to what extent this can be explained or nor by the ways Europe was used.  The 
second finding is on the uses of Europe by bureaucratic actors and state institutions. In the 
process of social security reform, the bureaucratic actors such as the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security and Social Security Institution were involved with the uses of European 
cognitive, legal and financial resources that did not have an immediate impact in the social 
security reform process. However after the reform process, their uses of EU resources led to 
initiation of projects in terms of capacity building of the Social Security Institution and 
aligning with EU acquis. This demonstrates that the bureaucratic actors are key in the 
institutionalization process but further research is needed to understand the dynamics of the 
bureaucratic actors’ uses of Europe.  
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III. Enriching the Uses of Europe approach 
The overall findings of this inductive research on the three reform processes are 
instructive about the utility of mobilizing certain theoretical concepts developed in the welfare 
state change literature and discussed in detail in Chapter I. The review of the three reform 
processes and the case study chapters support the claim that whether Europe is used in a 
cognitive, strategic or legitimizing way depends on the national actors’ interest and coalition-
building strategies. This means that a specific use of Europe can not simply be explained 
according to its occurrence in a certain phase of policy process as suggested by Jacquot and 
Woll (2003) and Woll and Jacquot (2010: 116). Rather analysis must consider carefully the 
strategies and practices of domestic actors and their interactions in the political and corporatist 
arena.  
Secondly, this research demonstrates the utility of integrating certain concepts 
developed in the welfare state literature drawing on the findings of the research on formal 
institutions, policy legacies and partisan politics. In the three reform processes, the 
institutional rules of law making and the existence of veto points that shaped the power 
concentration or fragmentation of the executive branch were important factors for fully 
understanding the reform dynamics. The veto points represented by the Constitutional Court 
and the Office of the President were very important in the process, both shaping the content of 
the reform and constraining the actors. The observed results and the processes and strategies 
followed in good part from the exercise of these vetoes as well as the threat of their use. 
Fragmented power in the executive branch was also key. On the one hand, the fragmented 
power under the coalition governments obliged coalition partners to negotiate with each other, 
but not all differences over, for example, the accession process could be bridged.  This created 
a particular context shaping the strategies of the governmental actors, especially in their 
negotiation with corporatist actors. The power concentration under the AKP majority 
government created a quite different context, constraining and shaping more the strategies of 
the opposition political parties and the corporatist actors. Using the tools of formal 
institutionalism revealed the weight of institutional characteristics of the law making process 
in Turkey, which shapes any use of Europe at all.  
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The formal institutional tools also helped to understand the question with which the 
thesis began: why the social policy reforms occurred in the post-2001 period despite being on 
the governments’ agenda since the 1990’s. This question on the timing of the social policy 
reforms and the absence of change in social policy during the 1990’s is largely explained by 
the power fragmentation under coalition governments and partisan veto points as well as 
constitutional the veto points inserted by the 1982 Constitution. The disagreements among the 
coalitional partners in several instances illustrated partisan veto points. While in the post-2001 
period the AKP had a parliamentary majority it still faced institutional veto points in the form 
of Constitutional Court and the Office of the President during the three social policy 
processes. This difference with respect to power fragmentation during the 1990’s and 
concentration in the post-2001 period is important in explaining partly the timing of the 
reform. However without considering the politics of the social policy reform processes and the 
combination of national and international conditions including the EU membership process, it 
would not have been possible to fully explain the policy change. 
The process-tracing analysis of the reforms of the labor law , the social security system 
and the restructuring of the employment agency also demonstrated that policy legacies were 
important in constraining the policy choices of domestic actors. The reformers all had to 
contend with the dominant insurance-based policy approach in the social security system 
including the healthcare component, with the normative assumptions of the labor regulation 
considering the rights and obligations of the industrial workers and job matching and with the 
long-standing placement function of the employment agency. None of these reforms, despite 
the availability of alternative models in Europe, departed fully from this legacy. For instance, 
the insurance based social security system still provides coverage according to employment 
status, even though the macro reform in 2008 has equalized the differences among 
occupationally defined groups and introduced means-tested coverage for the healthcare.  
The theoretical tools adopted from the literature on partisan politics serve to fully grasp 
the picture of the reform processes. The findings indicate the policy seeking and vote seeking 
motives of the governmental actors that aimed to find a balance during the reform processes. 
In order to do so, they employed various strategies such as obfuscation, division, and 
compensation to deflect opposition. Moreover the governmental actors used blame avoidance 
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and credit claiming practices in the social policy reform. Thus these conceptual tools were 
helpful to understand better how national actors’ strategies shaped their uses of Europe. The 
process-tracing also found that particularistic political competition could well describe social 
policy preferences of both right-wing and left-wing parties with respect to the social security 
system during the 1990s. The particularistic characteristic of political party competition on 
social policy issues is apparent in the politics of three reform processes, as part of the vote 
seeking motives. This could explain for instance why Yaşar Okuyan from the ANAP, the 
right-wing coalition partner, insisted on the enactment of a law on job security, following the 
negotiations with union confederations. The AKP’s social policy concerns reflected also a 
certain vote seeking logic in combining the reforms in various combinations that would 
benefit diverse groups or why healthcare reform was undertaken so as to improve the coverage 
and extend benefits, thereby also allowing AKP government to claim credit.  
Integrating the theoretical tools and concepts from the welfare state literature about 
formal institutions, policy legacies and partisan politics improves substantially the Uses of 
Europe approach when the goal is to understand theoretically how welfare state reforms were 
designed and to explain the complex factors that shaped the uses of European resources.  
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